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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines the role of the Japanese police during the 
American Occupation of Japan (1945-52), highlighting the problems 
tha t attended reform of this key institu tion. It contends tha t there 
was tension between the commitment to  democratise the police on 
the one hand and the decision to  engage in an indirect  Occupation on 
the other. Emphasis on the ambivalence o f US policy, mirrored by 
divisions w ith in GHQ, SCAP, helps to  explain the discrepancy 
between the professed aims of police reform and its actual results.
Parallels are drawn between the prew ar/w artim e police and its 
postwar counterpart, particularly with regard to  the range of duties 
undertaken and the attitude of the police towards ordinary Japanese. 
Historical legacies stretching back to  the beginning o f the Meiji 
period and beyond are juxtaposed w ith  the ideas o f American 
reformers, determined to  circumscribe the role of the police and to  
dissolve its ties w ith the Japanese establishment. Both aims were 
d ifficu lt to  achieve, it is argued, amidst widespread socio-economic 
dislocation, typ ified by a thriving black market. Elucidation of the 
sym biotic relationship between prominent black marketeers and the 
police points up the la tte r's  financial problems. It is suggested tha t 
these were compounded by decentralisation of the police system in 
1948.
Drawing on the memoranda, le tters and reports o f reform ers in 
Tokyo and administrators in the field, the thesis concludes tha t the 
Japanese police resisted reform, taking strength from deeply-rooted 
trad itions and benefiting from the Occupation's decision to  opt for 
indirect rule. The police institution was too im portant an agency to  
be overhauled in the firs t two years of the Occupation, and when 
structura l reorganisation was finally pushed through in 1948 it was 
sabotaged by the Japanese government. In sum, this study sheds 
ligh t on the lim ita tions  o f the Occupation, the du rab ility  o f 
traditional forms and institutions and the basic continuity be tw een 
the prewar and postwar periods.
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JAPANESE WORDS AND NAMES
Japanese words are romanized according to  the modified Hepburn 
system. Long vowels are indicated by circumflexes, except in the 
case of capitals where they have been om itted for technical reasons. 
Likewise, they do not appear in such well-known place names as 
Tokyo and Kyoto.
The usual conventions concerning Japanese names are observed 
throughout the thesis (ie. the family name is followed by the given 
name). However, the order is reversed for Japanese scholars writing 
in English (eg. Tetsuo Najita).
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INTRODUCTION
The role o f the Japanese police during the American Occupation of 
Japan (1 9 4 5 -5 2 ) is surprisingly a neglected su b je c t am ongst 
Western historians. This can be explained in large part by general 
attitudes towards both the study of the Occupation itse lf and the 
police as an institution. In the case of the former there has been too 
much concentration on the various factors tha t informed US policy­
making, and too little  interest in the impact o f reform. A tendency 
to  dwell on the bigger picture, to  emphasize the contribution of 
particular individuals, has led to  neglect o f more mundane, but 
u ltim a te ly  more im portan t, issues. This thesis contends th a t 
survival rather than democracy was the principal aim o f m o s t 
Japanese. The key was the black market rather than a new basic law. 
Yet we have litt le  sense of the form er's pervasiveness and its  
impact on political and social relations. Study of the police, spread 
as they were throughout Japan, draws attention to  the black market 
together w ith its principal constituency - the Japanese people. We 
discover what they were doing through the activ ities o f th o s e  
officials with whom they had most contact.
The police are examined in this thesis from several angles - from 
the very d iffe ren t perspectives o f the Occupation, the Japanese 
government and the Japanese people. A comprehensive approach is 
necessitated by the absence of any rigorous, detailed studies o f the 
police during the Occupation period. This deficiency is explicable in 
term s o f a wider pattern of neglect - for a variety o f reasons 
historians seem reluctant to  focus their a tten tion  on the police, 
regardless of the country or period under examination. D. H. Bayley, 
an authority on police systems, seeks to  explain "the  discrepancy 
between the importance of the police in social life and the amount 
o f a tten tion  given them by scholars". Disregard for policing, he 
argues, may derive from its association with "forces o f control, of 
conservatism, of the status quo". More interestingly, he suggests 
th a t "police are rarely im portan t actors in great h is to r ic a l 
even ts ....The ir a c tiv itie s  are too  routine, the ir presence too
pervasive, and the ir clientele too ordinary to  be the s tu ff o f high 
political drama".!
It is precisely for these reasons tha t they are so im portant during 
the Occupation. "High political drama" - the machinations of a 
Yoshida or a Willoughby - must not be allowed to  dominate the 
historical landscape. Just as im portant were the p e tty  struggles 
that represented the real s tu ff of life for most people. By focusing 
on the police - the interface between government and governed - 
this thesis draws a tten tion  to  developments at all levels of the 
Occupation. It supplements existing lite ra tu re  on the Japanese 
police and, indirectly, general studies o f the institu tion  itself. More 
im portantly, however, it contributes to  an understanding o f the 
Occupation of Japan, adopting a different kind of vantage point in the 
hope tha t features hitherto obscured will stand out in sharp relief.
Studies of the Police in Japan and Elsewhere
Recent analyses of the prewar police have not generated sequels. 
Thanks to  the e fforts o f Richard Mitchell  ^ and Elise Tipton, 3 much 
is now known about the imperial police and the legal fram ework 
within which they operated. The notion of a "police s ta te " - its 
applicability to  prewar Japan - has been examined by both authors, 
Tipton accepting the term  only a fter redefinition,^ Mitchell opting 
for elaboration ("paternalistic police s ta te ").^  Whilst these studies 
concentrate on the interwar period, James Leavell and Eleanor 
Westney have focused on the origins o f the modern police system, 
the form er exploring the "trans ition  from  Tokugawa to  Meiji"
! D. H. Bayley, Patterns of Policing (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 
1985) pp.5-6.
2 R. H. Mitchell: Thought Control in Prewar Japan (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
N.Y., 1976); Censorship in Imperial Japan (Princeton University Press, N.J., 1983); 
Janus-Faced Justice: Political Criminals in Imperial Japan (University of Hawaii 
Press, Honolulu, 1992).
3 E. K. Tipton, The Japanese Police State: The Tokkô in Interwar Japan (Athlone Press, 
London, 1991).
"Prior to the 1930s ('police state') was the translation of Polizeistaat. a neutral 
technical term used to designate the type of 'regulative state' that emerged on the 
European continent during the eighteenth century" (p. 14). Thus, she uses the term to 
describe a tightly controlled state under an absolute monarch.
3 Mitchell, Janus-Faced, p.xvi.
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(c . 1 8 5 3 -7 6 ) ,6  the la tte r assessing the re lative im portance o f 
Western models and indigenous in fluences / Westney examines the 
postal system and newspapers as well as the police, investigating 
each institu tion w ith reference to  "cross-societal em ulation". Her 
seventy page chapter represents the only substantial analysis of the 
Meiji police w ritten in English. In marked contrast to  the interwar 
period, the years before World War One and immediately after World 
War Two have been largely disregarded as far as the police are 
concerned. The Occupation period does not even merit a chapter in a 
book.
English-language studies of the postwar police firs t appeared in the 
1 9 7 0 s .8 W ritten  by American social sc ien tis ts  they generally 
reflected admiration for Japan's success in reducing  crime in th e  
face o f increasing urbanization.9 D. H. Bayley places Japan's police 
system  w ith in a comparative framework, analysing the cultural, 
social and p o litica l de te rm inan ts  o f police w ork and its  
effectiveness. Detailed studies of the police systems of India, US 
and J a p a n , ! 0 together with periods of research in Britain, France and 
Norway, culminated in a comparative work tha t examines "re la tions 
between police and society - the ways in which each affects the 
o th e r".! 1 Although Bayley provides a useful theoretica l/conceptua l 
framework, his analysis of the historical developm ent o f Japan's 
police system is sketchy. Other relevant tex ts  by Walter Ames and 
Craig Parker examine police-community relations w ith litt le  regard
G J. B. Leavell, "The Development of the Modern Japanese Police: Transition from  
Tokugawa to Meiji", Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, 1975.
 ^ D. E. Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organisational 
Patterns to Meiii Japan (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1987).
9 D. H. Bayley, Forces of Order: Police Behaviour in Japan and the United States 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1976); W. L. Ames, "Police and Community 
in Japan", Ph.D. dissertation. University of Michigan, 1976 ( Police and Communitv in 
Japan. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1981).
9 E. F. Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (Charles E. Tuttle, Tokyo,
1 9 7 9 ) pp .204-22 .
! 0 D. H. Bayley: The Police and Political Development in India (Princeton University 
Press, 1969); Forces of Order. D. Bayley and H. Mendelsohn, Minorities and the Police 
(Free Press, New York, 1969).
! ! D. H. Bayley, Patterns of Policing, p.3.
1 1
fo r historical legacies.i  ^ in fairness to  them all, the ir subject is 
police studies rather than Japanese history. Nevertheless, the ir 
conclusions are still important for the student o f Occupation Japan. 
As Bayley explains, "the police are not self-created; they are tied to  
the social units from which they derive au tho rity ". These social 
units survived the shocks o f defeat and Occupation - the way they 
functioned during the Occupation would not have been very different 
from the way they function today.
Comparison w ith other countries th a t were occupied a fte r the 
Second World War may reveal some general tru ths about the impact 
of defeat and Occupation on an indigenous police force. Were other 
police systems as durable as tha t o f Japan? Are there features 
peculiar to  police organisation tha t make it impervious to  change? 
In Germany and Korea, both subject to  d irect rule by the Allied 
powers, indigenous police forces were ne ither supplanted nor 
transformed.T 3 With regard to  the British zone in West Germany the  
Foreign Office regarded a reliable police force as an essential 
"instrument of Military Government". As a result, "the German police 
force was (only) half d e n a z if ie d " . In  the case of South Korea, the 
American chief o f the Police Division saw no reason why policem en 
trained by the Japanese should not be retained: "We fe lt that if they 
did a good job for the Japanese, they would do a good job for us. It 
would be unfair to  drive men trained by the Japanese out o f the 
fo r c e " . !5 Given tha t the Occupation o f Japan was "ind irect" - the 
Japanese Government was responsible for im plem enting American 
directives - it can be supposed tha t the Japanese police was even 
less susceptible to  reform than its Korean and German counterparts. 
All three were conforming to  a general pattern identified by Bayley:
! 2 w. L. Ames, Police and Communitv: L. C. Parker, The Japanese Police System Today: 
An American Perspective (Kodansha, Tokyo,1987).
! 3 Another interesting case is that of Italy. See D. W. Ellwood, Italy 1 9 4 3 -1 9 4 5  
(Leicester University Press, 1985).
! 4 A. Kramer, ’"Law-abiding Germans'? Social Disintegration, Crime and the 
Reimposition of Order in Postwar Western Germany, 1945-9", in R. J. Evans, ed.. The 
German Underworld (Routledge, London, 1988) p.254.
! 5 M. Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981 ) p .391.
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Police systems exhibit an enormous inertial strength over time; their 
forms endure even across the divides of war, violent revolution and 
shattering economic and social change J®
The Japanese Police and the American Occupation 
English-language studies of the Japanese police during the American 
Occupation are confined to  a few articles in periodicals’l l  and one 
short piece in a collection of e s s a y s These sketch in the outlines 
of the pre-surrender police, discuss the impact o f the Occupation 
and then highlight the re trea t from decentralisation. There is a 
sense in which the Occupation is nothing more than a tem porary 
irritation for the Japanese police, an interlude between defeat and 
reconsolidation. The s tr ic t division between local and national 
ju risd ic tions, formalized in 1948, barely lasted three years. "A 
succession o f leg is la tive  revisions beginning in 1951 and 
culm inating in 1 9 5 4 ,....succeeded in recentra lis ing the police 
s y s t e m . . . . " . ! 9  Developments a ffec ting  the police are generally 
examined in the light o f the Police Law of December 1 947. This is in 
keeping with most studies of the Occupation, Japanese and American 
scholars preferring to  examine the process of policy formation - the 
influences tha t informed it - rather than the more mundane business
of adm inistration.20
!0  D. H. Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe", in C. Tilly, ed.. The 
Formation of National States in Europe (Princeton University Press, 1975) p.370.
17 R. J. D. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", Far Eastern Survev. Vol.18, No.2 
(2 4 /1 /4 9 )  pp.17-22; H. Nakahara, "The Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law. 
Criminoloov and Police Science. Vol.46, No.4 (Nov.-Dee. 1955) pp .583-594; H. E. 
Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law. Criminoloov and 
Police Science. Vol.43, No.5 (Jan.-Feb. 1953) pp.655-671.
18 s. Sugai, "The Japanese Police System" in R. E. Ward, ed.. Five Studies in Japanese 
Politics (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1957) pp.1-14.
19 J. w. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shiqeru and the Japanese Experience. 
1 878-1  954  (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1988) p.347.
20 Nakahara, Sugai and Wildes all concentrate on the Police Law and its subsequent 
revision. Articles in Japanese tend to focus on divisions within GHQ concerning police 
reorganisation; Takemae Eiji, "Sengo Keisatsu no Seiritsu Katei", Chûô Kôron (May 
1975), pp.190-202; Yoshikawa Jun, "Keisatsu Kaikaku - Minsei Kyoku (GS) Kôan Ka 
(PSD/CIS) no Tairitsu o ChOshin ni", Hôoaku Semina Zôkan. Gendai no Keisatsu (Oct.
1980); Miura Yôichi, "Senryôka Keisatsu Kaikaku no Ichi Danmen: 1947-nen 9-gatsu 
16-nichi Makkâsâ Shokan no Seiritsu Katei", Rekishiqaku Kenkvû. 498  (Nov.1981 ), 
pp. 35-51 .
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The most recent study of the Occupation period by Richard Finn 2i 
typ ifie s  the tendency among Western historians to  focus on 
individuals - in this case MacArthur and Yoshida - w ith a view to  
assessing the ir relative importance. A t the same tim e they seem 
concerned to  highlight and explain the changing balance of pow er 
between Washington and Tokyo and its e ffects  on policy-making. 
Finn's book is atypical in the sense that it surveys the Occupation as 
a whole rather than examining a specific aspect,22 but its principal 
conclusions can be located in a well-established historiographical 
framework. Finn describes "waves of reform " and then moves on to  
the evolution o f "new policies and new d irections", indicating 
acceptance o f the conventional outline o f the Occupation - a 
progressive phase followed by a period o f reassessment. The la tte r 
is described as a "second phase" or, less charitably, as a "reverse 
course", depending on the politics of the writer. Regardless o f th e  
designation chosen, this change of direction cannot be ignored. The 
police were affected by it as were other im portant actors in the 
Occupation drama (eg. the labour unions, the za ibatsu. conservative 
p o litic ia n s ).
Justin Williams dismisses the concept o f a reverse course as "th a t 
idée fixe o f sym pathizers w ith radical socialism in Japan.. . . " , 2  3 
whereas John Dower incisively defines it as "the sh ift o f Occupation 
priorities from democratization of a former enemy to  reconstruction  
of a fu tu re  cold-war a lly ...".24 D ivergent views, representing  
"o rthodox" and "revis ion ist" schools o f in te rp re ta tion , tend to
21 R. B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur. Yoshida and Postwar Japan (University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1992).
22 For example, H. Baerwald, The Purge of Japanese Leaders Under the Occupation 
(University of California Press, Berkeley, 1959); R. P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan 
(Oxford University Press, 1959); M. S. Farley, Aspects of Japan's Labour Problems 
(John Day, New York, 1950); Takemae Eiji, Amerika Tainichi Rôdô Seisaku no Kenkvû 
(Nihon Hyôronsha, Tokyo, 1970); T. Nishi, Unconditional Democracv: Education and 
Politics in Occupied Japan (1 9 4 5 - 5 2 )  (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 
Cal.,1982); A. C. Oppler, Legal Reform in Occupied Japan: A Participant Looks Back 
(Princeton University Press, N.J., 1976).
23 J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur: A Participant's Account 
(University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1979) p.208.
24 J. Dower, "Reform and Reconsolidation" in H. Wray and H. Conroy, ed., Japan  
Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese Historv (University of Hawaii Press, 
Honolulu, 1983 ) p.347.
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obscure a common focal point, namely p o l i c y  - the principal 
participants in its creation together w ith its various determ inants. 
The orthodox line tends to  concentrate on early social and political 
reforms, equating the passage of progressive legislation with benign 
motives on the part o f the A m e r i c a n s . 2 5  Concluding his book on a 
positive note, Finn encapsulates the orthodox interpretation:
Whatever historians say about "feudal survivals" or "reverse course", 
few people would disagree that Japan today is democratic, peaceful and 
prosperous. This is the kind of Japan Americans wanted, and Japanese 
eagerly cooperated. It is not too much to say...that the peace that followed 
the Pacific War in 1945 resulted in victory for both the US and J a p a n . 6^
Revisionists, however, reject the "American Altruism  Abroad School 
of postwar Japanese h i s t o r y " , 2 7  iden tify ing  US economic and 
s tra teg ic  in terests as the principal determ inants o f p o l i c y . 2 8  The 
"reverse course" and "feudal survivals" figure  prom inently in 
revisionist accounts, indicating little  regard for positive appraisals 
o f e ither the aims or achievements o f the Occupation. In s h o rt. 
Occupation policies are regarded as at best ambivalent, at worst as 
clear indicators of US determination to  use Japan for its own ends. 
This thesis contributes to  the policy debate by examining the 
Occupation's original intentions with regard to  the police (C hapte r 
Two). Moreover, it  draws a tten tion to  the factional struggles - 
within both GHQ and the Japanese government - over such questions 
as the comprehensiveness of the purge programme and the extent of 
structura l decentralisation (Chapters Two and Six respectively). The
25 Examples include R. E. Ward, "Reflections on the Allied Occupation and Planned 
Political Change in Japan", in R. E. Ward, ed., Political Development in Modern Japan 
(Princeton University Press, N.J., 1968); G. K. Goodman, ed.. The American Occupation 
of Japan: A Retrospective View (Centre for East Asian Studies, University of Kansas, 
Lawrence, 1968).
26 Finn. Winners. p.316.
2 7  J .  Dower, "The Superdomino in Postwar Asia: Japan In and Out of The Pentagon 
Papers", in N. Chomsky and H. Zinn, eds., The Senator Gravel Edition of the Pentagon 
Papers Vol.5 (Beacon Press, Boston, Mass., 1972) p .113.
28 Works that stress the international context of the Occupation and the role of U.S. 
economic/strategic aims include: J. Dower, "Occupied Japan and the American Lake, 
1945-50", in E. Friedman and M. Selden, eds., America's Asia: Dissenting Essavs on 
Asian-American Relations (Pantheon, New York, 1 9 7 1 ) pp. 146-206; Joyce and 
Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policv. 1 945- 
54 (Harper and Row, New York, 1972); M. Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: 
The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (Oxford University Press, New York, 1985).
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decision to  break up the centralised police system and the problems 
tha t attended fragmentation reveal much about the motor o f reform  
- the Occupation headquarters - and the context o f reform - the 
Japanese social environment. Whilst the form er's s tructure  served 
to  complicate the process of policy-formation (and implementation), 
the la tte r proved resistant to  change. Social a ttitudes and patterns 
of interaction, regarded by many reformers as "feudal", became more 
entrenched in the face of economic dislocation.
The Occupation Structure
Personality clashes and ju risd ic tiona l rivalries led to  constan t 
bickering among those who had an interest in police reform. Various 
sections, particularly Government Section (GS) and General S ta ff 
Section G-2 (In te lligence), the la tte r form ally responsib le fo r 
"public safe ty", regarded the police as o f vital importance for the 
realisation of Occupation objectives. Whereas GS saw the police in 
negative terms - as an obstacle to  democratization - G-2 stressed 
the importance of effective law enforcement in the face o f serious 
social dislocation. These divergent a ttitudes arose from differing 
rem its and conflicting political perspectives. Moreover, overlapping 
ju rsd ic tions , particu larly  noticeable in the case o f the police, 
invited in ter-sectional hostility . In short, the progress o f reform 
was impeded by the poor design o f its engine - the Occupation 
headquarters was assembled from parts th a t did not f i t  well 
together.
The principal flaw was the coexistence o f civilian and m il ita ry  
organisations, GHQ SCAR29 and GHQ AFPAC^o (later FEC) respectively. 
Physically combined in Tokyo, they represented the key components 
o f a rather awkward structure produced by surprises more th a n  
anything else - surprise at the premature end of the war and 
surprise at the cooperative a ttitude  o f the Japanese fo llow ing 
surrender. The Military Government Section of GHQ, US AFPAC was 
"formally activated" on August 5, 1945, only to  be deactivated at the
29 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. See Figure 1.
29 General Headquarters, (US) Army Forces Pacific. FEC - Far East Command. See 
Figure 2.
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beginning o f October. Its function was never clearly defined, "the 
main d ifficu lty  (arising) from the fac t th a t the role of m ilitary 
government had been planned in terms of an invasion, or at least in 
term s o f the assum ption o f d irect con tro l o f the  Japanese 
goverm ental machinery at all levels".31 The decision to  use the 
Japanese emperor and the government he dignified resulted in 
"guidance" by American civilians and "supervision" by their m ilita ry  
counterparts. Whilst the former was undertaken by GHQ, SCAP, the 
la tte r involved GHQ, AFPAC.
However, the division of responsibility was not as neat as implied. 
In October, 1945, the Military Government Section was replaced by 
ten  special s ta f f  sec tio ns ,32 c o n s titu e n t pa rts  o f General 
Headquarters o f the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. A t 
the same time, however, GHQ SCAP "included the general and some 
special s ta ff sections o f GHQ US AFPAC, which served in a dual 
c a p a c ity " .33 One such section was G-2, whose residual m ilitary 
respons ib ilities  included in te lligence and secu rity . Its SCAP 
equivalent was the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), set up to  "advise 
on policies related to  civil public safety agencies...".34 it seems that 
these overlapping jurisdictions produced some confusion, evidenced 
by shortlived administrative changes during the firs t half o f 1946. 
On 3rd May CIS ceased to  be a special s ta ff section, its fu n c tio n s  
and responsibilities taken up by G-2. A little  over four months later, 
on 29 August, the section was reactivated with the Assistant Chief 
of Staff, G-2, as its head.35
These changes suggest tha t in the case o f the Japanese police th e  
d is tin c tio n  between m ilita ry  and non -m ilita ry  in te re s ts  was
31 A. D. Bouterse, P. H. Taylor and A. A. Maass, "American Military Government 
Experience in Japan" in C. J. Friedrich, ed., American Exoeriences in Military 
Government in World War Two (Rinehart, New York, 1948) p.335.
32 Economic and Scientific Section ; Civil Information and Education Section ; Natural 
Resources Section ; Public Health and Welfare Section; Government Section; Statistical 
and Reports Section; Civil Communications Section; Legal Section; Civil Intelligence 
Section; Office of General Procurement Agent (Bouterse, Taylor and Maass, p.337).
33 SCAP, Historv of the Non-Militarv Activities of the Occupation of Japan (Tokyo, 
1950 -1951 ) Monograph 2 (Administration of the Occupation), p.29.
34 Ibid.. p.35
35 Ibid.
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blurred. Whilst there was a commitment to  démocratisation of the 
c iv i l  police, there was also a sense o f Japan's vu lne rab ility  
fo llow ing the dism antlem ent o f her war machine, a feeling in 
certa in circles th a t exceptional c ircum stances m ight ju s t ify  a 
m ilita ry-sty le  police force. Thus, the in te rests  o f the Japanese 
police were p ro tected  by G-2, whose members harboured the 
m ilitary's dislike o f instability and revolutionary upheaval. In short, 
they were determined to  err on the side o f caution. G-2/CIS tended 
to  be s ta ffed  by soldiers, whose politica l views were generally 
conservative or reactionary. This tendency was typ ified  by Major 
General Charles A. Willoughby, the head o f G-2, who warmed to  the 
likes o f Mussolini and Franco. The American h istorian, Michael 
Schaller, gives us the following profile:
A German-born immigrant with pretensions of noble birth, Willoughby 
brought a Prussian demeanour and extremely right-wing views to his 
intelligence post. MacArthur hit the mark when he once called his aide 
"my lovable fascist". Willoughby saw Communist and Jewish conspiracies 
at home, abroad, and especially in SCAP's ranks.
W illoughby's principal sparring partner was Brigadier General 
Courtney Whitney, the head of Government Section. The la tte r stood 
in marked contrast to  G-2. The product o f a novel creation, GS 
epitomised the crusading mission of GHQ, SCAP. Unlike G-2, there 
were no residual m ilita ry  functions, and li t t le  regard fo r the 
soldier's sense of insecurity, even paranoia, vis à vis the Occupation. 
Charged w ith  reform ing "the  internal s tru c tu re  o f the c iv i l 
governm ent o f Japan", Government Section sought to  prom ote 
decentralisation of political power, to  fos te r local r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 37 
In short, GS's reformers were determined to  politicise the Japanese 
people, to  convince them that they had rights tha t government could 
not infringe.
Members o f GS embraced the opportunity to  remake Japan, to  teach 
her the lessons of American democracy. W hitney's deputy, Charles 
Kades, was regarded as "the  epitom e o f the brainy, liberal
36 M. Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1989) p.1 21.
37 Historv of the Non-Militarv Activities. M.2, p.39.
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A m e r i c a n " 3 8  com m itted  to  the dém ocratisation o f Japan. His 
lieutenants - Guy Swope (head of National Government Division, GS) 
and Cecil Tilton (chief of Local Government Division, GS) amongst 
others - used a politica l vocabulary qu ite d iffe ren t from  the ir 
opponents in G-2/CIS. Whilst they warned of the dangers posed by a 
strong, centralised police force - namely "the ruthless liquidation of 
opposing elements"39 - the head of G-2/CIS's Public Safety Division, 
Colonel H. E. Pulliam, warned against turning "the nation over to  the 
pinks and r e d s " . 4 0  other sections had a view on the subject, the 
Economic and Scientific Section, for example, voicing concerns over 
the financial implications of drastic decentralisation.
A t the risk of oversimplification, the conflicting positions of GS and 
G-2/CIS reflected the divergent views of civilians and soldiers, or, 
more interestingly, o f liberals and conservatives. According to  one 
reformer, Robert Texto^^ i "the 'liberals'.... tended to  be people who 
had m atured po litica lly  during the Roosevelt period, and who 
endorsed the broad humanitarian and equity goals of the New D e a l " . 4 2  
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru distinguished between "realists" and 
"idea lis ts" like Kades, "en lis t(ing) the support o f SCAP's fanatic 
anti-communists against its 'New D ea le rs '. . . . " . ^ 3  According to  Textor, 
liberal Occupationnaires active ly pursued ambitious goals, w h ilst 
their more conservative counterparts "were more inclined to  regard 
pro-change Japanese as Communist or pro-Communist", p re ferring
Finn, Winners, p.87.
39 GS Memo dated 1 2 /4 /4 7 ; For: The Deputy Chief, GS; Subject: Reorganisation of the 
Japanese Police System Submitted by the PSD; From: G. Swope [National Diet Library: 
fiche GS(B) 02306 ].
40 CIS, G-2, PSD; Memo dated 2 4 /3 /4 7 ; Subject: Conference - Reorganisation of and 
Increase in Strength of the Japanese Police (NDL: fiche G-2 00247).
41 Robert Textor served in two capacities during the Occupation - first, in the 1 Corps 
area around Kyoto, as a Civil Information and Education Officer (1 9 46 -7 ), then as a 
member of the Wakayama Military Government Team (1947 -8 ).
42 R. Textor, "Success in Japan - Despite Some Human Foibles and Cultural Problems" 
in W. Nimmo, ed., The Occupation of Japan: The Grass Roots (MacArthur Memorial, 
Norfolk, Va., 1992) p.1 58. The resonance of the New Deal in Occupation Japan is 
examined in T. Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal (Free 
Press, New York, 1987).
43 J. w. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience. 
1 878-1 954  (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1988) p.295.
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" to  build up conservative elements....(to) serve as a bulwark against 
the spread of Communism in A s i a " . ^ 4
W illoughby's G-2 was at the fo re fro n t o f the fig h t against 
Communism. His principal instrument was the Counter In te lligence 
Corps (CIC), "which spied on Americans and cu ltiva ted  form er 
members of Japan's secret police and armed forces".^^ Although the 
CIC were th in ly spread throughout Japan, the ir presence caused 
disquiet amongst liberal-minded Americans working in the field. 
Thus, there were clashes over reform at all levels of the Occupation, 
the skirmishes in the localities sometimes proving as b itte r as the 
battles tha t took place in GHQ. Rather than focusing on either  the 
local or the national dimension of the Occupation, this thesis seeks 
to  weld the two together, to  illuminate their interrelationship.
The contours of "m ilita ry  gove rnm en t", or more accura te ly  
m ilita ry /c iv ilia n  s u p e r v i s i o n , ^ 6  are less well known than those of 
GHQ, SCAP. Those in the field can basically be classified according 
to  three types: counter intelligence agents; m ilitary governm ent 
officials; and tactical troops. The former acted as G-2's field units, 
receiving instructions from and reporting directly to  their seniors in 
intelligence. In marked contrast, m ilitary government officia ls were 
assigned to  one of 35 prefectural military government teams or one 
o f eight regional teams. Depending on the ir location, they took 
orders from one of two Corps HQ (I Corps in Kyoto or IX Corps in 
Sendai), which occupied a level immediately below Eighth Army 
Headquarters in Yokohama (See Figure 3, p.19). The la tte r liaised 
with GHQ, SCAP, passing on MGT reports to  the relevant section, and 
then channelling instructions or advice back down to  the field units. 
This five-layered structure ^7 was extremely cumbersome, leading 
to  fru s tra tio n  am ongst m ilita ry  governm ent o ffic ia ls  and an 
increasing willingness on the ir part to  act u n i l a t e r a l l y . ^ ^  As far as 
the tactica l troops were concerned, they were suffic iently rem oved
R. Textor, "Success in Japan....", p.1 58.
M. Schaller, Douglas MacArthur. p.121.
The local dimension is examined in detail in Chapter 5.
47 The five layers, in descending order, were as follows: GHQ, 8th Army HQ Corps HQ 
Region, MGT.
48 In Textor's words, to "guide and assist" rather than "observe and report".
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from the Japanese people as to  make such active in te rven tion  
improbable. Their role was, for the most part, a passive one - they 
represented the potential enforcement arm o f GHQ, SCAP, to  be 
actively employed only in the event of widespread disobedience or 
resistance. In August 1947, the ratio o f tactica l troops to  CIC 
agents and military government officials was roughly 30:1.49
As well as there being local and national dimensions to  the 
American Occupation, there was also of course an international one. 
Such organisations as the Far Eastern Commission (PEC) or the 
Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) qualified, albeit to  a very lim ite d  
ex ten t, the notion o f an exc lus ive ly  Am erican O ccupation. 
Established outside Japan - in Washington - the EEC comprised 
representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, China, 
Britain, Australia, Canada, France, India, the Netherlands, N ew  
Zealand and the P h il ip p in e s .A lth o u g h  the com m ission was 
accorded an active policy-making role, in practice "activ ities were 
largely confined to  approving policies long a fte r the ir execution".^ i 
Operating within Japan and representing the interests o f the United 
States, China, the British Commonwealth and the Soviet Union, the 
ACJ assumed an active advisory role, challenging Occupation policy 
on a number of occasions. In January 1949, for example, the Russian 
representative alleged th a t "the  Japanese police force secretly 
(was) being expanded into a revived a r m y " . 52
The Occupation's international context lies outside the scope of this 
thesis, hardly impinging at all. What is being exam ined is 
spec ifica lly  dom estic  in o rien ta tion  - the  s tru c tu re  o f the 
Occupation and the degree to  which it influenced the reform of the 
police. In th is  section GFIQ's s truc tu ra l problems have been 
investigated, w ith a view to  understanding its  schizophrenic 
character. Flowever, in order to  fully understand the impact,  rather 
than ju s t the process, of police reform, the recipient o f Occupation
49 Analysis of Population, Military and Police Strength by Prefecture, dated 2 9 /8 /4 7  
(NDL: G-2 0 27 7 6 ).
50 Burma and Pakistan became members in November 1949.
51 G. Daniels, "Nationalist China in the Allied Council; Policies Towards Japan, 1946- 
52", in The Hokkaido Law Review. Vol.27, No.2 (Nov. 1976), p. 337.
52 Stars and Stripes (5 /1 /4 9 ) .
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policy must be examined - ie. the Japanese police and the social 
environment in which they operated.
Police and Society
From the tim e o f its establishment in the early Meiji period, the 
Japanese police developed within a social structure  tha t many in 
GHQ, SCAP found d ifficu lt to  fathom. The principle o f kanson minpi 
(meaning "respect for officialdom, contempt for the people") placed 
policemen above the people, affording the form er a privileged 
position at the expense o f the la tte r. This was something th a t 
American reformers sought to  overturn, determined as they were to 
weaken the Japanese propensity for hierarchy. The intention was to  
loosen some of the bonds of Japanese society, to  free people from 
some of the constraints, in the hope tha t they would be be tte r able 
to  influence the conduct o f the ir po litica l masters. This was 
d ifficu lt to  achieve, however, during a tim e of economic privation, 
when people naturally fell back on social ins titu tions  th a t many 
Occupationnaires dismissed as "feudal".
One such ins titu tion  was the o va b u n -ko b u n  system , variously 
translated as the division between parent-child or boss-henchm an. 
The Occupation identified it as an enemy of democracy, highlighting 
its criminal m anifestations and largely disregarding its  positive 
aspects. Those who had been badly affected by the war sought refuge 
in pseudo-families, the heads o f which provided them w ith food, 
clothing and shelter in return for services rendered. People needed 
friends in high places, and were keen to  ingratiate themselves with 
anyone who m ight help them  acquire scarce com m odities , 
particularly food. The methods employed ranged from bribery to  
g ift-g iving, the distinction constantly exercising zealous reformers. 
"The non-reciprocal exchange of g ifts "  was, and remains, an 
essentia l "expression o f hierarchical d i f f e r e n c e " . 5 3  when the 
Occupation discovered "contributions" - public "donations" to  the 
police - it confronted some of Japan's most durable cultural tra its . 
Just as reformers were unable to  instil in the Japanese mind the 
cherished d istinction between public and private realms, so too
53 j. Hendry, Understanding Japanese Society (Routledqe. London, 1992) p.72.
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were they incapable of taking on such sacred cows as collective 
responsibility and respect for officials.
This thesis aims to  elucidate the mutual relationships between the 
police and their charges on the one hand, and the police and their 
political masters on the other. The feelings of ordinary Japanese 
towards the police were conditioned by the manner in which they had 
been dominated, their lives closely regulated during the 1920s and 
'30s and especially during the war. Fear and deference were the 
products of a pervasive system of thought control, characterised by 
excessive intrusion by the police in to c itizens' daily lives. The 
authority and raw power of the police and its identification with the 
conservative ruling order can best be explained by tracing its  
development from the early 1870s when it was established as a 
vital support for the new regime.
The characteristics o f the prewar/wartim e police are examined in 
Chapter One, and its development traced from the establishment o f 
the Keishichô (Metropolitan Police Board) in the early years of the 
Meiji period; through the Taishô and early Shôwa periods when police 
functions were increasingly divided among specialist units, such as 
the Tokkô or Thought Police; up to  1945, by which time the degree o f 
police regulation was unprecedented. Tokyo's police force was 
modelled on the Paris Prefecture o f Police, and pa rticu la rly  
im portant was the transmission o f the notion of a "Higher Police" 
(ie. one engaged in political activities conducive to  the maintenance 
of the status quo). It was one of the Occupation's primary objectives 
to  cut the umbilical cord between the political establishment and 
the police in order to  make the agency o f law enforcem ent 
accountable to  the people.
The a ttitude  o f the Japanese police towards the people, tha t is to  
say those w ithou t influence, is examined in Chapter Three - 
essentially from two perspectives: the ir po litica l/soc ia l ac tiv ities  
and their economic role. The former encompasses the ir response to  
demonstrations and strikes, and their behaviour towards individual 
detainees, suspected of having com m itted crimes. C onstitu tiona l 
guarantees were often not enough to  ensure respect for civil
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liberties, especially when police lock-up facilities were in a poor 
state of repair and food, disinfectant and medicines in short supply. 
As for the police's economic activities, these remained much the 
same as before the surrender - the enforcem ent o f pricing and 
rationing regulations, which involved the m onitoring o f reta il 
ou tle ts  and the control o f tra ffic  in scarce com m odities. Any 
purchase of food, or indeed any controlled commodity, on the black 
m arket was technica lly illegal, although the huge number o f 
economic offences^^ attests to  the inadequacy of official rationing 
and d is tribu tion  systems. Sudden blitzes on illegal transport o f 
goods in short supply revealed the scale o f the problem, although 
these intensive drives against the black market were often followed 
by long periods of inaction. The s itua tion  was com plicated by 
continuing police searches of persons and their baggage, a practice 
tha t was not consistent w ith the Occupation's promotion o f c iv il 
lib e rtie s .
Chapter Four investigates the relationship between the police and 
the political establishment, their connections with the conservative 
government and what was deemed its "shadow" counterpart, the 
ovabun-kobun system. The main aim of the chapter is to  determine 
the valid ity of a claim made by a prom inent Occupation o ffic ia l, 
Theodore Cohen, tha t from the beginning o f the Occupation "the 
property o f the nation as a whole was skewed in e ffec t to  restore 
the old r e g i m e " . 55 if this indeed was the case, then the police must 
have consciously turned a blind eye to  illegal activ ities aimed at 
safeguarding the position o f the old regime. The establishm ent's 
appropriation o f the "surrender dividend", by which is meant the 
substantia l m ilita ry stores "c iv ilian ised" im m ediately a fte r the 
surrender, certa inly required the cooperation of the police. It is 
inconceivable tha t they did not know about large amounts of hoarded 
goods in their respective localities. On both individual and corporate 
levels, the police depended on those w ith  influence in the 
community. Given the harsh economic climate, it was not surprising 
tha t police officia ls were compromised by dealings on the black
54 These were conveniently ignored by the Occupation's statisticians when determining 
levels of crime.
55 T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.347.
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market. More seriously, however, police forces received substantial 
funds from prominent figures in the community. These contributions 
- a necessary supplement to  government subsidy and local taxation - 
invited preferential treatm ent.
Financial problems were accompanied by a burdensome workload, 
forcing the police on occasion to  de legate respons ib ilities  to  
pow erfu l black m arketeers w ith  friends in high places. The 
unpopularity o f Osaka's police chief, Suzuki Eiji, in the upper 
reaches o f government resulted from his determ ination to  expose 
the illegal practices o f powerful ova b u n . a course of action th a t 
would have im plicated members o f the ruling party . Smear 
campaigns tha t aimed to  discredit Suzuki would have succeeded had 
it not been for the active support of the head of the Police branch 
(Public Safety Division), who was determined not to  lose "the only 
Japanese official I have met who thinks like an A m e r i c a n " . 56 Chapter 
Five focuses on the unlikely alliances th a t developed between 
Japanese and American personnel in the field. Accorded a very 
lim ited role and subjected to  an extrem ely cumbersome chain of 
command, m ilitary government officials increasingly chose to  react 
to  developments rather than simply monitor them. As a result, they 
began to  identify w ith local hierarchies, frequently  e lic iting the
cooperation of the police.
Chapter Six explores the reasons fo r "im m edia te  and final 
decentralisation" o f the police, focusing on divisions w ith in both 
GHQ and Japanese governing circles over structura l reform. As th e  
seventh  and fina l chap te r dem on s tra tes , d e ce n tra lisa tio n  
compounded the problem of finance and further enfeebled police 
forces vis à vis gangster organisations and communist elements. It 
returns to  themes developed in Chapters Three, Four and Five, such
as the locus o f power in the community and the loyalties o f th e
police. The la tte r were not transferred to  the people, as the
Occupation intended. Drawing strength  from  longstanding social 
attitudes and the exigencies of an indirect Occupation, the Japanese 
police resisted reform.
56 Letter from H. S. Eaton to Lt. Col. R. T. Battey, undated (NDL: G-2 00257).
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Methodology and Sources
The thesis t it le  - "R esisting Reform: Police and Socie ty in
Occupation Japan" - immediately identifies the principal foci o f this 
study, namely the Occupation itself, the Japanese police and the 
society tha t defined it. The combination of these elements produced 
tensions and conflicts tha t reveal much about the process of reform, 
the d iffe ring perceptions o f the various partic ipan ts and the 
a ttitudes o f those on the receiving end. In any analysis o f the 
Occupation there is tension between the American view on the one 
hand and the Japanese experience on the other. This is particularly 
true of this study, which unravels the Occupation structure so as to  
c la rify  the process of reform , ju s t as it  probes the  socia l 
environment in which the police operated in order to  properly assess 
the impact of reform. The crucial link, o f course, is ind irect  rule, a 
s ta te  o f affairs tha t forced Occupation o ffic ia ls  and Japanese 
policemen to  work together, often for very d iffe rent reasons. Thus, 
the police took on numerous, conflicting roles - guarantor o f social 
s tab ility , agent o f reform  and, most uncom fortably, ob ject o f  
reform .
Any study o f the Japanese police during the Occupation challenges 
such d ichotom ies as cen tre -pe riphery  and policy fo rm a tio n - 
implementation. Involved in all these arenas - as active agents or 
passive recipients - the police invite a comprehensive view o f the 
Occupation, one tha t is not too narrowly focused. The problem with 
most studies o f the Occupation is tha t they e ither focus on a 
particular area of policy or examine the whole gamut o f reform 
through the eyes of those in GHQ. Neither approach begins to  unite or 
merge the various Occupations tha t have been separated out by 
historians. A recent symposium on this subject concluded tha t there 
were "tw o distinct, ye t intertwined. Occupations" - one represented 
by GHQ, the other by the grassroots.5  ^ Of course there were many 
more, re flec ting  the spectrum  o f po litica l views in both the 
Japanese and American camps. This study o f the Japanese police 
begins to  reassemble the Occupation jigsaw. Adm ittedly the police 
are in the centre, as be fitting  their pivotal position, but the viewer
T. W. Burkman, "Reflections on the Occupation's Grassroots and the Eight Symposia" 
in W. Nimmo ed., The Occupation of Japan: The Grass Roots, p.l 88.
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can also make out the faces of Japanese and Americans in a variety 
of roles. In short, this thesis highlights the importance of the police 
as the crucial link between high-level political agencies and low- 
level social institutions. This suggests a holistic approach, one tha t 
marries the formation of policy w ith the process of administration. 
The final product is social-political-economic history, the balance 
depending on the piece of jigsaw at hand.
The jigsaw, however, remains incom plete, perhaps unsurprising 
given the scale of the enterprise. Whereas numerous American faces 
can be discerned, relatively few Japanese ones appear around the 
jigsaw's jagged edges. The missing pieces correspond to  Japanese 
sources. This thesis grew out o f eight months' research in the 
National Diet Library, Tokyo. The richness o f the SCAP archive, 
together with the limitations on the author's ability to  use Japanese 
sources, d ic ta ted  th a t the subject would be viewed essentially 
through American eyes. Although new vistas have been opened, new 
te rrito ries  explored, the preoccupations and predilections of th e  
Occupier are much clearer than those o f the great m ajority of 
Japanese. This deficiency must be acknowledged at the outset. 
Although Japanese primary sources have been hardly used at all, a 
number o f secondary sources have been consulted, particularly w ith  
regard to  the history o f the police and the debate concerning 
decentralisation in 1947 /8 .
As far as the police are concerned, there seems to  be a pattern of 
neglect on the Japanese side th a t m irrors gaps in W estern 
scholarship. Still, more use could have been made o f Japanese 
newspapers, prefectural histories and personal accounts. Although 
they would have added another dimension, their inclusion would have 
substantially increased the length of the thesis, perhaps making it 
unwieldy (not to  mention the time involved). Some details of local 
and national developments - as reported by Japanese newspapers - 
were obtained from the press summaries o f the Allied Translator 
and In te rp re te r Service (ATIS). Translations o f the  com m unist 
newspaper, Akahata (Red Flag), afford an interesting contrast to  the 
more conservative appraisal o f developments, contained in such 
newspapers as the English-language Japan Times. The ATIS records
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provide fascinating glimpses o f problems and flashpoints - a 
policeman's disregard fo r a detainee's human rights, a ba ttle  
between Koreans and Japanese over control o f an area o f market 
stalls, the over-zealous reaction of policemen in Osaka to  a civil 
disturbance.
A large amount of new material was uncovered in the National Diet 
Library, and, to  a lesser extent in the National Archives and Records 
A dm in is tra tion  (NARA), Suitland, M a r y l a n d . 5 8  |n both cases the 
principal sources were the records of G-2, the section responsible 
for the Japanese police, GS and, to  a lesser extent, ESS. Numerous 
le tters, memoranda and reports draw attention to  inter-section and 
intra-section relations within GHQ, SCAP, the dialogue between the 
centre and the periphery, and, most significantly as far as this study 
is concerned, the various issues and questions raised concerning the 
Japanese police. W ithout access to  the le tte rs  and reports of 
reformers in Tokyo and administrators in the field, it  would have 
been impossible to  get a sense o f the interrelationship between 
American officials and Japanese policemen.
In addition, two multi-volume histories o f the Occupation, published 
by GHQ, SCAP, proved to  be invaluable sources. The Summations of 
the Non-Military A ctiv ities in Japan, of which there are th irty -five  
volumes, provide m onth-by-m onth coverage o f a c tiv itie s  from  
September, 1945, to  August, 1948. Although the series does not 
extend to  the final years of the Occupation, there is a great deal o f 
raw data concerning crime, the black market, the police response to  
such problems, and prison conditions. The summations provide a 
useful running commentary, a detailed account o f developments as 
they occurred. Adopting a them atic, rather than chronological, 
approach, the H istory o f the Non-M ilitary A c tiv it ie s  o f the 
Occupation o f Japan consists of fifty -five  monographs. These cover 
the period up to  1950, and contain useful appendices of s ta tis tic s  
and documents. As an official account, a house history, the series is 
not w ithou t bias. The final volume, "Police and Public Safety",
58 The National Diet library has a huge stock of documents on fiche, classified according 
to section and subject. Although it is hard on the eyes, this system is much easier to use 
than the one in NARA, where the researcher must wade through numerous "boxes" of 
documents in order to find what s/he is looking for.
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generally presents police reform in a favourable ligh t, although 
problems attending decentralisation are acknowledged. Like the 
Political Reorientation of Japan, published by Government Section in 
1949, the offic ia l h istory concentrates on American policy and 
initiative, paying little  a ttention to  Japanese attitudes.
This deficiency is partially corrected by the trenchant accounts o f 
such foreign journalists as Mark G a y n , 5 9  William Costello GO and 
Honor T r a c y . 6 i  Suspicious of the offic ia l record, these intrepid 
characters ventured out of Tokyo in order to  assess the impact o f 
reform , the  responsiveness or o therw ise  o f its  rec ip ien ts . 
Adm ittedy they are prone to  cynicism or sensationalism, the usual 
vices of Journalism. Honor Tracy makes it clear tha t she is "not 
quite sym pathetic w ith American e ffo rts  in J a p a n " . G2 Similarly, it 
could be argued th a t William Costello and Mark Gayn Judge the 
O ccupation too  harshly, th a t they se t standards th a t were 
impossible to  meet. Like our friend in m ilitary government, Robert 
Textor, they perhaps "demanded too m u c h " . G 3  Although these sources 
must be used w ith care, they add an im portant dimension to  this 
study. Gayn's hunches, for example, often turned out to  be correct, 
leading to  disclosure of "feudal survivals", resistance to  reform and 
corruption in high places. Interesting ly, and reassuringly, th e s e  
Journalistic accounts frequently echoed the misgivings of m ilita ry  
government officials, voiced in their reports to  higher authority. As 
is made clear by this thesis, the anxious whispers o f those in the 
field must be heard above the din emanating from GHQ, SCAP.
G9 M. Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981).
GO w. Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism in Postwar Japan (Hagaki Shoten, Tokyo, 
1 9 4 8 ).
G1 H. Tracy, Kakemono: A Sketch Book of Postwar Japan (Methuen, London, 1950).
G2 Rinjirô Sodei, "The Occupier and the Occupied" in W. Nimmo ed.. The Occupation of 
Japan: The Grass Roots, p.3.
G3 Ibid.. p.171.
32
CHAPTER ONE 
FOUNDATIONS
The Japanese word for "police" - ke isa tsu  - was coined at the 
beginning of the Meiji period (1868 -1912 ). The need for "the new 
n o m e n c la tu re " !  and the novel in s titu tion  th a t it  described or 
an tic ip a ted  reveals as much about the s itua tion before the 
res to ra tion  as it does about the priorities o f the new regime. 
According to  J. B. Leavell, "Tokugawa Japan was an unpoliced 
s o c ie ty " ,2 underpinned by the principle o f "s e lf- re g u la tio n ". 
Emphasizing "organised and legitimate coercion (police)" rather than 
"norm ative and voluntary processes (trad itiona l values)", Leavell 
s ta tes  th a t "the  em peror's policeman, as opposed to  the 
neighbourhood's watchman, served as a dem onstration o f the 
imperial government's determination to  rule...".3 Taking its cue from 
Leavell, this chapter will focus on the development o f Japan's police 
system during the period 1874 to  1945, drawing attention to  bo th  
W estern models and indigenous tra its . It begins w ith  the 
establishment o f a Continental European-style police system, and 
concludes w ith the crucial role of neighbourhood associations in 
wartime Japan, suggesting tha t a modern police force dovetailed 
neatly w ith traditional values, namely "the principle o f collective 
respons ib ility ".4
The history o f the Meiji police system e ffective ly  begins with the 
transfer o f the Police Bureau, together w ith its functions, from the
! Oura Kanetake, "The Police of Japan", in Fifty Years of New Japan. Okuma Shigenobu, 
ed., trans. Marcus B. Huish (Smith, Elder & Co., 2nd ed. 1910) V o l.l, p.281.
2 According to R. J. Smith (see fn.4), Tokyo was policed in the 1850s and 1860s by 
"only 3 5 0 ...officers, of whom 60 were responsible for dealing solely with members of 
the warrior class". It was lower-grade samurai ( dôshin) who investigated crimes and 
ordered arrests where necessary. The system of crime control in Tokugawa Japan is 
described in M. Hane, Premodern Japan (Westview, Boulder, Col., 1991) pp.l 39-142;
C. Dunn, Everyday Life in Traditional Japan (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1972) pp.28-31.
2 J. B. Leavell, "The Policing of Society", in H. Conroy, S. Davis, and W. Patterson, eds., 
Japan in Transition (Associated University Presses, Cranbury, 1984) pp.22-45.
R. J. Smith, Japanese Society (Cambridge University Press, 1983) p.39.
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Justice Ministry 5 to  the new Home Ministry 6 in January 1874 J  
This coincided with the establishment of a metropolitan police force 
( Keishichô or Metropolitan Police Board), "directed and supervised by 
the Home Minister" through the Board's Superintendent-General.8 
Both developments followed the submission o f a report by eight 
young members o f the Justice Ministry, who had travelled abroad in 
18 7 2 /1 8 7 3  and spent tim e in France, Belgium, Germany, Russia, 
Austria and Italy, studying legal systems, the courts, penal codes 
and the police.^ A Satsuma samurai, Kawaji Toshiyoshi, directed 
investigation of police organisations, becoming the firs t head of the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board in 18 7 4 . ^ 0  Characterised as "the 
great benefactor of the imperial police" (teikoku keisatsu kensetsu 
no d a io n i in ) J  i Kawaji was active as both a planner and an 
administrator, supervising the establishment and early development 
o f the Ke ish ichô. The la tte r's  significance derives from the use o f 
the capital's police system as a model for prefectural organisation.
The Japanese government accepted and adopted most o f Kawaji"s 
proposals for the establishment of a modern police system . His 
association o f police organisation w ith  monarchical principles 
caused him to  be drawn to  the European Continental s tructure , 
characterised by a centralised, national s y s t e m . 1 2  The new regime 
had the option of e ither im ita ting the Continental system or 
follow ing the English example. Whilst the form er offered a high
8 The Police Bureau (Keihorvô) had been established in 1872.
8 The Naimushô was established on November 10, 1873
 ^ S. Sugai, "The Japanese Police System", in R. E. Ward, ed.. Five Studies in Japanese 
Politics (University of Michigan Press, Ann Abor, 1957 ) p .l.  For developm ents  
between 1868 and 1874 see Leavell, "Policing of Society", pp.26-36 . Sources in 
Japanese include: Keishichô Shi Hensan linkai, ed., Keishichô Shi. Vol.l (Keishichô Shi 
Hensan linkai, Tokyo, 1959); Obinata Sumio, Tennôsei Keisatsu to Minshû (Nippon 
Hyôronsha, Tokyo, 1987); Oka Tadao, Meiii Jidai Keisatsu Kan no Seikatsu (Yuzankaku 
Shuppan, Tokyo, 1974); Saitô Teruo, ed., Keisatsuchô (Kyôikusha, Tokyo, 1974); 
Taikakai, ed., Naimushôshi. Vol. 2 (Chihô Zaimu Kyôkai, Tokyo, 1971); Takahashi 
Yûsai, Meiii Keisatsu Shi (Reibunsha, Tokyo, 1961).
8 K. Steiner, Local Government in Japan (Stanford University Press, Cal., 1965) p.45.
8 D. E. Westney, "The Emulation of Western Organisations in Meiji Japan: The Case of the 
Paris Prefecture of Police and the Keishichô", Journal of Japanese Studies. 8, No. 2 
(Summer 1 982 ) p .311.
 ^8 Saitô Teruo, ed., Keisatsuchô (Kyôikusha, Tokyo, 1974) p.23.
 ^  ^ Hironaka Toshio, Senoo Nihon no Keisatsu (Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1969) p.4.
^2 Sugai,"Japanese Police System", p.2.
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degree o f centralisation, a m ultip lic ity o f adm inistrative functions 
and an active political role, the la tte r combined a more restricted 
role with a decentralised o r g a n i s a t i o n  J  3  Around fo rty  years later 
Raymond Fosdick, an au tho rity  on European police system s, 
trenchantly distinguished between the tw o alternatives:
In Great Britain the police are the servants of the community....They are 
civil employees, whose primary duty is the preservation of public 
security. In the execution of this duty they have no powers not possessed 
by any other citizen....In sharp contrast is the Continental theory, which, 
evolved from the necessities o f autocratic government (my italics), 
makes of the police force the strong arm of the ruling classes. The 
Continental policeman is the servant of the Crown or the higher 
authorities....He possesses powers greatly exceeding those of the citizen.
Considering the demands on the early Meiji s ta te , it was not 
surprising th a t its leaders favoured the Continental model. D. H. 
Bayley places their decision in context:
The statesmen of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 wanted to impel Japan 
into the the modern world by the creation of an effective national 
government...The political imperatives of modernization compelled the 
government to centralize administration, especially in education, taxation 
and policing.T 5
A police force w ith a broad ambit o f control was highly desirable, 
considering tha t a modern administrative system was barely in the 
making and a blueprint for local government had yet to  be drawn up. 
So too was the active political role accorded the police - those in 
contro l, in ten t on defending them selves against po litica l rivals, 
coveted the weapons of surveillance and c o n t r o l . is  Determined to  
survive "a whirlpool o f disturbance" and smarting from the insult 
o f the unequal treaties, the Japanese governm ent's  im m ediate 
ob jective  was to  "reclaim  full sove re ign ty  over its  in terna l
 ^3 Westney, Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organisational Patterns 
to Meiii Japan (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 198 7 ) pp.41-2 . An 
invaluable source, I & I provides the material for much of this chapter.
14 R. B. Fosdick, European Police Svstems (Century Co., New York, 1915) pp.l 5 -16.
D. H. Bayley states that it is "still properly regarded as a fundamental text".
13 D. H. Bayley, Patterns of Policing (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 
1985) p.69.
1  ^ Westney, JJ£ p.313.
1  ^ Oura Kanetake, "The Police of Japan", p.281.
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a f fa ir s " .18 a  strong, e ffective  police force would fac ilita te  the 
maintenance o f internal order and win the respect o f the Western 
powers. Thus, domestic and international pressures combined to  
recommend a theory of policing tha t stressed social control rather 
than citizens' freedoms.
It was the French system, specifically the Paris police, tha t was 
singled out as the one most suitable for Japan. According to  R. H. 
Mitchell, this was "a logical choice":
It was famous, it was highly centralized, it performed a wide range of 
administrative functions (including preventive policing and political 
surveillance), and that model was already under study for the legal 
system and the courts
Influenced by the French set-up, Kawaji had recommended tha t the 
judicial police be separated from the ir adm inistrative counterparts, 
the la tte r maintaining public order under the ju risd iction o f the 
Home Ministry, the former investigating offences on behalf of the 
Justice Ministry. Although the two spheres were not as discreet as 
Kawaji implied, his proposal reassured Justice M inistry officia ls, 
keen to  retain some influence over police affairs after the necessary 
establishm ent o f an Interior M inistry. Thus, even the system 's 
complexity was utilised by Japanese planners, in this case to  tem per 
inter-departm ental com petition . 20
The ideas and patterns imported from France were complemented by 
indigenous influences, such as the samurai legacy. With the 
establishment o f new forms, the ranks of the police were filled w ith  
unemployed ex-samurai. Benefits and disadvantages flowed from 
this pattern o f recruitm ent: "staunchness (and) relative im m un ity  
from corruption, (indicative) of a system of morality peculiar to  the 
former warrior class", was coupled w ith "an a ttitude  o f disrespect
18 P. J. Katzenstein & Y. Tsujinaka, Defending the Japanese State (Cornell East Asia 
Series, Ithaca, N.Y., 1991) p.35.
18 R. H. Mitchell, Janus-Faced Justice (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1992 )
p.2.
20 Leavell, "Policing of Society", p.37; Westney, JJS. pp.317-18. In practice "for most 
of the Meiji period the same men performed most...tasks, under the supervision of 
specialized administrative units in the Keishichô central headquarters" (Westney, I & I. 
p .57).
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and superciliousness towards the p e o p l e " . 21 A t the same time the 
Ke ish ichô identified strongly w ith the m ilitary, conscious o f the 
Japanese army's organisational superiority and the need fo r jo in t  
action against threats to  the country's security. Kawaji saw the role 
of the "forces" as complementary - the army and navy defending the 
nation against external adversaries, the police dealing w ith in terna l 
d i s s e n t . 22  in fact, it was the army rather than the police th a t 
suppressed uprisings in the 1870s, the newly-organised urban police 
units unable to  meet the challenge on their o w n . 2 3  Nevertheless, "in 
1877, when the (Satsuma) Rebellion broke out under the leadership 
of....Saigô (Takamori), a police brigade....displayed no small valour in
the campaign (winning) for the police in general a re p u ta tio n
which....(in 1910 was) still green in the memory of the p e o p l e " . 24
A National Police Organisation
During the early 1870s available resources fo r policing were 
concentrated on Tokyo - as the new capital and the administrative 
centre, it was the obvious starting point. However, the Police Bureau 
( K e i h o k v o k u ) 25  was well aware of the existence of a variety of local 
policing structures outside the capital. These would have to  be 
swept aside before new police organisations modelled on the 
Keishichô could be established in the prefectures. When it moved to  
the Home Ministry in 1874 the bureau ordered prefectural governors 
to  dismiss municipal police personnel, who were characterised as 
ineffective and untrustworthy.
In January 1877 the Keishichô was "made a bureau of the Home 
...(Ministry) under the name of the Keishikvoku". its Superintendent- 
General now responsible for "the police business o f the  whole 
c o u n t r y . . . . " . 2 6  The reorganisation reflected "internal disorder and 
financial pressures", but was reversed in 1881 due to  positive and
21 Sugai, "Japanese Police System", p.4.
22 Westney, I & I. p.61; See also Keishichô Shi Hensan linkai, ed., Keishichô Shi. V o l.l .
23 R. L. Sims, A Political History of Modern Japan (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi,
1 9 9 1 )p .4 6 .
24 Oura Kanetake, "The Police of Japan", p.293.
23 This was called the Keihorvô until April 1876.
26 Oura, "The Police of Japan", p.283.
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negative developments - the decline o f internal disorder and abuses 
of centralized police power re s p e c tiv e ly .^7 One o f the principal 
reasons for structural change had been "the low standards of quality 
and performance among the provincial forces".28 However, little  had 
been achieved in term s of standardization by 1881, despite a 
positive trend signalled by the promulgation o f the Adm inistrative 
Police Regulations ( Gvôsei Keisatsu Kisoku) in 1 8 7 5 . 2 9  The 
governm ent's  announcement in 1881 th a t it  would establish 
constitutional government within ten years acted as "a spur to  the 
consolidation o f the structures of adm inistration and c o n t r o l " . I t  
was followed by the creation of a new post - ke ib u ch ô  (ch ie f 
inspector) - tha t ensured tig h te r contro l o f prefectural police.8 1 
"The firs t prefectural police official to  be appointed directly by the 
central governm ent", the chief inspector headed the prefectural 
Police Central Headquarters (Keisatsu Honbu). A key agent of 
standard ization and centra lization, he enforced national police 
regulations and, "in connection with political cases....took orders 
from the Home Ministry".32
Ultimately the Japanese police surpassed its French progenitor in 
the level o f centralisation a c h i e v e d . 3 3  The Home Minister stood at 
the top o f the command structure. His immediate subordinate was 
the director of the Police Bureau, "the  key person in nationwide 
police adm inistration...":
He could issue directives in the name of the Home Minister, formulate 
general policies and carry out administrative and operational control over 
all prefectural departments except the Keishichô. His chief means of 
control, however, was his authority to appoint and transfer police 
officials in the rank of superintendent or a b o v e .^4
27 E. K. Tipton, The Japanese Police State (Athlone Press, London, 1990) p.40. See also 
Keishichô Shi. Vol.l ; Taikakai, Naimushôshi, V o l.l.
28 Westney, I & I. p.67
29 Leavell, "Policing of Society", p.43. These were modelled on regulations drawn up by 
Kawaji for the Keishichô.
3 0 Westney, I & I. p.71. The source for the remainder of this paragraph unless 
otherwise stated.
31 Mitchell, Janus-Faced, p.3.
32 IW.
33 Katzenstein and Tsujinaka, Defending, p.38.
34 Tipton, Police State, p.39.
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Bureau personnel were civilian adm in istra tors w ith  higher civil 
service qualifications, rather than police officials who had worked 
their way up through the ranks; uniformed policemen seldom rose 
higher than the rank of superintendent.35 in the prefectures, w ith the 
exception of Tokyo, police authority u ltim ate ly resided w ith the 
centrally-appointed governor. In practice, however, the chief o f the 
prefectura l police division exercised contro l over police units in 
cities and towns throughout the prefecture.36 The fact that the Home 
M inister appointed pre fectura l police chiefs, ra ther than the 
governors under whom they ostensib ly served, undermined the 
la tte r's  position.37 The centre also had financial muscle, prov id ing  
about 35% of all prefectural policing expenses and 60% in the case 
of Tokyo.38
By the end of the Meiji period the key functions o f the Police Bureau 
were divided between sections concerned w ith police affairs, peace 
preservation and censorship.39 This division o f police activ ities  
corresponded with organisation at the prefectura l level, although 
there were differences within these broad categories reflecting the 
level o f urbanisation and industrialisation. Beneath the prefectura l 
divisions were the d is tr ic t sta tions which again varied in the 
grouping o f police fu n c t io n s .D e s p ite  the diversity w ith regard to  
the minutiae of organisation, the core categories of police w o rk , 
such as peace prevention or general affairs, characterised all levels 
o f the system. A t the same tim e channels o f com m unication 
followed a clear command hierarchy. To take Tokyo as an example, 
there was a two-way flow from Keish ichô HQ to  the main police
35 Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, R. & A. Report No. 2758, 
"The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation"(28/9/45) p.38.
36 For further details re. national police organisation: H. Nakahara, "The Japanese 
Police", Journal of Criminal Law. Criminology and Police Science. Vol.46, No.4 (Nov.- 
Dee. 1955) pp.583-4.
37 R. J. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", Far Eastern Survey. Vol.l 8, No.2 
(2 4 /1 /4 9 )  p. 18: "Although the police director was one civil service rank below the 
governor, there were many instances in which, because of the personalities of the two 
officials, the director of police wielded greater power than the governor".
3 8  R. & A. Report, No.2758, p.l 1.
3 9  R. H. Mitchell, Thought Control in Prewar Japan (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
N.Y., 1976) diagram on p.l 95.
^6 PSD, Report on the Japanese National Police System (1 /4 7 ), P t.l, Section 6, p . l36 
(NARA, Suitland, Box 335, file 9).
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stations, which in turn passed/received inform ation to /fro m  the ir 
respective  substa tions and police boxes. The exchange o f  
in form ation between the d iffe ren t levels, concerning the social 
environment and the performance o f police offic ia ls, fac ilita ted  
coordination and control.^i
Moreover, the pervasiveness of the police presence made monitoring 
o f social/poltical activ ity  tha t much easier. The dispersal o f police 
substations and boxes throughout the country took place during 
Yamagata Aritomo's period of office as Home Minister (1883-90).42 
His "term  as Home Minister....marked the transition from the French 
to  the German model of p o l i c e " . ^ ^  indeed, it was Wilhelm H o h n , 4 4  a 
captain o f the Berlin police, who critic ised the concentration of 
police offic ia ls in urban areas and recom m ended th e  w ider 
d istribu tion of permanent police p o s t s . His proposal, adopted in 
1886, led to  an increase in the to ta l number o f police posts from 
3,068 in 1885 to  1 1,357 by 1890.46
The basic unit of policing was the kôban - a small three man post, 
which operated as a neighbourhood institu tion, encouraging contact 
and information exchange between the police and the public. The 
regular three man kôban was essentially an urban policing unit; its 
rural equivalent was the one man residential box (chûzaisho). which 
served as both an office and a h o m e . 47 in 1909, A rthur Lloyd, a 
lec tu re r at the "Imperial U n ive rs ity ", s ta te d  th a t Japanese 
policemen worked from "boxes at regular intervals along the stree ts .
41 Westney, I & I. pp.58-9.
42 According to Roger Bowen, Yamagata was "Japan's Bismarck" (Rebellion and 
Democracy in Meiii Japan). For a more detailed analysis of his contribution to police 
development, see R. F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan. 1838- 
1 922 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971).
43 Tipton, Police State. p.41.
44 Heinrich Friedrich Wilhelm Hohn was employed as an adviser to the Home Ministry 
during the period 1885 to 1891.
45 Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo. pp. 103-4; Westney, I & I. p.80; Taki Shizuo, Keisatsu 
Koniaku Monoaatari (Shin Jinbutsu Oraisha, Tokyo, 1974) p.61.
46 Westney, I & I. p.80.
47 PSD, Report on the Japanese National Police System (1 /4 7 ), P t.l, Section 6, p . l30  
(NARA, B.335, file 9). The kôban and the chûzaisho still constitute the backbone of the 
Japanese police system, eliciting the praise of foreign commentators (eg. Bayley and 
Ames).
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....m aintain(ing) order and discipline". Drawing a tten tion  to  th e  
pervasiveness o f the police system, its  cellular s truc tu re , he 
remarked tha t nobody "could travel far in Japan, certainly not in a 
Japanese city, w ithout coming across the ubiquitous p o l i c e m a n " . ^8 
This impression of ubiquity was strengthened by the scope of police 
activ ity - the many instances in which police exercised control over 
people's lives.
Wide-Ranging Police Powers
In a le tte r to  the Japanese Prime Minister w ritten in 1947, General 
MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, suggested 
tha t "in the past, one of the ill-conceived aspects of the Japanese 
police system was the exercise by police officials o f nu m ero us  
administrative functions not related to  the task of investigation and 
apprehension o f criminals or the preservation o f public order".4 9 
Convinced tha t there were close parallels between imperial Japan 
and Nazi Germany, Americans viewed the broad scope o f police 
powers and the methods employed as the key supports of a "police 
s ta te " in pre-surrender Japan. R. H. Mitchell, an authority on the 
prewar criminal justice system, plumps for the label "p a te rn a lis tic  
police s ta te ", suggesting perhaps tha t "persuasion" rather than 
coercion was the preferred method of c o n t r o l .E .  K. Tipton argues 
tha t Japan can be usefully described as a "police s ta te " if the term 
is associated w ith  its European exemplars in the  e ig h te e n th / 
nineteenth centuries rather than the em battled regimes o f the 
1930s. In the former case "'police' referred to  civil administration - 
to  government regulation of any kind...".5i
48 Arthur Lloyd, Everv-dav Japan: Written after Twentv-five Years' Residence and 
Work in the Country (Cassell, London, 1909), p . l61.
49 Letter dated 1 6 /9 /4 7  (NDL: fiche G-2 02750)
50 Mitchell, Janus-Faced, p.xvi. He draws attention to "scholarly theory about 'soft 
rule', which depicts force as frequently used in the West to subjugate people, whereas in 
Japan obedience was secured through persuasion rather than fear". More detailed 
explanation of "soft rule" can be found in J. V. Koschmann, "Introduction - Soft Rule and 
Expressive Protest" in J. V. Koschmann, ed.. Authority and the Individual in Japan: 
Citizen Protest in Historical Perspective (Tokyo University Press, 1978): "In Japan, a 
pattern of given authority, reflected in an affirmative belief system, forms the 
background for a system of political rule characterised by the use of ideology as an 
integrative mechanism in place of physical force".
51 Tipton, Police State, p. 14.
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According to  a report compiled by the Public Safety Division of GHQ, 
the activ ities of the police prior to  surrender entered into every 
phase o f Japanese life, a claim supported by a long lis t o f 
responsibilities: those relating to  the prevention and inves tiga tion  
o f crime, the enforcem ent o f laws and the  apprehension o f 
offenders; tra ffic  control; supervision of the licensing and operation 
o f numerous financial and commercial institu tions including banks, 
res tau ran ts , doc to rs , barbers, masseurs and m arket sta lls ; 
enforcement of laws, rules and regulations concerning public health 
and hygiene, from venereal disease prevention to  overseeing th e  
biannual compulsory cleaning of individual houses; welfare work, 
including the d is tribu tion o f emergency re lie f supplies and th e  
attem pted resolution of dom estic/social d ifficu lties; supervision of 
construction , repair, maintenance and fireproofing o f buildings; 
enforcement of game laws, conservation of forests and other natural 
resources; in te rvention in the se ttle m e n t o f labour disputes, 
regulation o f unions and enforcem ent o f fa c to ry  leg is la tion ; 
monitoring the neighbourhood environment by frequent checks on 
population, individuals' occupations and leisure ac tiv ities , and 
family relations; control o f scarce economic resources through the 
enforcement o f price control and rationing laws; and supervision of 
fire  prevention in urban a r e a s .  ^2 The list is a leng thy one, 
d e m o n s tra tin g  the  ind ispensab ility  o f the  police to  the 
administration of public affairs. Their involvement in economic and 
social activities was matched by an active role in politics.
The National A ffairs Police (ie. political police) was renamed the 
Higher Police (Kôtô Keisatsu) in 1886,53 its duties encompassing the 
various forms o f political expression - organisations, m eetings.
52 PSD, Report on the Japanese National Police System (1 /4 7 ), P t.l, Section 5, p . l20  
(NARA, Suitland, B.335, file 9); Braibanti, "New Police Law", p . l8.
53 Mitchell, Janus-Faced, p.3.
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newspapers 54 and other political p u b lica tio n s .55 Measures were 
taken against the Freedom and People's Rights Movement ( iivû  
minken undo), "a series of semi-popular campaigns, ag ita tion and 
organizations which provided the main vehicle for the expression o f 
anti-governm ent opinions (from 1875) up to  the establishment o f 
the firs t diet in 1 8 9 0 ".56 in April 1880 the Home Ministry extended 
its range of control beyond the censorship of newspapers, ta rg e tin g  
the activities o f political parties and other dissident organisations. 
Policemen were empowered to  approve or deny the organisation o f 
political societies, to  enforce the ban on membership by soldiers, 
women, teachers and students, to  w ithold permission to  convene 
public meetings and to  intervene if speakers were encouraging 
lawlessness. In December 1887 the government again signalled its  
determ ination to  prevent the spread of dissent by issuing the Peace 
Preservation Ordinance, which, amongst other things, authorised the 
police to  expel from the capital anyone engaged in subversive 
a c t iv it ie s .57 According to  R. F. Hackett, "the ordinance was so 
unexpected and so sweeping tha t the momentum of the popular 
movement was decisively broken".58 The Public Peace Police Law, 
prom ulgated in 1900, included measures intended to  " firm ly  
check....the expanding labour movement; A rtic le  17, while not 
exp lic itly  outlaw ing union organizing a c tiv ities  or s trikes, was 
worded in a manner tha t allowed government officials to  in te rpre t 
such activ ities as illegal".59
54 As far as the press was concerned, laws confining political commentary to positive 
appraisals of government policy were enforced by the Home Ministry from 1875. The 
following year a separate Publications Bureau was assigned the task of overseeing the 
publication of books, whilst the police monitored newspapers, periodicals and pamphlets 
(Westney, I & I. p.98).
55 Tipton, Police State, p.45. The title "higher police" was borrowed from France, and 
reflected common attitudes towards political management.
56 J. E. Hunter, The Emergence of Modern Japan (Longman. London, 1989) p .210.
57 w. G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1990) 
p.75; Sims, Political Historv. p.70.
58 R. p. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo. p.l 05. 570 people were expelled from Tokyo
(p. 1 0 6 ).
59 Mitchell, Janus-Faced, pp.23-4. See also S. Large, Organised Workers and Socialist 
Politics in Interwar Japan (Cambridge University Press, 1981 )
pp .l 5-1 6.
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Every e ffo rt was made to  force political developments along a 
course favourable to  the system's powerholders. For example, in the 
second national Diet election o f February 1892, Home Minister 
Shinagawa Yajirô tried to  influence the outcome of the election by 
encouraging police intimidation. However, "the extensive and violent 
use of the police to  sway electors benefited the oligarchy in no way 
w h a ts o e v e r" .60 The death of tw enty-five  people and the in ju ries 
sustained by four hundred others served to  "deepen the hostility of 
Diet members to  the police system", restricting the flow of funds 
"un til well in to the tw en tie th  cen tury".6 i Thus, Itô Hirobumi was 
rig h t to  regard "th e  use o f m ilita ry  and police fo rce  (as) 
counterproductive to  the achievement o f those national goals he and 
Yamagata were agreed upon". Not surprisingly, "he objected to  
Yamagata's endorsement of police interference at the polls".62
Clearly Itô was not concerned about the "legality" of police violence. 
"Law was considered primarily as a framework w ithin which the 
central government organised the exercise o f its power, not as a 
restra int on tha t p o w e r " . 63 Members of the oligarchy were not so 
confident in the ir positions of power tha t they could voluntarily 
subject themselves to  a higher principle, namely the rule of law.
R. H. Mitchell refers instead to  "the concept o f rule-by-law":
Under the Meiji constitutional system the concept of natural laws was 
pushed into a dark corner, and administrative agencies were responsible 
mainly to themselves, with kanson minpi 64 (putting government above 
people) as an all-pervasive attitude.ss
Thus, "laws....became instruments o f the lawmaking p o w e r " . 66 The 
police were happy to  invoke the law, since e ffective ly  they were 
operating outside it. It was not there to  restrain them, but rather to  
fac ilita te  adm inistration and social control.
60 Hunter, Emergence. p.217
61 Westney, I & I, pp.96-7.
62 Najita Tetsuo, Japan - The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics 
(University of Chicago Press, 1974) p . l04.
63 Steiner, Local Government, p.42.
64 This literally means "revere officials, despise the people".
65 Mitchell, Janus-Faced, pp. 12-13.
66 Tipton, Police State, p.56.
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Apart from the Diet, the executive and its agencies had legislative 
powers, namely the right to  issue administrative ordinances. There 
was, therefore, a division between s ta tu te  law and a d m in is tra tive  
law. A rtic le  nine of the 1889 C onstitu tion declared th a t "the  
emperor will issue or have issued ordinances necessary fo r the 
execution o f statutes, for the preservation of the public peace and 
order, and for the promotion of the welfare of his s u b je c ts " .T h u s  
the emperor, the Home Ministry, the Metropolitan Police Board and 
p re fe c tu ra l governors were empowered to  issue numerous 
ordinances for police purposes, provided they did not override 
sta tu tes passed by the Diet.68 This condition did not in fact check 
the growth of adm inistrative law, since the language of s ta tu tes  
was often vague and their scope i l l - d e f i n e d . 69 Although Chapter Two 
of the Meiji Constitution outlined popular rights vis à vis executive 
power, it was understood tha t these were in the g ift o f the emperor 
and were cons titu tiona lly  sub ject to  res tric tions  orig inating in 
statutes. Once a sta tu te  limiting rights came into existence it could 
then be implemented by ordinances which usually in terpre ted its 
provisions very freely. The Meiji rulers followed well-established 
Western precedents (ie. Continental European practices) in ensuring 
tha t constitutional guarantees could be modified by law.^o
In addition to  administrative authority, "the  police held judicial and 
quasi-judicial powers, based on both ordinance and law".^i Summary 
Trial Regulations for Police Offences (1885 ) empowered heads o f 
police stations summarily to  convict people for minor crimes. Such 
acts as loitering w ithout a fixed residence or job, punishable w ith 
detention o f up to  twenty-nine days and w ith fines of less than 
tw enty yen, were included in the Ordinance on Penalties for Police 
Offences (1908). Police station chiefs thus acted as both prosecutor 
and judge w ith regard to  minor offences. The A dm in is tra tive  
Enabling Law of 1900 was a procedural law tha t restric ted certain
67 Ibid.
68 Sugai, "Japanese Police System", p.3.
69 R. & A. Report No. 2758, p.l 3.
70 Ibid.. p p .l4-1 5.
71 Katzenstein & Tsujinaka, Defending the Japanese State, p.43.
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constitu tiona l rights. It authorized the de tention o f those who 
needed protection or were deemed a threat to  public order (the so- 
called "p ro tective  and preventive custodies") until sunset o f the 
following day; the forceful entrance o f a residence under ce rta in  
circumstances such as suspicion of gambling activities; and the use 
o f force to  e ffec t compliance with police orders - these powers 
were exercised w ithout consultation w ith judicial a u t h o r i t i e s .^2
Although the Code o f Criminal Procedure stipu lated "reasonab le  
lim its" on the length of detention for someone held w ithou t charge, 
in practice the police were able to  hold people for months or even 
years by simply renewing the ir detentions on a daily b a s i s . ^ 3  Since 
the courts had no Jurisdiction over the  po lice 's  adm in is tra tive  
a c tiv itie s , people were unable to  ac t aga ins t illega l or 
u n co n s titu tio n a l b e h a v i o u r . The legal system  provided no 
p ro tection  against a police force, which was already inclined 
towards arrogance and disregard for the people's wishes.
The Police Ethos
In the preface to  his report submitted in 1873, Kawaji Tosh iyosh i 
s tated tha t "the police are a daily cure and remedy to  a state, as 
everyday hygiene is to  the individual...(They) are able to  protect good 
citizens and nurture the active force o f a c o u n t r y " . ^ 5  The analogy 
between a state 's police force and an individual's personal hygiene is 
an interesting one, pointing up the preventive aspect o f police work, 
w ithout which the health o f the polity would deteriorate. The idea 
th a t the police should foresee problems and prevent them from 
occurring by s tr ic t  regulation was in line w ith  practices in 
Continental Europe, as was the prom otion o f the police as a 
mechanism for integration and national mobilisation. Thus, they had 
a dual purpose - the preservation of the nation and the protection of
^2 Mitchell, Janus-Faced, pp.24-5; Sugai, "Japanese Police System", p.3; Tipton, 
Police State, pp.60-61. "While fines were light and Jail terms short, these regulations 
were used effectively against the government's political foes as well as against 
individuals in the various movements for social reform; and in so doing police badly 
abused their power to arrest" (Mitchell).
^2 Braibanti, "New Police Law", p . l8.
Ibid.; Sugai, "Japanese Police System", p.4.
Sugai, p.2.
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the people - combining authoritarianism  w ith  paternalism , the 
balance between these tw o elements re flec ting  dom estic and 
international developments.
Observance of hierarchy, a basic Confucian tenet, was fundamental 
to  Kawaji's vision o f both an e ffec tive  police ins titu tion  and a 
stable political order. In "Hand and Eye of the Police" he stressed the 
nurturing role of the police, describing it as "nursemaid" to  the 
p e o p le .^6 The police acted as interm ediaries, implementing the 
commands of government (the parents) ostensibly for the benefit of 
the people (the children). Kawaji's use of the family as a metaphor 
fo r the nation illustrates the ruling group's a ttitude  towards th e  
masses, who were considered politically immature and in need of 
g u id a n c e . I n  the same way as it was acceptable for a parent or 
nursemaid to  be s tr ic t or firm with his/her charges, so the police 
were perm itted to  use force to  secure compliance w ith directives. 
Confucian term inology was used not only to  characterise police- 
public relations but also those within the institu tion  itse lf - "The 
officer is parent and older brother; the subordinate is child and 
younger brother".^8
Arthur Lloyd, our man in Japan at the turn of the century, noted the  
du rab ility  o f "honourable tra d itio n s " in the police force. H e 
maintained tha t Japanese policemen were "as a rule superior to  
bribery and corruption", and despite their being "no longer mostly of 
samurai orig in,...they generally act(ed) as such".^9 These positve 
features can be a ttribu ted  to  the "pa tte rn  o f professionalization", 
discernible from the early Meiji period. "By 1887 (police) personnel 
throughout the country were rigorously selected...and trained in 
prefectura l police s c h o o l s " .80 The cohesiveness of the police and 
their identification w ith the in terests o f government, rather than 
personal or community concerns, reflected a strong commitment to  
education and training.
^8 Hironaka Toshio, Senoo Nihon no Keisatsu (Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1969) pp.3-5.
Tipton, Police State, p.47.
^8 Keishichô Shi, p.56 - Quoted in Westney, I & I. p.53.
^9 Lloyd, Everv-dav Japan, pp. 162-3.
80 Bayley, Patterns of Policing, p.48.
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Nevertheless, central organisations, such as the national Police 
Officers' Academy, established in Tokyo in 1885, fared less w ell 
than the prefectural institu tes. The academy was in operation for 
only four years due to  shortage of funds, whereas the prefectural 
tra in ing foundations survived until the Pacific War. The second 
national school lasted from 1897 to  1904, its successor supported 
by proceeds from the Police Association ( Keisatsu Kvôkai). Only in 
1918 did the government provide the necessary financial backing to  
safeguard the fu ture  o f the o ffice rs ' academy. It continued to
function until 1943, although there were cuts in expenditure and
shrinkage of training courses to  cope w ith financial constraints.81
Policemen were taugh t m ilita ry expressions o f organisational 
identity  - salutes and drills - and practised martial arts. Jûdô and 
kendo were regarded as essential for the development o f spiritual 
and physical discipline and strength. "Police training was exacting. 
The patrolman was trained to  walk his beat at the speed of seventy- 
five steps per m i n u t e " . ^ 2  When dealing w ith the public he was 
instructed to  be polite but reserved. Matsui Shigeru, a leading police 
educationalist during the interwar period, insisted tha t policemen 
were both guardians of the people and representatives o f the s t a t e . 83 
That the re  was tension between these tw o  pos itions is  
demonstrated by a policeman's reaction to  his chief's instructions in 
1920:
As a police officer of Japan, I am a central government official, and I
intend to work hard to save the nation. Isn't it strange that he should tell
us to work hard for the people of Nihonbashi ward? There may well be a 
contradiction between the interests of the people of the ward and those of 
the nation.84
Efforts at professionalization, particu larly a fte r the First World 
War, re flected concern at the high turnover o f patrolmen and
81 Westney, I & I. pp.76-80, 86-9; Tipton, Police State, p.79
82 Braibanti, "New Police Law", p . l8.
83 Matsui Shigeru, "Sengo no Keisatsu ni tsuite", Keisatsu Kvôkai Zasshi. No.242 (Aug. 
1920) pp.16-34; Tipton, Police State, pp.82-4.
84 Miyashita Hiroshi, Tokkô no Kaisô (Tabata Shoten, Tokyo, 1978) pp.28-9. Quoted in 
Westney, I & I. p.88.
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dissatis faction w ith  the quality o f applicants. Harsh w o rk in g  
conditions and poor salaries 85 were identified as the  principal 
causes of these problems. Patrolmen earned on average ¥ 5 0 /m o n th  
between 1930 and 1937, spending about half o f it on living 
e x p e n s e s . 8 6  in 1941 the approximate level of pay for a constable in 
Osaka was ¥70/m onth, following a 20% increase in base pay granted 
to  all police personnel to  meet the rising cost o f living. Although 
this did not include overtime pay, allowances for meals when on 
duty twenty-four hours a day, help with accommodation and bonuses 
for meritorious deeds, the police as an occupational group were no t 
well o ff. Perhaps the key issue was working conditions. Police 
officers often worked tw en ty -fou r hour sh ifts  or a pa tte rn  of 
tw en ty-fou r hours on duty, eight hours off, then eight hours on. In 
rural areas where there was ju s t a single one-man police post the 
constable was never o ff duty. 87
Pressure of work and a keen sense o f superiority together ensured 
tha t the police were im patient w ith the ir charges. The rudeness 
with which policemen stopped passersby resulted in the nickname o i 
k o ra , an exclam ation more commonly associated w ith  parents 
chastisng the ir c h i l d r e n . 88 The arrogance of police officers derived 
from the ideas tha t underpinned the police institu tion, such as their 
characterisation as nursemaids of the people, but also from modern
85 In 1909 Arthur Lloyd referred to police pay as "exiguous". Five years earlier 
Lafcadio Hearn stated that the police were "paid from £1 to £1 10s. per month, 
according to locality; and the average pay of school-teachers is yet lower...- many 
receiving less than 7s. a month". Both compared unfavourably with the monthly wage of 
a second lieutenant in the army, which Hearn estimated at £3 (Japan - An Attempt at 
Interpretation. Macmillan, New York, 1904).
86 In 1933 a commentator on police affairs, Toyama Fukuo, stated that policemen were 
not that badly off, bearing in mind that many people were suffering. According to Hane, 
the average urban worker earned three yen a day in 1935-6, and had to spend at least 
1 /3  of it on food ( Modern Japan. p.219). J. B. Cohen states that the average monthly 
factory money wage for males increased from ¥65 .42  in 1936 to ¥71 .02  in 1939  
(Japan's Economv in War and Reconstruction. p.330). The Japan-Manchukuo Yearbook. 
1 9 4 0 . contends that "with a pittance of a salary, ¥ 4 0 -7 0  in the service of the 
Metropolitan Police Board, besides a petty allowance below ¥7, the lot of policemen is 
anything but enviable...they certainly deserve better treatm ent from the central and 
local treasuries" (p .145). If the other figures quoted are correct the upper limit of the 
figure suggested -¥70  - is more likely to be correct than the lower limit.
87 R. & A. Report No.2758, p.40; Tipton, Police State, p.87.
88 See subsection entitled oi kora keisatsu in Hironaka Toshio, Senqo. pp.2-4.
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organisational mechanisms tha t encouraged a positive self-image 
and a sense of belonging to  an elite.
Eleanor Westney argues tha t close identification w ith the police 
institu tion  caused patrolmen to  be intolerant o f challenges to  their 
authority. Referring to  the Hibiya rio t of 1 9 0 5 , 8 9  she states tha t 
"police overreaction and violence were w idely blamed fo r the  
transform ation o f a peaceful pro test into six days of rioting tha t 
le ft over two thousand citizens....injured".90 Arthur Lloyd was in no 
doubt as to  the cause of the disturbance:
(The) demonstration was on the occasion of the publication of the peace 
terms with Russia. Everybody was excited and disappointed, and the 
citizens of Tokyo wanted to assemble in Hibiya Park and talk the thing out. 
Unfortunately the authorities viewed the m atter from a different 
standpoint, and the park gates were guarded by police, who drew their 
swords and wounded several persons, some of them fatally. Then the 
people rose up in their w ra th .
However, the police were capable of harnessing the people's energies 
for their own ends. In 1923, following the great Kantô earthquake, 
hundreds of Koreans were killed by mobs incited by talk o f sinister 
plots. "Rumours spread tha t Koreans were poisoning wells. The 
police were la ter accused o f encouraging h o s tility  by u rg in g  
pa rticu la r a tte n tio n  to  w e l l s . . . " . 9 2  The a u th o ritie s , always 
suspecting Koreans of antisocial activ ities, decided to  whip up 
la tent popular hostility . Following the declaration o f martial law, 
the police took the opportunity to  round up anarchists, communists 
and socialists. Ten labour leaders were murdered at Kameido police 
station and the anarchist Osugi Sakae suffered a similar f a t e . 93
89 This began as a protest against the terms of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, which 
concluded the Russo-Japanese War. Matsui Shigeru, first division chief of the MPB at 
the time, dismissed the claim that "the riot was caused by 'unlawful police intervention 
and brutality'", arguing that "fundamentally the police were made scapegoats for the 
popular indignation invited by government secrecy about the peace negotiations" (S. 
Okamoto , "The Emperor and the Crowd: The Historical Significance of the Hibiya Riot", 
in T. Najita & J. V. Koschmann, eds.. Conflict in Modern Japanese Historv. Princeton 
University Press, N.J., 1982).
90 Westney, I & I. p.89.
91 A. Lloyd, Everv-dav Japan, p. 164.
92 E. Seidensticker, Low Citv. High Citv (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1984) p.7.
93 Tipton, Police State. p.21; M. Weiner, The Origins of the Korean Communitv in 
Japan. 1 91 0 -1 92 3  (Manchester University Press, 1989) pp.164-200 .
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Police Methods
Early in 1946 a high-ranking Japanese police official explained the 
relationship between "b ru ta lity " and "effic iency" to  an investigator 
o f the Public Safety Division in the following terms:
Humane treatment toward suspected persons and...expensive methods of 
crime detection are luxuries which we (Japanese) cannot afford...The loss 
of his clothing to a Japanese is irreparable - the loss of his bicycle may 
deprive him of his livelihood. Under these circum stances, no 
consideration can be given to abstract justices; the policeman is 
interested only in recovering the suit of clothes or the bicycle. This is 
done by apprehending all the likely suspects, and if necessary their 
families, and securing a confession...by methods that perhaps are not 
considered humane.
The speaker's examples of crime - the th e ft of a suit or a bicycle - 
suggest th a t m istreatm ent o f suspects and criminals served to  
p ro tect the interests o f ordinary, law-abiding Japanese who could 
not afford to  lose the few possessions they had. It is implied tha t 
firm , decisive police action acted as a de te rren t against the  
violation of an individual's right to  property. In fact police brutality 
was mainly directed at those who undermined national un ity and 
m obilisation - those who voiced reservations concerning the 
soundness of government policies or advocated a radical political 
agenda. Above all, the police o ffic ia l's  s ta te m e n t reveals the 
durability o f trad itional practices, namely the use o f to rtu re  to  
extract confessions from suspects. In Tokugawa Japan, to rtu re  was 
an acceptable method of obtaining a confession, w ithout which there 
could be no p u n i s h m e n t . 9^ The in troduction of French criminal 
procedures after the Meiji Restoration did little  to  discredit it as a 
means of solving crimes.
The principle of trial based on evidence was introduced into Japan 
fo llow ing the  adoption o f French legal practices, and was 
accompanied by the formal abolition of to rtu re  in 1879 on the
94 PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p. 10 (NARA, Suitland, 
Box 334, file 25). The identity of the police officer is not revealed.
95 Hane, Premodern Japan, p.141.
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recommendation of the French adviser, Emile B o i s s o n a d e . 9 6  However, 
the choice of an accusatorial trial system, in which the suspect is 
considered guilty until proved innocent, encouraged the Japanese 
practice of securing evidence of guilt and then sending the case to  
c o u r t . 9 7  Confessions were to  be expected, given the ease w ith which 
a procurator could detain a suspect and the judge's lengthy pretrial 
in v e s tig a tio n  (b o th  c h a ra c te ris tic  o f C on tinen ta l crim inal 
procedure).98
Neither the provisions of the 1889 Constitution nor the six basic 
legal codes im ported from  France and Germany s u p p la n te d  
trad itional thought and practice. Deference towards governm ent 
o ffic ia ls  ra ther than assertion o f rights remained the rule, a 
suspec t's  confession rep resen ting  an accom m odation w ith  
constituted authority. Just as the law was manipulated by the police 
as a flexible tool of administration, so the extraction o f confessions 
was used to  speed up the process o f solving crimes and, more 
im portan tly , to  Justify rehab ilita tion . The emphasis placed on 
apprehension and confession was mirrored by neglect o f sc ie n tific  
investigation and preparation of e v i d e n c e . 9 9
In the immediate prewar period the primacy of confession as a legal 
device was such th a t in most cases its extraction was seen as 
suffic ient Justification for the means employed. These ranged from 
persuasion to  b ru ta lity . Accord ing to  an Am erican m ilita ry  
government officer, "the use o f th ird  degree tac tics  to  enforce 
confessions was common. In one instance....(he) saw the effects o f 
acid being poured over the eyes o f prisoners, blinding them  for 
l i f e " . 100 Kobayashi Takiji, who w ro te  a novel ab ou t po lice
90 Boissonade campaigned hard for the abolition of torture following an incident on 
1 7 /4 /1 8 7 5 . Passing the Tokyo High Court Building he heard "a half-human, half animal 
scream....(On investigating) he was paralysed with horror at the sight of a man seated on 
a rigidly corrugated board holding a big stone slab, screaming under the brutal torture". 
See H. Abe, "Criminal Justice in Japan: Its Historical Background and Modern 
Problems", American Bar Association Journal. 97 (June 1961) p.557.
97 Tipton, Japanese Police State, p.39.
98 Chalmers Johnson, Conspiracy at Matsukawa (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1 972 ) p.1 56.
99 PSD, Police branch, "Japanese Police System", p.1 5 (Suitland, B.334, file 25).
’’ 90 Braibanti, "New Police Law", p.18.
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b ru ta N ty ,io i was subjected to  appalling trea tm en t following his 
arrest. Horrific injuries indicated that he had been tortured to  death,
rather than dying o f heart failure as the police claimed. He had
wounds consistent with beating and kicking, marks le ft by hot tongs
on his forehead and perforations on his thigh made by a nail or
d r il l.102 That the m istreatm ent of detainees was widespread is 
indicated by a statem ent made by Procurator-General Koyama 
Matsukichi in 1927. Directing his comments at procurators and 
policemen, he warned them  th a t beating and to rtu re  were 
unacceptable. His reminder to  senior police officers to  observe 
"moral principles" and "p ro tect human rights", both fundamental to  
the revised Criminal Code, was probably an a ttem pt by the Judiciary 
to  rein in police excesses.^ 03
R. H. Mitchell draws atten tion to  the "psychological to rtu re " tha t 
attended miserable conditions in gaol and the long wait for a trial. 
Feelings o f isolation and depression were probably more conducive 
to  meaningful conversion (tenko) than direct action by the police.^ 04 
Individuals were held for as long as tw o  years w ith o u t being 
charged, policemen merely issuing successive orders for detention. 
The police managed to  evade legal constra in ts , such as the 
prohib ition of detention for the purpose o f criminal investigation 
and the time lim it on protective and preventive detention. Officers 
observed the rules w ithou t paying a tten tion  to  the ir spirit. For 
example. Special Higher Police (SHP) personnel went through the 
motions o f releasing a suspect at one door, only to  immediately 
detain him at another ( h ik im odosh i). Another ruse was to  take the 
prisoner to  colleagues in another station, and have them detain him 
immediately a fter his formal release ( t a r a i m a w a s h i ) . ' ' Q 6  As for the
TOI The novel, The Fifteenth of March (1 9 28 ), exposed police practices in Otaru, 
Hokkaido.
T02 Tipton, Japanese Police State, p.26.
T 03 R, H. Mitchell, Thought Control in Prewar Japan (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
N.Y., 1976) p.101.
T 04 Ibid.. pp. 101-2; R. & A. Report No.2758, p.28. The tenkôsha's perspective is 
examined by P. G. Steinhoff, "Tenko and Thought Control", in G. L. Bernstein and H. 
Fukui, eds., Japan and the World (Macmillan, Oxford, 1988) pp.86-91.
T 05 Examined in the next section.
T 06 Tipton, Police State, pp.66-7; Hironaka, Senao. pp.15-18.
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extent of such abuses, even former SHP officials admit tha t they
were prevalent J 07
Although most Japanese did not suffer in police cells, they all 
experienced intrusion, however harmless it m ight have seemed. The 
policeman on duty in the kôban had access to  the local population or 
fam ily reg ister (ko se k i). which contained details o f the life and 
background of every citizen in a given d is tr ic t.^08 indirect methods 
of investigation, such as home visits, represented a subtle form of 
surveillance, one which often produced results. An informal chat 
with residents over a cup of tea provided an invaluable opportun ity 
fo r observing and hearing about local developments.109 Another 
pretext for invading an individual's personal space was the periodic 
inspection of houses for reasons of public health or morals.11 o The 
SHP lacked the subtlety o f the regular police - they justified  forced 
entry of a residence during the night by citing the provision "when a 
police officer deems tha t there is d a n g e r".m  As the elite o f Japan's 
police organisation and the primary agents of social control, they 
could act w ith impunity. Responsible for controlling thought, the 
SHP's role expanded in line with increasing m ilitary adventurism  in 
China and the d rift towards war in the Pacific. During this period o f 
crisis it was deemed essential th a t Japan be ideologically one, 
united behind a common purpose and confident of the realisation of 
national ambitions.
Thought Control
In 1911 the Special Higher Police f Tokubetsu Kôtô Keisatsu or 
T okkô) was established in the Keishicho as another branch of the 
political po lice.11  ^ its creation represented the final stage in the 
organisational development of that part of the police force involved 
in s tr ic tly  political activ ities. Subsequent expansion re flected an 
increasing awareness by the authorities o f the th rea t posed by
Tipton, Police State, p.26.
T 08 Braibanti, "New Police Law", p.18. 
 ^09 Mitchell, Thought Control, p.1 21.
- T 0 R & y\ Report No.2758, p.24.
 ^  ^  ^ Tipton, Police State, p.67.
 ^  ^2 p.44.
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radical political groups to  national unity and political stab ility , bo th  
of which became more important as the country found itse lf entering 
a period o f crisis. The decision to  establish the T okkô was made 
a fte r the dramatic high treason case o f 1910, involving Kôtoku 
Shusui, a leading anarchist. Accused o f "conspiring against the 
throne", Kôtoku was found guilty and hanged along w ith eleven 
others. "In the years tha t followed his name came to  symbolize the 
type of person who indulged in 'dangerous thoughts' to  the detriment
of the nation....".113
The principal duties of the SHP, or "though t police" as it later 
became known, were the control of social m ovem entsU ^ and the 
suppression o f rad ica ls /a d vo ca te s  o f dangerous fo r e ig n  
ideo log ies.115 Political functions were not monopolised by the new 
unit, the Higher Police dealing with election control and the Book 
Section of the Police Bureau responsible for censorship. In 1912 
Tokko sections within the Metropolitan Police Board and its Osaka 
counterpart became independent o f the Higher Police, in itiating a 
process tha t culminated in an elite force - a "police aristocracy" - 
tha t operated separately from the regular police. "As the eyes and 
ears o f the powerful Home Ministry, the 'though t police' kept an 
investigative finger on the pulse of society, sending detailed reports 
regularly to  that Ministry".116
The growth in importance of the Special Higher Police from the early 
1920s ran parallel w ith the reinvigoration o f th rea te in ing  alien 
ideologies, particularly communism in the wake o f the Russian 
revolution. The Tokko represented a logical development from the 
notion of a higher police. As the political threats to  the status quo 
became more sophisticated, so there was a corresponding need for 
the police organisation to  become more elaborate, dividing its
113 F. G. Notehelfer, Kôtoku Shusui: Portrait of a Japanese Radical (Cambridge 
University Press, 1971) p.1. Some historians argue that Kôtoku was "framed" by the 
the Japanese government - See G. 0. Totten, The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar 
Japan (Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1966) p.4.
114 See Large, Organised Workers & Totten, Social Democratic Movement.
113 Mitchell, Thought Control, p.24.
11G R. H. Mitchell, Censorship in Imperial Japan (Princeton University Press, N.J., 
1983) p.146.
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various tasks among specia list units so as to  function  more 
effectively. As for the great majority o f the Japanese people, their 
compliance became more marked as the government refined its 
instruments of persuasion and coercion. The authorities perpetuated 
Tokugawa norms, namely the lack of redress against authority and 
the absence of a distinction between public and private morality.11  ^
The la tte r premise implied tha t an individual's thought was a matter 
o f concern for the government, and accounts for the visibility of the 
thought control system.^
According to  P. G. Steinhoff " 'though t con tro l' refers to  a power 
relationship in which one party deliberately a ttem pts  to  lim it or 
direct the thoughts and beliefs of some other pa rty ".! 19 Censorship, 
propaganda and police harassment were the principal means by  
which the s ta te  sought to  influence indiv iduals ' be lie fs and 
discourage independent intellectual development. Formal procedures 
o f pre-publication and post-pub lica tion censorship e f fe c t iv e ly  
lim ited the parameters o f public debate, confining it to  positive 
appraisals o f the imperial political system. A t the same time police 
in tim idation forced editors and w rite rs to  "vo lun ta rily " censor
themselves.! 20
As far as propaganda was concerned, the ruling e lite  sought to  
p ro tect its position by manipulating the imperial figurehead. The 
emperor embodied the kokutai - "the unique essence o f Japanese 
s o c ie ty " . !21 Literally translated as "national po lity", its  principal 
elements - "a ruling fam ily 'unbroken for ages eterna l', and an 
intimate connection between throne and people" 122 - reflected the 
Meiji o ligarchy's "invention o f t r a d i t i o n " . !  2 3  These doctrines.
! ! ^  Ibid., p.337.
! ! 9 Tipton, Police State, p.137.
! !9 Steinhoff, "Tenko and Thought Control", p.78.
! 20 Mitchell, Censorship. Preface p. 10.
!2 ! R. H. Minear, Japanese Tradition and Western Law: Emperor. State and Law in the 
Thought of Hozumi Yatsuka (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970) p.65.
! 22 Ibid.
! 23 E. Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870 -1914" in E. Hobsbawm 
and T. Ranger, eds.. The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge University Press, 1992) 
p.266. See also C. Gluck, Japan's Modern Mvths (Princeton University Press, N.J., 
1 9 8 5 ).
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however, were challenged by fore ign po litica l theories th a t 
advocated abolition o f the emperor system and the liberation of the 
individual. The establishment o f an illegal communist party in 1922 
and the assassination attem pt on the Prince Regent by Nanba Daisuke 
in 1923 brought about an atmosphere of profound unease tha t paved 
the way for the passage of the Peace Preservation Law in 1925.124 
This coincided with the passage of the universal male suffrage bill, 
and represented "a counterweight w ith which conservative forces 
sought to  buttress the emperor system and a capitalist e c o n o m y " . 125
"Since the intention o f the Peace Preservation Law was to  prohibit 
acts which stemmed directly from certain political ideas, the aim 
can be termed 'thought con tro l'".126 Criminal punishment could now 
be meted out to  anyone involved in activ ities arising from  an 
ideology tha t threatened the koku ta i. the authorities directing their 
a tten tion  to  ideological motive rather than actual p r a c t i c e s . !  27 
Membership of a political group with radical aims, and later jus t a 
sym pathetic a ttitu d e  towards th a t group's goals, was su ffic ien t 
Justification for arrest and detention. Article one o f the law read as 
fo llow s:
Anyone who organises a group for the purpose of changing the national 
polity (kokutai) or of denying the private property system, or anyone 
who knowingly participates in said group, shall be sentenced to penal 
servitude or imprisonment not exceeding ten years. An offence not 
actually carried out shall also be subject to punishment.
The phrases "changing the national polity" and "denying the private 
property system " were ta rge ted at anarchists and c o m m u n is ts  
respectively. Although the legal meaning o f kokuta i was re la tive ly  
precise - the emperor as the location of sovereignty - it conjured up 
in the minds o f the Japanese people a much broader p icture, 
comprising the ir way of life .129 The vague, ill-defined term inology
124 Mitchell, Thought Control, p.39.
125 Katzenstein & Tsujinaka, Defending the Japanese State, p.37.
126 Steinhoff, "Tenko and Thought Control", p.80. Unravelling the notion of "thought 
control", she explains that "the reach of the law was limited to action proceeding from 
thought. The law could not exercise effective Jurisdiction over what a person thought".
127 Tipton, Police State, p.64.
128 Quoted in Large, Organized Workers, p.67.
129 Tipton, Japanese Police State, pp.62-4.
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of the law promoted the Tokko not only as agents of enforcement but 
also as decision-makers.
There was "a vast discrepancy between arrest rates and charge 
rates", suggesting tha t "the Peace Preservation Law was utilised for 
harassment p u r p o s e s " . ! 3 0  Between January 1928 and October 1941, 
65,921 "le ftis ts ", the great majority communists, were arrested by 
the police, but only 5,559 were indicted. 6,199 suspects received 
"suspension of indictment", and for 2,667 charges were w i t h h e l d . !  31 
Clearly, the Peace Preservation Law was used by the police to  deter 
people from indulging in dangerous thought. Revision o f the law in 
1928 in the d irection o f harsher provisions was fo llow ed by 
expansion of the thought police, w ith a unit now assigned to  each 
prefecture. A fte r 1932 the Special Higher Police became a full 
departm ent w ith six sections, presumably so as to  accommodate 
expansion and elaboration of Tokko functions. In Tokyo Headquarters 
there were now 380 thought police, compared to  only 70 in 1928. 
New recru its  assisted in the work o f in te lligence -ga thering , 
maintaining surveillance over such organisations as unions, political 
parties and educational i n s t i t u t i o n s . !  3 2
The scope and degree of police repression increased in line w ith 
developments abroad. Following the "China Incident" o f July 1937, 
the government took further measures to  ensure con fo rm ity  and 
extract more intense expressions of loyalty from suspects. The 1941 
revision o f the Peace Preservation Law approved the practice of 
applying it to  religious movements and individuals unassociated 
w ith  any po litica l o rgan isa tion , by which tim e  anarch is ts , 
com m unists, soc ia lis ts , liberals, Christians and even some 
Shintoists and Buddhists had been victimised by the thought control 
s y s te m .!33 A fte r 1 9 3 7  the police became increasingly involved in 
the daily life o f each citizen. By the early 1940s the burden o f
! 30 Steinhoff, "Tenko and Thought Control", p.80.
! 31 Mitchell, Thought Control, p.142. Figures that also cover the period 1941-45 can 
be found in B-A. Shillony, Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1981 ) pp.12-13.
! 32 Mitchell, Thought Control, pp.119-120.
! 33 Tipton, Japanese Police State. p.70; Mitchell, Thought Control, pp. 137, 148.
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regulation was such tha t they could not have coped w ithout the 
active cooperation of neighbourhood groups.
Wartime and the Neighbourhood Associations
The neighbourhood associations ( tonari-qum i or rinpo-han) were an 
integral part o f the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taise i 
Yokusankai). The la tte r was a loose federation o f citizens' groups 
and former political parties which, according to  Vice-Governor Soto 
o f Tokyo, aimed to  "drastically....expand the fighting strength and 
enhance the fierce sp irit o f service to  the  s t a t e " . ^  3 4  Both 
institu tions were formally established by the Japanese government 
in 1940, although as far as the neighbourhood groups were concerned 
it was more a case of revival for government purposes. During the 
Tokugawa period townships were organised into groups o f from five 
to  ten householders ( g o n in -a u m i). Members were "held jo in tly  
responsible for the payment o f taxes and criminal acts committed by 
any of (their n u m b e r ) " . ^ 3 5  The system of neighbourhood cooperation 
and solidarity had deep roots in Japanese society, and became 
increasingly im portan t as the demands o f war forced ordinary 
Japanese to  endure many privations. In marked contrast, the Imperial 
Rule Assistance Association was created by central government, its 
"cum bersom e sogginess....(m aking it )  alm ost useless to  the 
authorities a fte r mid-1 9 4 2 " . 136 in January 1942 the Asahi Shinbun 
declared tha t "the IRAA has accomplished very little...since the Tôjô 
cabinet was established (October 1941)....Yet there are people who 
still advocate investing th is organisation w ith political p o w e r s " . ^  3 7  
In May 1 945 the paper smugly reported the IRAA's dissolution:
Ever since the IRAA was established, we urged it to adopt reasonable
objectives. Unfortunately, it did not heed our advice and became a huge
body with no clear functions. Under such circumstances its dissolution
became inevitable.^^ 8
 ^ 34 Braibanti, "Neighbourhood Associations in Japan and their Democratic 
Potentialities", Far Eastern Ouarterlv Vol.7. No.2 (Feb. 1948 ), p .141. Shillony, 
Politics and Culture, p.3.
T35 Hane, Premodern Japan, p.148.
 ^36 T. R. Havens, Valiev of Darkness - The Japanese People and World War Two (W. W. 
Norton & Co., New York, 1978) p.GO.
 ^37 Asahi. 1 1 /1 /4 5 . Translated by Shillony, Politics and Culture. 102 
T 38 Asahi. 1 8 /5 /4 5 . Translated by Shillony, Politics and Culture, p.107.
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It was the local groups, operating independently o f the ir parent 
federations, tha t mobilised communities and assisted the police in 
the implementation o f war-related m e a s u r e s  J  3 9  Performing a vital 
role, the neighbourhood associations continued to  exist until May
1947.140
There were two administrative tiers below the recognised organs o f 
local government. A t the base was the tonari-qum i. composed of 
about ten households within a given area.i4i Between ten and tw enty 
to n a r i-q u m i in turn made up one block association, known as 
chônaikai in cities and towns and burakukai in rural areas. The block 
association was essentially a coordinating agency, responsible fo r 
the d is tribu tion  o f orders and papers ou tlin ing  governm ent 
p o lic ies .142 "The ton a ri-q um i were the de facto  agencies o f local 
ru le " .143 It was at this level tha t "the application o f sanctions 
compelled the desired behaviour pattern".144 Order number seventeen 
- "Essentials o f Providing for Community Councils" - was issued by 
the Home Ministry in September 1940 to  explain the purpose o f 
neighbourhood councils and associations.145 According to  the firs t 
three paragraphs of the order, the aims o f the structure  were as 
fo llow s:
1) To reorganise the people of towns and villages on the basis of the 
cooperative neighbourhood spirit and to make them perform their 
duties....
2) To make this system the foundation in building national morality and a 
national spirit of cooperation.
3) To disseminate the national policy thoroughly so that the national 
administration can be improved.
139 An excellent summary of the history, organisation and significance of neighbourhood 
associations can be found in J. B. Cohen, Japan's Economv in War and Reconstruction 
(University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1949) p. 374, fn. 37.
140 Shillony, Politics and Culture, p. 179 (fn. 4).
141 J. w. Masland, "Neighbourhood Associations in Japan", Far Eastern Survev. Vol.15, 
No. 23 (2 0 /1  1 /4 6 ) p.356.
142 Braibanti, "Neighbourhood Associations...", FEO. p.143.
143 Mitchell, Thought Control, p.1 63.
144 Braibanti, "Neighbourhood Associations...”, FEO. p.143.
145 Havens, Valiev of Darkness, p.75.
146 Braibanti, FEQ, P-142.
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The reference to  "national m ora lity" suggested a role for the 
neighbourhood groups in the contro l o f thought. Indeed, th e ir  
involvem ent in "moral t r a in in g " ' 'w a s  the main reason for the 
Occupation's disapproval o f the system. A Public Safety Division 
report referred to  "the  re-establishment o f the to n a ri-q u m i (in 
1940) as a communal spy system", and stated tha t neighbourhood 
groups fostered patriotism  and served as effective instruments o f 
rigid control. The neighbourhood association is described as "an 
auxiliary police agency which reported crime, conducted censuses, 
registered changes of address and performed functions concerning 
sanitation, tra ffic , public peace, morals and punishment for minor 
offences". In addition it liaised w ith the police concerning public 
health, and organised savings and bond subscription campaigns. 
According to  the report the police were often working from the 
inside: "D is tric t commissioners became the heads o f local tona ri- 
qumi in many instances and in all o f them the police participated in
leadership".148
American preoccupation with the active cooperation between police 
and neighbourhood associations and the ir common involvement in 
thought contro l comes across clearly in Research and Analysis 
Report Number 2758. It contends th a t "the  associations are a 
valuable asset to  police strength", the ir importance deriving "more 
from a de terren t e ffec t than anything else. The in tegra tion  of 
individual Japanese into communities" made it d ifficu lt for them to 
escape the observation of others and led to  a fear o f social 
ostracism , a major disincentive to  commit crime.149 The census 
surveys, conducted regularly by the associations and shared with the 
police, reminded people th a t "p riva te " developm ents were the 
business o f others, thus adding to  the sense of personal denial and 
public duty.
John Masland, a member of Government Section during the firs t half 
o f 1946, highlighted "the  d is tribu tion  o f com m odities and the
147 Mitchell, Thought Control, p.1 63.
148 PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", pp. 8-9 (Suitland, 
Box 334, file 25).
149 R. & A. Report No.2758, p.25.
61
operation o f the official rationing system" as the principal functions 
o f the to n a r i-q u m i^50. Clearly, these related to  an economic role 
rather than a political one. Paragraph four of order number seventeen 
(September, 1940) characterised the local groups as "a force in the 
management o f a controlled economy and in the stabilisation o f 
national liv in g ".! 51 As the Pacific War progressed it  was th is 
function, more than any other, that increasingly occupied police and 
the ir auxiliary agencies. A fte r all, nothing is more basic to  the 
execution o f a war than provision of an adequate supply of food for 
both the m ilitary forces figh ting  overseas and those at home 
working on their behalf.
In 1938 Economic Peace Preservation became an independent section 
in the Police B u r e a u , !  5 2  its new status reflecting an in c rea s ing  
awareness o f the need to  marshal scarce economic resources. In 
September 1939 price controls were imposed and in April 1941 rice 
rationing to  consumers was in troduced.! 53 However, it was not until 
October 1 942 tha t the authorities delegated the task of distributing 
food and clothing rations to  the t o n a r i - q u m i . ! 5 4  so making these 
local organisations the key to  survival. J. B. Cohen maintains tha t 
"there  is considerable evidence to  indicate tha t the use of the 
neighbourhood associations for rationing resulted in w idespread  
m aldistribution of civilian supplies. Goods were...d iverted into the 
black m a rke t" .! 55 The "corruption o f the economic police" is 
identified on several occasions as an im portant contribu tory factor 
to  the rapid growth of the black m arket.! 56 Increasingly aware o f 
their country's plight, police officials gave in to  tem ptation, putting 
their own interests before those of the nation.
!50  Masland, "Neighbourhood Associations...", p.355.
! 51 Braibanti, FEO. p.142; Havens, Valiev of Darkness, p.75. For more detailed analysis 
of the economic role of tonari-qumi see E. Pauer, "From a 'Controlled Economy' to a 
'Planned Economy'; Food Distribution and Neighbourhood Associations in Japanese Cities 
During the Pacific War", in G. Daniels, ed., Europe Interprets Japan (Paul Norbury 
Publications, Tenterden, Kent, 1984) p.34.
! 52 Mitchell, Thought Control, p.1 96.
! 53 Havens, Valiev of Darkness, p.49. Cohen, Japan's Economv. pp. 358, 362.
!54 Braibanti, FE^, p.1 50.
! 55 Cohen, Japan's Economv. p.374, fn.37.
!56  Hbid., p.362.
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"O ften as much as 30% of staple foods were diverted in to  black 
market c h a n n e l s " J  5 7  not surprising given the rising value o f scarce 
com m odities. "A private research organisation, in a s tudy o f  
purchases by factory workers in Tokyo during Septem ber-October 
1944, found that such consumers purchased 9% of their rice, 69% of 
their vegetables, 38% of their fish and 7% of their seasonings on the 
black m a r k e t " . ' ' 5 8  These figures increased d ram atica lly  once 
American bombing raids began in November, 1944. The po lice , 
charged w ith enforcing economic regulations, had to  contend w ith 
large numbers of hungry c ity  residents travelling to  the nearby 
countryside in search of food. As a result absenteeism became a 
major problem in 1945. The police rebuked those guilty o f neglecting 
the ir public duties but w ith litt le  success.^ 59 Trains leaving the 
cities were crowded w ith Japanese on the ir way to  nearby rural 
areas to  buy directly from farmers. "The police were supposed to  
search their baggage for food, but arrangements could be made to  
avoid th is ". For example, the leader of one local branch o f the 
fu iin k a i (Lad ies ' A id - to -th e -W a r-E ffo rt S o c ie ty )  o b ta in e d  
permission from the local police for each woman to  carry in a 
"daily...back-load of garden p r o d u c e " . As early as January 1943 the 
economist Kawakami Hajime claimed th a t people were "th inking 
from morning to  night only o f fo o d ".^^ i By the spring o f 1944 
thousands of Tokyo residents were travelling every day to  Chiba or 
Saitama prefectures to  buy food on the black m a r k e t . ^  6 2
There were around 1,300,000 neighbourhood associations throughout 
Japan during the w a r . ' ' 6 3  Their effectiveness as units o f local 
governm ent made them indispensable to  the civil police force, 
a lthough they were not the only auxiliary organisation. T h e  
d istinction tha t has been drawn between economic and politica l 
functions is a convenient one, perhaps obscuring the true picture. In
T 57 Braibanti, FEO. p.1 51.
T 58 Cohen, Japan's Economv. p.385.
 ^59 p s. Hulse, "Some Effects of the War upon Japanese Society", Far Eastern Ouarterlv 
Vol.7, No.l (Nov. 1947), p.30.
160 p.28.
161 Quoted in Havens, Valiev of Darkness, p.118.
1 62 Ibid.. p.1 24.
163 1 ^ ., p.77.
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1939 the head o f the Criminal Affairs Bureau stated th a t thought 
and economic crimes were one and the same thing,164 since both 
threatened the kokutai by undermining national mobilisation. Such 
problems as hoarding of scarce com m odities and illegal black 
market sales frustrated government e ffo rts  to  d is tribu te  resources 
equitably throughout the nation and were potentially damaging to  
morale. The police focused on any activ ities  th a t weakened the 
national will to  support the war e ffo rt, and as the d istinctions 
between different types of crime became more and more blurred, so 
too did the separation of military and civil police functions.
The Kenpei
The quiescence of the Japanese people is unsurprising given tha t 
they had to  contend with not only the Tokko but also the Kenpei 
(m ilita ry  police). Both agencies were determ ined to  suppress 
po litica l d issent and given w ide-ranging powers to  do so. 
Established in 1881, the Kenpei combined m ilitary, adm in istra tive 
and judicial powers under the Jurisdiction o f the army, home and 
justice ministers respectively.165 Formally attached to  the Japanese 
army and "commanded by a Provost Marshal-General d irec tly  
responsible to  the War M in is te r",166 the K enpe i increasingly 
represented a roving police presence. A lthough the M inister o f 
Justice had the power to  act against the m ilitary police, th is was 
rarely exercised, reflecting the strength o f the m ilitary vis à vis 
civil agencies of government.
Following Japan's aggression in Manchuria in 1931 the defin ition of 
m ilitary security e x p a n d e d J G z  The Kenpei was increasingly active in 
Japan and abroad, making every e ffo rt to  stamp out d isaffection 
w ith  the m ilita ry 's  policies. By the la te 1930s its  vig ilance 
extended to  anything which might undermine the war e ffo rt. "Since 
pacifism , liberalism and sym pathy fo r the US or Britain were 
considered to  be obstacles to  v ictory, the m ilita ry police were
 ^ Mitchell, Thought Control, p.166.
^65 Westney, Imitation and Innovation, pp.72-3.
T R. Deacon, Kenoeitai - The Japanese Secret Service Then and Now (Tuttle, Tokyo, 
1990) pp.162-3.
T Hulse, "Some Effects of the War...", p.27, fn.l 2.
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determined to  suppress t h e m " . ‘' 6 8  Their functions overlapping, th e  
K e n p e i increasingly encroached on the T o k k ô 's ju r isd ic tio n , 
genera ting  c o n flic t betw een them se lves and th e ir  c iv ilian 
counterparts. The police institu tion , therefore, was not monolithic. 
That rivalry between civil and military police forces continued up to  
ministerial level is demonstrated by the "Go-Stop Incident" o f 1933, 
when the Home Ministry clashed w ith the army. The origin of the 
dispute was a figh t between a soldier and a policeman following a 
minor tra ffic  violation (the soldier tw ice crossed the road when the 
"go-stop" light was r e d ) . ^  6 9
As the Kenpei became increasingly involved in policing functions 
outside the army, the size o f the force grew - from a domestic 
strength of 2,000 men during the Meiji period to  7,500 during the 
Pacific War (there were many more overseas, mainly in Japan's 
colonial possessions, engaged in intelligence work). Despite its  
being a small force it was dreaded everywhere. According to  a PSD 
report, "the  Kenpei became interwoven in the entire pattern o f 
Japanese life ....(and) the severity o f the ir methods made them 
disliked and feared by the civilian p o p u la tio n " . i  ^i In 1941 the 
Kenpei's commander, Major-General Katô Hakujirô, fe lt the need to  
reassure the public in a radio broadcast:
In some quarters Military Policemen are feared and suspected as a kind of
secret police. I positively assure you...that you need not fear them.^^^
The Japanese people, however, were not convinced. F. S. Hulse, who 
was in Japan from October 1945 to  June 1946, stated tha t "there 
was s till, during the f irs t few m onths a fte r  the  surrender, 
considerable dread of the police, although....the (civil) police claimed 
to  be the protectors o f the people, especially from the K e n p e i " . i
T 68 Shillony, Politics and Culture, p. 14.
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T P S D ,  Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p. 14 (Suitland, Box 
334, file 25).
Shillony, Politics and Culture, p.1 5.
Hulse, "Some Effects of the War....", pp.39-40.
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Although this claim may have reflected a ttem pts by the Japanese 
authorities to  focus all the blame on the military, it is indicative o f 
the unpopularity of the Kenpei tha t ordinary police agencies should 
defend them selves in th is  way. Russell Brines, an American 
journalist in Japan between 1939 and 1941, intimated tha t m ilitary 
police excesses surpassed those of the ir civilian counterparts by  
alleging tha t "to rtu re  was routine in ordinary prisons (b u t) much 
more highly developed among the Kenoeitai".
Wartime emergency measures, such as the National Mobilisation 
Law, the National Defence Security Law and the Peace Preservation 
Law, "furnished the police w ith indisputable authority to  act w ith 
te rro rism  and b ru ta lity  in en forc ing  the  po lic ies o f t h e  
m i l i t a r i s t s " . The state monopolised the instruments o f violence, 
and the Japanese people fell into line, incapable o f resisting th e  
police and the army. Ultimately, "fear was probably an even more 
awesome means of standardisation than the elaborate organisational 
restrictions imposed on workers, neighbourhoods, and the media".
Conclusion
This chapter has set the scene for the Occupation's initial e ffo rts  at 
reform of the police. By highlighting the principal characteristics of 
the pre-surrender police force it has sketched in the con text o f 
Occupation policy, antic ipating its aims and hinting at possible 
problems. Japanese bureaucrats must have known th a t American 
reformers would take a dim view o f the centralised police system, 
e ither because they were aware o f its  excesses during the 
prewar/wartim e period or because they advocated "Anglo-Saxon" 
theories o f policing. Moreover, a com m itm ent to  sweep away the 
remnants o f a "police s ta te " necessitated the constriction o f what 
was a wide ambit of control, and the re-education of police officia ls 
"prone to  sermonising...(and) bu lly ing".i Policemen could not be
allowed to  continue m istrea ting detainees, regulating economic
R Brines, MacArthur's Japan (J. B. Lippincott, New York, 1948) p.49. 
PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p. 11.
T Havens, Valiev of Darkness, p.69.
Lloyd, Everv-dav Japan, p.1 63.
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affairs, frustrating the expression of dissenting views and engaging 
in neighbourhood surveillance. In short, dém ocra tisa tion d ic ta ted  
transformation of the police system.
Although this may well have been an admirable aim, it was perhaps 
an unrealistic one. Japan's police force had evolved over several 
decades, and was deeply rooted in the Japanese social environment. 
The appearance o f a Meiji policeman m ight have owed much to  
Western models, but his behaviour reflected the priorities o f the 
new regime and. Just as im portant, o ften the a ttitudes o f the 
Tokugawa samurai. American values were up against social norms 
and patterns of thought tha t had developed over hundreds of years. 
Reformers tended to  shelter behind dichotomies - public and private, 
rights and duties, the state and the individual - tha t were not as 
well defined in Japan as they were in the United States. A more 
im m ediate problem than th a t o f h is to rica l legacies was the 
economic state of Japan by 1945. Reference has been made to  the 
growth of the black market, and the breakdown of central controls. 
C oopera tion and so lidarity  at the local level minimised the 
disruptive effects of war, demonstrating the strengths o f Japanese 
society rather than inviting alternative solutions.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT
When the American Occupation of Japan began in September 1945, 
the role of the Japanese police and their effectiveness as an agency 
of law enforcement was determined by three factors: the a ttitude  of 
the Occupation authorities towards the police and the ir in tentions 
w ith regard to  reform or abolition of the prewar system; the health 
o f the police institution in terms of both human assets - manpower, 
morale, con fide n t/e ffec tive  performance o f duties - and physical 
resources - firearms, transport facilities, communications; and the 
disastrous economic situation in Japan following her defeat. The 
decision to  engage in an indirect Occupation meant tha t the police 
were indispensable to  the Americans, and ensured th a t the 
institu tion  would not be radically altered until o ther reforms had 
been successfully pushed through. In the meantime, however, 
reforms aimed at democratising Japanese society, namely the 
promotion o f civil liberties and the e ffo rts  made to  stim ulate a 
rights-consciousness on the part of the Japanese people, adversely 
affected the position of the police by undermining the people's 
trad itiona l respect fo r government officia ls. This reinforced th e  
weakness of the police, who, as a vita l support o f the prew ar/ 
wartime regime, were associated w ith a political order th a t had 
been discredited by the convincing defeat o f Japan in the Pacific 
war. The privations tha t had accompanied national mobilization for 
war, compounded by the tra il o f destruction le ft by American 
bombing raids, le ft a legacy of anger and resentment.
Popular activism, deliberately encouraged by the Occupiers, made 
such duties as economic regulation and maintenance of law and order 
particularly d ifficu lt for the police to  perform. Despite the ir siding 
with the Japanese people, the Americans still expected the police to  
ensure tha t stable conditions conducive to  a successful Occupation 
prevailed. Chaotic economic conditions forced the Americans to  
recognise the traditional police system as a necessary evil; thus it 
was le ft largely in tact until 1948. The above three determ inants o f 
police ac tiv ity  - Occupation policy, the s ta te  o f the in s titu tio n  
itse lf and economic conditions - impinged upon one another.
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Although they will be dealt w ith separately in this chapter, the aim 
is to  demonstrate how the ambiguity and ambivalence o f Occupation 
policy further weakened an already enfeebled force. This had serious 
consequences for the resolution of economic problems, particularly 
the expanding black market. Such was the weakness of the police 
th a t they were forced to  ally w ith in fluentia l members o f the 
community, whose power often derived from control o f illegally- 
hoarded goods. Thus the pathetic state of the police force combined 
w ith the d ifficu lt economic situation to  ensure the obstruction o f 
Occupation reforms, particularly those relating to  the permanent 
removal of the "Old Guard" from positions of influence.i
United States Policies
Article 10 of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 2 called fo r 
the removal o f "all obstacles to  the revival and strengthening o f 
dem ocratic tendencies among the Japanese people" and the 
establishment of "freedom of speech, o f religion, and of thought, as 
well as respect for fundamental human r i g h t s " . 3 Such statem ents, 
made before the Pacific War had been brought to  a close, promised 
very d iffe rent policing methods from those th a t had characterised 
the prewar/wartim e period. The liberation o f the Japanese people 
d ic ta ted the destruction of what American reform ers saw as a 
to ta lita rian  political system, underpinned by a police force th a t 
closely controlled the lives o f the people and employed methods 
considered unacceptable in "democratic" societies. Whilst those who 
had "deceived and misled the people in to embarking on w o rld  
conquest" would be punished, the Japanese people would be free to  
elect a "peacefully inclined and responsible government".^
However, the decision to  engage in an indirect Occupation  ^ presaged 
an accommodation w ith the Japanese establishment, which would
 ^ These contentions will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
2 The Potsdam Declaration was issued by the Presidents of China and the U.S. and the 
Prime Minister of Britain.
^Japanese Ministry of Finance, Financial History Section, The Financial Historv o f 
Japan. Volume 20 (Tokyo Keizai Shinposha, Tokyo, 1982) p.1 51.
Ibid.
 ^ According to Theodore Cohen, this decision was not taken until after the Japanese 
emperor's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on 14 August, 1945.
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undermine the realisation o f objectives agreed at Potsdam. The 
rationale for retaining the Japanese governmental s tructure  was 
explained in the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for 
Japan,6 dated 29 August 1945:
In view of the present character of Japanese society and the desire of the 
United States to attain its objectives with a minimum commitment of its 
forces and resources, the Supreme Commander will exercise authority 
through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the 
Emperor, to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers United States 
objectives. ^
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General MacArthur, 
was empowered to  intervene if the Japanese Government did not act 
on Occupation directives. More significantly he was to  encourage 
"changes in the form of government initiated by the Japanese people 
...in the d irection o f m odifying its feudal and au th o rita ria n  
tendencies" even if violent means were used. In such a case he was 
perm itted to  intervene "only where necessary to  ensure the security 
o f his forces and the atta inm ent o f all other objectives o f th e  
o ccu pa tion " . 8 A t firs t glance this policy of detachment afforded a 
nightmare scenario for the Japanese police who could expect little  
respect from their former charges. On closer inspection, however, 
the people's freedom to  push through some sort o f revolutionary 
programme for change was so qualified as to  make it almost 
meaningless. It was inconceivable tha t a violent transfer o f power 
could take place w ithou t a ffecting  the security  o f Occupation 
personnel. The firs t target of a hungry, angry urban population would 
have been stores of scarce commodities, which were guarded by both 
the Japanese police and Allied soldiers. Even if the new regime
 ^ The process of policy-formation is examined in detail by Theodore Cohen ( Remaking 
Japan, pp. 1 4 -4 8 ).He argues that the US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan 
reflected the views of "radical economic reformers and the 'China crowd'" rather than 
those of the "old Japan hands" in the State Department, whose dominant role in policy 
formation was usurped in the summer of 1945. "The result was the rejection of 
moderation"(p.31 ) and the endorsement of fundamental economic reforms. R. A. Moore, 
writing in the August 1979 issue of the Journal of Asian Studies, contends that the 
"contradictions between SCAP's professed goals and its actions" originated in this "change 
in policy" in mid-1 945. He identifies three phases of policy development - 1942-45, 
1 945 -48  and 1 948 -1952  - maintaining that the middle one was sandwiched by 
Occupation policies of a "conservative orientation".
 ^ Government Section, SCAP, The Political Reorientation of Japan. September 1945 to 
September 1 948 (Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1949) Appendix A : l l ,  
p.423.
 ^ Ibid. p.424.
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avoided conflict w ith the American authorities, it would still have 
to  be in com ple te agreem ent w ith  the  O ccupation 's  re fo rm  
programme in order to  be permitted to  govern.
US policy was both ambivalent and ambiguous. A t the same time as 
it perm itted the continued operation o f the trad itional Japanese 
civil police system, it encouraged the Japanese people, through the 
active promotion of civil liberties, to  obstruct the performance of 
police duties. Both Japanese government officia ls and the people 
themselves must have been confused. Imperial amnesties of October 
1945 and November 1946 resulted in the release o f 300 ,000  and 
90,000 political offenders respectively.9 Those released from prison 
were allowed to  organise, but when mass demonstrations took place 
organisers were warned not to  go too far - a fter all the police could 
be reinforced by Allied soldiers if the need arose. Despite the 
ambiguity, the fact tha t an institu tion  like the civil police survived 
the arrival o f American forces on Japanese soil b e n e fite d  the 
forces of tradition over those of change. Although political re fo rm s 
were pushed through, these were only piecemeal, the ir effectiveness 
always depending on the commitment of those charged w ith the ir 
implementation. Once the Japanese people became accustomed to  
seeing Occupation personnel working w ith governm ent o ffic ia ls , 
particularly the police, the possib ility of radical political change 
receded in to the distance. By administering reform through the 
prewar governmental structure, the Americans, whether they liked 
it or not, were leg itim iz ing  th a t very s tru c tu re . There was, 
therefore, a contradiction at the heart of the Occupation's policy "to  
use the existing form of government in Japan, not to  support it " . i o 
The distinction was not as clear cut as the Americans perceived it 
to  be, the former in fact suggesting the latter. For Ralph Braibanti, a 
m ilita ry governm ent o ffice r in Yamanashi p re fectu re , " i t  was 
unfortunate but inevitable tha t American forces in the early stages 
o f the occupation relied on the Japanese police to  an extent tha t 
increased the la tte r's  power".11 He acknowledged the d ifficu lty  of
9 R. J. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", Far Eastern Survev. V ol.18, No.2, 
( 2 4 /1 /4 9 )  p.19.
Political Reorientation of Japan (PRJ), Appendix A :11, p.424.
T  ^ R. J. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", p. 18.
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reconciling "American slogans o f dém ocratisation w ith  ob v io u s  
support of the police system".i ^
The confusion characterising the relationship between SCAP and 
Japanese Government officials was complemented by an ambivalent 
reform programme that demanded radical change on the one hand and 
a stable socio-political environment on the other. It was d ifficu lt to  
envisage a revolution in police-community relations when the police 
continued to  regulate the daily lives of ordinary Japanese much as 
they had done before and during the war. As Ralph Braibanti 
suggested, there was tension between the Occupation's policies of 
dém ocratisation and the exigencies o f an ind irect Occupation. 
However, before démocratisation came dem ilitarisation, the la tte r 
proving far less problematic than the transformation o f Japan from 
a "feudal" to  a "democratic" society. Japan's armed forces, together 
w ith such auxiliary organisations as the Kenpei (M ilitary P o lice ), 
were abolished, and factories engaged in production for war were 
shut down.
Part One o f the United States In itia l Post-Surrender Policy - 
"U ltim ate  O b jectives"- s ta ted  th a t "Japan will be com p le te ly  
disarmed and dem ilitarized" by elim inating "the  au thority  o f the 
m ilita ris ts  and the influence o f m ilita rism ....from  her political, 
economic and social life" and "ins titu tions expressive o f the spirit 
o f m ilitarism and aggression will be vigorously s u p p re s s e d " .!3 In 
view of the fact tha t the police had developed along m ilitary lines 
from the beginning of the Meiji period and had been responsible for 
suppressing anti-m ilita ris t opinions, it should have been the main 
target a fter the armed forces for disarmament and demilitarisation. 
However, General D irective Number One from  the  Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers to  the Japanese Government 
(otherwise known as SCAPIN 1), dated 2 September 1945, excluded 
the Japanese police force from the disarmament provision. It was 
acknowledged in Occupation circles th a t if radical surgery was 
im m ediately performed on the police institu tion , the implications 
for the maintenance of stability would have been serious indeed. So
! 2 Ibid.
!3  PRJ, p.423.
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the police were instructed to  "remain at the ir posts" and would 
continue to  be "responsible for the preservation of law and o r d e r " . i  ^  
On 17 October 1945 General Headquarters, SCAP, directed the 
Japanese Government to  demobilise the Kenpei w ith the condition 
tha t "the civil police...be instructed by proper Japanese authority to  
take over all remaining police duties previously performed by the 
m ilitary police" (SCAPIN 156)J5 Bearing in mind tha t the Kenpei was 
seen as a vital support of the wartime "fascist" regime, it is strange 
th a t American policy-makers advocated the transference of any o f 
its functions to  the civil police. Perhaps the oversight was due to  
increasing concern w ith problems of socio-econom ic dislocation
throughout Japan, which caused many in General Headquarters to
demand stab ility  as well as democracy - support for the Japanese 
authorities as well as encouragement of popular protest.
The la tte r, along w ith dem ilitarisation, was seen as an essential 
prerequisite for the establishment o f a peaceful and responsible 
government, properly accountable to  the Japanese people. The Initial 
Post-Surrender Policy called for the development o f "a desire for 
individual liberties and respect fo r fundam ental human r ig h ts , 
particularly the freedoms o f religion, assembly, speech and the 
press" on the part o f the Japanese people.16 in a later section of the 
same document the implications for the police o f the promotion of 
civil liberties were made clear: "Laws, decrees and regulations 
which establish discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, creed 
or political opinion shall be abrogated ....and agencies charged
spec ifica lly  w ith  th e ir en fo rcem en t shall be abolished or
appropriately m od ified".!^  Abolition was the fate of the Kenpei and 
Tokko. whereas the rest of the traditional police structure was to  be 
subject to  modification sometime in the future.
The Tokko was formally abolished on 4 October 1 945 when SCAPIN 
93, concerned with the removal of restrictions on political, civil and 
religious liberties, was issued. Usually referred to  as the Civil
SCAP, Historv of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan (Tokyo 
1950 -1951 ), Monograph 55 (Police and Public Safety) Appendix 2, p.10.
 ^  ^ Ibid.. Appendix 5, p.19.
16 PRJ, p.423.
1  ^ Ibid.. p.424.
73
L iberties  D irective, it ta rg e ted  those laws, ord inances and
regulations which had severely lim ited the freedom o f ordinary 
Japanese to  question government policies before and during the war 
as well as those agencies charged w ith  the ir enforcem ent. The 
Bureau o f Police in the Ministry o f Home A ffa irs was abolished, 
along w ith all I o kkô  un its and com m issions concerned w ith  
"protection and surveillance" under the Ministry of Justice, on the 
grounds tha t they in terfered w ith freedom o f thought, speech, 
religion or assem bly.! 8 in addition the d irective called for the 
release o f all po litica l prisoners, the removal o f centra l a n d
prefectura l police chiefs and an end to  physical punishment and 
m istreatment of detainees and p r i s o n e r s . !  9  The Occupation sought to  
establish a government responsible to  the will o f the people, and the 
Civil Liberties Directive was seen as a mechanism for accelerating 
tha t process. Although it undermined the police by discrediting the 
prewar/w artim e system of control, it must be remembered tha t it 
was a legal measure tha t could only work in practice if it was 
properly enforced. As will be made clear later in this chapter, the 
enactm ent o f legislation forbidding the em ploym ent o f form er 
Kenpei or Tokkô officials was not enough to  ensure an end to  their 
influence in public sa fe ty  activ ities . As fo r legal s ta tem e n ts  
concerning the rights of detainees and prisoners, these were not
enough to  ensure hygienic conditions and adequate provision of food,
clothing and medicines for those awaiting tr ia l. 20
The abolition and disarmament of such agencies as the Tokkô and the 
Kenpei were seen as essentially "negative" policies; the ir positive 
counterparts, much more d ifficu lt to  achieve, were a reduction in 
"the pervasive powers o f the police" and the injection o f a "Western" 
(ie. American) police e t h o s . 2! Although the establishment of legal 
lim itations on police activ ities could be pushed through w ithout 
delay, fundamental reforms could not take place against a backdrop 
of serious socio-economic problems. American reformers, aware of 
the importance of an adequate force for the maintenance o f internal
! 8 Ibid.. Appendix B: 2d, pp.463-464.
!9 Ibid.. p.464.
20 The situation in Japanese gaols will be described in Chapter 3. 
2! History of the Non-Military Activities. M. 55, p.5.
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security, had acknowledged the importance o f traditional agencies 
of law enforcement at the outset. In the Initia l Post-Surrender 
Policy document it was admitted tha t "the judicial, legal and police 
systems shall be reformed as soon as practicable..."(rr\y ita lics ) . 22  
Thus "from September 1945...to December 1947 the prewar system 
preserved its precarious life w ith minor internal c h a n g e s " . 23  A good 
example o f such slight adjustment was the abolition o f the Police 
Defence Corps (Keibita i) on 16 January 1946. Set up in 1944 to  help 
deal w ith problems arising from American bombing raids, its duties 
and powers can have been little  different from those o f the regular 
p o l i c e . 2 4  SCAPIN 606 instructed the Japanese Government "to  abolish 
and disband the Keibitai and all other organisations or mobile forces 
organised to  augment the Japanese civil police f o r c e " . 2 5  However, 
the intention was not "to  affect the overall authorised strength of 
the Japanese civil police force, which was established at a to ta l of 
93 ,935".26  That is to  say the institu tion itse lf was abolished on the 
grounds th a t it  was m ilita ris tic  2 7  ^ bu t its  personnel were 
presumably transferred to  the civil police force. Cosmetic change 
rather than structura l transform ation was the order o f the day, 
reflecting the discrepancy between legislative reforms and de facto 
conditions.
On 3 May 1947 a new C onstitu tion, w ritte n  by members of 
Government Section, became law. As far as the powers of the police 
and the rights o f citizens were concerned, it  represented the 
culmination of earlier directives, particularly SCAPIN 93. A rtic le  13 
reads as follows:
All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, to the extent that it does not 
interfere with the public welfare, shall be the supreme consideration in 
legislation and other government a ffa irs .
2 2  P R J .  Appendix A:11, p.424.
23 S. Sugai, "The Japanese Police System", in R. E. Ward, ed.. Five Studies in Japanese 
Politics (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1957) p.4.
24 PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p .12 (Suitland, Box 
334, file 25).
25 History of the Non-Militarv Activities. M. 55, Appendix 6, p.20.
26 Ibid.
22 Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, R. & A. Report No. 2758, 
"The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation" (2 8 /9 /4 5 )  p.32.
26 Historv of the Non-Militarv Activities. M. 55, Appendix 10, p. 30.
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Such language exposes the docum ent's  American parentage, 
dem onstra ting the authors' fa ith in the universal relevance of 
American ideas and ins titu tions . The C onstitu tion 's  p ro v is io n s  
reflected policy statem ents concerning democratic government and 
civil rights, enumerated in both the Potsdam Declaration and the 
United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan. "The in flic tion
o f to rtu re  and cruel punishments" were forbidden (A rtic le  36),29
and "confession made under compulsion, to rtu re  or threat, or a fter 
prolonged arrest or detention" was not to  be adm itted in evidence 
(A rtic le  3 8 ) . The Constitution declared tha t "all public officia ls 
are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof" 
(A rtic le  15),3 i the juxtaposition perfectly capturing the contrast 
between the reformers' rhetoric and the real situation in the case of 
the police. The contention tha t the police served the interests o f a 
narrow establishm ent ra ther than the Japanese people will be 
pursued in later chapters. For now it is enough to  acknowledge the 
lim its  o f reform , and the cosm etic qua lity  o f much o f the 
legislation. The Japanese political system appeared to  have assumed 
dem ocratic credentials, but in reality operated in much the same 
way as before.
With startling prescience, a report en titled  "The Japanese Police 
System under Allied Occupation", dated 9 September 1945, drew 
attention to  the possible consequences o f the Occupation's conflict 
of interests. It stated tha t the Allied forces "will have an in terest 
in both the maintenance of order on a level adequate fo r the ir 
operations and protection, and the accomplishment o f such reforms 
as the aims of the Potsdam Declaration may require", and then 
remarked on the dangers of such a dual purpose:
These two interests may conflict in practice since effecting in the police 
force....reforms vital to the achievement of the ends of the Occupation, or 
the diminution of police power under disorganised conditions, may impair 
the maintenance of public order and open the way for the operations of 
subsidized gangs ( sôshi) with reactionary aims.^2
29 Ibid.. p.34.
30 Ibid
31 Ibid. p.31
32 OSS, R & A Report No. 2758, p.45.
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The authors were realistic about the likely machinations o f the 
Japanese government, warning that it "may attem pt, unless checked, 
to  use the police system to  repress popular movements in opposition 
to  its policies, justify ing its measures as necessary in the interests 
of orderly conditions demanded by Occupation f o r c e s " . 33 There was, 
therefore, an appreciation of the lengths to  which conservative 
elements would go in order to  frustrate the reformers' designs. The 
report accepted the lim itations o f "mere alteration o f the police 
system " and the utilisation o f legal checks, arguing tha t the only 
real guarantor of democratic development is the "enlargement of the 
political power o f the Japanese p e o p l e " . 34 American forces did not 
want to  assist the police in preserving internal s tab ility , because 
such action would have suggested support fo r the Ja p an e se  
government. Fortunately the Japanese authorities would be aided "by 
the existence....of long-established machinery for the maintenance o f 
public order and by the traditional acquiescence o f  the Japanese 
people in orders issuing from what they  regard  as legally  
c o n s t i tu te d  a u th o r it ie s " { r r \y  i t a l i c s ) . 35 Thus the A m e r ic a n s  
simultaneously sought to  exploit the Japanese people's traditional 
docility  and to  in ject a sp irit o f popular activism . The re p o r t  
concludes by enumerating specific problems concerning police 
reform, namely the lim itation of police functions, the question of 
legal constraints on police powers and methods, and the elimination 
of undesirable p e r s o n n e l . 36 The last o f these had direct bearing on 
the strength and confidence of the police force.
The Health of the Police Institution
The purges of police personnel naturally affected those in the upper 
echelons o f the police service more than the ir junior counterparts. 
The reasons for this were twofold: firstly, the authorities, given the 
indirect character o f the Occupation, were not able to  purge all 
members o f the prewar/wartime police force; flowing from this was 
the decision to  hold individuals responsible for past abuses rather
33 Ibid. pp. 43-4.
34 1 ^ .  pp. 52-3.
35 The Financial Historv of Japan. Summary of R. & A. Report No.2758, p.276.
36 ibid.. p.277.
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than the system itse lf - in the short term , at least, only the 
leadership would be targeted for removal. The only exceptions to  
this policy of lim ited purge were those policemen who had been 
members of units, such as the I  o kkô . considered to  be in direct 
con travention  o f the Civil L iberties D irective . In such cases 
personnel were barred from further employment in the police force 
regardless of the ir rank. Following the issuance o f SCAPIN 93 in 
October 1945, 47 out of 51 prefectural police chiefs were purged, 
together w ith 54 superintendents, 168 inspectors, 1,000 assistant 
inspectors, 1,587 sergeants and 2,127 patrolm en.3^ The last three 
statistics represent members of the T o k k ô . 3 8
As a result of SCAPIN 550, issued on 4 January 1946 and more 
commonly known as the Purge D irective, fu rth e r removals were 
made - two more prefectural police chiefs lost their jobs, to g e th e r 
w ith another 60 superintendents and another 28 inspectors.39 By 
1946 12% of superintendents had been purged, along with 11% of 
inspectors, 15.2% of assistant inspectors, 12% of sergeants and 3.2% 
o f patrolmen. The only ass is tan t inspecto rs , sergeants and 
patrolmen to  lose the ir Jobs were those employed by the T o kkô . 
evidence o f the Occupiers' sympathetic a ttitude towards the lower 
ranks; they were seen as more malleable, more responsive to  
democratic change. The purge reduced the police force by some 5,073 
men, or 5.7% of the to ta l s t r e n g t h . 4 0  Although numerical strength is 
an im portant determinant o f a police force's effectiveness, o f equal 
if not greater significance is the quality o f its  leadership, often 
measured by such criteria as length o f service or experience. The 
fact tha t it was experienced, influential officials who were rem oved 
meant th a t the e ffects o f the purge were disproportionate to  its 
size.
However, the  enactm ent o f leg is la tion excluding in fluen tia l 
personnel from further employment did not necessarily mean an end 
to  their activities. SCAPIN 115, issued on 10 October 1945, tried to
37 History of the Non-Militarv Activities. M.55, p.11
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
78
guard against evasion o f purge d irec tives , caution ing against 
reemployment of Tokkô personnel "in any other position of power or 
responsibility over the p e o p le " .L ik e  its predecessor, SCAPIN 93 , 
the new directive "lim ited but did not forbid transfer" o f purged 
officia ls from the Ministries of Home Affa irs or Justice to  other 
agencies of government.^2 Following the issuance of SCAPIN 550 in 
early 1946, the rules became s tric te r, barring purgees from all 
public service. The Purge Directive sta ted th a t "Persons removed 
from  public o ffice will be disqualified from  holding any o the r 
positions in the government service".^^ The Occupation authorities, 
aware tha t there were large holes in the purge's net, sought to  
prevent undesirable personnel from slipping through. It was reported 
on 2 August 1946 tha t 1,187 persons had been "removed from 
positions in other agencies to  which they had been transferred"."^
It is interesting to  consider what happened to  the purgees, many of 
whom had great influence and substantia l local follow ings. Not 
surprisingly, the evidence suggests tha t they did not disappear from 
the scene, but continued to  operate much as before. A t the end of 
1945 one Tsubaki Kenkichi, a patrolman at Nerima police station, 
Tokyo, complained tha t the directive eliminating the Tokkô was not 
thorough enough. His interviewer characterised the problem as 
fo llow s:
As in cases of other men holding positions in objectionable organisations, 
there are not a few instances where injustices have occurred when...men 
who were in their positions but a few days were dismissed, while men 
who held the positions for a good part of the war...were proceeding from 
one good position to another unaffected.
In the case of Nerima police station, even the new chief o f thought 
control, in his position but a week and appointed presumably to  
protect his predecessor, was untouched by SCAPINs 93 and 11 5 . ^6  
The admission tha t "apparently similar s ituations exist throughout
History of the Non Military Activities. M.55, Appendix 4, p.l 7.
Ibid.. main text, p. 10.
"^ 3 PRJ. Appendix B: 5b, p.482.
History of the Non-Military Activities. M.55, p . l0.
Memo dated 1 3 /1 1 /4 5 ; To: Major Davis, Office of Chief of Counter-Intelligence; 
From: Capt. W. H. Smith; Subject: Pertinent Contributions by Patrolman Tsubaki 
Kenkichi [National Diet Library, fiche no. G-2 00231 ]
Ibid.
79
the  c o u n try "^ / confirm s the suspicion th a t e ffo rts  to  evade 
Occupation directives were not confined to  Nerima police station. 
Mark Gayn, a correspondent for the Chicago Sun who worked in Japan 
from December 1945 to  October 1946, commented on the d ifficu lty 
of removing Tokkô officials from positions o f influence. In his diary 
en try  for December 22, 1945 he refers to  five thought control 
officers in Yamagata prefecture who resigned, only to  be identified a 
litt le  later as high police officia ls.48 in Aomori prefecture, in th e  
extreme north o f Honshu, US Command purged six high p o lice  
o ffic ia ls . However, " i t  was not long before the US M ilitary 
Government found three of them back at work - in other towns".49
The problem o f evasion o f American directives may have been 
compounded by a less than unanimous endorsement o f the police 
purge by those within GHQ. A degree of ambivalence is detectable in 
the Office of S trategic Services' report, en titled  "The Japanese 
Police System under Allied Occupation" (dated 28 September 1945): 
"Since members of the Special Higher Police are experienced in the 
de tec tion  o f subversive a c tiv ity , some m od ifica tion  short o f 
complete elim ination....m ight be c o n s id e re d " . I t  is even suggested 
th a t they m ight be used to  help e lim inate u ltra n a tio n a lis t/ 
m ilitarist elements, although "the dangers of using a body devoted 
prim arily to  the elim ination o f le ft-w in g /lib e ra l e lem en ts" is 
recognised.51 Accurately predicting the retention o f both Tokkô and 
Kenpei personnel, albeit against the wishes o f many Occupation 
officials, the report calls for "especially careful screening of ex­
members and the balancing of the potential danger o f using trained 
agents against their value as p o l i c e m e n " . 5 2  in February 1949 a Civil 
Censorship Detachment of the Civil Intelligence Section intercepted 
a le tte r from an ex-Kenpei member, one Saitô Masa, in which the 
w rite r s ta tes th a t he is now working as a tra ffic  policeman in 
Y o k o h a m a . 53  There were even occasions when former Tokkô officials
4^ Ibid.
48 M. Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981 ) p .51.
49 Ibid.. p.52.
50 OSS, R&A Report No. 2758, p.55.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.. p.61.
53 CCD, CIS-MIS-GHQ-SCAP, PSD files (NDL, fiche no. G-2 03755).
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were employed by the US army, the Occupiers often unaware of their 
inconsistency. When Mark Gayn visited Sakata, a conservative town 
in Yamagata prefecture, in December 1945 he found the former head 
o f the local T okkô unit acting as the liaison officer for contacts 
between local Japanese and American soldiers. To make m atters 
worse three o f his colleagues were "w ith  the Liaison O ff ic e ,  
assisting the American detachm ent".^4 Lieutenant Robert McHardy, 
the local garrison commander, angrily asked o f Gayn's informer if 
tha t meant "tha t every Japanese who wants to  see me has to  be 
passed firs t by these characters?"55 The answer cannot have pleased 
him.
Such revelations cast doubt on the official purge s ta tis tics  (quoted 
on page 9), since it is clear th a t formal removal o f certa in 
policemen did not always amount to  the ir exclusion from  public 
office. The extent of the problem of evasion is impossibe to  quantify 
accurately, but what is clear is that many former Tokkô and Kenpei 
members continued to  be employed in a public safe ty capacity. 
Nevertheless, the purge of police personnel must have disrupted the 
process of leadership by at least removing those at the very top (the 
prefectural police chiefs) and forcing others to  change the ir jobs, to  
spend tim e and e ffo r t avoiding de tection  by the O c c u p a tio n  
au thorities . That the purge o f higher o ffic ia ls undermined the 
effectiveness o f the police is indisputable, bu t perhaps more 
significant were the large number of voluntary departures from  the 
force, both cause and symptom of declining morale and a lack of 
confidence vis à vis American reforms.
In 1945, according to  statistics compiled by the Police Bureau o f the  
Home Ministry and published by the Public Safety Division, G-2, 
7,891 policemen voluntarily gave up police work, 3,769 le ft the 
force due to  illness or injury and 1,649 died.56 The re la tive  
importance of these various determinants can best be illustrated by 
means of a piechart (figure 4). Far more policemen le ft the force of 
the ir own accord than were compelled to  do so by order o f the
54 M. Gayn, Japan Diary, p.68-9.
55 Ibid.. p.69.
56 History of the Non-Militarv Activities. M.55, Appendix IB, p.2.
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Police Losses by Reason during 1945
9 . 2 0 %
3 . 2 9 %
2 2 . 4 2 %
2 1 . 0 4 %
4 4 . 0 5 %
Figure 4
Pol ice Losses by  Reason du r in g  1 9 4 6
B  Voluntary 
B  illness/ injury 
B  Discharge or Reprimand 
iH Retirement 
□  Death
9 . 9 3 %
2 . 7 9 %
2 1 . 7 1 %
4 9 . 8 2 %
B Voluntary 
B  Illness/ injury 
M  Discharge or Reprimand 
HI Retirement 
□  Death
1 5 . 7 6 %
Figure 5
Source: Historv of the Non-Militarv Activities of the Occupation of 
Japan. Monograph 55 (Police and Public Safety), Appendix IB, p.2.
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Occupation authorities. With regard to  the higher ranks the opposite 
was true, the purges accounting for the loss of 5,073 capable and 
experienced police officers, other causes for only 1,583.57 |p 1946 
voluntary departures increased, both in absolute term s and as a 
proportion of the to ta l (see figure 5). Losses in police personnel in 
tha t year to ta lled 22,494, o f which 1 1,206, nearly 50%, were 
motivated by a belief on the part o f the individuals concerned tha t 
they could improve their lives by giving up police w o r k . 5 8
The Public Safety Division, which was responsible for the Japanese 
police, a ttribu ted  the high level o f disenchantment to  "economic 
d ifficu lties and probable loss of face suffered as a result o f the 
defeat and purges".^9 Those tha t remained in the force, "instructed 
to  tolerate many things that previously had been a n a th e m a " ,w e re  
confused, unsure of themselves. The reformers' promotion o f civil 
liberties, which dictated the release o f imprisoned communists and 
le ft-w ing  ac tiv is ts , tog e the r w ith  what one American o ffic ia l 
referred to  as "scathing criticism  and denunciation of the whole 
police system in the newly-liberated p r e s s " , fo r c e d  policemen to  
exercise great care in their dealings w ith the Japanese public. One 
report on the results o f the police purge stated tha t "the (Japanese) 
people, in some cases, have evidenced a too complete disregard for 
police authority", suggesting that "the pendulum has swung as far as 
is healthy in the opposite d i r e c t i o n " . ^ 2  Thus, restraint on the part o f 
the police m irrored an increasing public w illingness to  voice 
grievances and ignore the rebukes of policemen. According to  an 
Am erican radio programme, presum ably broadcast to  A llied 
personnel, "many Japanese drivers and pedestrians v io la te  the 
tra ffic  regulations and ignore (the  po licem an 's) w h is tle  and
Memo dated July 1947; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Thru: CIS; From H. E. 
Pulliam, head of PSD; Subject: Police Purge (NDL, fiche no. G-2 0 2775 )
Historv of the Non-Militarv Activities. M.55, Appendix IB, p.2.
59 Ibid.. p.7.
60 H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law. Criminology 
and Police Science (Jan.-Feb.l 953). p.659.
61 R. J. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", Far Eastern Survey. V o l.18, No.2 
(2 4 /1 /1 9 4 9 )  p.l 9.
62 Document undated and incomplete (NDL, fiche no. G-2 02767)
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s i g n a l s " . 6 3  The solution to  the problem, to  have American m ilitary 
police in attendance, was obvious, given the supremacy o f Uncle 
Sam's blue-eyed warriors - "Before the great big American soldier, 
the little ...Japanese policeman is overawed,...conscious o f th e  
physical and mental superiority of his c o - w o r k e r " . 6 4  Although there 
is evidence of public disobedience in Tokyo and other large cities, it 
is unlikely, given the existence of a residue of fear and the tradition 
o f respect fo r governm ent o ffic ia ls, th a t it  was a pervasive 
phenomenon.
Low morale amongst policemen can be explained in part by this 
negative attitude towards them on the part o f vocal sections of the 
Japanese public, most notably political activ ists and the media. A t 
the same tim e many American reformers were suspicious o f the 
police, closely observing the ir every move so as to  p reven t 
retrograde steps. However, the main determinant o f low morale was 
economic. Just as it was the economic problems o f the cities tha t 
made policing them so d ifficu lt, so too  it  was poor w o rk in g  
conditions (pay, hours, quality of life) tha t affected morale amongst 
policemen most seriously. In January 1947 it was reported tha t 
resignations in recent months reflected an "inability to  subsist on 
the meagre pay they receive", a state o f affairs tha t damaged both 
the morale and prestige of the police f o r c e . 65 Policemen were ju s t 
as vulnerable vis à vis serious shortages o f food and clothing as 
other Japanese, the ir wages no less susceptible to  the ravages of 
in flation. Tsubaki Kenkichi, our friend at Nerima police s ta tion , 
complained tha t the gulf tha t existed between ordinary policemen 
and the higher echelons in terms of pay and status, the inability o f 
the former to  Join the latter, led to  frustra tion and resentment. He 
argued tha t the average policeman, unable to  improve his lot, turned 
to  corruption, augmenting his small income by numerous "subsidiary 
sources". This was made possible, according to  Tsubaki, by " th e
65 "Larry; Tokyo calling: Gangbuster's ready with Commissioner Valentine" - Both the 
title and format of the document suggest a radio broadcast. Valentine, of the New York 
Police, was responsible for recommending changes re. the urban police system in Japan 
(NDL, fiche no. G-2 02756).
64 Ibid.
65 SCAR, Summations of Non-Militarv Activities in Japan. No. 16 (Jan. 47), p.46.
84
deeply-rooted fear the average Japanese family has o f p o l i c e m e n " . 6 6  
The link between corruption and low wages was not accepted by his 
interviewer, who claimed tha t "merely raising (policemen's) pay will 
not cut down greed, nor remove the corrupt sources o f his extra 
income, nor prevent his taking advantage of his position to  obtain 
goods, services and money from certain people in his a llo tted  
area".67
In 1946 the M etropolitan Police Planning Group, composed o f 
American experts in law enforcem ent, gave more credence to  
Tsubaki's claims by calling for increased wages, sho rte r working 
hours, more appropriate uniforms and equipment, holidays, health 
benefits, pensions and rewards fo r m eritorious service .68 These 
measures were designed to  improve the psychological and physical 
condition of policemen, essential if they were to  be confident and 
proud of their role in society. In August 1946 the working hours of 
the Tokyo police were shortened, the average working day consisting 
of 8 /9  hours rather than the former average of 1 2 / 13 hours. Such 
changes may have reduced the pressure on Tokyo policemen, but did 
little  to  improve their living conditions, thus proving an ineffective 
antidote against corruption. The Commander-in-Chief of the British 
Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF) described the state o f the 
police in September 1946 as follows: "The Japanese c iv ilia n  
police...are a willing group but they turn out for me as tramps "(m y 
ita lic s ).69 Their poverty combined w ith the ir unpopularity to  make 
the police service a last resort as far as the search for employment 
was concerned. In the radio broadcast referred to  earlier it was 
claimed tha t the be tte r quality men refrained from joining, "because 
their family and friends would be humiliated by an appointm ent to  
the police force". Recruits would be of a higher quality only when the  
sta tus of the police improved, toge the r w ith  th e ir  econom ic
position.70
66 Pertinent Contributions by Patrolman Tsubaki Kenkichi (NDL, fiche no. G-2 
0 0 2 3 1 ) .
67 Ibid.
68 Summations. No.9 (June 46), p.50.
69 GHQ, U.S. Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC); Check Sheet, dated 1 4 /9 /4 6 ; To: Pulliam, 
PSD; Subject: Standards of Civilian Police (NDL, fiche no. G-2 0 0228 )
70 OSS, R&A Report No.2758, p.62.
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According to  official statis tics the numerical strength o f the police 
remained fa irly constant, despite the loss o f large numbers of 
personnel through either forced removal or voluntary abandonment o f 
the job. Apparently the actual strength  of the Japanese police 
increased from 87,663 in 1944 to  96,810 in 1945, fell to  90,550 in 
1946 and then rose again to  94,029 in 1947.^1 A t the same time we 
are asked to  believe that during the course o f 1945 and 1946 Just 
over 40,000 policemen le ft the s e r v i c e . ^ 2  Such a serious discrepancy 
can be explained, at least in part, by the circumstances of defeat and 
surrender, which must have impeded accurate s ta tis tica l survey. 
Even w ithin GHQ, there seems to  have been confusion as to  the 
number of policemen throughout Japan. One source states tha t it was 
"the return to  service of repatriated former policemen" th a t caused 
numerical strength to  increase at the end of 1945 (from 93,913 to  
96 ,810); 73 and yet a report by the Police Branch o f the Public Safety 
Division warned tha t any country tha t loses one fifth  o f its police 
strength in one year (1 9 4 5 )...is in serious condition!"74 The June 
1946 issue of The Summations of Non-Militarv A ctiv ities in Japan 
stated tha t there were 88,000 police, compared w ith an authorized 
complement o f 93,935.75 Just tw o months later Colonel Pulliam, 
head of the Public Safety Division, claimed tha t numerical s trength 
was only about 66,000.76 Adm ittedly the tenor o f his comments on 
law and order was alarmist, his aim to  persuade others tha t "some 
tee th  must be placed in the law enforcement and Judicial arms of 
the Japanese Government".77 The suspicion tha t he was deliberately 
underestim ating the number of policemen seems to  be Justified, 
given his claim tha t in January 1947, less than six months later, 
there were 90,550 police.78 This array of conflicting data suggests
71 History of the Non-Militarv Activities. M.55, Appendix 1 A, p .l.
72 Ibid.. Appendix IB, p.2.
73 Ibid.. main text, p.8 .
74 PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p.20  (Suitland, 
8.334, file 25).
75 Summations. No.9 (June 46), p.50.
76 Report dated 1 5 /8 /4 6 ; Thru: CIS, G-2; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (NDL, fiche 
no. G-2 0 0 2 2 8 )
77 Ibid.
78 Memo dated July 1947; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Thru: CIS; Subject: Police 
Purge (NDL, fiche no. G-2 0 2775 )
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tha t there was a substantial degree of turnover w ithin the police 
force, tha t losses were quickly cancelled out by hasty recruiting o f 
new personnel.
In view o f the d ifficu lt conditions throughout Japan follow ing her 
defeat and the large number of demobilised soldiers (about 5 million 
by the end of 1946), it was to  be expected tha t the Occupation's 
attem pts to  discourage the employment o f former m ilitary personnel 
would be largely unsuccessful. Yoshida Kohei, o f Fukushima 
P refectu re , addressing his com m ents to  M acArthur h im self, 
complained tha t many former soldiers had joined the p o l i c e , and 
Tsubaki Kenkichi, o f Nerima police station, stated tha t "members of 
the army and navy are being inducted in to the force and given 
p re fe re n c e " .80 A t the end o f 1945 the Civil Intelligence S e c tion  
referred to  reports from the field, which indicated th a t fo rm er 
officers and non-commissioned officers of the army and navy were 
being employed by the police and fire organisations.^! In November 
of tha t year it was reported tha t "thousands o f demobilised Kenpei 
and regular army and navy personnel are being recruited in to th e  
civil p o l i c e " .  8 2  Therefore, the evidence suggests tha t num erica l 
strength remained constant due to  the employment of demobilised 
soldiers, which went some way to  neutralise police losses. The new 
recruits, whether or not they were ex-so ld iers, inspired li t t le  
confidence in allied personnel. The Commander-in-Chief of the BCOF 
suggested in the autumn of 1946 tha t the civil police be "selected 
personnel rather than 'pickups' who cannot get a Job e l s e w h e r e " . 83 
The picture cannot have been a tidy one, and it is reasonable to  
assume the existence of a "floating population" of policemen, tha t is 
to  say a large number tha t floated in and out o f e m p lo y m e n t. 
According to  several American officia ls the police generally were
^8  SCAP, Military Intelligence Section, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section - 
digest of undated letter (NDL, fiche no. G-2 00226)
80 Pertinent Contributions by Patrolman Tsubaki Kenkichi (NDL, fiche no. G-2 
0 0 2 3 1 ) .
8 ! Memo for record, dated 1 2 /4 5 ; Problem: Barring Certain Personnel from  
Employment in the Police, Prison or Fire Control Organisations of Japan (NDL, G-2 
0 0 2 3 5 )
82 Office of Chief of Counter-Intelligence; Memo for record, dated 1 0 /1 1 /4 5 ; Subject: 
Need for Public Safety Directive (NDL, G-2 00237).
83 Check Sheet, dated 1 4 /9 /4 6 ; To: Pulliam, PSD; Subject: Standards of Civilian Police 
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inexperienced, fu rther implying tha t a large number were hastily 
recru ited during the firs t tw o years o f the Occupation. Indeed, 
Colonel Pulliam, writing in August 1946, claimed tha t 75% of the 
force had less than one year's e x p e r i e n c e . 84 H. E. Wildes, former head 
o f the Political and Social A ffairs Division, drew a tten tion  to  the 
loss of experienced personnel, but disagreed w ith Pulliam as to  the 
extent of the problem: "Of the 84,141 policemen on Pearl Harbour day 
(7 December 1941) only 40,993 were active by the end of 1946".85
Pulliam saw the lack of experienced personnel as a serious handicap, 
citing it as one of the main determinants o f police ineffectiveness. 
In his report on law and order (1 5 August 1946) he stated tha t there 
was a serious law-enforcement problem, arising from the police's 
inability to  deal w ith the troublesome activ ities o f the so-called 
"sangokujin" (lite ra lly  "people from three countries" - Chinese, 
Taiwanese and Koreans). The police were hesitant to  exercise their 
very lim ited jurisdiction over the m inority groups. They were afraid 
to  take too  drastic action against these new "a llies" o f the ir 
c o n q u e r o r s . 8 6  According to  Pulliam, things had got out o f hand, the 
Chinese and Koreans conducting open gang w arfare among 
themselves and against the police. He demanded tha t the Occupation 
authorities support "constitu ted civil authority", suggesting the use 
of troops as well as m ilitary p o l i c e . 87 The Japanese police were 
unable to  cope w ith the increasing lawlessness tha t accompanied 
social and economic dislocation. They were dependent on the 
reinforcement o f American personnel, calling on the ir services 784 
times during the firs t tw o years o f O c c u p a t i o n . 8 8  Likewise, one 
m ilitary governm ent o ffice r w rote in 1949 th a t "the  declining 
prestige o f the police had to  be constantly  bo lstered by the 
A m ericans . . . " . 8 9  The relationship was one of mutual benefit, the 
Japanese police often being used to  guard the barracks, residences
84 Report dated 1 5 /8 /4 6 ; Thru: CIS, G-2; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (NDL, fiche 
no. G-2 0 0 2 2 8 )
85 H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law. Criminology 
and Police Science Vol.43. No.5 (Jan-Feb 1953), p.659.
86 R. j .  Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", FES, p. 19.
87 The report on law and order (1 5 /8 /4 6 )  represents the beginning of a policy of open 
support for the police by PSD, G-2 (NDL, G-2 00228).
88 History of the Non-Militarv Activities. M.55, p.60.
89 R. J. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", FES, p . l8 .
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and warehouses of Occupation troops along w ith goods earmarked for 
reparation ( 1 , 2 0 0  policemen were used in th is way in November 
1 9 4 6 ) . 9 0  In August 1 9 4 6  Pulliam objected to  the fact tha t 5 , 6 3 2  of 
the 6 6 , 0 0 0  policemen in Japan were working for the Occupation 
forces, arguing tha t this was straining the resources o f an already 
enfeebled f o r c e . 9 i  By 1 9 4 7  the poor quality o f Japanese policemen, 
the ir lack of experience and declining morale, was a cause for 
increasing concern to  the Public Safety Division and other agencies 
within GHQ, SCAP.
Therefore, the decision by Government Section to  insist on the purge 
o f the Dai Nippon Butokukai (Great Japan Military V irtue Society), 
membership of which was automatic for police officials prior to  the 
s u r r e n d e r , 9 2  caused consternation within those sections responsible 
for ensuring the maintenance of law and order, most notably G-2. 
The inevitab le  clash between Government Section and G -2  
represented a dress rehearsal for the collision tha t would take place 
over the reform of the police system in late 19 4 7 .  In both cases the 
views of the two sections were d iam etrically opposed. Pulliam's 
reaction to  the extension of the police purge to  include the 
B u to kuka i tes tified  to  his belief tha t there could be no fu rthe r 
punitive measures against the police w ithout serious repercussions 
fo r the maintenance of social s tab ility . In a memorandum to  
Willoughby, Assistant Chief o f Staff, G-2, Pulliam claimed tha t the 
"Butokukai purge, now being sponsored and urged upon the purge 
board of the Japanese Government by the Government Section, will 
remove about 1 , 0 0 4  additional police officers, all in the grade of 
inspecto r or higher.... 10 . 3 %  o f the  rem ain ing experienced 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s " . 9 3  He insisted tha t the damage in flic ted on the 
police force through purge, allowing for the results of the Butokukai 
sweep, would amount to  a to ta l loss of 25.16%  of all top bracket 
police officers (all men of the rank of prefectural chief, two thirds
90 An anonymous document (NDL, G-2 02863).
91 Report on law and order, dated 1 5 /8 /4 6 ; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (NDL, G-2 
0 0 2 2 8 )
92 History of the Non-Militarv Activities. M.55, p.l 2.
93 Memo dated July 1947; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Thru: CIS; Subject: Police 
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89
of superintendents and one th ird  o f inspecto rs).^4 What really 
alarmed the head of PSD was the socio-economic backdrop to  this 
loss of experienced police personnel. He referred to  the large number 
o f repatria ted ex-soldiers, "d isillusioned and jobless, who may 
become easy prey to  subversive ideas", and the problem o f lawless
Koreans.95
In August 1947 Willoughby took up the baton, arguing tha t the 
activities o f the Butokukai were roughly equivalent to  those of the 
US National Rifle Association (Just as the Japanese police officials 
concerned were ex officio members of the B u to kuka i. so too the 
members o f state forces in the U.S. were ex officio game, forest and 
fire wardens).96 He insisted tha t "continual purging of experienced 
police officials...w ill continue to  be reflected in decreasing police 
e ffic iency and dom estic tra n q u ility ", suggesting th a t "the  low 
effectiveness o f the forces of law and order, on the basis o f  
numerical ratios, tra in ing and decreasing effic iency, could not 
prevail against organised b locks".97 Both Pulliam and W illoughby 
pointed out tha t any reduction in the e ffic iency o f the police 
affected the Occupation, exerting extra pressure on shrinking Allied 
manpower. Both insisted tha t a balance be struck between police 
efficiency and blanket purges. The reservations o f PSD were shared 
by the Tokyo Provost Marshal and the Commanding General, Eighth 
Army. The la tter voiced concern over the ability o f the higher police 
offic ia ls to  cope w ith  "the  growing lawlessness o f g a n g s te r  
elements", and asserted tha t the Butokuka i purge should not be 
applied to  the police.98
Government Section was uncooperative, adamant tha t members of a 
society tha t promoted martial arts were sure to  have m ilita ris tic
94 Ibid.
95 1^ .
96 Memo for the Chief of Staff, dated 2 9 /8 /4 7 ;  Subject: Police Purge - Dai Nihon 
Butokukai (NDL, G-2 02776 ).
97 Ibid. According to Willoughby, the average ratio of Japanese police to population was 
1:807, which compared unfavourably to the U.S. ratio of 1:598 backed up by a regular 
army and national guard. However, the ratio of Japanese police and Allied soldiers 
combined to population was 1:433. This was not very high in view of the problems 
affecting Japan. Source: Statistics attached to Memo for Chief of Staff (NDL, G-2 
0 2 7 7 5 ) .
98 Memo for record, dated 2 5 /7 /4 7 , written by Colonel Pulliam.
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leanings. Such undesirable personnel were to  be rooted out and 
removed from the police service. Willoughby, in comments addressed 
to  the Supreme Commander, referred to  "unavailing contact...w ith  
Government Section", fostered in order to  postpone or minimise the 
purge's e ffec ts  on the Japanese police.99 The reformers un de r 
W hitney were com m itted  to  far-reaching changes in Japanese 
society, and paid little  a ttention to  the prevailing socio-econom ic 
conditions throughout Japan, whereas Willoughby and Pulliam were 
preoccupied w ith the dangers o f po litica l/socia l in s ta b ility . The 
relative merits o f the tw o positions will be discussed in a later 
chapter.  ^oo For now it is enough to  acknowledge the ir d ivergent 
views on such fundamental political issues as the role of the police 
vis à vis the state. In the case of the Butokukai purge, the realism of 
G-2, supported by the views of those working in the field, won the 
day. For example, the unwillingness of the commander o f Yamagata 
Military Government Team to permit further loss of policemen in his 
locale was exploited by PSD, used as ammunition against the 
idealists in Government Section. Lieutenant Colonel William Nunn 
requested tha t four police officials subject to  purge be retained on 
the grounds th a t "simultaneous release o f these peace officers 
would seriously hamper the enforcement o f law and order w ith in  
th is p re fec tu re ".! 01 G-2 informed Government Section o f Nunn's 
predicam ent, suggesting th a t reconsideration be given to  the 
application of the purge directive to  police o f f i c i a l s . ! 02 |p the end 
only 222 police officers were removed and barred from  p u b lic  
service as a result of the Butokukai purge.!03 By the end of 1947 the 
loss of experienced police personnel had been stemmed, but serious 
problems remained, not least o f which was the poor s ta te  of 
equipment vital for effective law enforcement. There was a shortage 
of firearms and m otor vehicles, and communications facilities were 
in a dreadful state o f repair.
99 Memo for the Chief of Staff, dated 2 9 /8 /4 7 ;  Subject: Police Purge; From: 
Willoughby (NDL, G-2 0 27 7 6 ).
! 90 Chapter 6 examines the clash between G-2 and GS re. the decentralisation of the 
police.
!0 ! HQ, Yamagata MGT, Letter to C-in-C, GHQ SCAP, dated 4 /1 0 /4 7 . Passed through 
Command channels [NDL, GS(B) 02307].
!02 Check Sheet, dated 1 7 /1 0 /4 7 ; From G-2; To: GS; Subject: Japanese Police Losses 
[GS(B) 0 2 3 0 7 ]
! 03 History of the Non-Militarv Activities. M.55, p.l 2.
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H. E. Wildes characterised the police for the greater part o f the 
Occupation as "tra g ica lly  d e f e n c e l e s s " . ^0 4  Although there was 
disagreement as to  the extent of the problem - tha t is to  say, how 
many policemen had to  share each firearm - nobody disputed the fact 
tha t supplies were insufficient to  ensure effective policing. The 1 5 
December 1945 issue of the Mainichi Shinbun (a Japanese daily 
newspaper) declared tha t Tokyo residents were concerned about a 
local crime wave and were of the opinion tha t "the poor handling o f 
arrests is due to  the insufficient armament o f the police".^ 05 The 
article suggested tha t in view o f the police's vulnerability vis à vis 
riots "permission will shortly be granted (to  the Metropolitan Police 
B o a rd )....to  use te a r bombs and re v o lv e rs ....w ith  a few  
r e s t r i c t i o n s " . 1 0 6  As late as December 1948, H. S. Eaton, chief police 
adm in istra tor, s ta ted in a press conference tha t "the  police are 
getting along with about one pistol for every five m e n " , i 0 7  although 
the shortage of firearms seems to  have been less acute in rural 
areas. According to  the offic ia l h is to ry o f the Occupation, six 
municipal policemen shared one pistol, whereas it was one between 
three for the ir colleagues in the c o u n t r y s i d e . 1 0 8  i n  November 1945 
the Sixth and Eighth Armies had requested clarification of policy 
w ith regard to  armament o f the prefectural police forces, sta ting 
tha t one pistol for every three policemen was considered adequate 
by police experts.! 09 "Studies in m id-1947 showed th a t casualties 
among police in the line of duty had increased 227% over the ra te  
ju s t before the surrender", and the number killed by guns or other 
weapons, compared w ith prewar years, had risen by more than six 
t im e s .n o  This suggests tha t criminal elements were in possession
104 H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", p.660.
105 GHQ, SCAP Press Translation; Title: "Use of Tear Gas by the Police" (NDL, G-2
0 0 2 3 5 ) .
106 Ibid.
107 Extract from Press Conference of 1 2 /5 /4 8  (NDL, G-2 00250).
108 Historv of the Non-Militarv Activities. M.55, p.61.
109 Office of Chief of Counter-Intelligence; Memo for record, dated 1 0 /1 1 /4 5 ; Subject:
Need for Public Safety Directive (NDL, G-2 00237).
110 History of the Non-Militarv Activities. M.55, p.60.
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of firearms, which, it may be assumed, were originally the property 
o f the armed forces or even the policeJ 11
In his firs t general directive the Supreme Commander, as was stated 
in section one of this chapter, directed the Japanese civil police to  
continue the ir work of law enforcement, exempting them from the  
order to  disarm all "Japanese armed forces". However, in th e  
confusion attending surrender, the police turned in their weapons in 
the mistaken belief tha t th is was what was expected o f them .i i z 
Four months later, in January 1946, GHQ informed the Japanese 
Government tha t "the police are authorized to  carry pistols in the 
performance o f their duties...so long as the to ta l number...available 
does not exceed the (authorized) strength o f the Japanese civil 
police force ( 9 3 ,9 3 5 ) " . ' '  ^3 Unfortunately, " it  was hard to  find the 
necessary weapons", and "only suffic ient pistols were recovered to  
give one out of five Japanese police a gu n".i i ^ Many of those that 
were voluntarily given up by the police in Septem ber/October 1945 
had apparently disappeared by January 1946. This suggests that they 
were appropriated by government officials, who presumably saw 
them as valuable assets, either as a means for personal protection 
or as a source of future profit.
The low ratio of firearms to  policemen had not been rectified  by 
1948, and the probem was compounded by the variety and poor 
quality o f the weapons available. A survey in December 1948 
identified 165 d iffe rent models, a diverse collection tha t was n o t 
matched by the necessary assortment of ammunition.115 Even after 
May 1948, when the Occupation authorities released to  the police 
the remaining stock of captured and surrendered ammunition, the 
police had only 1,820,177 rounds. Supplies were carefully regulated 
- only three rounds/ recru it were provided fo r basic training and
T T  ^ All kinds of products were concealed from the Occupation authorities and sold on the 
black market (see Chapter 4).
PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p. 17 (Suitland, 
B.334, file 25).
^^3 Memo for Imperial Japanese Government, dated 1 6 /1 /4 6 ;  Thru: Central Liaison 
Office; Subject: Armament of Police Forces in Japan (NDL, G-2 00250).
 ^ PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p. 17.
 ^  ^  ^ Historv of the Non-Militarv Activities, p .61.
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tw o more allocated for in-service train ing.! 16 By the end of 1948 
m ost policemen were armed w ith  batons, which replaced the 
traditional short swords and symbolised the changing role o f th e  
police in Japanese society. However, these wooden sticks provided 
lit t le  p ro tec tion  against gunfire, and did not prevent b la tan t 
vio lation o f laws and regulations. In August 1949 the loan o f 
American revolvers ! !  ^ redressed the balance between the police and 
criminal elements, and demonstrated the Occupation's com m itm ent 
to  a strong and effective police force. Although Yoshida Shigeru, the 
Japanese Prime Minister, believed tha t the police should be equipped 
with machine g u n s jis  the Americans considered such provision to  be 
excessive. In May 1 948 Eaton had suggested tha t machine guns were 
not suitable for close-quarters shooting and would result in injury 
to  innocent people or damage to  h o u se sJ is  The possession o f 
firearms fac ilita ted confident and e ffic ien t performance o f police 
duties, and certa in ly le ft the individual policeman feeling less 
vulnerable and more self-assured. However, in terms of a collective 
response to  crime or unrest, the existence o f adequate transport and 
communications facilities was equally im portant.
In August 1946 Pulliam warned tha t "the  police have very litt le  
motor transport and no means o f rapid communication with which to  
cope w ith the gangster tactics o f m inority g r o u p s " . !  The following 
month a survey of the rural police in Saitama pre fecture revealed 
th a t "m otorized equipment was e ither obsolete or in very poor 
mechanical condition...", and emphasized the need for "more vehicles 
for transport of prisoners and answering emergency c a l l s " . !  2 !  /\s for 
Saitama's communication system, it was old and in need of repair or 
replacement; numerous telephones were found to  be out of order, and 
the correction of faults took days or weeks. The over-exploitation o f 
machinery during the war years, the failure to  m aintain properly 
limited stocks and the devastation le ft by numerous bombing raids
! ! 6 Ibid.
! !^ PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p.l 7.
! !G Press Conference of 1 2 /5 /4 8  (NDL, G-2 00250).
! ! 9 Ibid.
! 20 Report on law and order, dated 1 5 /8 /4 6 ; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (NDL, G- 
2 00228).
! 2 ! Memo, dated 5 /9 /4 6 ;  To: Chief, PSD; From: Major W. C. Bower (NDL, G-2 
0 0 2 3 1 ) .
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combined to  frus tra te  e ffec tive  policing during the Occupation 
period. These problems adversely affected all sections o f Japanese 
society. In his diary entry for 24 December 1945, Mark Gayn claimed 
tha t "millions o f Japanese were on the road" and the country was 
"gasping fo r transpo rta tion ".1 22 Likewise, police communications, 
consisting of both wire and radio-telegraph networks, ran parallel 
w ith the lines of the Ministry o f Communications throughout most of 
the c o u n t r y ; ! 2 3  i n  urban areas wartime bomb damage was extensive, 
while the problem in rural areas was poor m a i n t e n a n c e . !  2 4  |t was 
not until the late 1940s tha t these problems even began to  be 
rec tified . In January 1948 a developm ent plan called for the 
immediate establishment of wire circuits between the new National 
Rural Police (NRP) Headquarters and its six regional b r a n c h e s . !  25 The 
NRP was the rural component o f the new police structure, set up 
following the enactment o f the Police Law in December 1947.! 26 it 
coexisted w ith municipal police (MP) forces, established in towns 
and cities w ith populations of more than 5,000.
Delay over the repair or replacement o f equipment did not reflect a 
lack o f com m itm ent, but was rather the product o f a set o f 
priorities tha t put the personal needs of policemen before those of 
the force. In 1949 Osaka introduced a patrol system tha t combined 
policemen working on foo t w ith a few radio-equipped patrol cars. 
Since there were not enough cars w ith radios, the authorities were 
keen to  purchase more, but o f far greater consequence was the 
shortage o f shoes and low boots, the necessary vehicles for foo t 
patrols.! 27 The fact tha t such necessities were in short supply more 
than three years after Japan's defeat a ttes ts  to  the persistence of 
serious economic problems. These preoccupied the police in their 
capacity as agents o f economic regulation, but also, by a ffe c tin g  
the ir own living conditions, influenced the  way they behaved 
towards d iffe rent sections of the community. The last part of this 
chapter sketches the broad outlines of the economic situation in
! 22 M. Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1 981 ) p.59.
! 23 Historv of the Non-Militarv Activities. M.55, p.64. 
! 24 Ibid.
!25 1^ . ,  p.65
! 26 The Police Law went into effect on March 8 , 1948.
! 27 History of the Non-Militarv Activities. M.55, p.71.
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Japan following her surrender. It is intended to  serve as a preface to  
Chapters Three, Four and Five.
Economic Conditions
The OSS report, entitled "The Japanese Police System under Allied 
Occupation", predicted in September 1945 tha t prevailing economic, 
social and physical conditions would increase the d ifficu lties o f the 
Japanese police in maintaining order, warning th a t "shortages o f 
consumers' goods and available shelter may be expected to  aggravate 
such problems as black markets, th e ft and r i o t s " . ' ' 28 Mark Gayn, 
arriving in Japan on the 5 December 1945, described the desperate 
plight of the defeated Japanese:
The closer we came to Yokohama, the plainer became the gravity of 
Japan's hurt. Before us, as far as we could see, lay miles of rubble. The 
people looked ragged and distraught. They dug into the rubble to clear 
space for new shacks. ^ 9^
The problem of inadequate shelter was accompanied by other more 
pressing sho rtfa lls , namely in su ffic ie n t supplies o f food and 
clothing. Poverty and scarcity characterised Japan in 1945. The 
policies of her government in the early months o f the Occupation 
only made matters worse.
When the Emperor broadcast his surrender speech on 15 August 
1945, Japan's economy, which had been to ta lly  geared to  war, was
close to  collapse. The developments in the weeks im m ediately
follow ing th a t broadcast ensured th a t the Am ericans' po litica l 
ob jectives would be seriously undermined by the s ta te  o f the 
economy. The increase in note issue in the last year o f the war and 
much heavier governm ent spending com bined to  crea te  an 
inflationary pressure tha t was released by the decline of authority
tha t accompanied defeat. The problem was compounded by hasty
withdrawals of deposits and uncontrolled government expenditure. In 
the firs t half of August the Japanese Government paid out ¥ 9 .9  
million earmarked as extraordinary m ilitary budget funds, much of 
this made up of discharge allowances and pensions paid years in
128 OSS, R&A Report No. 2758 (2 8 /9 /4 5 )  p.44.
129 |vj_ Gayn, Japan Diary, p .l.
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advance. In September another ¥24 billion was spent in this way.^ 30 
By the time the Occupation became aware of what was going on and 
tried to  stop it, prices had increased three t i m e s . ' ' 3 1 There was a 
growing shortage of essential consumer supplies, the product of the 
promotion of wartime production at the expense o f everything else, 
and there had been a marked drop in coal ou tpu t from seriously 
undermaintained mines. Add to  these problems the lack of essential 
raw materials from abroad and it becomes clear why the Occupation 
au tho rities  did not s tick  by th e ir original position o f non­
responsibility for the economy. The situation was too serious to  be 
le ft to  a Japanese governm ent w ith  lim ited  resources and 
questionable commitment.
Part Four o f the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy fo r 
Japan insisted th a t the governm ent o f Japan was to  be held 
responsible for the state of the economy, justify ing this position as 
follows: "..the prospect of economic d ifficu lty  and suffering, (and) 
the plight o f Japan is the direct outcome of its own behaviour, and 
the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage".132 
The Japanese au tho rities  were charged w ith  developing and 
enforcing programmes tha t would prevent acute economic distress 
and ensure "Just and impartial d istribution of available supplies".^ 33 
It was the Japanese police who were the principal agents o f 
economic regulation, particularly the collection and distribution o f 
essential commodities. Their wartim e activ ities in the economic 
sphere were not altered by defeat and Occupation. The black economy 
continued to  hamper equitable d is tribu tion  o f necessities, and 
increasingly preoccupied the police. J. B. Cohen explains the black 
market's development in terms of a vicious circle: "As less food 
appeared in legitimate channels, greater demand was created on the 
black market, this in turn reducing the quantity o f food going into 
le g itim a te  c h a n n e l s " .  ^3 4  The illegal transport o f fo o d s tu ffs  by 
individuals on passenger trains, reflecting the inadequacy of official
T 30 J B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, 1949) p.418.
 ^31 Ibid.
 ^32 Political Reorientation of Japan. Appendix A :11, p.425.
 ^33 Ibid.
 ^34 j_ B. Cohen, Japan's Economy, p.385.
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r a t i o n s , "13 5  was too pervasive to  be e ffec tive ly  controlled. "The 
solution of...w ar-born and surrender-swollen problems was not 
helped by (the) original policy o f non-responsibility in the economic 
s p h e r e " , T  3 6  and ultimately demanded the active involvement of the 
Americans.
The Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to  Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control o f Japan 
instructed MacArthur to  ensure tha t "all practicable economic and 
police measures are taken to  achieve the maximum utilisation of 
essential Japanese resources in order tha t imports into Japan may 
be s tric tly  l i m i t e d " . 1 3 7  Necessary measures included production and 
price controls, rationing and restriction of black markets. Therefore, 
from the outset MacArthur was authorized to  compel the government 
o f Japan to  exp lo it its  lim ited resources to  the fu ll. M ilitary 
government officials were to  monitor the situation, and actively to  
intervene only when circumstances demanded. Increasingly, as the 
Occupation progressed. Allied personnel were required to  work w ith 
the police to  enforce collection of rice. Deployment o f Occupation 
forces re fle c ted  the weakness o f the  Japanese police, the 
persistence o f economic problems, and, more im portan tly , the 
convergence o f interests between the Japanese authorities and their 
American masters.
Conclusion
The consequences of Japan's defeat and Occupation, as far as the 
police were concerned, were both negative and positive. Close 
association w ith the discredited wartim e regime, tog e the r w ith  
American policies tha t sought to  promote civil liberties, damaged 
the status and prestige of the police institu tion . The removal o f 
high-ranking police officials through purge was accompanied by the 
voluntary departure of thousands o f policemen of all ranks, both
135 According to J. B. Cohen, the caloric intake during 1945 averaged 1,680 calories/ 
person/ day compared to a minimum requirement of 2 ,163 (p .386). In May 1946  
caloric consumption in Tokyo was 1 ,3 5 2 / capita/ day while in rural prefectures it was 
2,022. By August 1947 it had risen to 1,704 in Tokyo and was 2,041 in rural areas 
(p .4 7 7 ).
136 1 ^ . ,  p.418.
137 Political Reorientation of Japan. Appendix A;13, p.436.
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cause and sym ptom  o f declining morale. Confident, e ffe c tive  
performance o f police duties was undermined by a feeling o f  
vulnerability. Policemen harboured personal doubts as to  the ir role 
in socie ty, and were o ften  ill-equipped to  deal w ith  armed 
criminals. The police force was enfeebled by defeat and Occupation, 
but remained an essential agency of law enforcement.
Indeed, the abolition o f Japan's armed forces increased th e  
im portance of the civil police. In the con tex t o f an ind irec t 
Occupation they represented the only stabilising force available to  
the Japanese government. The decision to  govern through the 
Japanese authorities afforded the police an ambivalent status. The 
Americans considered them to  be a necessary evil, prone to  
undemocratic activ ities and ye t v ita l auxiliaries, w ith o u t which 
reforms could not be implemented. Persistent economic problems 
further strengthened the police; they continued to  dominate the daily 
lives of ordinary Japanese through their enforcement o f regulations 
concerned w ith  pricing and ration ing . In the  fina l analysis, 
am bivalent Occupation policies combined w ith  vo la tile  socio­
economic conditions both to  impair the effectiveness of the police 
and to  emphasize their importance.
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CHAPTER THREE 
GUARDIANS OF THE PEOPLE
Kawaji Toshiyoshi, the architect of Japan's modern police system, 
characterised the police as "nursemaids" of the people.i The degree 
to  which they supervised and regulated the lives o f ordinary 
Japanese was seen as excessive by American reformers, accustomed 
to  a more circumscribed form of policing. In March 1946 Lewis 
Valentine, former commissioner of the New York c ity  police, and 
Oscar dander, commissioner of Michigan s ta te  police, arrived in 
Japan. Invited by the Occupation authorities to  assess the current 
s itua tion  and recommend changes, they were to  oversee the 
compilation o f reports on Japan's metropolitan police organisation 
and her rural forces respective ly. Both m issions called fo r 
"déconcentration" and decentralisation, tha t is to  say the removal of 
extraneous police functions and the devolution of police power.2 The 
Valentine Report instructed the Occupation to  "s trip  the existing 
police of every duty not acceptable by American standards to  the 
field of police w o rk " ,3 and dander recommended tha t such functions 
be transferred as soon as other government agencies could absorb 
thenr4
The Occupation's inability to  find e ffective  substitu tes for police 
regu la tion con s tan tly  underm ined e ffo r ts  to  re s tr ic t  police 
activities. As will become clear, the Japanese police continued to  
dominate the lives o f ordinary people, paying litt le  heed to  th e  
Occupation's occasional demands for the ir w ithdrawal from such 
areas as economic regulation. The proposed reduction of the ir 
powers and responsibilities was dictated by the active promotion of 
civil liberties and human rights. In short, it was seen as an essential 
precondition for transform ing the role of the police in Japanese 
society and th e re b y  im proving  p o lice -co m m u n ity  re la tions .
 ^ Discussed in Chapter 1.
3 History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, Monograph 55 
(Police and Public Safety), p. 18. The debate surrounding the speed and extent of 
decentralisation is examined in Chapter 6 .
3 The Intelligence Series. Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), 
F EC and SCAP" (GHQ/FEC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Tokyo, 1949) 
Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Summation of the Valentine Report, p.1.
^ Ibid.. Documentary Appendices 3, Introduction to the dander Report (2 4 /6 /4 6 ) ,  p.3.
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Unfortunately serious socio-economic dislocation throughout Japan 
impeded the  shrinkage o f police a c tiv itie s  and n e g a t e d  
constitu tiona l guarantees of civil rights. Threats posed by both 
political agitation and economic instability forced the Americans to  
say one thing and do another. Their ambivalence encouraged the 
police to  tru s t to  the ir own instincts: they continued to  regulate 
economic affairs, sometimes a little  too enthusiastically, and were 
jealous o f their Jurisdiction; they were careless as to  the rights of 
detainees; surveillance o f the population remained a p rio rity , 
ostensibly as a crime prevention measure; and, although confused as 
to  the correct course of action vis à vis demonstrations and strikes, 
they preferred an active response to  a passive one.
The numerous regulations and controls tha t sustained the war e ffo rt 
were perceived by the Occupation as an obstacle to  the liberation of 
the Japanese people. This much is clear from observations made in 
the report on the Japanese police system, compiled by the Office of 
Strategic Services in September 1945:
The Japanese police perform many functions discharged by separate 
government bureaus in other countries. Police functions in Japan range 
from the enforcement of economic regulations to arbitrary control of 
dissident political elements by means of censorship, suppression of 
labour unions, and arrest and detention for political opposition. The police 
by their performance of such political activities have constituted an 
obstacle to the fulfilment of democratic tendencies in Japan.^
Almost immediately, in October 1945, "the overwhelming power of 
police agencies over the daily lives o f the people was broken by the 
changes effected as a consequence of the Civil Liberties Directive".^ 
U nfortunate ly th is was true only on paper, the scope of police 
activities remaining much the same as before in practice. Efforts to  
free the press from police control met w ith success, perm itting  
ordinary Japanese at least to  read about the civil liberties granted 
them by the benevolent Occupation. However, for the most part the 
people concerned themselves with more pressing issues such as the 
search fo r food and o the r necessities. The problem s th e y  
encountered in this regard were compounded by the interference of
 ^ Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, R. & A. Report No. 2758, 
"The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation" (2 8 /9 /4 5 )  p.5 
 ^ Historv of the Non-Militarv Activities of the Occupation of Japan. M.55, pp.12-13.
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police, who remained the principal agents o f economic regulation, 
continuing to  work within a framework of price and rationing laws. 
For example, a lis t o f economic contro l laws and ordinances, 
compiled in 1949, reveals tha t the Foodstuffs Control Law tha t was 
issued during the war, in February 1942, was still in operation.^
Economic Regulation
By the end of 1945 the Japanese Government had formulated a plan 
for the reorganisation of the police system, recommending amongst 
other things a reduction in economic duties.^ When the Economic 
Police Section o f the Metropolitan Police Board was abolished the 
following month^ it seemed tha t the government's desire to  strip the 
police of economic functions was a genuine one. However, this was 
no more than a symbolic gesture, designed to  placate the Occupation 
authorities. Changes affecting the adm inistrative divisions o f the 
police system did litt le  to  undermine policing practices tha t had 
developed before and during the war. As late as November 1949 
Makoto Matsukata, a Government Section research analyst, was 
recommending th a t "the  Public Safety Division in itia te  action to  
remove the police from investigation o f economic crimes and 
enforcem ent o f economic regu la tions".i o Arguing tha t "great ill- 
feeling is created with the people when police powers are applied to  
economic controls",11 he reminded the deputy chief o f MacArthur's 
call for the abolition o f the economic police in a le tte r to  the 
Japanese Prime Minister in September 1947.12 Matsukata asserted 
th a t "the  police (were) more than ever involved in economic 
r e g u l a t i o n " . !  3 An expanding black market tha t constantly frustrated 
a ttem pts to  fully exploit lim ited supplies of staple foods, clothing 
and raw materials connected war w ith Occupation; it acted as a
 ^ NDL, GS(B) 02270  - undated (1949  or1950).
Q Summations. No.2 (Nov. 45), p.36.
9 Ibid.. No.3 (Dec. 45), p.30.
Memo dated 3 /1 1 /4 9 ;  To: Deputy chief, GS; Subject: Enforcement of Economic 
Controls [NDL, GS(B) 02270 ]
! ! Ibid.
! 2 MacArthur’s letter to Katayama concerning the Reorganisation of the Japanese Police 
System, dated 1 6 /9 /1 9 4 7  (NDL, G-2 02750).
! 3 Memo dated 3 /1 1 /4 9 ;  Subject: Enforcement of Economic Controls [NDL, GS(B) 
0 2 2 7 0 ].
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bridge across which the Japanese police successfully c ro sse d , 
bringing w ith them their overarching authority in economic affairs. 
In short, where there was a black m arket there was also an 
economic police, despite Occupation e ffo rts  to  the contrary.i  ^
American a ttem pts to  deal w ith illegitimate channels o f commerce 
were at best half-hearted, subordinated to  the desire to  push 
through radical political change. The maximisation o f Japan’s scarce 
resources by means of a properly regulated economy, despite its 
being the essential precondition for ef fec t ive  political change, was 
to  remain the responsibility of the Japanese government.15
The Office of S trategic Services' report on the Japanese police 
system explained th a t economic sections o f prefectura l police 
divisions "handle applications for rations, d is tr ib u te  emergency 
rations and enforce wage, price, rationing and o ther economic 
re g u la tio n s ".!6 The nature of such duties, it was claimed, was not 
p o lit ic a l. ! This surprising conclusion surely derived from  the 
authors’ realisation that, given tha t "there (were) no other agencies 
immediately or economically available, abrupt transfer o f functions 
from police control might lead to  confusion".!8 Thus, the Occupation 
authorities jus tified  the ir sponsorship o f the police as economic 
regulators by characterising such activ ity  as a temporary expedient 
that was in any case innocuous.! 9 It was noted tha t the police were 
not e ffe c tiv e  en forcers o f econom ic co n tro ls , th e ir  poor 
performance reflecting an excessive workload and the unworkability 
of the measures th e m se lve s . 20  Their economic activ ities, it  was 
argued, should be circumscribed, and the burden o f such regulation 
somehow shared . 21 Rather than abolishing the economic police, it
!  ^According to Matsukata, the Economic Stabilisation Board was created principally to 
replace the civil police as the agency of economic control.
!5 The Japanese establishment was too involved in the "free market'Vblack market to 
discharge this responsibility with any conviction (See Chapter 4).
!  ^ R&A Report No. 2758, "The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation" 
(2 8 /9 /4 5 )  p.57.
!  ^ Ibid.
! G Ibid.
!9 Given the importance of the black market in Occupation Japan, such a contention was 
clearly false (See Chapter 4).
20 OSS, R&A Report No.2758, p.57.
2! Ibid. With regard to the regulation of market stalls and other commercial outlets the 
burden was shared by powerful individuals whose influence often derived from criminal
103
made more sense to  confine their role to  the apprehension of those 
infringing economic regulations "unless...enforcem ent o f (such) 
controls was found to  be extremely c o r r u p t " . 22 The la tte r proviso 
was well made, given their reputation during the war. J. B. Cohen, 
assessing the effectiveness o f the Anti-P rofiteering Ordinance in 
1937, remarked tha t "the economic police (Keizai Keisatsu) o f the 
Home Ministry were responsible for its enforcement and as a result 
it was enforced only against those who did not have the means to  
buy exemption from the p o l i c e " . 2 3  Those tha t compiled the OSS 
report seem to  have largely disregarded the economic police's poor 
track record, preferring to  recommend th a t "in te rfe rence w ith  
regular procedures...(be) kept to  a m i n i m u m " . 24
The police continued to  employ spasmodic, inadequate contro l 
measures tha t were supposed to  combat organised black market 
operations. Raids on trains, inspections of warehouses and check 
points on major roads revealed the quantity of illicit tra ffic , but did 
little  to  stem it. For example, in August 1946 Miyagi prefectural 
police raided an express train bound for Tokyo, apprehending tw o  
hundred passengers in possession of "excessive amounts o f foo d ". 
Most were identified as black market operators from Tokyo, Osaka 
and Nagoya, returning from Aomori prefecture, northern Honshu, 
where they had illegally purchased the ir cargo. 25 During the firs t 
tw o weeks of November, 1946, incoming passengers at leading 
railway stations in Tokyo were "inspected", resulting in the arrest 
o f more than seven hundred people fo r "carry ing unauthorised 
amounts o f g o o d s " . 2 6  On the 21st January, 1947, the police set up 
checkpoints on all major roads into the capital, and stopped more 
than tw o hundred trucks, confiscating large quantities o f nails, 
wire, coal, tar, charcoal, cloth ing, vegetables and fish. 27  The 
follow ing month seven checkpoints on the Kawagoe highway
activities (See chapter 4).
22 OSS, R&A Report No.2758, p.58.
23 j .  B. Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction (University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, 1949) p.357.
24 OSS, R&A Report No.2758, p.58.
23 Summations. No.11 (Aug. 46), p.34.
26 Ibid.. No.14 (Nov. 46), p.77.
2^ \b\6., N0 . I 6 (Jan. 47), p.40.
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(Saitama pre fecture) ne tted food and raw materials destined for 
contraband channels - within four hours on one day 200 trucks were 
stopped and large quantities of assorted goods seized, inc lud ing 
more than 12,000 pounds of dried fish, 3,000 bundles o f firewood, 
300 bales o f charcoal and about 8,000 pounds of vegetables.28 in 
April, 1947, a system of changing checkpoints was established in 
the metropolitan area of Tokyo to  frustra te  attem pts to  bypass the 
roads where barriers were usually set up.29 The extent o f the 
problem was such th a t the actions o f the police were generally 
reactive rather than proactive.
Policing the railways was particu larly d ifficu lt, criminal elements 
proving more than a match for the agents o f law enforcement. 
Trains were regularly used by black market brokers, generally able 
to  act w ith impunity whether they were operating individually or in 
gangs. Towards the end o f 1946, the Ministry o f Transport, "in an 
a ttem p t to  curtail th e fts  and o ther law vio lations....proposed to  
increase the number of railway police by granting police powers to  a 
to ta l o f 8 ,915  railroad em ployees".30 Acknowledging the civil 
po lice ’s need fo r re in forcem ents, the  Public S a fe ty  D ivision 
approved o f the M inistry’s plans "w ith  the understanding tha t no 
additional personnel will be employed, tha t employees will not carry 
firearms or any weapons except sticks, canes or batons and th a t  
police powers will be restricted to  enforcement on railway property 
only...".31 The recommended increase in personnel does not seem to  
have been put into effect. According to  the 2nd March 1949 issue of 
the Nippon Times. "The Ministry of Transport (was still) planning to  
increase the number o f railway public safe ty o ffice rs from the 
present 2,000 to  6,000...in view of the increasing number of....crimes 
on tra in s ".32 Whatever action was taken in late 1946 apparently
28 CIS Periodical Summary No. 12, Excerpt No. 19, dated 1 5 /2 /4 7 :  Police Campaign 
against Black Market - Highway Checkpoints Established, Markets Raided (NDL, G-2 
0 2 7 7 7 ) .
29 Summations. No.19 (April 47), p.56.
39 CIS Periodical Summary No.1, Excerpt No.2, dated 1 /9 /4 6 :  Railway Police (G-2  
0 2 7 7 7 ) .
31 Ibid.
32 Article entitled "Ministry to Increase Railway Police Force - Action Decided to Stop 
Theft of Cargoes from Trains" [GS(B) 02282].
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failed to  stem the tra ffic  in " y a m i " 3 3  products and its  a ttendan t 
problems. In February 1947 it was reported tha t violence on the 
railways necessitated a robust response from the police:
The prevalence of various kinds of lawlessness on Japanese trains, 
resulting in nationwide complaints by victimised passengers, finally 
moved the Home Ministry to inaugurate a system whereby armed 
policemen are assigned to certain trains, to check on violations ranging 
from illegal occupancy of seats to blackmarketeering, pickpocketing and 
even organised gang robbery.
On local or com m uters' tra ins there was "open black m arket 
t r a d i n g " , 35  a practice tha t aggravated the crowded, uncomfortable 
conditions endured by Japanese trave lling to  work or to  the 
countryside in search of food. Racketeers carrying bundles o f black 
market goods "monopolise(d) far more than the ir rightfu l share of 
space, to  say nothing of their violations of economic l a w s " . 36 in the 
space of three days a special patrol rounded up 1,424 offenders in 
the Tokyo area alone, m ost o f whom, however, were not 
"professional racketeers". The distinction between "the small fry ", 
those infringing economic regulations in order to  feed or clothe 
the ir fam ily, and "the  big fish", the large-scale brokers, is an 
im portant one, and will be examined later in this section. For the 
moment it is enough to  acknowledge tha t the la tte r, operating in 
organised groups, were the intended quarry o f armed police, 
dispatched from Tokyo, Kanagawa, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, Yamaguchi and 
Fukuoka.37
The press’s response to  the assignment of armed police to  passenger 
trains was a mixed one. It was suggested by one editor th a t the ir 
presence smacked too much of the old days when the revolvers o f the 
Kenpeitai "spelled awe tha t would have silenced a crying b a b y " . 38 
Most, however, interpreted it as a much needed and tim ely a ttem pt 
to  solve a problem th a t was beyond the capability o f unarmed
33 An abbreviation of vami ichiba. the Japanese phrase for "black market".
34 CIS Periodical Summary No.12, Excerpt No.18, dated 1 5 /2 /4 7 :  Armed Police on 
Trains - Measures Taken to Combat Black Market (G-2 02777).
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Yomiuri Shinbun. 2 4 /1 /4 7 ,  Ibid.
106
railway officials. In any case it seems to  have been e ffective . In 
Nagano prefecture armed police handled a to ta l of 1,060 offences 
during the firs t three weeks o f February, o f which 600 related to  the 
black market and 1 30 to  disturbances of the peace (the rest were 
classified as minor o ffences).39 Commodities confiscated by the 
police teams included 190 bags of rice (10,133 kg), 26 bags of soy 
beans (1,577 kg), 45 bags o f red beans (2,793 kg), 459 items o f 
clothing and 1,800 kan of apples (15,750 kg).40 It may be assumed 
tha t the quantities involved represent the tip  o f the iceberg, the 
scale of the black market being far beyond the expectations o f the 
Occupation. The to rren t o f "yami" products was continuous, police 
raids amounting to  nothing more than the tem porary closure o f 
sluice-gates. Despite the e ffo rts  o f both the Occupation and the 
Japanese Government, the flow was not e ffective ly  stemmed. As 
late as March, 1950, it was reported tha t "rice carriers", evading 
numerous train and station checks, were s till entering Kanagawa 
prefecture w ith the ir cargoes i n t a c t . T h a t  much was clear from 
the results of police clamp downs. For example, between 1 5 January 
and 2 February, 1950, 17,257 kg of staple foods were impounded in 
train checks.^z
It was above all the scale of the black market tha t defeated the 
Japanese police. The level o f illegal commercial a c tiv ity  can be 
measured according to  either the quantity of "yami" goods detected 
or the number of people caught in fring ing economic regulations. 
Whilst the form er is examined in the next chapter, the la tte r is 
re levant to  any discussion o f the ex ten t to  which the  police 
in terfered w ith the e ffo rts  o f ordinary Japanese to  eke out an 
existence for themselves. The number of violations o f economic 
laws remained extremely high throughout the Occupation period, 
suggesting th a t many Japanese were consuming black m arket 
produce in order to  supplement inadequate official rations. Those
39 Letter from HQ, GIG Area No.20, dated 2 2 /2 /4 7 ; Thru: 2nd GIG Region (9 Gorps); To: 
441st GIG Detachment, GHQ; Subject: Armed Police on Railways - Summary of 
Information (G-2 0 02 3 9 ).
Ibid.
Report on Gonference held at Economic Investigation Agency, Kanagawa prefecture 
(hand-written); dated 1 6 /3 /5 0 ; author unknown (NARA, Suitland, Givil Affairs Section 
Box No.2733, File 2, entitled Economic Investigation Activities 1949-51).
^3 Ibid.
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who controlled the supply - they are identified in Chapter 4 - 
accum ulated riches, whilst the m ajority struggled to  make ends 
meet by whatever means possible. In 1949, when the United Press 
enquired as to  the incidence of crime in Japan, the Public Safety 
Division considered it advisable to  conceal the high number of 
infringements of economic regulations. Colonel Pulliam was adamant 
tha t only those s ta tis tics  enum erating transgressions o f the 
criminal code should be released for public scrutiny:
The other offences, mainly violations of economic regulations, are now 
running at 1 00 ,000  per month. A similar situation in Germany was 
publicised in the American press and (resulted in)unfavourable press 
comment...The U.S. generally feels that it is a minor problem here. We 
should encourage that f e e l i n g . ^ ^
A little  deceit was necessary to  p ro tec t the Occupation's image 
from the many detractors at home, who increasingly charged SCAP 
with mismanagement o f the economy. Governments, aware o f the 
overrid ing im portance of public p e rc e p t io n s ,  natura lly incline 
towards the selective use of sta tis tics. The Public Safety Division's 
a ttem pts  at s ta tis tica l massage were more easily achieved a fte r 
January 1947, when non-criminal offences, largely connected w ith  
black marketing, were extracted from the to ta l number o f reported 
v i o l a t i o n s . 44 a  clearer picture of the incidence of crime emerged, 
the non-criminal element accounting for nearly 30% o f all reported 
o f f e n c e s . 45 This gives some indication o f the prominence o f the 
black market, although, given tha t the police were often e ither 
despised or feared, the number of repor ted  offences is a s ta tis tic  
tha t should be cited w ith caution. Likewise, it is d ifficu lt to  draw 
conclusions from the number o f arrests, this more than any other 
s ta tis tic  re flec ting  the level o f police vig ilance. F luctuations 
recorded by government officials were more often than not caused 
by enforcement drives, when the police neglected other duties in 
order to  check the rising number o f illegal transactions. Generally, 
it can be assumed tha t the level o f black market activ ity , although 
subject to  seasonal variation, remained fairly constant.
43 Inter-Office Memo, dated 1 8 /5 /4 9 ; From: PSD; To: G-2; Subject: UP Inquiry (G-2 
0 0 2 5 5 ) .
44 History of the Non-Militarv Activities of the Occupation of Japan. M.55, p.75.
45 Ibid.
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Figure 6 illustrates tha t the number of infringements of econom ic 
regulations ranged from around 80,000 to  more than 1 20,000 per 
month during 1947. This was the level specified by Pulliam in 1949, 
suggesting tha t for the duration of the Occupation, certa inly from 
1 947, there were more than a million recorded  economic offences a 
year. The m ajority o f these concerned staple and supplem entary 
foods - 77.32% in 1946 and 82.81% in 1947 (See figures 7 and 8). 
This was not surprising given tha t price and rationing controls were 
primarily concerned with ensuring fair and equitable distribution of 
necessities. During the war the Japanese governm ent considered 
effective economic regulation to  be a vital precondition for national 
mobilisation. The Occupation, however, demanded tha t food supplies 
be properly shared in the in te rests o f dém ocratisation. Serious 
shortages would induce apathy or radicalism, both of which were 
discouraged by American reformers.
The high number o f economic offences concerned w ith  illegal 
possession of food produced a fairly tolerant attitude on the part o f 
the Japanese police. Acknowledging the inadequacy o f o ffic ia l 
rations, the ir a ttem pts at economic regulation were o ften  mere 
gestures, intended to  reassure the Occupation authorities t h a t  
som ething was being done to  check illegal trading in scarce 
commodities. Early on it was made clear tha t those caught "food- 
hunting" ( kaidashi) would be treated leniently - "the economic police 
will consider the circumstances of the o f f e n d e r " . 4 6  Sometimes, "a 
woman would seek to  disguise her black market rice by strapping it 
and cosseting and posseting it and making soothing noises to  it, 
quite as if it were a baby".^^ In the unhappy event tha t rice was 
trickling from the bundle on her back, the policeman, often reluctant 
to take action, would allude to  the leak. Thus, there was a story of a 
policeman who told a woman that her "baby", which he knew to  be a 
sack of rice, was wetting its p a n t s . 4 8  The Home Ministry, anxious to
Crime Prevention Section, Public Safety Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs; undated 
(Folder title - Police General and Prefectural, Book 1, 1 1 /4 5  - 1 1 /4 6 ) [NDL, G-2 
0 0 2 2 6 ].
E. Seidensticker, Tokyo Rising - The City Since the Great Earthouake (Alfred A. 
Knopf, New York, 1990), p.1 53.
Ibid.
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please its new masters, assured them tha t such leniency was not 
applicable in the case of th e ft or improper disposition of im p o r ted  
foodstuffs^ offences countered by "s tric t contro l".^9 Whatever might 
be said about the manner in which the economy was policed - 
incompetently, leniently or s tric tly  - there is no doubt tha t it was 
the c o n s u m e rs  o f black market produce, rather than the key 
suppliers, who were oppressed by the many and diverse economic 
regulations.50
The police considered many o f the laws and regulations to  be 
"inappropriate", the ir complexity undermining effective control, not 
least by the public confusion they en ge nd e red .51 According to  a 
report w ritten at the end of 1949, it was often the case that those 
reprimanded or charged by the police fo r in fring ing economic 
regulations reacted angrily or incredulously, apparently unaware 
tha t they were breaking the law.52 The report maintained tha t it was 
the responsib ility  o f the  Economic Investiga tion  Board (EIB), 
established in August 1948, to  provide the cure for both innocence 
and ignorance through education.53 Characterised by the police as a 
mechanism for the adjustment or modification of economic controls, 
the EIB was encouraged to  conduct research w ith  a view to  
"economic rehabilitation", and not to  concern itse lf w ith "exposing 
economic v io la tions".54 The la tte r was to  remain the responsibility 
of the police, however d ifficu lt it proved to  be. By the end of 1949, 
when Occupation policy was stressing the need for economic 
recovery, the Japanese police had to  contend w ith  government 
agencies tha t increasingly threatened their overarching authority in 
the economic sphere. Although critical o f the numerous economic 
controls, the police were nevertheless Jealous o f the ir Jurisdiction 
and unwilling to  relinquish it. Thus, we find them  continually at
49 Crime Prevention Section, Public Safety Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs; undated 
(NDL, G-2 0 0 2 2 6 ).
50 By consumers I mean those who scraped a living from black market goods as well as 
those who purchased them for their own use. The key suppliers were those with the 
facilities to hoard large quantities of goods.
5^  Report accompanying memo for Deputy Chief, Government Section, from Matsukata, 
dated 3 /1 1 /4 9  (re. Enforcement of Economic Controls). Author unknown, but the tone 
of the document suggests a member of the Japanese police [GS(B) 02270].
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
112
loggerheads w ith the Economic Stabilisation Board (ESB) and its 
various o ffshoots , the ensuing con flic t im pairing ra ther than 
enhancing the quality o f economic regulation. This s ta te  of affairs 
must have perplexed many Occupation officials, convinced tha t the 
police no longer meddled in economic affairs.
In July 1947 it was reported tha t "economic inspectors" were being 
appointed in large numbers by the Home, Transport and Finance 
ministries 55 to  assist rather than supersede the police. Whilst the 
Ministry o f Transport had the largest number (8 ,000 ), the Home 
Ministry was planning to  increase its complement of around 2,000 by 
more than three tim es, thus overtaking both the M inistry o f 
Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry o f Finance w ith 3,500 
inspecto rs.56 With powers ranging "from  those o f the judicial police 
to  those o f mere inspectors w ith no police a u th o rity ",57 t h e s e  
officials seem to  have complicated the task o f economic regulation. 
The question o f the role o f the ESB enforcement bureau and its 
government inspectors was one th a t the Economic and Scientific 
Section was re luc tan t to  tackle . It was recommended th a t 
Government Section, "w ith  its obvious concern over the police 
trad ition", assume the burden.58 The Occupation faced a dilemma in 
1947. Whilst recognising the strain on the police afforded by severe 
economic shortages and extensive government controls, it  was 
hesitant to  approve large increases in manpower "because o f the 
police trad ition  o f the Japanese s t a t e " . 59 The solution was to  
approve the appointment o f officials, who were not classified as 
policemen but exercised policing powers. A lthough the extra 
economic regulators were characterised as allies o f the police, the 
relationship between the two was more often one o f rivalry than 
cooperative endeavour.
The main source of fric tion was ill-defined areas of resp ons ib ility , 
which caused both duplication o f e ffo r t and an uncoordinated
5 5 Memo dated 2 1 /7 /4 7 ;  To: Chief, Government Section; From: E. M. Hadley, 
Governmental Powers Division; Subject: Economic Inspectors [GS(B) 02306].
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
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response to  economic crime. In November 1949 Makoto Matsukata 
described communication between the police and the Economic 
Investiga tion  Board, established to  spearhead more e ffic ie n t 
economic control, as both poor and confused.^o He recommended that 
the police’s role be restricted to  the investigation and apprehension 
of those contravening the criminal code (this would "include all the  
notorious violators of economic c o n t r o l s " ) . A  spokesman for the 
police argued tha t "the EIB should concern itse lf w ith research and 
education...(and) determine whether the present economic con tro l 
laws and regulations coincide w ith real c o n d i t i o n s . . . " . ^ 2  Meanwhile 
the police would continue to  dominate the realm o f action (ie. 
e n fo rc e m e n t) .63 The EIB and police, the spokesman maintained, 
should make every e ffo rt to  promote economic reconstruction by 
liaising w ith each other, at the same tim e occupying d is tin c t 
spheres of operation.64
Both agencies resorted to  unseemly practices to  guard against the  
o ther’s encroachment. On the 22nd May, 1949, the Tokyo Shinbun 
accused the EIB o f "overstepping its  a u th o r ity " .65 The charge 
originated w ith a special enquiry into the EIB by the Lower House 
Judiciary Com m ittee. O fficials ordered before the  co m m itte e  
included the ESB chief, who was cautioned against exceeding the 
board’s rem it, namely the prevention o f econom ic o ffe n ce s .6 6 
Furthermore, the committee investigated the "prevailing rumour th a t 
personal grudges enter(ed) into some of the exposures by field 
o f f ic ia ls " .67 It was established tha t the EIB was selective in its  
exposures of hoarded goods:
The Tokyo District Prosecutor’s Office found that the Tokyo Economic
Investigation Agency exposed hoarded steel at the Metropolitan
Transportation Bureau in retaliation for the latter’s refusal to give free
60 Memo dated 3 /1 1 /4 9 ;  Subject: Enforcement of Economic Controls [NDL, GS(B) 
0 2 2 7 0 ].
61 Ibid.
62 Report accompanying memo for Deputy Chief, Government Section, from Matsukata, 
dated 3 /1 1 /4 9 ; Subject: Enforcement of Economic Controls [NDL, GS(B) 02770].
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 ATis translation, dated 2 6 /5 /4 9  [GS(B) 02281].
66 1^.
67 Ibid.
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streetcar passes to economic investigators.®®
The Japanese police, however, were by no means blameless. In 1950 
the case o f Furuya Tatsuo, an offic ia l o f Saitam a Econom ic 
Investigation Agency (EIA),69 demonstrated tha t truculence on the 
part of the police often reflected involvem ent in black market 
operations. In February, 1949, Furuya instructed his assistant to  
investigate Chiyodaya c o m p a n y , 7 0  the legally designated agent of the 
Sanqvô Fukkô Kôdan (SFK).^i Rumours tha t a large quantity o f SFK 
materials were being sold on the black market proved to  be well- 
founded, the investigation revealing a discrepancy between the 
amount o f goods available and the quantity  accumulated following 
exposure o f illegal hoards.
It was not until September, 1949, tha t EIA investigations began in 
earnest. Although all illegal and hoarded goods uncovered by the 
police should have been turned over to  Chiyodaya company as the 
agent o f the SFK, it was found th a t one Hosaka, chief o f the 
economic section o f the Omiya M etropolitan Police, had w ithheld 
about 400 items and had taken them to  the police station. During the 
period March to  May, 1949, Hosaka had ordered Chiyodaya company to  
deliver goods into his care. Furuya warned the police tha t th is was 
an illegal act, but took no immediate action "fo r the sake o f good 
relations between government a g e n c i e s " . ^ 2  Nevertheless, Chiyodaya 
company was ordered to  compile a report, a task made impossible by 
the subsequent confiscation of all the company’s books and records 
by Omiya police. Unable to  secure the la tte r ’s cooperation, Saitama 
EIA managed w ith Occupation backing to  acquire data from  SFK’s
Ibid.
Described in the Economic Stabilisation Board Establishment Law (No.164 ) as an 
"external organ" riHistorv of the Non-Militarv Activities of the Occupation of Japan. 
Monograph 34 (Price and Distribution Stabilisation: Non-Food Programme), Appendix 
5].
Report on Furuya Case, dated 3 1 /1 /5 0  - Information Obtained from Saitama EIA 
(NARA, Suitland, Civil Affairs Section Box No. 2733 , File 2, entitled Economic 
Investigation Activities, 1949 -51 ). All information re. Furuya case comes from this 
source unless otherwise stated.
Sanqvô Fukkô Kôdan - Industrial Reconstruction Corporation. The kôdan. or public
corporations, replaced the old wartime industry control associations.
Although this was the reason given, ElA's policy of restraint more probably derived
from uneasiness over their authority in police affairs.
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books and records th a t revealed the amount o f goods illegally 
disposed of by Chiyodaya c o m p a n y / ^
Meanwhile, Omiya police were secretly investigating EIA personnel, 
anxious to  undermine the ir in te g rity  by exposing shady deals. 
Hosaka, insisting tha t the EIA had no authority over the police, did 
not shrink from unilateral action. On 20 January, 1950, following 
Furuya’s arrest by Omiya police on suspicion of receiving bribes, all 
documents and data relating to  the Chiyodaya company case were 
impounded by Hosaka. Four days later the charge tha t Saitama EIA 
was disseminating false information and using Kantô Civil A ffa irs  
Region (ie. m ilitary government) as a shield was carried in a local 
newspaper. Presumably this was the jus tifica tion  fo r refusing to  
allow EIA access to  Chiyodaya company’s books from  the 3 1 s t  
January,! 950.
Furuya may have been guilty o f improper practices, but the scandal 
he was try ing to  expose was of another order and magnitude. He 
accused the Procurator’s Office, the Saitama branch o f the M inistry 
of International Trade and Industry, SFK headquarters in Tokyo and 
its local branch of illegally receiving hoarded g o o d s .^4 An Am erican 
official, who had had frequent contact w ith Furuya over a ten month 
period, described him as "a man o f courage and in tegrity , who 
through faithfu l devotion to  duty and diligent e fforts has performed 
his work in an outstanding manner w ithou t fear or f a v o u r " . ^5 He 
maintained tha t Furuya’s arrest was not surprising, given tha t his 
investigations in the summer and autumn of 1949 were leading to  
the exposure o f illegal dealings by offic ia ls in the prefectura l 
government (he had already implicated the governor o f Saitama 
prefecture, Nishimura, in a hoarded goods scandal).^^ The Furuya 
case is an extreme example o f the tensions th a t arose f ro m  
Jurisdictional rivalries, but its real significance derives from  the 
issue of corruption in high places. Clearly it  was the influence th a t
Information Received from Furuya, dated 3 1 /1 /5 0  (Suitland, CAS Box No.2733, File
2 ).
^4 Ibid.
Letter from R. A. Hashitani, Distribution and Enforcement Division, Kantô Civil 
Affairs Region, dated 3 /3 /5 0 ; To whom it may concern (CAS Box No.2733, File 2).
Ibid.
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accompanied dominance in the field of economic regulation th a t 
produced aggressive riva lry between the  various governm ent 
agencies. W hilst a reg im e o f econom ic co n tro ls  g re a tly  
inconvenienced and harassed ordinary Japanese, it greatly b e n e fite d  
those charged w ith  its  enforcem ent. The s itua tion  was well 
summarised in the February 1949 edition of Shinsô magazine:
MPB...officials in charge of economic controls over staple foods, 
perishables and other foods often conduct unannounced searches for illegal 
goods at such centres as Shinbashi, Ginza, Ueno and Shinjuku; but the 
tendency is to overlook black marketeers who are rampant in their own 
offices.
The difference in treatm ent accorded the "respectable" law-breakers 
and the pe tty  traders, who were constan tly  in fringing economic 
regulations, was a cause for increasing concern among Occupation 
officials. It was bad enough tha t the police were still active agents 
of economic control. What made m atters worse was the manner in 
which they policed the economy, the ir behaviour towards ordinary 
Japanese, which showed litt le  regard for civil liberties and human 
rights. American reformers, whose policy documents had linked  
dém ocra tisa tion  o f the police w ith  "déconcentra tion" o f the ir 
functions, witnessed the tw o issues becoming entwined in practice. 
It became clear th a t policemen, w h ils t e n fo rc in g  econom ic  
regulations, were flouting constitutional guarantees o f freedom and 
privacy.
In 1949 the legality o f spot checks o f individuals' personal e ffects  
by the police was frequently discussed in both the Japanese media 
and Occupation circles. In January of tha t year Mr. Rauwald of the 
Civil Transportation Section/policy branch informed Legal Section 
tha t so-called "railroad police" had been spot checking fre ight and 
b a g g a g e . ^ 8  Responding to  his doubts as to  the legitimacy of such 
actions, Meyers (Legal Section) s ta ted th a t railway police "were 
lim ited in the ir ac tiv ities  as judicial police to  maintaining order
ATIS Translation, dated 5 /2 /4 9 ;  article entitled "Metropolitan Police Exposed" 
[GS(B) 0 22 8 3 ].
^8 Legal Section, 2 7 /1 /4 9 ;  Memo for the record; From: H. Meyers (Legislative and 
Justice Division); Subject: Judicial Police - Ability of Railroad Employees with Judicial 
Police Powers to Search Baggage and Freight [GS(B) 02271].
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among passengers and preventing mishaps to  baggage and fre ig h t" /^  
The issue raised a d ifficu lt policy problem - it was essential to  
stem  the tra ffic  in black market produce, but "the  C onstitu tion 
appear(ed) clearly to  deny any search o f baggage on the basis of a 
spot check which is unconnected w ith reasonable suspicion tha t a 
crime has been committed".80
Japanese people subjected to  police searches understood th e ir  
purpose, but objected to  the manner in which they were conducted. It 
was th is more than anything else th a t provoked critic ism  in the 
national press. In April and May, 1949, the mainstream newspapers 
a lerted the  Occupation au thorities to  the resentm ent fe lt by 
ordinary Japanese on being forced to  alight from trains for police 
checks. On 28 April, the Asahi Shinbun reported tha t members of the 
Upper House Judiciary Committee had gone to  Kôriyama in Fukushima 
pre fecture the previous day to  investigate allegations o f "rough 
handling of railway passengers by policemen...".8i They witnessed a 
raid at Shirakawa station , and were le ft in no doubt as to  the 
a ttitude  o f those undergoing "inspection". Itsuki Takeo, a committee 
member, had this to  say:
Police circles contend that passengers get off the train to cooperate with 
the police, but in our opinion few of them cooperated with the police of 
their own free will. It is hoped that the police will change or entirely 
abolish this control method, from the standpoint of respecting the people's 
human rights..
One traveller, interviewed by the Yomiuri Shinbun. stated tha t any 
cooperation on the part of passengers could be explained by the fact 
tha t they were often "half-asleep when rounded up by the p o l i c e " . 8 3  
In response to  his demand that inspections be conducted in the train, 
he had been to ld  tha t searches were done on the orders o f the 
O c c u p a t i o n . 8 4  The police, he maintained, fully exploited the docility
Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 ATIS Translation, dated 3 /5 /4 9 :  Rough Police Handling on Trains Probed - Full 
trans. of Kôriyama dispatch, Asahi Shinbun [GS(B) 02281].
82 1^ .
83 ATIS Translation, dated 6 /5 /4 9 :  The Compulsory Examination of Passengers - 
Summary of sub-editorial, 3 0 /4 /4 9  issue [GS(B) 02281 ].
84 Ibid.
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of Japanese vis à vis Occupation d irec tives .85 Presumably the 
interviewee was not alone in finding it "unpleasant to  be awakened 
on the n ight tra in and forced to  ge t o ff to  undergo police
inspection".86
Nobody seems to  have paid much attention to  statem ents made by 
the offices of A ttorney General and Public Prosecutor in early April, 
1949, inform ing passengers th a t the police had no authority to  
coerce them into obeying orders, tha t they could refuse to  submit to  
inspections if they so d e s i r e d . 8 7  The Public Prosecutor's Office ruled 
th a t it was illegal to  stop trains to  search passengers, and 
restric ted legitim ate police ac tiv ity  to  questioning travellers as to  
the contents o f hand l u g g a g e . 8 8  By 30 April, however, pressure 
exerted by media coverage was forcing the various police forces 89 
to  m oderate the ir behaviour. On 30 April National Rural Police 
Headquarters, Miyagi prefecture, issued a notification to  all police 
s ta tions  th roughou t its  ju risd ic tion , "p roh ib iting  the fo rc ib le  
removal o f passengers from trains while carrying out searches for 
illega lly -transported  staple f o o d s t u f f s " . 8 0  Any disruption o f th e  
tra in  service due to  police in te rfe re n ce  was now deemed 
unacceptable.^!
However, respect for citizens' rights was bound to  be obscured by 
the increasing emphasis on economic recovery. If the Occupation had 
to  tem porarily suspend constitutional guarantees o f freedom from 
police intrusion, then tha t was a price worth paying to  fac ilita te  
economic rehabilitation. Comments made by the Director-General o f 
the National Rural Police, Saitô Noboru, in May 1949 demonstrated 
the shallowness o f the police's commitment to  restraint in the field
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 ATIS Translation, dated 1 4 /4 /4 9 : General Passengers can Refuse Baggage Inspection 
- Summary, Jiii Shinpô ( 9 /4 /4 9 )  [GS(B) 0 22 8 1 ].
88 Ibid.
89 Following the implementation of the Police Law in 1948, Japan's national police 
system was decentralised.
80 ATIS Translation, dated 5 /5 /4 9 :  Removal of Passengers in Police Train Checkups 
Banned - Full trans. from Yomiuri Shinbun. 3 /5 /4 9  (Sendai dispatch) [GS(B) 
0 2 2 8 1 ],
8! Ibid.
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of economic regulation. Although he stated tha t passengers would no 
longer be forced to  alight from trains, he added tha t "violations of 
regulations concerning transport o f staple fo o d s tu ffs  were so 
numerous tha t the police had to  resort to  th is practice" regardless 
of the inconvenience c a u s e d . 9 2  Saitô's assurance tha t the police 
would not re-employ such methods providing tha t there was no 
increase in the number o f economic v i o l a t i o n s 9 3  suggested tha t 
things would in fact continue much as before.
The Treatment o f Detainees
The harassment experienced by Japanese citizens, forced to  submit 
to  such con tro l measures as "sp o t checks", was a m inor 
inconvenience when compared to  the rough treatm ent o f those held 
in police custody. Although there were cases of policemen resorting 
to  violence against prisoners, the more common charge was neglect 
o f prisoners ra ther than active  abuse. Prevailing economic 
conditons and the inability of Occupation personnel to  constantly 
m onitor developm ents th roughou t Japan made a m ockery o f 
directives th a t supposedly ushered in a new era o f tolerance and 
freedom. For example, the Civil L iberties D irective , issued in 
October 1945, prohibited "the physical punishment and m istreatm ent 
o f all persons detained...under any and all Japanese enactments, 
laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations", and added tha t 
"all such persons will receive at all times adequate s u s t e n a n c e " . 9 4  
However, Occupation personnel who visited police stations and lock­
up facilities during 1946 found th a t detainees were enduring 
appalling privations, and tha t police chiefs were still arrogating too 
much power to  themselves, particularly w ith regard to  the release 
o f prisoners. What was particularly disturbing was tha t many o f 
those detained had com m itted only minor offences, usually relating 
to  the possession of black market food.
In August, 1946, tw o PSD police adm in istra tors, Gabrielson and
92 ATIS Translation, dated 1 0 /5 /4 9 , Item 19: Police Halt Detrainment of Passengers 
for Food Check - Mainichi Shinbun 1 0 /5 /4 9  [GS(B) 02281].
93 Ibid.
94 Political Reorientation of Japan. Appendix B: 2d, p.464.
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W hitlock, inspected six police s ta tions in Osaka. They found 
"sanitary conditions (to  be) in a deplorable s ta te", and contended 
tha t the overall s ituation had deteriorated rather than improved 
since their previous visit. Whitlock listed a number of problems tha t 
ju s tifie d  regular monitoring o f police facilities in the area. They 
were as follows: there was evidence o f bru ta l tre a tm e n t o f 
prisoners; cells were overcrowded; children were confined w ith  
adults; there was insuffic ient light and ventila tion, and "obnoxious 
smells" in all the cells; prisoners w ith  communicable diseases, 
usually scabies, were not kept separate from others; detainees were 
not perm itted to  take physical exercise; there was a lack of medical 
care; and, lastly, a large percentage o f detainees, gu ilty  o f minor 
offences such as th e ft, were confined for more than th ir ty  days 
pending trial. Such prisoners were effective ly on remand. Once they 
were moved to  detention centres or prisons following tria l, they 
ceased to  be the responsibility o f the police. Overcrowding in police 
cells reflected the high number o f offences and the inadequate 
supply of prison facilities, but more significant was the inability of 
Japanese courts to  dispose of cases quickly and e ffic iently . The 
la tte r was particu larly marked "in July and August when to p  
officials stop(ped) working at noon daily". Whitlock complained o f a 
lack of initiative on the part of police station chiefs and the absence 
of a proper framework of supervision and inspection by Occupation 
personnel. He called for a clean-up campaign to  include all police 
s ta tions and recommended frequent spot checks by m ilita ry  
government officers and tactical c o m m a n d e r s . 9 5
In Fukuoka, Kyushu, W hitlock catalogued similar problems to  the 
ones he had found in Osaka. Police lock-ups were extremely crowded 
- there were 174 detainees crammed into 15 cells, each measuring 
8' by 9' by 9 '.96 six inmates had been held for more than 60 days, 
including one, Uehara Tadao, who had been languishing in gaol for 
1 30 d a y s . 9 7  The length of detention in gaols was a recurrent theme 
in memoranda addressed to  Pulliam. In October, 1946, W hitlock
95 Memo dated 2 7 /8 /4 6 ;  To: Chief, PSD; From: M. W. Whitlock; Subject: Report of 
Inspection of Police Facilities in Osaka Prefecture, 19-20 Aug. 46 (G-2 00228).
96 Memo dated 2 7 /8 /4 6 ; To: Chief, PSD; Subject: Inspection of Fukuoka Police Station, 
11 Aug. 46 (G-2 00228).
97 Ibid.
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reported tha t visits to  police installations in Osaka, Kobe, Fukuoka, 
Kumamoto and Oita prefectures revealed th a t economic offences 
accounted for the majority of detainees.98 He maintained tha t minor 
firs t offences were poorly handled, many such cases provoking a ten 
to  tw en ty  day detention period when " it  (was) obvious tha t they 
could be cleared in five days maximum".99 What made matters worse 
was th a t f irs t offenders were accom m odated w ith  hardened 
c r i m i n a l s , ! 9 0  a situation tha t assisted the development o f criminal 
associations. Gabrielson warned tha t "Juveniles (were) held for many 
days w ith  adults (under in v e s tig a tio n ) fo r fe lo n ie s ", and 
recommended separation despite the lack o f facilities.! 9i He too 
maintained tha t detention periods were too long, usually from th irty  
to  sixty days and sometimes up to  120 days, the delays reflecting
lethargic investiga tions.!92
Following v is its  to  prefectura l police headquarters in Fukuoka, 
Kagoshima, Oita, Osaka and Kyoto, Gabrielson blamed "inspectors lax 
in the ir duties" for filthy  conditions in stations and g a o l s . !  9 3  The 
la tte r "(hadn 't) been cleaned in months and the stench coming from 
cells was u n b e a r a b l e " . ! 9 4  Police chiefs denied w ilfu l neglect, 
complaining th a t it  was impossible to  obtain d i s i n f e c t a n t . ! 9 5  
Likewise, they claimed tha t the poor health o f detainees reflected 
serious shortages of food and medicine, and could not be a ttributed 
to  their own indifference. Nevertheless, Whitlock noted tha t none of 
those questioned in Fukuoka police station could remember a docto r 
vis iting the gaol, despite the fac t th a t several prisoners were 
clearly in need o f m edical a t t e n t i o n . ! 9 6  Police s ta tion  chiefs 
generally seem to  have cared litt le  fo r the sp irit o f Occupation
98 Civil Intelligence Section, 2 9 /1 0 /4 6 ;  Subject: Report of Inspection, 16 Oct. - 28  
Oct.; To: Chief, PSD; From: M. W. Whitlock (G-2 00227).
99 Ibid.
!99  Ibid.
! 9! Memo dated 2 8 /8 /4 6 ; To: Chief, PSD; Subject: Inspection Trip, 4 Aug. - 9 Aug., 46  
(G-2 0 0 2 2 8 ) .
! 92 Ibid.
! 93 Ibid.
! 94 Ibid.
!95 1^.
!96 Memo dated 2 7 /8 /4 6 ; To: Chief, PSD; Subject: Inspection of Fukuoka Police Station, 
11 Aug. 46 (G-2 00228).
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directives, which circumscribed the ir powers whilst promoting the 
rights o f detainees. For example, in October 1946 the chief of Kuki 
police s ta tion , Saitama pre fecture , was questioned as to  his 
authority to  continue holding one Sakimei Hideo, who had been taken 
in to police custody on the 24 th  August, 1 9 4 6 . ^ H i s  response 
dem onstrates tha t the police had learnt to  live w ith  new legal 
constra in ts :
...theoretically the man is released each morning...legally the police are 
not authorised to detain an individual past sunrise...entry of release and 
rearrest is made in the records each day.^°®
It transpired tha t Kuki police had completed the ir investigations as 
far as possible, but were waiting for inform ation requested from 
other police stations. Thus, the procurator had not been notified as 
to  Sakimei's arrest, detention or the charges against him, and no 
report had been forwarded to  prefectural h e a d q u a r t e r s . ^09 The chief 
o f Kuki police station also considered it within his power to  release 
suspects, whether or not there was su ffic ien t evidence against 
them . Resistance to  such unilateral action was only possibe w ith 
cases o f major importance, when no tifica tion o f arrest preceded 
completion of investigation.i lo
The Valentine Report stated in 1946 tha t "the existing and legalised 
system of detention by the police is medieval in character, (and) a t 
variance w ith  democratic principles o f due process o f law...". It 
highlighted the tw o themes of this section - the m istreatm ent of 
detainees and the absence of effective legal safeguards. The authors' 
description is indeed a stark one:
(The system) places in common cells the criminal with juvenile 
delinquents, as well as orphans, the homeless, the lost, those mentally ill 
or those physically incapacitated who are held in protective custody.
Persons detained are not entitled to bail, may be held for long periods of 
time without notification of the charges against them, and have no right of 
communication with friends or counsel by telephone or mail. Medical 
attention is not available for the sick and injured and inadequate
Memo dated 4 /1 0 /4 6 ;  To: Chief, PSD; From: J. F. Nealon; Subject: Police Authority 
to Detain or Release (G-2 00238).
 ^ Ibid.
 ^09 Ibid.
 ^  ^0 Ibid.
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ventilation and sanitation, plus overcrowding in detention cells, breeds 
epidemics J  ^1
Above all the Occupation au thorities were concerned w ith  the 
police's a ttitud e  to  detainees, the ir disregard fo r basic human 
rights. However, the temporary imprisonment of suspects in police 
gaols was considered a leg itim a te  practice , provid ing it  was 
properly regulated. Such recognition was not extended, as has been 
stated, to  the police's economic role. Likewise, "census" activities 
were deemed unacceptable by American reformers, concerned as 
they were with restricting the scope of police control and promoting 
civil libe rties.
Neighbourhood Surveillance
The Valentine Report called for many functions to  be removed from 
police control, one of which was "the responsibility for taking and 
keeping the census, and the collection o f inform ation on living 
c o n d i t i o n s " . ^   ^2  Those activities tha t involved questioning people or 
the ir ne ighbours /acqua in tances about p riva te  m a tte rs  were 
subsumed under the heading "census", a term  tha t usually denotes 
the collection of routine information (eg. address, occupation e tc .) 
for both operational and sta tis tica l purposes. American reformers 
were disturbed by the kind o f in form ation sought by Japanese 
policemen, often o f little  direct  relevance to  crime prevention, and 
the manner in which it was collected. It was fe lt tha t po licem en 
were too  inquisitive, th a t they were constan tly  in truding in to  
people's "private" lives. As one Japanese official put it, there were 
two issues involved, one a justification o f the police's role as public 
monitors - the need to  protect life and property and prevent crime - 
the other a re jection of census ac tiv ities  - the existence o f 
fundamental human rights, which were not to  be violated by the 
p o lice .1T 3 With regard to  the la tter, the Occupation elevated the
 ^  ^  ^ The Intelligence Series. Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section 
(CIS), FEC and SCAP" (GHQ/FEC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Tokyo, 
1949) Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Summation of the Valentine Report, p.5.
 ^  ^2 Ibid.
^^2 Report on Actual State of Census Taking; To: Harrison, Police Administrator; From: 
National Rural Police; undated - given the dates on accompanying documents it can be 
assumed that it was written in 1950 (NARA, Suitland, Box No.334, File 35).
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notion o f a "peaceful private life ",i a sanctuary th a t should be 
p ro tec ted  from  public in terference. It was not surprising th a t 
a ttem p ts  to  separate "private" and "public" spheres of activ ity, a 
d is tin c tio n  of v ita l importance in the United States, met w ith 
frus tra tion  in Japan, where the tw o  are not seen as m utually 
exclusive.
In October, 1949, Makoto Matsukata reported tha t enquiries were 
being made o f Government Section tha t suggested tha t the police 
were constantly checking on those in the ir respective jurisdictions, 
questioning individuals themselves, or the ir neighbours, about their 
personal affa irs and social a c tiv itie s .1 1 5 Such practices were 
"considered by progressive citizens to  be outside the Jurisdiction of 
police affa irs". It transpired th a t families were still required " to  
carry out the regular spring and fall housecleaning", and th a t 
policemen were s till enforcing measures concerned w ith  f ire  
prevention. This was in spite o f the fact tha t the police had been 
formally deprived of such duties. Whilst they were legally entitled 
to  question  fam ilies and indiv iduals " to  fu r th e r  crim ina l 
in ves tig a tio n ", the usual excuse fo r asking abou t p e rso n a l/ 
household a ffa irs  was its  supposed co n trib u tio n  to  "crim e 
prevention". Census activities, representing a proactive rather than 
a reactive approach to  crime, were Justified by the assumption tha t 
"the m ajority o f citizens are potential criminals".
Matsukata obtained translations o f both Yamaguchi p re fecture 's 
regulations w ith regard to  crime prevention 116 and those of Tokyo 
m etropolitan police concerning routine investigations w ithin police 
boxes and stations, i In the former, it was stated tha t the purpose 
of census taking was "to  build up a picture of local inhabitants" in 
order to  fa c ilita te  "the  smooth execution o f police d u tie s ". 
Policemen, it  was stressed, should update the ir records at least 
once every four months, the frequency o f review procedures
 ^1 Ibid.
T T  ^ Report entitled Police Surveillance of the Population; dated 1 1 /1 0 /4 9  [GS(B) 
02270]. This is the source for the remainder of the paragraph unless otherwise stated.
 ^  ^  ^ Based on those of National Rural Police central HQ.
T T  ^ Report entitled Police Surveillance of the Population, dated 1 1 /1 0 /4 9  - the main 
source for the remainder of the paragraph.
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increasing or decreasing according to  the wishes o f the chief of the 
police s ta tion . Regulations enumerating the duties of the Crime 
Prevention Section lis ted  item s o f a personal nature to  be 
investigated during census (Section 3, article 99) and cautioned tha t 
certa in m atters "shall be examined secre tly" (artic le  100). The 
la tte r  were as follows: character and conduct in the past and  
present; living standard; com m itm ent to  occupation; c r im in a l 
involvem ent; acquaintances; tidiness o f accom m odation. W hilst 
prelim inary studies o f the Tokyo M etropolitan Police regulations 
suggested little  correspondence with those of Yamaguchi prefecture, 
closer inspection revealed a great deal o f common ground - "the 
handbook containing these regulations ha(d) an appendix w h ich  
outline(d) the old census procedures". Tokyo's police manual is a 
fittin g  metaphor for the Occupation as a whole - it seemed (from 
reading the tit le  page and opening chapters) tha t advances had been 
made, but more penetrating study (o f the footnotes and appendices) 
revealed retrogressive steps.
Our de term ined in ves tig a to r, M atsukata, pe rs is ted  un til his 
suspicions were confirmed. He visited several police stations in the 
Tokyo area with a police inspector, and examined several census 
books, all o f which contained only routine information (name, date o f 
b irth, occupation and income).! in each police box there were two 
or more offic ia ls "engaged in compiling an accurate census".! 19 
Above all, it was the information sanctioned by the above articles, 
99 and 100, tha t preoccupied Matsukata, anxious to  demonstrate 
intrusive behaviour on the part o f the police. He visited a police box 
in a residentia l area and interviewed a policeman, asking him 
questions about the people in his area. It transpired tha t policemen, 
perhaps deliberately, did not write everything down:
Although no record of pertinent points was kept in his notebook, he had all 
the necessary information at his disposal concerning the personal affairs 
of individuals and families...He felt it was his responsibility to know 
about everything that went on in his area even if he did not transmit this 
information to higher HQ.^^o
! ! G Ibid. 
! ! 9 Ibid. 
! 20 Ibid.
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The action taken to  res tric t surveillance activ ities  showed litt le  
regard for Matsukata's perseverance. In March, 1950, a PSD police 
investigator stated tha t meetings had been held w ith Superintendent 
Nakano, Chief o f the Control and T raffic  Section (National Rural 
Police headquarters) "w ith  a view to  making the 'police census' a 
voluntary p ro ce d u re ".^S u rp ris in g ly , the Police branch had accepted 
assurances tha t "comprehensive survey of police jurisdictions (was) 
necessary, given an inadequate house numbering system and a lack of 
proper communications throughout the country" . 122 in August of the 
same year a public relations programme, utilising newspapers and 
radio broadcasts, informed the Japanese people tha t they did not 
have to  cooperate w ith policemen engaged in census-taking.123 The 
system , however, was not rendered harmless by re a s s u r in g  
comments in the press. Everybody knew tha t answering the police's 
questions would be far less problem atic than incurring the ir 
disapproval by refusing to  cooperate. "Voluntary census" was a face- 
saving formula, considered inadequate by those responsible for it. 
This much is clear from the qualification th a t accompanied it - 
"when a sim plified numbering system  is inaugurated ( it  hasn't 
happened ye t) it will be unnecessary for police to  maintain voluntary
census". 124
Japanese police continued to  monitor developments not only in the 
home but also in the workplace. Again the Occupation authorities 
were concerned at the police's failure to  confine the ir activities to  
legitim ate police functions, depite directives to  tha t e ffec t issued 
early in the Occupation. In 1950 the Economic and Scientific Section 
stated tha t "police officials (were) making surveys of employment 
cond itions and issuing public reports as to  the em ploym ent 
s i t u a t i o n " . 12 5  An inspection by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board, 
reported in Nihon Keizai on 18th May, 1950, was cited as the most
121 PSD, Police branch; Memo for the record, dated 2 7 /3 /5 0 ; To: H. S. Eaton; From: P 
E. Harrison; Subject: Police Census (NARA, Suitland, Box No.334, File 35).
122 Ibid.
123 PSD, Police branch; Memo dated 5 /8 /5 0 ; To: Chief Police Administrator; From: P. 
E. Harrison; Subject: Newspaper Comments re. Voluntary Census (Box No.334, File 
3 5 ).
124 Ibid.
125 Check sheet, undated (1950 ); From: ESS; To: G-2; Subject: Police Survey of 
Employment Conditions (G-2 00703).
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recent e x a m p l e . 12 6  "Such ac tiv ity  appear(ed) to  be a carry-over 
from....wartime....when police were in charge o f public employment 
o ff ic e s ... ." .!  27 Given the traditional ties between employers and 
policemen, it  was clearly de trim enta l to  the in te rests  o f the 
w orkfo rce  to  allow resum ption o f any practices re la ting to  
em ploym ent conditions. Thus, ESS requested G-2 to  direct the 
various police forces to  discontinue such s u r v e y s . ! 2 8
A lthough the  Occupation had set up a lte rna tive  agencies to  
administer public employment programmes and to  gather and analyse 
data on employment cond itions,!29 these did not eclipse the police. 
It was the Occupation's ambivalence more than anything else tha t 
pe rm itted  the police to  retain powers th a t had form ally been 
transferred to  others. For example, the OSS report on the Japanese 
Police System under Allied Occupation stated tha t, although it was 
"log ica l" to  confer responsib ility  fo r sa fe ty  laws on Welfare 
Ministry personnel, it was beneficial to  all concerned when there 
was a governm ent o ffic ia l, com bining awareness o f fa c to ry  
conditions with permanent proximity to  the establishment concerned 
(ie. the  local p o l i c e m a n ) . !  3 0  Such inconsistency paled in to  
insignificance beside the ambivalence exhibited when many Japanese 
citizens took to  the streets to  agitate for larger rations and higher 
wages.
Strikes and Demonstrations
The Occupation authorities acknowledged tha t the Japanese police 
had a duty to  preserve the p e a c e . !  21 There was never any question 
tha t this was a legitimate and necessary police activ ity . Rather like
!26 Ibid.
! 27 Ibid.
! 28 Ibid.
! 29 Ibid. These were the Employment Security Bureau of the Labour Ministry, the 
prefectural Employment Security sections and local Public Employment Security 
Offices.
!2 0  R&A Report No.2758, "The Japanese Police System under Allied Occupation" 
( 2 8 /9 /4 5 ) ,  p.58.
! 2! The Intelligence Series. Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section 
(CIS), FEC and SCAP" (GHQ/FEC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Tokyo, 
1949) Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Special Report, Metropolitan Police Planning 
Group, dated 1 7 /5 /4 6 , p.3.
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in the case of detainees, it was the behaviour of the police, the ir 
m otivation, tha t preoccupied the reformers in GHQ. Restraint and 
neutra lity were to  be the new watchwords, ensuring tha t the police 
served the people rather than their traditional overlords. Occupation 
officia ls realised tha t only by carefully circumscribing the role o f 
the police vis à vis industrial disputes and demonstrations would it 
be possible to  strike a balance between the maintenance o f law and 
order and respect for civil liberties. For example, there was a need 
for rules and regulations tha t would facilita te control o f "parades 
(and) s tree t meetings w ithout infringing the constitutional right of 
free speech".132
Traditionally biased towards the interests o f employers, the police 
were forbidden to  intervene in conflic ts between management and 
labour, except in cases where violence was being used by either side. 
Although it was generally accepted tha t this ban was being upheld, 
poor liaison between reformers in SCAP and m ilita ry  figures
working in the fie ld, to g e th e r w ith  d iffe r in g  a tt itu d e s  and
perceptions, meant tha t there was always a discrepancy be tw een 
GHQ's claims and the testim ony of the Japanese people. Early on in 
the Occupation, the police response to  street meetings or industrial 
action was closely monitored by an Occupation determined to  allow 
the seeds of democracy to  germinate. However, the rapid expansion 
o f labour unions and the increasing influence o f the communist 
party, both made possible by widespread popular resen tm ent,
produced an explosion of conflict on the streets and in the workplace
tha t alarmed the Occupation. The Japanese people, like the police 
before them, were then ordered to  exercise self-restraint.
In November 1945, following the promulgation of the Civil Liberties 
Directive, the Japanese Government was directed to  train the police 
"to  keep order by wisdom and example rather than by force and 
i n t i m i d a t i o n . . . " . ' !  3 3  Around the same tim e, the Crime Prevention 
Section o f the Public Safety Bureau warned th a t the food crisis 
would be accompanied by an escalation of mass movements.^ 34
 ^32 Ibid.
 ^33 Summations. No.2 (Nov. 45), p.36.
 ^34 Crime Prevention Section, Public Safety Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs; undated 
(Folder title - Police General and Prefectural, Book 1, 1 1 /4 5  - 1 1 /4 6 ) [NDL, G-2
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Although the police intended to  avoid "oppressive action" against 
dem onstra to rs , th e ir to le rance was co n tin g e n t on "o rde rly  
p e r f o r m a n c e "  J  3 5  it  was adm itted tha t policemen were "n e v e r 
com plete ly successful unless supported by the public, (bu t they 
were) determined to  apply s tric t control in any c a s e " . 136
On January 10, 1946, C. V. Cadwell, representing the Office of the 
Provost Marshal, stated tha t "no orderly meetings or parades....will 
be broken up by f o r c e " . ^  3 7  He stressed the need for patience and 
to lerance when dealing w ith  unauthorised dem onstrations.^ 38 
However, his intended audience, the American m ilitary police (MR), 
saw demonstrators as an unruly mob, as a portent of instability and 
chaos, rather than a symptom of démocratisation. On December 8, 
1945, m ilitary police had broken up a protest rally in Matsuyama, in 
southern Kyushu, and then had denied entering the fray. "A crowd of 
1000 Japanese (had) gathered in fron t of the City Hall to  protest 
inequities in the distribution of food and cloth ing" - they had no 
quarrel w ith the Occupation authorities, some of whom happened to  
be living in the b u i l d i n g . ^  3 9  On 7  April, 1946, unsuccessul attem pts 
to  control a large crowd outside the premier's residence in Tokyo 
culminated in "skirmishes...all over the y a r d " . ^ 4 i  The Japanese police 
retreated, waved their pistols menacingly at the demonstrators, and 
then waited for reinforcements before resuming the offensive - "one 
of the policemen opened fire, and others fo l lo w e d " .H o w e v e r ,  it 
was le ft to  the American m ilitary police to  disperse the crowd. 
"They were armed with nightsticks, and they beat the dem onstrants 
on the backs and b u t t o c k s " . ^ 3  The Japanese police must have 
relished such actions on the part o f the American m ilita ry , a
0 0 2 2 6 ].
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136 1^.
137 Memo to: Provost Marshals of Tokyo, Yokohama; Subject: Unauthorised Mass 
Meetings or Parades [GS(B) 00244].
138 Ibid.
139 M. Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1 981 ) p.17.
140 According to Summation No. 7 (April 46), p.51, the 3 0 ,0 00  demonstrators 
involved were "members of leftist political groups".
141 M. Gayn, Japan Diary, p.165.
142 1 ^ .,  p.1 66.
143 1 ^ .,  p.167.
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welcom e con tras t to  the  unsym pa the tic  a tt itu d e  o f those 
formulating policy in GHQ.
May day rallies, attended by 300,000 in Tokyo alone, marked the 
beginning of a month when "popular mass demonstrations increased 
in size and f r e q u e n c y " . ^ O n  May 1, 1 9 4 6 , d e m o n s tra to rs , 
congregating outside the Imperial Palace, the premier's residence, 
the headquarters of the Metropolitan Police Board and the Ministry 
o f Agricu lture and Forestry, "demanded increased food rations, 
exposure o f hoarded food....and the creation of a united workers' 
front to  assume the reins of g o v e r n m e n t " . On May 16 "thousands of 
railroad w orkers...forced the ir way in to  the compound o f th e  
prem ier's residence, but were driven out by Japanese policemen, 
aided by our MPs".^46 Following the failure o f extra-parliam entary 
action, a delegation was dispatched to  the Diet to  demand "b e tte r 
wages, b e tte r rations, and a be tte r g o v e r n m e n t " .A s  many as 
250,000 people participated in mass meetings and demostrations on 
May 19th, culminating in a "s it-dow n s tr ike " outside Yoshida's 
r e s i d e n c e . 1 4 8  This explosion of popular ag itation seems to  have 
confirmed suspicions in GHQ tha t "labour in general, and especially 
the Communists, (were) getting out o f hand".149 The following day. 
General MacArthur found it necessary " to  caution the Japanese 
people tha t the growing tendency toward mass violence and physical 
processes o f intim idation, under organised leadership, present a 
grave menace to  the future development of Japan".i so He continued 
as follows:
While every possible rational freedom of democratic method has been 
perm itted and will be p erm itted ....th e  physical violence which 
undisciplined elements are now beginning to practise will not be 
permitted to continue. They constitute a menace not only to orderly 
government but to the basic purposes and security of the Occupation 
itself. If minor elements....are unable to exercise such self-restraint....as
144 Summations. No.8 (May 46), p.37.
145 Ibid.
146 M. Gayn, Japan Diary, p.222.
147 Ibid.
148 1 ^ .,  p.230.
149 Ibid., p.223.
1 GHQ United States Armed Forces, Pacific; Public Relations Office; For Immediate 
Release, dated 2 0 /5 /4 6 : General MacArthur today issued the following statement which 
warns against demonstrations and disorders by mass mobs (NDL, G-2 00244).
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the....conditions require, I shall be forced to take the necessary steps to 
remedy such a deplorable s i t u a t i o n . ^ si
What the Supreme Commander failed to  realise was tha t Japan's 
"orderly governm ent" was making no e ffo rt to  ensure e q u ita b le  
d is tr ib u tio n  o f food, th u s  p ro vo k in g  "m in o r e le m e n ts " 
(dem onstra tors w ith  legitim ate com plaints) to  resort to  vio lent 
extra-parliam entary methods of protest. Of course the communists 
were involved, and were ju s t as capable of deceit as the Japanese 
government, but what mattered most was tha t the Occupation had 
not heeded the predom inantly economic grievances o f ordinary 
Japanese (eg. the charge th a t government offic ia ls and private 
citizens were involved in concealing hoarded food).^ ^2 as fo r the 
basic purposes of the Occupation, these were constantly undermined 
by the very regime it was endorsing.
The conservative governments, headed by Shidehara and Yoshida, 
sought to  p ro tect the interests of big business, conceding as little  
ground as possibe to  unionised labour. Demoralised and uncertain 
about the future, business circles opted for defensive measures, 
concerned w ith  self-preservation rather than Japan's econom ic 
rehabilita tion. "Big business began a general retrenchm ent as a 
hedge against the troubled days ahead", closing production facilities 
and hoarding stocks o f essential c o m m o d i t i e s .  ^53 Labour responded 
by "se iz ing" the ir workplaces, by securing "production con tro l" 
(seisan kanri). "In sum the sit-down by the za iba tsu  had created 
conditions which required worker occupation and operation o f 
factories if the ir tw in demands for Jobs and production were to  be 
m e t " . 154 A lthough the ir com m itm ent to  production suited the 
Occupation, the ir a ttitude to  property rights caused concern. The 
Ministry o f Home Affairs, acknowledging tha t there was "confusion" 
am ongst Am erican offic ia ls as to  the lega lity  o f "p roduction  
con tro l", ins tructed  the police to  conduct "thorough, s e c re t
151 Ibid.
152 Summations. No.5 (Feb. 46), p.43.
153 j  B. Moore, "Production Control; Workers' Control in Early Postwar Japan", 
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars Vol. 17. No.4 (Oct.-Dec. 1985) p.5. See also J. B. 
Moore, Japanese Workers and the Struggle for Power. 1 9 4 5 -1 9 4 7  (University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1983).
154 ibid.. p.6.
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investigations to  detect crimes, (but to  be) very careful not to  be 
m isunderstood and accused of in terfering in labour d isputes".i ^5 
The offices o f the Yomiuri Shinbun, the th ird largest newspaper in 
Japan, witnessed the firs t "production control" strike on 27 October, 
1 9 4 5 . 1 56 The dispute was a complex one - what began as a battle 
between management and labour over editorial control became a 
vicious intra-union conflic t, which culm inated in the rejection o f 
the communists. Their fate was sealed by a conversation between 
Brigadier General Frayne Baker, the GHQ Public Relations O ffice r, 
and Baba Tsunego, the paper's publisher. The former, acting on 
information he had received indirectly from Yoshida, encouraged the 
la tte r to  take action against disobedient editors under Communist 
Party c o n t r o l . i ^7 Thus began a train of events tha t led to  a police 
raid on the Yomiuri building on 21st June, 1946. Theodore Cohen, the 
chief o f the Labour Division, witnessed the arrest o f 56 employees 
by 1 50 policemen. He was clearly appalled by what he saw:
while we were doing our best to remove police from labour affairs....only 
a block away truckloads of police were arresting dozens of workers in a 
labour dispute with no pretence of having to restore law and order....The 
number of arrests was the largest ever at one time in a labour dispute in 
Japan's history....To arrest fifty-six persons in order to catch four, or 
even six, certainly smelled strongly of intimidation....The new democratic 
police were outdoing the old.^^s
Only four communists, charged w ith trespass, were detained for 
more than a few h o u r s . ^  5 9  when Mr. Cohen la te r secured the ir 
temporary release so tha t they could attend a meeting, he found 
th a t they had been sub jected to  "unnecessarily harsh police 
treatm ent - they had been held incommunicado for a week, one had a 
bad chest bruise, and now they had showed up manacled like a chain
gang". ■'60
On October 16th, 1946, George Atcheson, who represented the US in
T 55 Crime Prevention Section, Public Safety Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs; undated 
(Folder title - Police General and Prefectural, Book 1, 1 1 /4 5  - 1 1 /4 6 ) [NDL, G-2 
0 0 2 2 6 ].
■'56 T. Cohen, Remaking Japan (The Free Press, New York, 1987), p.241.
 ^57 Ibid., pp. 247-9 .
158 pp.249-50.
159 p.249.
160 1 ^ .,  p.255.
133
the Allied Council for Japan, declared tha t the aims o f the Japanese 
"have become virtua lly  identical w ith Allied a i m s " J T h e  jo in t 
action taken by Japanese police and American MPs against striking 
radio workers on 5th October certainly suggested a convergence of 
views w ith  regard to  union d e m a n d s . 1 6 2  when "a procession o f 
sym pathetic unions marched by the Yom iuri building", they w ere 
treated to  another display of US-Japanese cooperation:
...a hundred Japanese policemen and a unit of American MPs had gone into 
action.The procession was orderly. Then suddenly armed men were upon 
it, pushing the demonstrants, seizing the posters, breaking up the 
parade. T
Restraint was now expected of the demonstrators rather than the 
police, who revelled in the support o f Occupation units. Growing in 
confidence, the Japanese police actively suppressed pro test rallies, 
d isregard ing SCAP d irec tive s  and c o n s titu t io n a l p rov is ions 
concerned with civil liberties. Above all, it was the tac it support of 
Occupation sections concerned with intelligence and security tha t 
encouraged the police to  tru s t to  the ir instincts as far as civil 
unrest was concerned. The strong community o f in terest be tw een 
Japanese and American law enforcement agencies encouraged close 
liaison between the tw o. Alliances forged at the local level 
throughout Japan had little  regard for the reforming ambitions of 
those in Tokyo, preferring to  concentrate on maintaining law and 
order in the ir respective localities. Social and po litica l s ta b ility  
were seen as the necessary preconditions for economic recovery, 
which increasingly eclipsed démocratisation as the guiding principle 
of Occupation policy after 1947.
The conviction tha t the role of the police as guarantors o f law and 
order should be s tr ic tly  circumscribed gave way to  a feeling tha t 
widespread demonstrations and strikes, and the perceived threat of 
a communist revolution, demanded a strong, confident police force, 
willing to  act on its own in itia tive. Thus, e ffo rts  were made to  
ensure tha t the police restricted the activities o f demonstrators and 
strikers, and to  make clear to  the Japanese people tha t they did so
T 61 w. MacMahon Ball, Japan. Enemy or Ally?. (Cassell, Melbourne, 1948), p.49.
162 M. Gayn, Japan Diary, p.332.
1 6 3  1 ^ . ,  p . 3 3 3 .
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w ith  American backing. D istracted by the Communist Party's 
involvement in rallies and parades, the Occupation disregarded the  
dem onstra tors ' complaints and grievances. If those in GHQ had 
investigated the allegations made against the Japanese Government, 
they would have found many of them to  be well-founded (eg. the 
charge tha t scarce commodities were being hoarded by the ruling 
class). A lthough the actions o f Yoshida's adm in istration were 
compounding the grave economic s itua tion and thus fom enting 
political unrest, it received the support o f the Occupation - the 
inevitable consequence o f governing through Japanese agencies. 
Whilst the political role o f the police was perm itted to  expand, 
breaking out o f the confines imposed at the beginning o f the 
Occupation, the shrinkage o f the ir economic and social role was 
prevented by a pervasive black market and marked increases in the 
incidence o f crime. MacArthur's claim tha t the Japanese police were 
undergoing a metamorphosis - from masters to  servants o f the 
people - was clearly not shared by those whose newly-won c iv il 
liberties were disregarded by officia ls supposedly accountable to  
them. As will be made clear in the next chapter, the traditional ties 
that bound the police to  the Japanese establishment remained in tact, 
strengthened rather than weakened by the experience of Occupation.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SERVING THE OLD GUARD
In 1946 a survey of police organisation and operation in Japanese 
c ities  contended th a t "th e  police system  (a t the tim e of 
Occupation)...enhanced the political welfare o f personnel in control 
of the governm ent".! This state of affairs was seen as unacceptable 
by those Americans charged w ith reform ing Japan. They w e re  
determined, at least at the outset of Occupation, to  create a police 
serv ice  tha t was properly accountable to  the public. In order to  
e ffe c t such a change it was necessary to  f irs t dissolve the 
traditional ties tha t existed between the police and the Japanese 
establishm ent. Given the circumstances o f the  Japanese police 
system 's creation, its close association w ith the ruling class and 
the post-surrender weakness of policemen, both in terms of physical 
health and social standing, it is not surprising tha t the Occupation's 
a ttem p t to  turn policemen away from the ir trad itiona l overlords 
met w ith s t if f  resistance and u ltim ately failure. The root o f the 
problem was the enduring connection between the police and the 
rulers o f Japan, a relationship of mutual convenience th a t became 
even stronger during a period of economic scarcity and Occupation 
by a foreign power.
According to  George De Vos and Keiichi Mizushima, "the  overt 
exercise o f power is often, though covertly, related to  o ff ic ia lly  
illegal groups" . 2 This was certainly the case in Occupation Japan. 
Socio-econom ic d is location stim ulated the grow th o f criminal 
organisations th a t provided a she lter fo r those incapable o f 
surviving alone, a substitu te, albeit a poor one, for family support. 
Perceived more as relief organisations than criminal groupings, they 
were able to  reach an accommodation w ith both the police and 
conservative politicians. The Japanese term  used by the Americans 
to describe this network o f "gangs" was ovabun-kobun system, a
! The Intelligence Series. Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), 
FEC and SCAP" (GHQ/FEC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Tokyo, 1949) 
Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Summation of the Valentine Report (1 7 /5 /4 6 )  p.1.
2 G. De Vos and K. Mizushima, "Organisation and Social Function of Japanese Gangs: 
Historical Development and Modern Parallels", in R. P. Dore, éd.. Aspects of Social 
Change in Modern Japan (Princeton University Press, N.J., 1967) p.290.
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label th a t captured th e ir pseudo-fam ilia l ch a ra c te r.3 O va b u n  
exercised considerable power due to  the ir control of black m arke t 
commodities and their ability to  service the needs of the Occupiers 
(principally w ith  regard to  building co n tra c ts ). The triangu lar 
re la tionsh ip  th a t ex is ted betw een the  police, conserva tive  
politicians and criminal ovabun will be examined in this chapter, 
along with the consequences of their mutual dependence. By 1947 
many Americans in Japan had begun to  grasp the immensity of the 
task they had set themselves. The misgivings of those in the Public 
Safety division essentially derived from four interrelated problem s 
tha t suggested a close relationship between the police and the 
establishment, one tha t was at the expense of the Japanese people. 
These were as follows: the m ystery o f the Japanese m ilitary 
supplies; the ovabun-kobun system; informal financing of the police 
through "contribu tions"; and the tale o f Suzuki Eiji, Osaka police 
chief, whose campaigns against the black market were a little  too 
e ffec tive .
The Disappearance o f Surplus Militarv Supplies 
During the course o f 1947 a scandal broke th a t im plicated the 
governm ent and bureaucracy o f Japan. It concerned t h e
disappearance o f vast quantities o f food, clothing and industrial 
material, accumulated by the Japanese armed forces for the final 
defence of the home islands. In direct contravention o f U.S. orders 
following acceptance o f the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese 
government had encouraged the wholesale plunder of these stocks, 
ensuring th a t they became the property o f those sections o f 
Japanese socie ty th a t had trad itiona lly  con s titu ted  "the  ruling 
class" or "e s ta b lish m e n t". A d m itte d ly , such te rm ino logy  is 
imprecise, disregarding the disruptive e ffec ts  of war and defeat, 
the blurring of boundaries be tw een socio -econom ic groups. 
Nevertheless, it is im portant to  appreciate tha t although social
d is tin c tio n s  were undermined by defeat, it  was the m ilita ry
services tha t absorbed the shock, the ir demise ensuring tha t other 
dominant in te rests  in Japan would survive the tw in th rea ts  of
defeat and occupation.
3 Joy Hendry translates ovabun/ kobun as parent-part/child-part.
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The "ruling class", or "old guard", was composed o f diverse elements, 
most benefitting from prevailing conditions, but doing so in a covert 
manner, lying low, at least during the  f irs t tw o years o f 
Occupation, in the face of hostile American directives. These labels 
encompass the various components of what the Occupiers re ferred 
to  as "feudal Japan" - tha t is to  say m ilitary leaders, conservative 
politicians, those active in the extension of za iba tsu  in te rests , 
neighbourhood bosses and gangsters - in short, those who had most 
to  gain from  o b s tru c tio n  or d ilu tion  o f policies prom oting  
démocratisation. Both the weight o f tradition and the exigencies of 
post-surrender Japan ensured tha t the in terests of the Japanese 
police would continue to  be tied to  those of the old guard. The 
significance o f the m ilitary supplies derived from the ir use as a 
powerful economic weapon. Those tha t controlled them, gradually 
releasing them into black market channels, continued to  dominate 
th e ir respective  com m unities, generously rewarding those in 
positions of power, particularly policemen, who chose not to  expose 
their providers' illegal activities. Thus, there is much to  recommend 
Theodore Cohen's contention that from the beginning "the property of 
the nation as a whole was skewed, in e ffect, to  restore the old 
regime".4
It is possible tha t the scandal would not have come to  light had it 
not been for the ceaseless efforts of one Sekô Kôichi, a Liberal party 
politician representing the second electoral d is tric t o f Wakayama 
prefecture. He was determined, in the melodramatic words o f one 
American journalist, " to  plead boldly the rights o f oppressed wage-
earners and taxpayers, to  reveal how the cards were being stacked
against the people".5 Appointed Parliamentary Vice Minister of Home 
Affairs in 1946, he used what had previously been an inert position 
to  actively pursue those engaged in the concealment and sale of 
hoarded m ilitary supplies. From February to  April 1 947 he was vice
T. Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal (Free Press, New 
York, 1987) p.347. Theodore Cohen, assigned as an adviser to Government Section, 
quickly rose to Chief of the Labour Division. A fter about a year and a half he was 
transferred to the Economic and Scientific Section, where he advised General Marquât.
 ^ William Costello, Democracv vs. Feudalism in Postwar Japan (Itagaki Shoten, Tokyo, 
1948) p.149.
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chairman o f the Hoarded Goods Committee, set up at his own 
insistence, which, although lacking authority, was used to  endorse 
his seizure o f illegal stocks. In May 1947 Sekô claimed tha t arm y 
stocks to  the value of at least 100 billion yen were being hoarded 
secretly at a time when they were desperately needed for economic 
reconstruction.6
Following accusations made against several members o f the new 
Katayama cabinet, an investigation committee, the firs t o f its kind, 
was established to  uncover hoarded goods and to  expose politicians 
involved in black market activities. Headed by the socialist Katô 
Kanjû, it  was the product o f a growing rea lisation th a t large 
quantities o f essential materials were being concealed throughout 
Japan. Widespread investigations by members of the com m ittee and 
offic ia ls o f the Economic Stabilisation Board indicated th a t th e  
hoarded goods represented a major source of black market supplies, 
and, more interestingly, tha t pro fits  from illegal transactions were 
being used to  finance "political manipulations".^ The report o f the 
Special Committee fo r Investigation of Concealed and H oarded 
Goods, or Katô committee, stated tha t probes into the location of 
hidden goods "encountered form idable opposition  in various 
quarters" and were obstructed by "government officials and persons 
in various classes o f s o c ie ty " .8 Such accusations against the 
executive endorsed the promotion o f Katô's com m ittee by Colonel 
Kades o f Government section, who saw it as an instrum ent for 
increasing the D ie t's  power vis à vis o the r in s titu tio n s  o f 
g o v e rn m e n t.9 In its report the com m ittee re ferred to  Sekô's 
reservations concerning the com m itm ent o f many local officials to  
the exposure of concealed materials; his comments regarding th e  
police are particularly interesting:
I made certain that no exposure could take place without the cooperation
and certification of the local police...However I was not successful in
 ^ Source for information concerning Sekô's claims and investigation of hoarded goods: T. 
Cohen, Remaking Japan, pp. 338-9.
 ^ Summation of Non-Militarv Activities in Japan. No.27 (Dec. 1 947), p. 23.
8 Ibid.
9 T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.339.
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obtaining the cooperation of local police....Instead, I encountered active 
resistance and non-cooperation,
The circumstances surrounding the dispersion of m ilitary supplies 
suggest th a t from  the beginning the  police knew who the 
beneficiaries were and where they were hiding the ir newly-acquired 
assets. They may even have assisted in further dispersion so as to  
avoid detection. Cooperation between the police and local elites 
following Japan's surrender was not surprising given a widespread 
feeling of dread, or at least unease, at the thought o f Occupation by 
a foreign power.
On August 14 1945, following Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam 
Declaration, the cabinet o f Admiral Suzuki Kantarô decided to  
distribute quickly all war goods possessed by the army and navy. 
According to  the Katô com m ittee report on hoarded goods, th e  
cab inet "w ilfu lly  m is in te rp re te d ....A llie d  in s tru c tio n s ...(a n d ) 
deliberately chose to  understand tha t only arms and ammunition 
should be handed over to  the Allies and tha t all other war goods 
could be disposed o f freely".11 On 15 August the Japanese Army 
issued Secret Instruction No. 363, which implemented the cabinet's 
decision. Paragraph 1 read as follows:
As a principle, war goods, materials and facilities for producing war 
goods should not be disposed of free of charge, but in the case of deliveries 
to local governments etc., these goods can be delivered free of charge. In 
other cases where goods are sold it is not necessary that payment be made 
at once.
Given the confusion and chaos tha t accompanied Japan's acceptance 
of defeat, it is safe to  assume tha t if payment was not made on 
receipt o f the goods, then the ir receivers acquired them virtua lly 
free of charge. According to  the Finance Ministry's ledgers, the sum 
of money collected by the Japanese Government represented only 
0.1% of the stock's v a l u e .  1 3
Summations. No. 27 (Dec. 1947), p.28.
Ibid., p.25.
13 Ibid.
13 w. Costello, Democracv vs. Feudalism, p.153.
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Katô Kanjû intimated tha t the dispersal o f m ilitary supplies among 
governm ent organs, public organisations, private factories and 
private individuals represented an a ttem p t to  "curry favour" w ith 
the Japanese public, "an effort to  bridge the gap...between the people 
on the one hand and the military forces on the o t h e r " . On the face 
of it, the Japanese people were afforded an opportunity to  recover 
their own property; in fact, only those with access to  transport and 
storage facilities could fully explo it the situation. An American 
jo u rn a lis t, William Costello, whose re liab ility  as a source is 
confirmed by his unpopularity in Occupation circles, described the 
"legalised private plunder" in the following terms:
As soon as order No.363 was circulated....trucks, wagons, railroad cars, 
carts, bicycles and porters swarmed into the arsenals; documents were 
forged, altered or destroyed. Thousands of tons of finished products, food, 
textiles, raw materials and machinery were hauled away".’ ^
According to  Theodore Cohen, the army had reserve stocks o f 
uniforms, provisions and equipment sufficient for a defence force o f 
four million men  ^6 _ an indicator o f the immensity o f the m ilitary 
stores. For fourteen days (15 -28 August) the d istribution process 
continued, ensuring tha t public property was scattered throughout 
Japan. Although the original order (No. 363) was rescinded at the 
insistence o f the Allies, no real e ffo rt was made to  reclaim goods 
tha t had been removed from government warehouses. Reflecting on 
these events, the Katô Committee claimed in its report, issued in 
December 1947, tha t "the goods thus diverted from the ir proper 
channels and the individuals thus enriched have remained throughout 
the Occupation a cancer threatening the economy of this coun try ".i  ^
What made m atters worse was tha t those charged with cutting out 
the cancer perm itted it to  grow. The com m ittee suspected an 
accommodation betweeen the hoarders and local governm ents - 
"frequently local authorities appear to  have connived in legalising 
the transfer o f property to  private i n d i v i d u a l s " . 1 8 Those determ ined 
to  uncover hoarded goods had to  contend w ith  "bureaucratic
Summations. No. 27 (Dec. 1947), p.25. 
w. Costello, Democracv vs. Feudalism, p.1 53. 
T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.339. 
Summations. No. 27 (Dec. 1947), p28.
18 Ibid.. p.30.
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sabotage, divided authority, and police collusion w ith hoarders".19 
Nevertheless, large quantities o f food, clothing, fuel, metals and 
metal products were recovered by the police, presumably at the 
O ccupation 's insistence. Colonel Hayes (Governm ent Section) 
estimated tha t about 50% of the m ilitary stockpiles "civilianised" 
during the second half o f August 1945 disappeared w ith ou t 
documentation or r e c o r d s . 20 Thus, it can be asserted with confidence 
tha t what was retrieved by the authorities represented the tip  o f 
the iceberg.
The Japanese police were charged w ith  d e te c tin g  hoarded 
commodities and, failing this, preventing the ir transport and sale on 
the black market. Surprise raids on storage areas and mobile 
checkpoints on both roads and railways were the principal means by 
which the police suppressed illegal com m ercial transactions. 
However, the ir a ttitud e  towards prominent black marketeers, as 
will be made clear later in this chapter, seems to  have been a 
sym pathe tic  one . 21 Ian Nish, posted to  Japan as an in te rpre ter- 
translator fo r the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, was 
based in rural Shikoku. He worked with the Japanese police in an ti­
black market operations, searching warehouses and other centres of 
hoarding, and implies tha t the police were less than com m itted in 
these activities - "scarcity breeds corruption....and farmers, nôqvô 
kum iai (agricultural cooperative) leaders and police were under 
severe te m p ta tio n " . 22 When the police took their economic du ties 
seriously, usually at the insistence o f the Occupation authorities, 
the results could be staggering. Figure 9 illustrates monthly levels 
o f detection of illegally-transported staple foods over an eighteen 
month period. Rather than providing an indicator o f black market 
activ ity , it is a measure o f economic policing. The huge quantity 
confiscated in December 1947 was "due to  increased police 
vigilance rather than more numerous vio lations".23 This is a glimpse.
w. Costello, Democracv vs. Feudalism, p.160.
20 T. Cohen, Remaking Japan. p .341.
21 See the next section on the links between the police and criminal ovabun.
2 2 I. Nish, "Britain and the Occupation of Japan - Some Personal Recollections", 
Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies Vol.4. Pt.l (1979 ) p.157.
23 Summations. No. 28 (Jan. 1948), p.267.
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Illegally-Transported Staple Foods Confiscated at Railway 
Freight Stations and Railway/ Flighway Checkpoints
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31 (p.244), 32 (p.315), 33 (p.252), 34 (p.258).
Figure 9
perhaps, o f the real level of black market a c tiv ity  as well as a 
demonstration o f one of the few instances of police effectiveness.
It was easier to  de tect the movement o f black market materials 
than it was to  locate the whereabouts o f hoarded supplies, assuming 
of course tha t local police were not in league with the hoarders. The 
Katô Com m ittee concluded th a t "local governm ent and police 
o ffic ia ls  have bo th  ac tive ly  and passive ly in te rfe re d  w ith  
investigations o f hoarded and concealed goods and in some cases 
have conspired w ith  holders o f concealed goods to  le g a lis e  
fraudulent tra n s a c tio n s ".24 Obstruction of the com m ittee ’s work 
seems to  have been pervasive, "opposition to  a fearless and honest 
exposure of postwar frauds (extending) to  all levels o f society and 
g o v e rn m e n t" .25 Thus, the mission o f both Sekô and Katô was 
constantly undermined by the fact tha t too many people, many of 
them holding postions of power and responsibility, were caught up in 
the web spun by those who had acquired a substantial quantity of 
surplus m ilitary supplies. Katô went so far as to  say tha t " it  is 
....obvious tha t the rights and interests o f the Japanese public...can 
be protected only by the active intervention and assistance of th e  
Allied Occupation au th o ritie s ".26 in fac t, however, the Americans 
compounded the problem by instructing the Japanese Home Ministry 
in October 1945 to  distribute the so-called "special goods", those 
materials initially appropriated by the Occupation force. They were 
to  be used to  ameliorate living conditions and revive the economy.27 
Given tha t politicians and bureaucrats had already encouraged the 
concealment o f large amounts of essential commodities, it was no t 
surprising th a t form er Finance M inister Ishibashi complained in 
1947 that he could account for only 2 to  3 % of the releases:
Only about 20 million yen or 30 million yen worth of material seemed to 
have passed through the hands of the Home Ministry and nobody knows 
where a 100,000 million yen worth (of stocks) has gone to.^s
24 Ibid.. No.27 (Dec. 1947), p.32.
25 Ibid.. p.25.
26 Ibid.
27 SCAPIN 53, 2 4 /9 /1 9 4 5 ; Subject: Materials, Supplies and Equipment Received and to 
be Received from the Japanese Armed Forces.
26 Katô Committee report. Part 3 - Summation No.27, p .31.
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Metals and primary metal products were distributed by the Arms 
Disposal C om m ittee , se t up by the  Home M in is try  and 
representatives of five zaibatsu concerns (Furukawa Electric, Kobe 
Steel, Nippon Steel Tube, Fuso Metals and Nippon Iron and Steel).29 
The Katô Committee concluded tha t the "special goods" had been 
"im properly  d is tr ib u te d " and "no accounting has ever been
rendered".30
Costello sensed a "colossal conspiracy", the ramifications o f which 
are impossible to  estimate, given tha t the hidden materials th a t 
came to  light represented a tiny percentage o f what either lay in 
cold storage or was slowly dribbling in to black market channe ls . 
Nevertheless, the quantity and nature of hoarded goods recovered by 
the police give some indication of the contents o f the m ilita ry  
stores, which were now sustaining the black econom y. From 
February 1946 the Summations quantified and catalogued concealed 
commodities detected by the police. Generally goods were classified 
according to  whether they cons titu ted  foods tu ffs , fuel, te x tile  
goods or miscellaneous items. The table on page 146 enumerates the 
amount and nature of durable goods (ie. the last category) recovered 
during the period February to  June 1946.
Japan’s physical reconstruction, in term s o f both residential and 
office accommodation, required the maximum use of such items as 
iron and steel, cement and nails. There is no indication of how much 
tim ber, an im portant building material in Japan, was recovered 
during th is  p e rio d .3 1 Companies and ind iv idua ls  w e n t to  
extraordinary lengths to  conceal what they had received from the 
military. A million dollars' worth of machine tools and rubber was 
stowed at the bottom  of Lake Inawashiro, Fukushima prefecture.32 in
29 T. Cohen, Remaking Japan. p,341 (and footnote 39, p .514); W. Costello, Democracv 
vs. Feudalism, p.1 54.
30 Katô Committee Report, Part 4 (Conclusions and Recommendations) - Summation 
No.27(Dec. 47), p.32.
31 The original source for the table’s contents was the Ministry of Home Affairs; a more 
accessible one, used in this instance, is Summation No. 11 (August 194 6 ) p.200. 
Reference is made to "lumber" (ie. partly prepared timber) in Summation No.31 (April
1948), when it is disclosed that timber to the value of 1 ,190,800  yen was uncovered 
in February 1948 (p .56).
32 Nippon Times. June 23, 1948, p.3.
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Okayama City the Nakajima Propeller Company built workshops on 
top o f a store of 80 tons of aluminium, tin , copper wire and 
sheeting, and scrap iron.33 One o f the Katô Com m ittee’s successes 
was a surprise raid on the Ishihara Gôkin factory, where th irty -tw o  
tons o f buried silver wire was discovered. Investigation revealed 
that it had been sold for 890,000 yen, was valued at 80 million yen 
in September 1947 and would have fetched 800 million yen on the 
black market.34
Miscellaneous Goods Recovered. February - June 1946
Goods Unit Quantity
Electric lamps piece 346477
Rubber shoes pa ir 7402
Nails cask 61792
Iron plate coated 
w ith zinc
sheet 33634
Cement sack 85938
Pig iron metric tonne 3729
Steel metric tonne 60996
Motors piece average 5 hp 4535
Electric transform ers piece average 5 hp 735
Lathes piece average 5 hp 146
Electric cord 250 metre rolls 12666
Other machines piece 19279
Tools piece 506769
Source: Summations. No.l 1 , p.200.
Examination of the second category (fuels) over a ten month period 
(September 1946 - June 1947) reveals the illegal disposition o f 
large amounts o f petroleum  products, the sine qua non for a 
function ing transpo rt system . One o f the  weaknesses o f the 
Japanese police, as was sta ted  in Chapter 2, was the p o o r  
maintenance of their inadequate stock of m otor vehicles. In Figure
33 Ibid.. June 8, 1948, p.3.
34 w. Costello, Democracv vs. Feudalism, p.160.
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10 oil-related products, as catalogued by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, include crude petroleum, gasoline, kerosene, automobile 
benzine, light oil, heavy oil and machine oil.
Hoarded Oil-Related Products Recovered, 
September 1946 - June 1947
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Source; Summations, No.s 13 (p.194), 14 (p.236), 1 5 (p.1 97), 16 
(p.204), 1 7 (p.221 ), 1 8 (p.211 ), 1 9 (p.230), 20 (p.1 95), 21 (p.205), 22 
(p.227).
According to  Mark Gayn, it was established that the Japanese Army 
Command in Kyushu had given its surplus fuel supplies to "big firms, 
contractors, officers and just friends....when somebody, quite by 
accident, stumbled on a buried fuel dump".35 Surprise discoveries 
seem to have been common. A Korean pedlar cannot have improved 
his prospects when he discovered a hundred tons of raw rubber in a 
ravine, hidden, the villagers said, on orders from the commander of 
the local naval b a s e .36 Presumably they fe lt tha t the rubber 
represented a potential source of profit for the whole community.
Local elites were united in their determ ination to  conceal the 
com m unity’s "assets" from the Occupation’s intrusive gaze. On
35 M. Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1 981 ) p.1 24.
36 Ibid.
147
January 2, 1946, Mark Gayn was involved in a raid on a school in 
Otsuki, a small town in northern Honshu. "Regressive" literature and 
hoarded supplies were the quarry. A lth ou gh  the  hun te rs  
acknowledged th a t surprise was the ir key weapon, the y  were 
actually in v ite d  to  visit the town's tw o schools by the principals 
themselves, the police chief and the deputy mayor. The raid was not 
a complete failure, uncovering some banned books on "eth ics" and a 
small collection o f aeroplane instrum ents. Gayn attached some 
significance to  the find, suggesting to  his companion. Lieutenant 
Hartley, th a t " if  we could find th is s tu ff  in a town th a t was 
obviously prepared for us, think o f the s tu ff we could find in an 
unprepared to w n ".37 He had been encouraged to  participate in a 
school raid by the revelations of one Sergeant Finley, whose 
enthusiasm for surprise searches began when he discovered and 
destroyed a full-size glider. Deciding to  follow up his successful 
raid, he returned the following day, only to  find the teachers digging 
a big pit, "and right next to  it, waiting to  be buried, three brand new 
airplane engines, airplane tools, instrum ents and a lo t o f o ther
junk".38
Given the physical condition of large numbers of ordinary Japanese, 
the burial o f machine parts paled in to insignificance beside the 
concealment o f food. In January 1946 it was reported th a t b lack 
market operations were widespread, fuelled mainly by fo o d s tu ffs  
and commodities formerly held by the Japanese armed services. 
According to  various prefectura l reports, illic it trading in many 
places was subject to  only occasional preventive action by the 
police.39 The following month the Home Ministry declared tha t police 
raids had led to  the disclosure of about 60,000 k o k u ^ o  of hoarded 
rice, wheat and other cereals (enough to  provide a daily ration for
28 ,21 0 ,000  people).41 During the period February to  June, 1946, 
29,250 tonnes of hoarded staple foodstuffs (rice, wheat, barley and 
other crops) 42 were confiscated and diverted to  deficit areas. This,
37 Ibid.. p.89.
38 Ibid.. p.84.
39 Summations. No.4, p.34.
40 1 koku = 0.18 cubic m t./ 180.39 It./ 5.12 US bushels.
41 Summations. No.5, p.43.
42 Summations. No.l 1 (Aug. 1946), p.200.
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we may be sure, represented a small percentage of the to ta l amount 
of hidden food stocks. Food was imported from the US to  supplement 
supposedly inadequate dom estic s u p p l i e s . Visible stocks  were 
certa inly insuffic ient, but the scale o f the black market in food 
suggests tha t the shortfa ll could have been made up - at least in 
part - by vigorous economic policing. The same could be said about 
textiles, supplies of which far exceeded official estimates. On April 
28, 1946, Gayn reported tha t the firs t installment o f a shipment of 
cotton had been authorized for export by the US and was on its way 
to  Japan. A to ta l of 890,000 bales were to  be donated to  Japan 
"under the magic 'prevention of disease and civil unrest' formula".^^ 
A t the same time two members of the international Textile Mission 
informed Gayn tha t "the  canny Japanese had concealed in the ir 
warehouses a billion yards of textiles or the ir e q u iv a le n t " . I n  
Niigata prefecture alone investigations had uncovered 100,000,000 
pounds o f hoarded cotton.^^ During the period February to  August, 
1946, 30,869,1 89 yards of textiles were recovered by the police.^^
An ind irect Occupation d ic ta ted  a degree o f tru s t th a t was 
misplaced in the case o f the Japanese governm ent. Those in 
positions o f power who b e n e f ite d  from  the surplus m ilita ry  
supplies were the very same people who never ceased to  warn 
MacArthur's team of the grave consequences o f widespread hunger 
and social deprivation. Demanding food and textiles to  save Japan 
from disaster, they delegated the/r governmental responsibilities to  
the Occupation authorities; it was the la tte r who laboured to  ensure 
an adequate supply o f n e c e s s i t i e s . ^ 8  The American reform ers, 
in itia lly unaware o f the hoards and then unwilling to  admit to  the 
deception, sponsored the corrupt conservative regime. Traditional
To maintain the staple food ration in June, 1946, 47 ,867  long tons (1 long ton 
=1,016.05 kg) of imported foodstuffs were distributed in the Tokyo-Yokohama area and 
Hokkaido, Aomori and Yamanashi prefectures ( Summations. No.9, p .217). Release of 
imported foods in 20 prefectures during July: 157 ,435  tonnes of cereals + 17,273  
tonnes of canned foods, equivalent to about 25% of total monthly staple food ration 
requirements for Japan (Summations. No.10, p.1 83).
Japan Diary, pp.192-193.
45 Ibid.. p.1 93.
48 Ibid.
4^ Summations. No.s 11 (p .200) & 12 (p .183).
48 M. Gayn, Japan Diary, p.465.
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economic and political organisations thrived on the surplus m ilitary 
supplies, whilst the privations of the great m ajority o f Japanese 
were prolonged. The significance o f Japan's war stockpiles was 
assessed by the magazine World Report (la ter US News and World 
Report):
The zaibatsu companies, Japan's family monopolies, obtained the largest 
share of the spoils....If the Japanese Government had obtained full 
payment for its stockpiles, it would have had enough to cover all budget 
deficits and Occupation costs since the surrender. As it is, deficit spending 
and sales of stockpile goods at black market prices have resulted in
soaring i n f l a t i o n .
Theodore Cohen claimed tha t "large segments of the propertied 
classes, on the verge of being suffocated economically by the 
defeat, were resuscita ted by the d is tribu tion  o f the m ilita ry  
s to re s ".50 According to  the above article in World Report, politicians 
as well as businessmen were implicated in the scandal - "There is 
evidence tha t Japan's ultraconservatives have filled the campaign 
chest o f the ir Liberal party w ith some o f the fraudulent gains". 
Writing in 1948, Harry Emerson Wildes, form erly o f Government 
Section, c ited examples o f co llabora tion between conserva tive 
politicians and black marketeers. He referred to  the exposure of a 
prominent politician by the Asahi Shinbun (26 October 1947):
Hara Susumu, Liberal party executive, told a party caucus in 
January,! 948, that he had himself received 2 ,000 ,000  yen and that the 
party had been promised a further 1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  yen from Ogawa 
Heinosuke, president of the International Industrial Economy Company 
(Kokusai Sanavô Keizai). as part of the proceeds of the sale of army shoes 
and uniforms illegally disposed of by crooked politicians.si
Thus, campaign funds often derived from profits made on the black 
market. Not surprisingly, party records did not disclose the g ifts  of 
black marketeers. It was not Just the politic ians who received 
money from  crim inal elements. The police, along w ith  o ther
World Report (6 /1 /1 9 4 8 )  - Quoted in R.Textor, Failure in Japan (Greenwood 
Press, Westport, Conn., 1972) pp. 48-49.
50 T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.346.
51 H. E. Wildes, "Underground Politics in Postwar Japan", American Political Science 
Review. 42 (Dec. 1948), p .1153.
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governmental agencies, gratefully accepted d irty money, despite the 
debts they accrued by doing so.^z
This section has examined the d istribu tion o f the large m ilitary 
stockpiles w ith only passing reference to  the Japanese police. 
Although responsible for the recovery o f illegally-hoarded stocks, 
the police often were more concerned w ith  pro longing th e ir 
concealment. Robert Textor, who spent twenty-six months in Japan 
as a civilian employee o f the Occupation, s ta te d  th a t " t h e  
police...were living and frequently fattening on the black m a r k e t " . 5 3 
By 1947, when investigations began in earnest, many ordinary 
Japanese had benefitted from the surplus m ilitary supplies, either 
through the ir sale or consumption. Their disappearance remained a 
mystery, because "too  many people, their relatives, or their friends 
were involved in some little  piece o f the a c t i o n " . 54 Sekô and Katô 
failed fu lly  to  expose the  scandal, because the  agents o f 
governm ent, particularly the police, were im plicated. Economic 
policing necessarily targeted those whose involvem ent w ith  the 
black economy was small-scale; tha t is to  say, ordinary Japanese, 
who purchased and consumed "va m i" materials. Prominent black 
marketeers, however, were immune from prosecution, because the 
police were in the ir debt. The m ilita ry  supplies fac ilita te d  the 
survival and dominance of sections of society tha t were com m itted  
to  the old order. As will be made clear in the next tw o sections, the 
police, weak and disorientated, looked to  these groups for moral and 
financial support. An accommodation was reached between the old 
guard and the Japanese police, which constantly  frus tra ted  the 
Occupation's attem pts to  turn the la tte r into public servants.
The Ovabun-Kobun System
In 1947 Colonel Kades, deputy head of Government Section, referred 
to  "a massive underground network extending from the sm a lles t 
rural village to  the highest echelons of the national g o v e r n m e n t " .  5 5
52 Examined in Section Three of this chapter.
53 R .  Textor, Failure, p. 102.
54 T. Cohen, Remaking Japan. p.350.
55 Quoted in D. E. Kaplan and A. Dubro, Yakuza - The Explosive Account of Japan’s 
Criminal Underworld (Macdonald, London, 1987) p.43.
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He cautioned against complaisance, claiming tha t "th is clannish and 
clandestine combination of bosses, hoodlums, and racketeers is the 
greatest th rea t to  American dem ocratic aims in Japan".56 Th is  
shadow government was labelled the o va bun -ko bu n  system b y  
American reformers, more a term  o f convenience than an accurate 
characterisation of the situation. The phrase was poorly understood, 
there being little  appreciation of its pervasiveness, and its positive 
as well as negative connotations. William Costello was endorsing 
the official line on the ovabun-kobun system when he portrayed it as 
"a s in is te r crim inal b ro th e rh o o d ",57 neg lecting to  analyse its 
importance as a peculiarly Japanese pattern of social organisation. 
Most Americans used the term to  denote bossism or gangsterism and 
were keen to  eradicate the system, whereas the Japanese police 
seemed reluctant to  break up social organisations tha t served the 
com m unity, a lbe it through crim inal a c tiv itie s . This seem ing 
d ive rgence  o f in te re s ts  de rived  from  d iffe r in g  cu ltu ra l 
perspectives, the police’s weakness vis à vis prevailing socio­
economic conditions and the Occupation’s failure to  appreciate the 
overwhelm ing im portance o f the black market as a lever for 
political contro l.
Within the Civil Information and Education Section, GHQ, the Public 
Opinion and Sociological Research Division (SRD) was set up to  
assist in form ulating policies compatible w ith  Japan's trad itions. 
The guiding principle o f the Occupation was lim ited reform ra th e r 
than sweeping change. Reformers, fo r the m ost part, were 
com m itted to  the m odification o f existing social and politica l 
organisations, although sometimes "adherence to  older forms was 
s e n s ib le " .58 The SRD’s research on the o va b u n -ko b u n  system  
recognised "the  desirability  o f reform ..., especially in the more 
e xp lo ita tive  developm ents (b u t)  acknow ledged certa in  v ita l 
functions in an industrialised, overpopulated nation w ith inadequate 
programmes of social security".59
56 Ibid.
57 Quoted in J. W. Bennett and I. Ishino, Paternalism in the Japanese Economy: 
Anthropological Studies of Ovabun-Kobun Patterns (University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 1963 ) p.283, fn.2.
58 Ibid., p.26
59 Ibid.
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Herbert Passin was the firs t o f the SRD s ta ff to  try  and spread 
awareness of ovabun-kobun ties. On the 12 September, 1947, at a 
conference convened to  discuss the issue, he tried to  explain the 
pervasiveness, com plexity and ram ifications o f the system  to  
representatives o f the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS), the 
Government Section (GS), the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS) and the 
Legal Section (LS). He stated tha t ovabun-kobun was "a type of 
relationship tha t can be applied to  a variety o f s i t u a t i o n s " , 6 0  the re  
being a broad spectrum of organisations engaged in legitim ate as 
well as illegal activ ities. Occupational d ivers ity  was matched by 
d iffe ring levels o f organisation, urban groupings proving highly 
specialised and organised. Although he characterised rural ovabun 
as more benevolent than their urban counterparts, Passin contended 
tha t "gangster o u tfits ...o fte n  take b e tte r care o f the ir people, 
promoting a different sort of loyalty". 62 it was the threat posed to  
Occupation reforms by "crim inal o v a b u n " th a t in te rested the 
representatives of the various sections. They can have found little  
consolation in Passings assurances:
The ovabun-kobun system is not just a system of corrupt, illegal 
activ ities ...Its  essential characteristic lies in the hierarchical 
relationship between a set of individuals...People normally expect to 
enter that relationship, because in almost every village for hundreds of 
years you have had persons of influence assuming this position of control, 
of authority, of protection....over people of lesser influence and lesser 
position. 63
From 1947, when the Americans firs t became aware o f a web o f 
criminal gangs, they were confused as to  the nature o f the problem 
and the best method of suppression. The difficulties experienced by 
those who sought to  eradicate what they saw as a criminal 
conspiracy derived from the blurred boundary between leg itim ate  
commercial concerns and those engaged in illic it activ ities (very 
often the former was used as a cover for the la tter).
60 Minutes of a conference organised by Government Section, 1 2 /9 /4 7 , p.5 (NDL, fiche 
no. G-2 04562 ).
61 Ibid.. p.2.
62 Ibid.. p.4.
63 Ibid.. p.2.
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Problems of enforcement flowed from problems of definition. Whilst 
most Americans translated ovabun-kobun as "boss-henchman", 
Herbert Passin and others in the  SRD cautioned a g a in s t  
oversim plifica tion. W riting tw en ty  years la ter, he s ta te d  th a t 
ovabun could be translated in English as lord, master, boss, leader, 
employer, landowner, p ro tec to r, and patron; kobun could mean 
underling, subordinate, henchman, vassal, dependent, protégé, 
worker, employee, tenant, servant, and c l i e n t . 6 4  This varie ty o f 
meanings suggests a diversity of attitudes towards ovabun. Whilst a 
Japanese policeman m ight have regarded such a figure as a 
philanthropist, an American reform er more probably would have 
characterised him as a Japanese AI Capone. In short, one man's 
gangster was another man’s altruist. The Occupation's association o f 
ovabun with the American "godfather" seems to  have stuck. Since the 
Second World War, according to  Passin, the term  has taken on 
unpleasant connotations. 65
In May, 1947, Harry Shupak, a police investiga tor fo r the Public 
Safety Division, produced a report on the " Ovabun S y s t e m " , 66 jp 
which he identified  three types o f o va b u n  organisation: the 
kashim oto (or baku to ) groups, involved in syndicated gambling; the 
te k iv a  or s tre e t-s ta ll associations; and the q u re n ta i gangs, 
composed o f thieves and racketeers. The la tte r were by far the 
largest and strongest organisations, usually well-arm ed 67 and 
prepared to  employ violent, theatening methods where necessary. 
They financed themselves by exacting tribu te  from bars, cabarets, 
dance halls, restaurants and coffee shops in the ir respective 
d is tric ts , local ju risd ic tions  th a t they guarded w ith  vigilance. 
Shupak had had personal experience o f the violence tha t attended 
qurentai rivalries. In August 1946 he compiled a report concerning 
gang warfare between the Matsuda gumi, based in the Shinbashi 
area, a Formosan organisation operating around Shibuya station and
64 "Japanese Society", International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Vol. 8 (The 
Macmillan Company and the Free Press, New York,!968) p.243.
65 1^.
66 "Investigation of Oyabun System", 9 /5 /4 7 ;  To: Administrator W. G. Fritz. Shupak’s 
sources of information: Japanese merchants; Otsuka Tadaishi - Inspector, MPB (NDL: 
G-2 0 45 6 5 ).
6^ Shupak suggested that they had access to secret arms caches, abandoned by the 
military at the end of the Pacific War.
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a group of Japanese stall vendors centred on Shinjuku station. 68 The 
gangs were fighting for control of market stalls, set up on te rrito ry  
adjacent to  busy stations,69 where black market commodities could 
be received and sold. Matsuda Giichi’s organisation, like o ther 
prom inent gangs, could be classified as both qu ren ta i and te k iv a . 
depending on which sphere of operations was being investigated.
Shupak stated tha t the influence of the qu ren ta i was far greater 
than the other two systems, both in terms of financial resources and 
public acquiescence. Anyone wishing to  open a business was forced 
to  give a large sum of money to  his local ovabun to  avoid damage to  
his property or injury to  his person, and thereafter was expected to  
subm it weekly or m onthly paym ents. While one thea tre  was 
rumoured to  be paying 100,000 yen every month for "protection", the 
average monthly disbursement from bars was 5,000 to  10,000 yen.^o 
Kobun frequently visited the establishments, collecting payment and 
usually drinking or eating free of charge. It was estim ated tha t 
there were about 200 qurentai bosses in Tokyo alone, some of whom 
had as many as 1,000 kobun. W h a t  is most interesting about this 
type o f criminal organisation is its development in the aftermath of 
war. This suggests tha t it was a product o f the socio-economic 
dislocation tha t accompanied defeat, a source of gainful em ploym ent 
for many demobilised soldiers. George De Vos and Keiichi Mizushima, 
writing in 1967, characterised the qurentai as institu tions "w ithout 
any sense o f continuity w ith the p a s t " . ^ 2  As "modern" forms, th e ir 
activities and ethos deviated from those of traditional ovabun-kobun 
organisations.
68 "Investigation of Oyabun System", 9 /5 /4 7  (NDL, G-2 04565); Summations. No.10 
(July 1946 ) p.39.
69 Shinbashi, Shibuya and Shinjuku were/ are mainline stations in Tokyo
^6) Information concerning tribute and intimidatory tactics comes from Shupak, 
"Investigation of Oyabun System", 9 /5 /4 7  (NDL, 04565).
Shupak’s estimates contained in "Investigation of Oyabun System". Given that he 
estimates a total of around 10,000 qurentai kobun in Tokyo, a following of less than 
fifty was probably typical.
^2 G. De Vos and K. Mizushima, "Organisation and Social Function of Japanese Gangs: 
Historical Development and Modern Parallels", in R. P. Dore, éd.. Aspects of Social 
Change in Modern Japan (Princeton University Press, N.J., 1967) p.301.
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In marked contrast, the kashimoto had a long history stretching back 
to  the Tokugawa period (1603 -18 68 ). As well as demanding and 
enforcing payment o f fees from gambling houses, kashim oto groups 
often operated such establishm ents them selves, to g e th e r w ith 
restaurants and bars. Police adm in is tra to r William Fritz, who 
developed some of the themes introduced by Shupak, maintained tha t 
in certain d istricts of metropolitan Tokyo there were higher ovabun. 
to  whom tw o or three lesser ovabun owed allegiance; they in tu rn  
commanded the loyalty of around five k o b u n . ^ 3  pritz estimated tha t 
there were fifty-seven gambling ovabun in metropolitan Tokyo, much 
the same as before the war, although there were considerably more 
kobun (around 3,000), the increase "due mainly to  the economic 
s itua tion ...and the lack o f e m p lo y m e n t" .S h u p a k ’s claim th a t 
kash im oto practices incited little  violence was contradicted by his 
colleague, who stated tha t eighteen out o f twenty-one such ovabun 
in Osaka had previous conv ic tions  fo r m urder, assault or 
in tim idation connected w ith gambling. Further indicating tha t the 
three types o f "o rgan isa tion" iden tified  by th e  O ccupation  
au thorities were in fac t more useful as a c la s s if ic a tio n  o f 
"ac tiv ities", Fritz stated tha t "since the cessation o f h o s tilit ie s , 
many gambling ovabun have extended the ir field o f practice into 
other fields of illegal operation, such as practised by the qu ren ta i
and tekiva organisations''.^^
All three elements of the "ovabun system" were seen as violent and 
undemocratic by American reformers, although the tekiva fitte d  less 
well than the other two into the gangster mould formulated by the 
Occupation. Composed of m erchants'/tradesm en's associations and 
cooperative unions, the ir economic significance was not fu lly  
realised until 1947, when the Americans acted quickly to  dissolve 
organisations th a t they had sponsored during the firs t year o f  
Occupation. The prime example was the Street Stall Tradesmen’s 
Union (Roten Dôavô Kumiai). which was controlled by Ozu Kinosuke, a
^3 The Intelligence Series. Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section 
(CIS), F EC and SCAP" (GHQ/FEC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Tokyo,
1949) Text 2, Documentary Appendix 1 5, "Investigation of the Oyabun (Boss) System" 
(1 5 /9 /4 7 )  pp. 1-2.
Ibid.. p.2.
73 Ibid.
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notorious criminal. In September, 1946, H. S. E a t o n , ^6 confusing the 
Tradesmen’s Union w ith a cooperative movement, perm itted the 
Metropolitan Police Board to  renew its righ t to  monopolize the 
adm in istration o f " te k iv a " (litera lly canvas-and-bam boo s tre e t 
s ta l ls ) .S h u p a k  had recommended th a t Ozu’s organisation be 
abolished, but his advice was not heeded, perhaps due to  practical 
considerations (there was no in s titu tiona l replacement fo r the 
Tradesmen’s Association).
In his report of May, 1947, Shupak stated that "the system had been 
in operation for many years but did not reach its present strength or 
influence until a fter the war".^8The growth of tekiva organisations 
reflected the proliferation o f market stalls in cities almost levelled 
by American bombs. These ad hoc retail outlets represented conduits 
for black market commodities, catering to  the needs o f ordinary 
Japanese and providing jobs for the unemployed. Men like Ozu and 
Matsuda seized the opportunities afforded by Japan’s defeat and the 
devastation of her cities, illegally appropriating property for open- 
air markets. Management o f the many fixed and mobile stalls tha t 
sprang up all over Tokyo and other Japanese cities was a lucrative 
business, financially and politically. The Japanese police delegated 
ad m in is tra tive  a u th o rity  to  the s ta ll-keepe r o v a b u n , th u s  
surrounding te k iva  organisations w ith an aura o f legitim acy. As 
early as March, 1943, the Tokyo Assembly had acknowledged the ir 
status not only as tax agents but also as price and d istribu tion 
regulators w ith  the power to  punish disobedience. This w as 
followed up by an ordinance, issued by the Economic Section of the 
Metropolitan Police Board (MPB) to  d is tric t police chiefs in January 
1945, com pelling all independent s ta ll vendors ' unions or 
associations to  Join a central organisation covering the whole of 
m etropo litan  T okyo , so U nfortunate ly fo r those concerned, the 
central organisation happened to  be the Roten Dôavô Kumiai. Thus it 
was no coincidence tha t Ozu’s organisation dovetailed neatly w ith
Head of Police branch, Public Safety Division.
H. E. Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo (Macmillan, New York, 1954), p.176.
^8 Shupak, "Investigation of Oyabun System", 9 /5 /4 7  (NDL, 04565).
^9 H. E. Wildes, Typhoon, p.176.
GO The Intelligence Series. Volume 9, Appendix 1 5: W. Fritz, "Investigation of the 
Oyabun (Boss) System" (1 5 /9 /4 7 )  p.6.
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the local police system, "the area covered by (each) branch office 
usually conform(ing) to  the area covered by each police station". 81
The ordinance o f January 1945 reflected the police’s determ ination 
to  centralise control over all stall keepers, which, it was hoped, 
would be accompanied by more effective regulation of price levels 
and suppression o f black m arket ac tiv itie s . Furtherm ore, the 
Tradesmen’s Union was expected to  put an end to  "sectional strife  
and friction between different ovabun and u n i o n s " . 8 Z  To begin with, 
the re fo re , it  was seen as the MPB’s puppet, a convenient 
organisation through which it could police the com m unity more 
effectively. However, in the context o f defeat and Occupation, the 
roles were reversed, the new puppeteer rising to  a position of such 
prominence tha t even the Americans found it d ifficu lt to  topple him. 
Ozu’s immense power and wealth derived from the efficiency of his 
organisation, combining a central headquarters w ith numerous local 
branches, and its lucrative regulation o f open-air markets. All stall 
keepers in Tokyo were subject to  a membership fee (30 yen); a daily 
rental charge, the level o f which depended on location; m o n th ly  
payments to  both the central association (5 yen) and the branch 
office (2 yen); and a daily charge for paper together with one for the 
cleaning o f stalls (1.5 yen and 50 yen respective ly). 83 C e n tra l 
headquarters was responsible for dividing all moneys c o lle c te d  
among the different ovabun. who in turn used these funds to  reward 
the ir u n d e r l i n g s . 8 4  There seems to  have been some confusion in 
Occupation circles as to  the number o f ovabun and kobun in Tokyo. 
Shupak estimated tha t there were around 300 tekiva ovabun with a 
follow ing o f around 1,200 k o b u n . 85 The la tte r  s ta tis t ic  was
81 Ibid.. p.4.
82 Ibid.. p.6.
83 Ibid.. p.4; the sums of money involved are described as "average". The daily rental 
charge is not mentioned by Fritz, despite its being referred to in Shupak’s report of 
9 /5 /4 7 . Galloping inflation makes it difficult to assess the actual value of these sums of 
money. By way of comparison, in July 1947 the Japanese government fixed the basic 
monthly pay of government employees at ¥1 ,800  (J. 8. Cohen, Japan's Economv. 
p.456). In terms of essential expenditure. The Oriental Economist estimated monthly 
food and drink expenses per capita of factory workers in Tokyo to be around ¥1,500  in 
September 1947.
84 Shupak, "Investigation of Oyabun System", 9 /5 /4 7 ;  To: Administrator W. G. Fritz 
(G-2 0 4 5 6 5 ).
85 Ibid.
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qualified by the suggestion tha t for many a more accurate label 
would be "appren tice", such s ta tus presumably re fle c ting  the 
inability o f young men and "s tre e t urchins" to  understand the 
demands as well as benefits o f traditional ovabun-kobun ties. The 
situation was, indeed, a fluid one, Fritz claiming four months later 
that there were 200 ovabun. 7,000 kobun and 22,557 followers in 
the Tokyo area. 86 The last s ta tis tic  must have included all those 
engaged in ancillary services, such as cleaning, fo r the te k iv a  
o rgan isa tions. The discrepancy between these tw o  sets o f 
estimates, separated by ju s t a few months, could be explained by 
rapid increases in numerical strength, but more likely reasons are 
differing sample areas (Fritz refers to  the Tokyo area rather than 
the c ity  itse lf) and conflicting methods of classification (whether 
or not Fritz included Shupak’s "apprentices" in his figure for kobun 
or "fo llow ers" is unclear). What comes across clearly is the 
Occupation’s confusion as to  both the nature and scale of the 
problem, although all agreed that it represented some sort of threat 
to  Japan’s nascent democracy.
In September, 1947, there were, according to  Fritz, approxim ate ly
45 ,000  s tre e t stalls registered w ith the Tradesmen's Union in 
Tokyo. Of these 88% were under the control o f ovabun. the remaining 
12% paying no "tribu te " but still liable for the usual fees and taxes. 
87 Nobody could set up a street stall w ithout the permission of Ozu’s 
organisation. All prospective vendors had to  apply for membership o f 
the Union at central headquarters and then fill in tw o license forms, 
which were then sent to  the local police station for approval. The 
relevant docum entation was available only at the Union’s branch 
o f f i c e s . 8 8  From the beginning those who operated street stalls were 
made aware who was in charge. The assumption of local government 
functions extended to  the collection o f taxes. Every day the street 
stalls paid 2-3 yen in government taxation, 89 moneys which w ere 
not immediately forwarded to  the Japanese Government; instead an 
annual lump sum was paid. The system encouraged corruption, "no
88 The Intelligence Series. Volume 9, Appendix 15: W. Fritz, "Investigation of the 
Oyabun (Boss) System" (1 5 /9 /4 7 ) ,  p.3.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.. p.4.
89 Ibid.
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governm ent employee or officia l assist(ing) in (tax ) collection". 
More seriously, "the tekiva organisation account(ed) to  no one for its
funds except to  its own heads no audit o f this organisation's books
(was) made by e ither the municipal, p re fec tu ra l or national 
government".90
It was bad enough tha t the Tradesmen’s Union was abusing its 
priv ileged position, employing adm in istra tive  m ethods out o f  
keeping w ith the Occupation’s policies. The reformers sought to  
create a cooperative, within which members would be free to  pursue 
economic goals w ith a minimum of constraints. In marked con tras t, 
Ozu’s organisation was characterised by what the  Am ericans 
regarded as "feudal" social relations - it was oppressive, a rigid 
hierarchy, at the bottom  of which were the very people who were 
now entrusted with the nation’s democratic dawn. What was even 
more galling than this frustrated ideal was the Union’s sponsorship 
of the black economy, which was sim ultaneously swindling the 
Japanese people and undermining the Occupation’s reforms. The 
supply and prices of commodities were controlled largely by tek iva  
organ isa tions,91 headed by individuals whose prominence reflected 
black market connections. William Costello referred to  " ovabun  
gangsters" as beneficiaries o f hoarded m ilita ry  supplies.92 All 
ovabun  organisations prom oted black market activ ities, if not 
directly then indirectly - by "exacting exorbitant tr ib u te /re n t they 
were contributing to  inflation and thus to  the black market".93
Shupak concluded th a t the ova bu n  system  "co n tro lle d  large 
commercial areas through threat and corruption, (th a t it was) in 
direct defiance o f law and order and should not be tolerated in a 
country dedicated to  democracy".94 Ten days after he submitted his 
report, he stressed the pervasiveness of the tek iva : "One can begin
90 Ibid.. p.6.
91 Shupak, "Investigation of Oyabun System", 9 /5 /4 7 ;  To; Administrator W. G. Fritz 
(G-2 0 4 5 6 5 ).
92 w. Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism, p.1 53.
93 Shupak, "Investigation of Oyabun System", 9 /5 /4 7 ;  To: Administrator W. G. Fritz 
(G-2 04565 ). Inflation/a reduction in the value of the yen encouraged hoarding and 
illegal disposition of scarce commodities.
94 Ibid.
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to  grasp the strength  and influence exercised by these illegal 
organisations in the everyday lives of the people, and on the nation 
as a w h o l e " . 9 5  Although most investigations concentrated on Tokyo, 
where the problem was most a c u t e , 96 Shupak was right to  see it as a 
nationwide phenomenon. In both Osaka and Kobe it was reported that 
m erchants associations, headed by o v a b u n , were p ro fitab ly  
regulating commerce, their actions condoned, even encouraged, by 
the police.
In the case of Kobe, the police professed ignorance of the exorbitant 
payments made by small shopkeepers to  the associations. These 
included an entrance fee o f 1,000 yen, m onth ly renewal o f 
membership costing from 80 to  1 20 yen and an annual tax rate o f
1,000 to  2,000 yen. To make matters worse, it was found tha t both 
the cleaning association and the m erchants' organisation were 
collecting tax revenue for the c ity  government from the same stall 
keepe rs .  It was interesting tha t even in Kyoto, unscarred by 
bombing raids and largely devoid o f market stalls, it was adm itted 
by the police tha t shop owners were obliged (ie. forced) to  become 
members o f merchants' associations under the control o f te k iva  
ovabun. For the privilege of conducting business they paid a 500 yen 
membership fee, 50 to  200 yen in dues, 5 yen a week in taxes and 10 
yen a month for a health inspection service. In addition, merchants 
were required to  subm it 5% o f daily takings to  the association, 
ostensibly as a price control measure! The associations assumed 
responsibilities normally within the jurisd iction o f the c ity 's  Health 
and Welfare Department, the la tte r presumably failing to  respond 
adequately to  popular n e e d s . 9 7  Weak government stim ulated the 
development o f ovabun organisations, a process overlooked by the
96 Shupak, "Further Investigation of Tekiva". dated 1 9 /5 /4 7  (NDL, fiche no. G-2 
0 4 5 6 4 ) .
96 Problem of ovabun. gangster organisation in Tokyo 3 times as serious as that of 
Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe combined - Comments by H. Shupak on Osaka police chief's report 
(NDL: G-2 0 45 6 4 ).
97 Information concerning tekiva organisations in Osaka, Kobe and Kyoto comes from W. 
Fritz's report, "Investigation of the Oyabun (Boss) System" ( 1 5 /9 /4 7 ) ,  pp.8-9. 
Higher membership fees etc. in the above three cities, compared with Tokyo, 
presumably reflected differences in retail outlets' size/financial value (ie. shops/stores 
rather than market stalls).
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police and promoted, albeit unconsciously, by the  Occupation 
au thorities .
From the beginning o f the Occupation, the Americans relied on 
individuals who could summon the necessary resources, in terms o f 
both manpower and materials, to  reconstruct and repair Japan's 
sha tte red  urban environm ent. Such men were rewarded w ith  
lucrative cost-plus contracts, ensuring the growth o f institu tions 
tha t the Americans came to  regard as illeg itim ate. The problem 
derived from the disguises assumed by ovabun-kobun groupings, 
usually tha t of a construction company or a labour contractor. This 
type of business was a convenient "fro n t" because o f its te rr ito ria l 
character - "th e  building business in Japanese c itie s  has 
trad itionally been divided in to te rrito ries  controlled by particular 
companies, which coincided w ith  the similar te rrito ria l nature of 
the  g a n g s " . 9 8  Fritz was not alone in realising tha t ovabun were 
operating "under the guise of legitimate public works con tracto rs".99 
H. E. Wildes maintained tha t construction companies (au m i/kum i) 
co n s titu te d  a powerful pressure group, "( th e ir)  chiefs (called 
ovabun) contro l(ling) elaborate o u tfits  o f tools, materials, minor 
artisans, day labourers, and ready capital, capable o f being directed 
toward any one of a number of different types of work".too
A t the conference convened by Government Section in Septem ber, 
1947, Mr. Collett, representing the Economic and Scientific Section, 
stated tha t the organisation regulating construction/casual labour 
(the contractors' association) was the same as its p rew ar/w artim e  
counterpart. It was exempt from any restrictions on its activities, 
despite its being composed of gumi involved in "widespread black 
market operations". Belonging to  an association was the essential 
precondition for employment in the construction industry, the ir 
expansion during the Occupation reflecting a hostile socio-economic 
environment. Unemployed Japanese were "sucked into the gum i", the 
in flux changing lo ya lty  pa tte rns  and d is to r t in g  t ra d it io n a l
98 Bennett and Ishino, Paternalism in the Japanese Economv. fn.2, p.283.
99 The Intelligence Series. Volume 9, Appendix 15: W. Fritz, "Investigation of the 
Oyabun (Boss) System" (1 5 /9 /4 7 ) ,  p.2.
T 90 "Underground Politics in Postwar Japan", American Political Science Review. 42 
(Dec. 1948) p .1155.
162
relationships. A prominent ovabun in one of the larger p re fe c tu re s  
stated tha t half of his kobun were not regular, loyal workers. Black 
market rice was used as an economic weapon, prompting unemployed 
Japanese to  equate membership w ith  survival. The Japanese 
Government strengthened the hand of the ovabun by paying for extra 
rations bought on the black m a r k e t .T h e  realisation tha t gumi had 
a complete monopoly on construction shocked the reformers in SCAP. 
They could hardly believe tha t "v irtually all the construction work 
done by (Occupation order), or fo r its  in terests, was h a n d le d  
th ro u g h ....ovabun organisations tha t held the ir workmen in semi- 
feudal bondage".! 02
The idealism o f the reform ers can be con trasted  w ith  t h e  
pragmatism o f most Occupation personnel. The reaction o f one 
Colonel Fregosi represented the view o f all those who saw 
themselves more as soldiers than administrators:
Where a conflict exists between executing procurement or cleaning out 
the system, the former must triumph, because the Occupation force 
intends...to get what it wants....There is no sense in trying to combat some 
of the problems that come up on the grounds of ethics....if it is going to 
stop procurement.
Clearly Fregosi had a job to  do, and considered it unfortunate, but 
nevertheless irrelevant, tha t those Japanese who furnished him w ith  
his needs did so through criminal activities. In short the supplies 
themselves interested him more than the suppliers. A good example 
o f such a supplier was Ando Akira, "one o f Tokyo’s great labour 
b o s s e s " , ! 0 4  who was frequently employed by the Americans as a 
contractor. Mark Gayn took an in terest in Ando, claiming th a t he 
controlled 10,000 workers ! and was probably "a receiver for the 
colossal hoards of war s u p p l i e s . . . " . !  0 6  According to  Captain N., who 
had been investigating Ando for three months and was quite happy to
!0 !  Conference in Government Section, 1 2 /9 /4 7 ,  pp. 9 -10  (NDL, fiche no. G-2 
0 4 5 6 2 ) .
!*^2 H. E. Wildes, Typhoon, p.177.
! 03 Conference in Government Section, 1 2 /9 /4 7 , p. 11 (NDL, fiche no. G-2 04562).
! O'! Mark Gayn, Japan Diarv. p.1 78.
! 05 Ibid.
!06  1 ^ ., p.246.
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supply Gayn w ith  in fo rm ation, th is  particu la r "gangs te r" had 
excellent contacts:
...he is on intimate terms with Prince Takamatsu, the emperor’s brother 
(and) is also friendly with cabinet ministers, with black market "kings" 
in half a dozen cities..
The owner o f six contracting firms and President o f the Tokyo 
Private Automobile Association w ith 8,000 m e m b e r s ,  ^0 8  Ando was 
an extremely powerful man on whom many Occupation personnel 
came to  rely.
Close working relationships w ith alleged criminals, on the part o f 
both the Japanese police and the Occupation authorities, suggested 
tha t any attem pt to  bring them to  justice would be half-hearted. The 
programme o f action agreed on at the in ter-sectional conference 
was confused to  say the least. Mr. Rose (ESS) maintained tha t an 
attack on the ovabun-kobun system would have serious implications 
w ith regard to  economic recovery. Mr. Meyers sensibly asked for 
clarification: "What do we mean by the ovabun system, and what part 
do we intend to  a ttack? "109 Generally, ta c it consent rather than 
active resistance was the favoured course of action, each speaker 
keen to  distance himself and his section from a seemingly insoluble 
problem. In May 1947 Shupak had w ritten a note to  Eaton concerning 
moves by ESS to  counter o v a b u n  influence - "F ritz  (PSD’s 
representative was) not to  commit himself to  any position which 
would amount to  an assumption o f responsibility by this section 
(Civil Intelligence Section)".11 o it is safe to  assume tha t as more 
facts  came to  ligh t, so the desire to  ignore " th e  shadow 
g o v e rn m e n t" !  TT became stronger. Meyers, who chaired the  
conference, proposed that it be suggested to the Japanese Goverment
!07  1 ^ . ,  pp.245-6.
!98 Ibid.. p.245. According to Captain N., you couldn’t  own a car in Tokyo without paying 
a tribute to Ando.
! 99 Conference in Government Section, 1 2 /9 /4 7 , p.16 (NDL, G-2 04562).
! ! 0  NDL, G-2 04563.
! ! ! This characterisation was coined by Mr. Ries (ESS), Conference in GS (1 2 /9 /4 7 ) ,  
p.6 (NDL, G-2 0 4 5 6 2 ).
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tha t "a law be passed forbidding any p riva te /q u a s i-g o ve rn m e n t... 
agency...to collect any taxes or fees whatsoever"."'‘'2 The notion tha t 
it was enough to  "suggest" to  the Japanese Government what should 
be done testified to  Government Section's poverty o f ideas. Meyers 
made sure tha t everyone knew who was expected to  solve the 
problem. Emphasizing the role of the police, he declared tha t "this is 
the Public Safety Division’s ju risd iction and we don’t  want t o  
in te rfe re".! ! 3
A ttem pting  to  simplify the ir task, the PSD decided to  ta rge t the 
notorious gang leaders, to  break up the system from the top. In a 
memo to  the director o f the Bureau o f Police, dated 20 Novem ber, 
1947, H. E. Pulliam stated tha t "instructions should be issued to  
prefectural chiefs of police to  stamp out all traces of ovabun-kobun 
and other gangster systems".! From [viay of tha t year efforts were 
concentrated on tw o of the best known ovabun in Tokyo, Ozu 
Kinosuke and Sekine Ken. The former was arrested on 26 June, 1947, 
on the authority of the chief of Yodobashi police station, who was 
forced to  take action against Ozu by Shupak.! !5 The police chief had 
told the investigator tha t his men were afraid to  raid, and even the 
procurator admitted to  a fear of taking proceedings against Ozu .ü ^
The trial began on 15 July and lasted until 25 August, when "the 
alleged king o f the Tokyo black market u n d e rw o r ld "  ! !  ^ w a s  
imprisoned, only to  be released on 12 September due to  ill health. He 
was returned to  prison on the 18 September, presumably at the 
Occupation’s prom pting.! !8 in a memo, dated 25 November, 1947, 
Shupak s ta ted  th a t "another charge o f in tim idation had been 
presented to  the Procurator’s O ffice for action and tw o other 
charges of illegal possession of weapons and black market dealings
! !2  Conference in GS, 1 2 /9 /4 7 , p.23.
! ! 3 Ibid., p.24.
! ! 4  NDL, G-2 00252.
! ! 5 Memo dated 2 5 /1 1 /4 7 ; From: Investigator H. Shupak; Subject: Data re. Ozu and 
Sekine Investigation (NDL, G-2 00233)
! ! 8 Conference in GS, 1 2 /9 /4 7 , p.13. Shupak had to accompany the nervous police 
chief on the raid (NDL, G-2 04562).
! ! 2 Summations. No.21 (June, 1947), p.48.
! ! 8 Memo dated 2 5 /1 1 /4 7 ; From: Investigator FI. Shupak; Subject: Data re. Ozu and 
Sekine Investigation (NDL, G-2 00233).
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(were) being worked on w ith  lit t le  hope o f success" J  ^  ^ j  h e 
M etropolitan Police Board (MPB) had inform ed him th a t the 
Procurator’s Office would decide when to  call the final trial, and 
until then the police would try  to  obtain more evidence against Ozu. 
Despite the ir leader’s incarceration, Ozu’s kobun still dominated the 
Shinjuku area, continuing to  collect fees and taxes.! 20 Tanemura o f 
the MPB’s Second Criminal Section "s ta ted  tha t th is problem was 
deplorable, but the police could do nothing more - it was up to  the 
ward office and other government a g e n c i e s " . !  21 Desperate to  salvage 
som ething fo r his e ffo r ts , Shupak recom m ended th a t " th e  
P rocurator’s Office be instructed to  bring the tria l to  a speedy 
conclusion, regardless o f the amount o f charges available against 
O z u " . ! 22 It was not until June, 1948, tha t Ozu received a credible 
gaol sentence (eight y e a r s ) . !  23
In the case of Sekine, the Occupation authorities were more wary of 
Japanese Judicial agencies. On September 30, 1947, the P rovost 
Marshal's Office, GHQ, issued a warrant for his arrest.! 24 The same 
day "Sekine Ken, head of a gang claiming the membership o f 20,000 
gamblers, thugs and construction workers, surrendered to  the 
police....ending a three month search throughout ten p r o v i n c e s " . ! 25  On 
28 November he was convicted by Provost Court and sentenced to  
five years im prisonm ent.! 26 So reluctant were the police to  curb 
gangster activ ities and so lenient the courts tha t the Occupation 
authorities were forced to  employ their own prosecutors to  ensure 
tha t Justice was done. However, as has been suggested w ith regard 
to  Ozu, it soon became clear tha t toppling the heads o f ovabun 
groupings did little  to  undermine the organisations themselves. On 
23 February, 1949, the Tokyo Shinbun reported that gangster groups 
still existed, despite the campaign in 1947 tha t aimed to  eradicate
! ! 9 Ibid.
! 20 Ibid.
!2 ! ibid.
! 22 Ibid.
! 23 w. Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism, p. 142.
! 24 Memo dated 25/1  1 /47 ; From: Investigator H. Shupak; Subject: Data re. Ozu and 
Sekine Investigation (NDL, G-2 00233).
!25 Summations. No.25 (O ct.1947), p.36.
! 26 Memo dated 2 5 /1 1 /4 7 ; From: Investigator H. Shupak; Subject: Data re. Ozu and 
Sekine Investigation (NDL, G-2 00233).
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th e m .1 27 It claimed tha t Sekine's organisation still wielded power 
throughout the Kantô d is tric t, the imprisonment of its boss and 
leading members making lit t le  d iffe rence. "Local gangs were 
ostensib ly reorganised in to commercial cooperatives, such as 
building contractor groups, but the bosses and henchmen in these 
gangs are as closely united as b e f o r e " ^  2 8 .  the artic le  surely 
brought tears to  Shupak's eyes.
The reluctance of the Japanese police to  actively participate in the  
O ccupation 's  drive against crim inal o v a b u n  o rg a n is a t io n s  
contributed to  the campaign's failure. However, there were more 
compelling reasons for the gangs' survival in the face o f the Public 
Safety Division's offensive. Their ascendancy was assured by socio­
economic conditions and political pressures, both beyond the control 
of the police. Bennett and Ishino maintained tha t "the efflorescence 
of ovabun-kobun-like groups during this...period (was) an excellent 
example o f the way the system  arises to  m eet needs fo r  
organisation in Japanese soc ie ty ".^  29 Japan's decisive de feat 
produced an econom ic-social-political vacuum tha t was filled, a t 
least in part, by such organisations as the Street Stall Tradesmen's 
Union. The increasing influence o f men like Ozu re flected  the 
declining authority of the Japanese Government and its agencies, a 
process speeded up by the Occupation’s reforms, particularly its 
purges. Recognising the usefulness of the Tradesmen's Union as an 
instrum ent o f con tro l, the  police chose to  en trus t it  w i th  
adm inistrative authority. They considered improper practices to  be 
of little  consequence, compared with the chaos tha t would ensue in 
the absence of a central coordinating agency. Besides, ovabu n  
sheltered demobilised soldiers and repatriates, often helping them 
to  set up and operate street stalls.^ 20 Costello remarked tha t Ozu’s 
"drives on behalf o f repatriates and ex-soldiers gave him an air o f
^27 ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Service) translation, 1 /3 /4 9  - Item 4: 
"Local Police Powerless Against Gangs" (NDL, GS[B] 02282).
 ^28 Ibid.
T 29 Paternalism in the Japanese Economv. fn.2, p.283.
^20 investigation of Ovabun in Gifu ken. 2 /7 /4 7 ;  To: Eaton; From: Lt. McCarthy. 
Reported that 2 ,500  repatriates with no regular employment were given priority re. 
right to operate a stand; for 8 yen/month electric lights installed and construction needs 
taken care of (NDL, G-2 04564).
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p h i l a n t h r o p y " . 1 3 1  Lawyers defending Ozu at his trial characterised 
him as a man who had risen "in order to  lead the people out of
c o n fu s io n  the police had asked him to  control the (Shinjuku)
d is tr ic t a fte r the war because they were powerless to  do so 
themselves". ‘■32
The continued acquiescence o f the police was secured by the 
benefits th a t they themselves acquired from the system. They 
received monetary g ifts  or goods from o v a b u n .133 som etim es 
employing the same techniques as their benefactors to  extract funds 
from retailers. In an interview with Ortman (ESS), E. M. Arenschield, 
a police investigator, received information concerning a policeman 
who had to ld the proprietor of a new restaurant tha t he could no t 
open his establishment for business. The decision was reversed 
when "friend ly gestures" were made towards members o f the 
policeman’s family (6 ,000 y e n ) .  ^34 Thus, there was a give-and-take 
relationship between the police and o v a b u n . 135 Shupak maintained 
that the former had never been able to  cope with the latter; they had 
"taken the lesser o f two evils and cooperated".^ 36 jh is  much was 
clear from the ir muted reaction to  the many com pla in ts made 
against te k iv a  organisations.  ^37 jh e  Tokyo Shinbun endorsed 
Shupak’s views, declaring tha t "policemen seem to  approve the 
special relationship betweeen gang bosses and their henchmen, (an 
a ttitude tha t) results in the special handling of gang violence cases
by the p o l i c e " . 138
Many in Occupation circles fe lt tha t the reasons behind the po lice ’s 
leniency were more sinister. A t the in te r-sec tiona l conference 
Matsukata, a representative of the Government Section, stated that 
the police and other governmental agencies were not independent
131 W. Costello, Democracy vs. Feudalism, p.125.
132 1 ^ . ,  pp .139-140.
133 Conference in GS (1 2 /9 /4 7 )  p.1 3.
134 Dated 2 0 /5 /4 7  (NDL: G-2 04563).
135 Lt. Col. Petty, Tokyo-Kanagawa MGT, on Oyabun activities (NDL: G-2 04562).
136 Conference in GS (1 2 /9 /4 7 )  p.13 (NDL, G-2 0 4 5 6 2 ).
137 Memo dated 2 9 /5 /4 7 ;  From: H. Shupak; Subject: Conference re. Anti-trust 
Organisations (NDL: G-2 04563).
138 ATIS translation, 1 /3 /4 9 , Item 4: "Local Police Powerless Against Gangs" - Tokyo 
Shinbun. 2 3 /2 /4 9  (NDL, GS[B] 02282).
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organisations, there being "a much bigger network tha t works behind 
the police and the po litica l scene" J 39 Shupak too  sensed a 
conspiracy, asserting tha t "the ovabun have influence far above and 
beyond the police - w ith the governors and other institutions (from  
whom the police take o r d e r s ) " . !  There was plenty o f evidence 
available to  support such contentions. Ozu Kinosuke was "a candidate 
for the Diet on a Liberal Party ticket, and was defeated only by a 
very small m a r g i n " . ! Rumours tha t he contributed large sums of 
money to  the party tha t adopted him and bought votes during his 
campaign were surely w e l l - f o u n d e d . ! ^2 | n  Kobe, it was reported that 
lhara, advisor to  the s tree t sta ll association and Liberal Party 
candidate, was e lected to  the A s s e m b l y . ! ^ 3  i n  his report o f 
September, 1947, Fritz described a web of alliances between ovabun 
and political parties in Osaka, one of which favoured a prospective 
prefectural g o v e r n o r . ! 4 4  Hitomatsu, Welfare Minister and member of 
the Liberal Party, was found to  have ties w ith a large q u re n ta i 
association ( Naniwa Shôkai) in O s a k a . !  45 in Gifu p re fectu re  Hori 
Yoshisuke, a member of both the prefectural assembly and the city 
council, "con tro lled " the Road Stall Keepers' A s s o c i a t i o n . !  4 6  
Presumably his unofficia l capacity was more profitab le than his 
offic ia l one.
Conservative politicians and criminal ovabun were both profiting 
from prevailing socio-economic conditions and the exigencies of an 
indirect Occupation. Collett (ESS) claimed tha t whenever there was 
an e ffec tive  campaign against black market operations in th e  
construction industry, reactions were immediate and came from 
peculiar sources - from political in te rests  seemingly unconnected 
with construction.!47 Ovabun funds were funnelled into the political
!39  Conference in GS (1 2 /9 /4 7 )  p.14.
!4 0  Ibid.. p.13.
! 41 The intelligence Series. Volume 9, Appendix 15: W. Fritz, "Investigation of the 
Oyabun (Boss) System" (1 5 /9 /4 7 ) ,  p.8.
!42 Ibid.
!43  Ibid.. p. 10.
!44  Ibid.. pp. 2-3.
! 45 Comments by Harry Shupak (NDL, G-2 04564).
! 46 Investigation of Oyabun in Gifu ken. 2 /7 /4 7 ;  To: Eaton; From: Lt. McCarthy (G-2 
0 4 5 6 4 )
147 Conference in GS, 1 2 /9 /4 7 , p. 14 (G-2 04562).
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parties, which were always willing to  assist the political passage 
o f anyone endowed with wealth or influence. As for the Japanese 
police, the political parties and criminal ovabun could offer them 
far more than the Occupation or the Japanese people. Consistently 
the la tte r lost out, whilst conservative elements consolidated their 
hold on Japan’s economic and politica l in s titu tion s . The Legal 
Section’s representative at the in te r-sectiona l conference, Mr. 
Carrington, clearly understood the nature o f the problem. He 
declared tha t "an attack (on the ovabun-kobun system ) cannot 
succeed w ithout the Japanese Government's active i n v o l v e m e n t " . ^48 
It was inconceivable, given the wealth, influence and po litica l 
connections o f such men as Ozu, tha t the Japanese Government 
would pay any more than lip service to  the Occupation’s demands. 
Profits made on the black m arket lubricated the machine of 
government. One component in particular - the police - increasingly 
disregarded the sources of its income.
"Voluntarv" Contributions
In late 1 946 the Occupation authorities happened upon a system of 
local government finance, which seemed to  represent both a source 
of corruption and a threat to  personal liberty. The Japanese public, 
either voluntarily or under duress, was contributing to  the costs o f 
local adm inistration, particularly those o f education and policing, 
other than by taxation. Officials charged w ith investigating th is 
"fea ture  o f fiscal im p ro v is a t io n " ' ' "^ 9 found th a t m ethods and 
practices were diverse, although there was a universal tendency to  
conceal the pa tte rn  o f expenditure. Reports from  Occupation 
personnel increasingly focused on tw o issues: the co n trib u to rs ' 
motives - did they have any choice in the m atter, and if so, what 
were they hoping to  buy with the ir money?; secondly, the true 
beneficiaries of the system - the community as a whole or those 
w ith illic it sources o f income to  pro tect?  The bureaucratic fog 
encountered by those seeking answers to  these questions arose from
Ibid.. p.20.
T"^ 9 History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan. Monograph 55 
(Police and Public Safety) p. 102.
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the absence o f both a legal fram ew ork and a system  o f  
accountability for contributions at national level.
In September, 1946, a unit o f the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) 
drew a tten tion  to  the Kyoto Prefecture Public Peace Society, 
discovered by accident during an investigation o f Usui Yoshio, 
Director o f the Daiwa Industrial Company.^ so jh e  aim of the society, 
which included all police officials in the prefecture and boasted a 
to ta l membership of about 2,500, was " to  improve the financial 
s ta tus o f p o l i c e m e n . . . " . !  S I  Hinomoto Kiyoshi, chief o f the Nishi 
Maizuru police station, had appointed one of his subordinates to  
collect contributions on behalf o f the society, the firs t campaign 
benefittng from the support of ten large firms and netting a tota l of
21,000 yen. Donations were later d istributed to  all police stations 
in Kyoto prefecture, each individual policeman receiving about 200 
yen. A t the time of the CIC detachm ent's investigations, another 
drive to  raise funds had attracted 17,400 yen, all o f which had been 
donated by businesses such as the Daiwa Industrial Company. Further 
financial backing to  the tune o f 28,000 yen was provided by the 
Police Welfare Association, headed by Hinomoto - another police 
supporters’ organisation uncovered by counter-intelligence agents in 
the Kyoto area. This time the intention was to  provide funds for the 
repair of police buildings and vehicles.! 52 The investigators' concern 
derived from the Occupation’s ignorance of these support networks - 
there was as yet no mention of improper practices.
An article in Akahata. the Communist Party’s newspaper, concerning 
amongst other things the acceptance of bribes by the police, caused 
Pulliam to  take action against the collection o f contributions. A 
memo was sent to  the Director General o f the Home M inistry's 
Bureau o f Public Safety, in which Pulliam quoted the follow ing 
accusation levelled against the police :
! ^0 CIC Area No.10, report dated 2 5 /9 /4 6 ; Subject: Establishment of Kyoto Prefectural 
Public Peace Society (G-2 00239).
!  ^! Ibid.
! 52 Ibid. All information concerning these support associations and the sums collected 
comes from the CIC unit's report.
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Recently a certain Yasunaga, and other officers of Toyonashi Stall 
Keepers' Association in Shizuoka ken, invited the chief of police and 
subordinates to a feast and presented them with more than 40 ,000  yen, 
forcibly collected from stall-keepers by bosses. The Government and the 
prefectural chief of police are aware of the incident but have made no
attempts to investigate.^ 3^
The chief o f the Public Safety Division followed up the quotation 
w ith the sta tem ent tha t there was "constant critic ism  o f police 
forces arising from the collection of con tribu tions", necessitating 
immediate action by the Japanese Government. These financial 
exactions, according to  Akahata. were obtained by tek iva  bosses. 
A ppa ren tly  s ta ll keepers were being forced to  help fund 
governmental agencies tha t accorded them little  respect, preferring 
to  pro tect those who oppressed them. Private financial backing of 
this sort tes tified  to  the symbiotic relationship between the police 
and organisations engaged in illegal activ ities. The police were 
financed by the very interests tha t the Occupation was d irec tin g  
them to  eradicate.
In December, 1946, presumably by way o f response to  Pulliam's 
reprimand, the Home M inister requested the form ation o f a 
committee to  study the phenomenon of "police contributions". Early 
the follow ing year, various police forces were investigated - in 
Tokyo, and in Shizuoka, Kanagawa, Yamanashi, Chiba, Saitama and 
Gunma p r e f e c t u r e s .  1 ^ 4  Meanwhile the situation in and around Kyoto 
continued to  be monitored by military government officials. Major H. 
B. Taylor contrasted prewar contributions, "accepted" from persons 
residing w ith in  the  locale, w ith  th e ir postw ar coun te rparts , 
"apparently solicited from large, well-to-do o rg an isa tion s".^55 jh e  
police now sought support from wealthy associations rather than 
the general public, the new pattern o f fundraising re flecting the 
concentration o f power, financial and political, in the hands of a 
few. Taylor recommended tha t "no action be taken toward the
T 53 Memo dated 2 1 /1 1 /4 6 ; Subject: "Police still Adhere to Undemocratic Methods". 
1 3 /1 1 /4 6  issue of Akahata contained these accusations (NDL, G-2 00237).
T 54 4 / 3 /4 7  _ Subject: Police Contribution Report; To Lt. Col. J. A. Benton, Executive 
Officer, PSD; From: Byron Engle, Acting Chief Police Administrator (NDL, G-2 0 0 2 3 9 /  
0 0 2 4 0 )
^55 hQ I Corps (Kyoto, Honshu); Report dated 1 0 /2 /4 7 ; Subject: Police Societies; To: 
Commanding General, 8th Army (NDL, G-2 00239 )
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dissolution of such organisations until the underlying causes (o f 
the ir pervasiveness) are r e m o v e d " . 1 5 6  His balanced assessment of 
the problem exemplified the common sense and pragmatism of many 
of those working in the fie ld:''5^
While such a situation might result in favouritism and partiality on the 
part of the police towards contributors, to outlaw such organisations with 
prominent political figures as officers might open the entire situation to 
even greater graft and c o r r u p t i o n
That there was already "g ra ft and co rru p tio n " clearly was 
indisputable, as far as Taylor was concerned. The recipient o f his 
correspondence inform ed GHQ th a t police s ta tions in Kyoto 
prefecture had collected more than 5,600,000 yen in two campaigns 
during 1946.^59 in addition, it was noted tha t the titu la r head of the 
Kyoto Prefectural Public Peace Society, so active in the fundraising 
e ffo rt, was the prefectural g o v e r n o r . 16 0  Prominent political figures 
apparently approved o f the work o f these extra-governm ental 
o rg a n isa tio n s , presum ably because th e y  had reached an 
accommodation with those in control. 8th Army HQ recommended 
that police societies, if perm itted to  exist, be s tric tly  regulated and 
controlled by the Japanese G o v e rn m e n t.T h is  was a more tolerant 
response to  the problem than tha t o f GHQ, which nine days earlier 
had informed the Commanding General, 8th Army, tha t "the practice 
of receiving contributions in any form by the police is undesirable 
and will be discontinued".^ 62 jh is  decisive statem ent o f in tent was 
qualified im m ediately by the proposal " to  d irect the Japanese 
Government to  deal w ith  the prob lem ".^63 Such delegation o f
156 Ibid.
15^ In many ways they represented an unused asset, more often than not their opinions 
being ignored.
158 h q  I Corps (Kyoto, Honshu); Report dated 1 0 /2 /4 7 ; Subject: Police Societies; To: 
Commanding General, 8th Army (NDL, G-2 00239 )
159 h q  8th Army, 1 9 /2 /4 7 ; To: SCAP; From: R. Schafer, Asst. Adjutant General; 
Subject: Kyoto Prefectural Public Peace Society (NDL, G-2 00239).
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
162 GHQ, SCAP, 1 0 /2 /4 7 ; From: R. M. Levy, Adjutant General. It was recommended that 
the operating costs of the police be paid from a system of legal taxation (NDL, G-2 
0 0 2 3 8 ) .
1 63 Ibid.
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responsibility reflected the ambivalent a ttitude  of many American 
officials regarding private financial provision.
Often it was more important to  make the right noises than to  take 
the appropriate action. Many appraisals of the Occupation were 
based on the views o f leading o ffic ia ls  and the  leg is la tive  
programmes they had s p a w n e d . 1 ^ 4  Frequently the reform ers' aims 
and ambitions were emphasized to  such an extent tha t the actual 
impact o f a given reform was seldom properly investigated. In the 
case of contributions it was enough to  order, as Pulliam himself did 
in May o f 1947, tha t all those "a ffecting  police, fire and prison 
activities be discontinued im m edia te ly".^ 65 jh e  recom m endations 
tha t followed this statem ent somewhat softened its impact. PSD 
was to  d irect "the  Home and Justice M inisters to  issue the  
necessary i n s t r u c t i o n s " P u W i a m  gave no hints as to  what these 
were, because, not surprisingly, the problem itse lf in te rested  him 
more than its solution . Finally he called on both the  Japanese 
Government and responsible sections of SCAP "to  revise the entire 
tax structure and budget system" in order to  ensure tha t the costs o f 
local and national governm ent were legally and dem ocratica lly 
f i n a n c e d . 1 6 7  There would have been no mention of the need for such 
wide-ranging reform if it  had fallen within the ju risd iction o f the 
PSD. Pulliam must have known th a t none o f the sections had 
suffic ient resources to  overhaul the entire fiscal s tructure  in the 
context o f an ongoing Occupation. However, he could not condone a 
system th a t he had characterised as in just and "inim ical to  the 
interests of a free people and a democratic g o v e r n m e n t " . !  6 8
In a lengthy memorandum on police contributions, Pulliam disclosed 
that there was no system of accountability for contributed funds, 
and no legal sanction for the ir solic ita tion or regulation by local
1 64 eg. Government Section, Political Reorientation of Japan ; J. Williams, Japan’s 
Political Revolution under MacArthur: a Participant’s Account (University of Georgia 
Press, Athens, 1979).
165 Memo dated 6 /5 /4 7 ;  Thru; Deputy-chief, CIS/G-2; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G- 
2; From: H. E. Pulliam, head of PSD; Subject: Police Contributions (NDL, G-2 00238).
166 Ibid.
1 6 / Ibid.
168 Ibid,
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adm in istrations J  The police supporters' organisations decided on
the amounts to  be collected from each person, sometimes forcing 
prospective contributors to  submit the a llo tted sum. According to  
Pulliam, there was sufficient evidence to  indicate tha t "p ra c tica lly  
all so lic ited con tribu tions were obtained under some form  o f 
duress". They were exacted from those who could not afford them, 
but also from those who definitely could - "Businessmen engaged in 
black market activities were afraid to  refuse exorbitant demands". 
Still, it seems more likely tha t prom inent black marketeers were 
voluntary donors, considering freedom from police interference to  
be a luxury worth paying for. Presumably, the chiefs of police in 
Shizuoka pre fecture  were not the only ones to  be la v is h ly  
entertained by their benefactors, there being no be tte r indicator of 
social standing than ready access to  supplies of good food. High- 
ranking police officials retained control o f the money they received, 
accounting to  no one for the manner in which it was spent. For 
example, "Asakusa d istrict chief o f police retained about 1 7,000 yen 
to be disbursed at his own discretion". In Hyôgo prefecture, "the  
chief of police of Okashi had at his disposal 187,413 yen in a bank, 
w ith the power to  w ithdraw any amount at any tim e". Whilst 
examination o f records indicated amounts withdrawn, there was no 
account o f what the money had purchased. In Saitama prefecture 
Malburg and Fujii, PSD police investigators, were told tha t revenue 
from contributions was put to  good use - the purchase and repair of 
equipment, rewards, public information posters, and assistance to  
ill/in ju red  police o ffice rs .i However, Malburg, noting tha t "no 
im partia l group accounts fo r the  money or expend itu res", 
recommended tha t "all statements made to  the investigators should 
be verified". i
Pulliam argued tha t the implications o f private financial support for 
such agencies as the police dictated tha t the system be abolished. 
His co lleagues, how ever, cons idered  the  e lim in a tio n  o f 
supplem entary funds to  be more dangerous than a q u a lif ie d
T 69 Ibid. Pulliam’s memo of 6 /5 /4 7  is the source for the remainder of this paragraph 
(except where stated otherwise).
T ^6 Report (undated); To: W. C. Gabrielson, administrator; Subject: Collection of Funds, 
Saitama ken police (NDL, G-2 00240).
T I b i d .
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acceptance of contributions as a valid method of fundraising. Major 
Taylor’s position was the one tha t most officials advocated. The 
deputy chief o f the Civil Intelligence Section, R. S. B ra tton , 
maintained tha t police societies should not be dissolved until the ir 
raison d’etre was properly appreciated, Believing tha t "the police 
force may not be capable of supporting its e lf w ithou t additional 
f u n d s " , ! ^ 3  Bratton advised against hasty eradication o f fundra ising 
organisations.
The Occupation authorities resolved the problem of contributions by 
belittling it. They were willing to  accept the reassuring statem ents 
of the Home Ministry's investigatory com m ittee set up in December, 
1946. Arguing tha t contributions were necessary to  ensure an 
effective police force, in terms of both equipment and morale, the 
com m ittee convinced the officials concerned tha t their inaction was 
Justified. Its report adm itted tha t "all expenses fo r police work 
should be paid from officia l funds", but reliance on contributions 
derived from "the poor state o f local financial p r o v i s i o n " . !  Extra 
funds helped pay for improved equipment, ensuring an e ffec tive  
response to  criminal a c t i v i t i e s . !  ^ 5  W ithout public donations, the 
committee argued, policemen would be so preoccupied with the daily 
struggle for survival amid "skyrocketing" prices tha t they would be 
unable to  do their Job properly: "the authorities concerned are trying 
to  improve living conditions...so tha t all police personnel work at 
the ir best w ithou t worries".! Reminding those in GHQ th a t "the 
duty o f maintaining social order rests solely on the shoulders of 
policemen", the committee declared tha t "the people desire to  have a 
strong and fair police....(and) are ready to give financial aid " . ! ^ ^ l t  
followed tha t the collection of contributions from the people was 
"very natural", but, in case the Occupation authorities were still
!^2  Memo dated 1 7 /5 /4 7 ; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Subject: Contribution 
Solicitation by Japanese Police Societies (NDL, G-2 00238).
!^3 2 0 /3 /4 7  - Letter to Assistant Chief of Staff; Subject: Contribution Solicitation by 
Japanese Police Societies (NDL: G-2 00239).
! Memo dated 4 /3 /4 7 ;  To: Lt. Col. J. A. Benton, Executive Officer PSD; From: Byron 
Engle, Acting Chief Police Administrator; Subject: Police Contribution Report (NDL, G- 
2 0 0240 ).
! ^^ Ibid.
!^6  Ibid.
! Ibid.
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concerned, the com m ittee assured them tha t it  was "a temporary 
p h e n o m e n o n " . 1^8 it was true that the to ta l value of contributed funds 
was much higher than before, but th is  was because o f "the  
decreasing value o f money, the reconstruction of police equipm ent 
and the necessity for supporting policemen who are suffering from 
the high prices o f co m m o d itie s ".^^9 jh e  com m ittee concluded its 
report w ith proposals tha t sought to  eliminate compulsion, namely 
the removal o f contributions from police control and the prohibition 
of their active participation in soliciting such funds.180
The Japanese Government’s recommendations were taken seriously, 
and it was generally accepted tha t new regulations were su ffic ie n t 
to  prevent abuses of the system. Byron Engle, acting chief police 
administrator, declared tha t the committee had gone "a long way in 
making an undesirable practice, which they feel must continue at 
this time, as unobjectionable as p o s s i b l e " . i8 i Thus, he recommended 
tha t " t a c i t  approval be given to  (the  Japanese Government’s) 
p r o g r a m m e " . !  82 Nobody wanted to  endorse openly the com m ittee ’s 
recommendations, because they suspected tha t they were designed 
merely to  reassure those in Occupation circles. Engle was aware of 
the risks he was taking by praising the report. He stated tha t the 
solicitation of contributions in any form was undesirable, especially 
in the case of police work, when it was "certain to  bring accusations 
of, if not actual, favouritism in law e n fo rce m e n t".!83 jh e  problem of 
bias, which dented the police’s image in the community and impaired 
the ir e ffectiveness, was even more acute where black market 
a c tiv it ie s  f l o u r i s h e d . !  84 Neverthe less, Byron con tinued , the  
contributions system had deep historical roots, and was o f vital 
importance in the context of the early Occupation:
! ^ 8 Ibid.
! ^9 Ibid.
! 80 Memo dated 4 /3 /4 7 ;  To: Lt. Col. J. A. Benton, Executive Officer PSD; From: Byron 
Engle, Acting Chief Police Administrator; Subject: Police Contribution Report (NDL, G- 
2 0 0239 ).
! 81 Ibid.
!82 Ibid.
! 83 Ibid.
! 84 Ibid.
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To prohibit it at this time of extreme fluctuation of the yen would 
seriously handicap the police, especially in many phases of 
reconstruction of partially-destroyed stations, construction of new 
detention cells and many other necessary p r o j e c t s . . . . ^
The Occupation authorities classified the moneys received by local 
police forces according to the proposed object of expenditure, 
usually "police buildings" or "welfare fa c ilitie s ". Figure 1 1 
illustrates the sums collected and spent from January to December 
1946 by the prefectural police departments, police stations and the 
Metropolitan Police Board. It is interesting that substantial amounts 
remained unspent at the end of the year, suggesting that not all 
moneys were immediately absorbed by construction and welfare 
schemes. It is safe to assume that chiefs of police controlled these 
funds, probably using them as personal expense accounts. Afterall, it 
was necessary to ply both Occupation personnel and influential 
Japanese with food and drink to ensure continued cooperation.
Breakdown o f Police C ontributions:
January - December 1946
Millions 25 ■
Received Amount
Outgoings
Balance
Prefectural
Police
Police
Station
Police
Station
Metropolitan 
Police Board
department (building) (w elfare)
Figure 1 1
Source: Table of Police Contributions, January-December 1946 
(NDL, G-2 00240)
^ I b i d .
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As has been s ta ted , PSD o ffic ia ls  accepted the J a p a n e s e  
Government’s assurances tha t properly regulated contributions were 
harmless. Concentrating on the system 's threat to  personal liberty, 
they insisted tha t no police supporters' association "be composed of 
any but vo lun te e r m e m b e r s " . The likelihood o f bribery and 
corruption ceased to  preoccupy those in GHQ, although this was not 
true of many ordinary Japanese. Commenting on the situation in the 
K yoto area in December, 1948, Frank Kowalski, a m ilita ry  
government official, stated tha t "many (people) see little  necessity 
for...(police supporters') associations and are inclined to  take the 
view tha t they contribute only to  banding together o f police and 
b o s s e s . . . " . 1 8 7  He enclosed the articles o f organisation of Nakatachiuri 
Public Peace Association and those of the Kyoto City Federation, 
which conjured up images o f atrocious crimes and rampant black 
market operations in order to  encourage public support for the 
police. Both Eaton and Pulliam, whose misgivings seem to  have 
disappeared by th is tim e, maintained th a t "p roperly  operated 
voluntary associations" would guard against collusion between 
police and bosses. 188 All those concerned now acknowledged tha t 
the police would be fu rth e r enfeebled by the  abo lition  o f 
contributions, and tha t such action would compound, rather than 
solve, the problem of bribery.
Ultimately, the Occupation authorities were forced to  condone the 
solic ita tion o f contributions, knowing full well tha t the ir approval 
contradicted reforms concerned with civil liberties and democratic, 
responsible local government. With regard to  the la tte r, it was 
surely clear, given the importance o f "ob liga tion" in Japanese 
society, tha t an organisation tha t voluntarily donated large sums of 
money to  the police would be accorded preferential treatm ent. For 
example, the g ift of a new official residence worth 1,650,000 yen -
186 Memo to Pulliam, dated 2 2 /1 2 /4 8 ;  From; Eaton; Subject: Nakatachiuri Public 
Peace Association and Kyoto City federation of Public Peace Associations (NDL, G-2 
0 0 2 5 0 ) .
187 Kyoto MGT, 8 /1 2 /4 8 ;  Subject: Public Peace Associations; Thru: Commanding 
Officer, Kinki MG region; To: Commanding General, 8th Army (NDL, G-2 00250).
188 Memo to Pulliam, dated 2 2 /1 2 /4 8 ;  From: Eaton; Subject: Nakatachiuri Public 
Peace Association and Kyoto City federation of Public Peace Associations (NDL, G-2 
0 0 2 5 0 ) .
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the police chief in Sakamoto, Kumamoto prefecture, was the lucky 
beneficiary - must have immunized the donors (they were gangsters) 
against prosecution.189 in 1949 a scandal in Honjo, sixty miles north 
of Tokyo, demonstrated tha t contributions were still being exacted 
from ordinary Japanese by unscrupulous organisations. Three million 
yen had been rapidly collected by the Police Supporters' Society, the 
head of which had a record of five convictions for gambling and had 
served a six month prison term .i^o
When American officials firs t became aware of contributions, they 
called for their replacement by a system of public taxation, properly 
regu la ted by governm ent o ffic ia ls . Realising th a t th is  was 
impossible due to  the scale of the operation, the Public S a fe ty  
Division neutralised the issue by suggesting tha t private fundraising 
activities be reformed. Providing tha t participation was voluntary, 
the collection of contributions would be perm itted  to  continue. 
Finding no solution to  the problem and not willing to  take on the 
burden of financial support, the Occupation decided to  monitor the 
system to  ensure tha t nobody was being compelled to  submit sums 
of money they could not afford. Knowing the answers to  the two 
questions posed at the beginning of this section - tha t most people 
were forced to  contribute and tha t donations often bought immunity 
from prosecution - PSD decided to  defer action against such 
practices until the tim e was ripe. i9 i It never was, mainly because 
the problem of contributions, like that of the ovabun-kobun system, 
had deep roots in Japanese society and was impossible to  tackle in 
the context o f an ongoing Occupation. Regular sh ifts  o f focus 
frequently  le ft reform  programmes inadequate ly  im p lem ented. 
Pulliam and his colleagues fell in to  line behind the Japanese 
Government, because they lacked the necessary resources, human 
and financial, to  take an independent stand.
189 Wildes, Typhoon in Tokyo, p. 188.
180 SCAP, History of the Non-Military Actiyities of the Occupation of Japan. Monograph 
55 (Police and Public Safety) p . l03. It was estimated that around 5,000 families had 
each "contributed" about ¥600.
18 1 Memo to Pulliam, dated 2 2 /1 2 /4 8 ;  From: Eaton; Subject: Nakatachiuri Public 
Peace Association and Kyoto City federation of Public Peace Associations (NDL, G-2 
0 0 2 5 0 ) .
180
The Tale o f Suzuki Eiii. Osaka Police Chief
This is the story o f an atypical police chief, who threw in his lot 
w ith the Occupation authorities and incurred the wrath o f th e  
Japanese establishment as a result. The lengths to  which black 
marketeers and Liberal Party politicians went in their a ttem pts to  
unseat him te s tify  to  the ir common in te res ts . Describing the 
powerful opposition tha t mounted against Suzuki, this short section 
goes some way to  explain the police's reluctance to  cooperate with 
the Americans. Most police chiefs considered Japanese politicians 
and prominent ovabun to  be surer guarantors o f their survival than 
the Occupation authorities. Osaka’s chief o f police clearly thought 
otherwise. As a result Eaton held him in high regard: "Suzuki of 
Osaka is the only Japanese official I have met who thinks like an 
American....he has been outspoken about many Japanese customs and
tricks".T 92
The s to ry  begins in April, 1947, w ith  the transm ission of a 
statem ent by Suzuki to  Major Burnett, the 25th Infantry Division’s 
Provost Marshal, in which he outlined a plot to  secure his transfer 
from Osaka prefecture.^ 93 jvvo parallel conspiracies, both m otivated 
by the need to  maintain the status quo, were endeavouring to  topple 
him from  his position o f power. Following his tra n s fe r from  
Hiroshima p re fec tu re  to  Osaka in July, 1946, Suzuki had 
concentrated on improving the system o f economic regulation. The 
following month, with the approval o f the Provost Marshal and Osaka 
m ilitary government team, he ordered the removal o f all shacks and 
stalls constructed on illegally-occupied land. When a nationwide 
campaign was launched against black marketeers in the firs t week 
o f February, 1947, Suzuki participated with such enthusiasm tha t 
those under threat decided to  strengthen their position. There was 
an election due for the prefectural governorship, and candidates of a 
conservative persuasion were approached and warned tha t Suzuki’s 
harsh policies were playing into the hands o f the socialists. His
T 92 Letter to Lt. Col. R. T. Battey; From: H. S. Eaton; Subject: Autonomous Entity 
Financial Autonomy (NDL, G-2 00257).
T 93 Office of Provost Marshal, HQ 25th Infantry Division, 2 6 /4 /4 7 ;  Subject: 
Transmittal of Statement by Osaka Prefectural Police Chief; To: Commanding General, 
GHQ FEC (NDL, G-2 00232). This is the source for all information concerning the plot 
to secure Suzuki’s transfer in 1 947.
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determ ination to  eliminate illegitim ate channels o f commerce was 
e ffec tive ly  stemming the illegal transport o f rice, thus cau s in g  
black market prices to  reach exorbitant levels.
Black marketeers approached Akama Bunzô, then running fo r th e  
governorship o f Osaka on a Liberal Party ticket, and requested the 
urgent removal o f Suzuki, w ithou t whom the anti-b lack m arket 
campaign would lose its impetus. The governor at the tim e, one 
Tanaka Kôtarô, was forced to  withdraw from the election due to  his 
falling under the provisions of the purge directive. Determined to  
retain some o f his form er power, Tanaka surrep titious ly  took 
command o f Akama’s campaign. The former's influence w ith Uehara 
E tsujiro, the M inister fo r Home A ffa irs , caused those m ost 
threatened by Suzuki’s drive against the black market to  seek his 
support. Tanaka was informed tha t the police chief’s actions were 
playing into the hands of the Socialist Party. It was in the in te re s t 
o f both parties - conservative politicians and black m arketeers 
alike - to  get rid of Suzuki. They were united in their opposition to  
the Socialist Party's programme of s tr ic t economic regulation. The 
police chief was requested to  tone down his policies, so as to  
prevent socia list successes in the coming election, bu t was 
uncooperative. He explained to  Tanaka tha t he was above party 
rivalries and had no intention o f diluting his campaign against the 
black market. The incumbent governor, certain tha t Suzuki’s removal 
would guard against the defeat of Liberal candidates, successfully 
sought cabinet approval for a plan to  appoint him Director o f the 
Commerce and Industry Bureau (Northeastern d is tr ic t) . Tanaka 
informed Akama by le tte r, stating th a t an offic ia l announcement 
would be made around 15 April (1947).
Meanwhile, o ther prom inent figures were pressing for Suzuki’s 
removal. Go Hyakufuku, a Formosan black marketeer who the Osaka 
authorities were trying to  expose, allied himself w ith a well-known 
political boss in Tokyo. Despite his being held under house arrest as 
a war crimes suspect, Kuhara Fusanosuke proved an extrem ely
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effective manipulator on Go's b e h a l f J  9 4  He convinced the Minister 
for Home Affairs tha t Suzuki’s drive against the black market in 
Osaka was setting dangerous precedents tha t would damage the 
Liberal Party’s political prospects. The Socialist Party aimed to  
establish a regime of central economic control, the initial stages of 
which were the eradication of the black market and the promotion of 
properly regulated channels of commerce. Such developments were 
anathema to  the business and financial interests represented by the 
Liberal Party. Kuhara on several occasions dispatched one Tanaka 
Tatsuo, prospective governor o f Yamaguchi prefecture, to  discuss 
the situation with the Minister for Home Affairs, his deputy, and the 
head of the Police Affairs Bureau (Tanaka Naraichi). The la tte r 
encouraged Suzuki to  bring his campaign to  a sw ift conclusion, 
warning him of the opposition in government circles incited by his 
actions. It was made clear tha t "his investigations did not please 
the Minister for Home Affairs". A spokesman for Tanaka Tatsuo and 
Kuhara was then sent to  Osaka to  explain that "Go was no rogue and 
was a very useful man for Sino-Japanese am ity". Suzuki was handed 
Tanaka Naraichi's name card, and was strongly urged to  discontinue 
his investigation.
In his sta tem ent Suzuki accused those who campaigned on Go’s 
behalf o f accepting bribes, describing the political machinations 
surrounding his projected transfer as a "black market dealing in 
personnel affa irs". His drives against illegal commercial operations 
in Osaka caused ripples that spread to  Tokyo, to  the very core of the 
Japanese Governm ent. The opposition aroused by Suzuki’s 
com m itm ent to  fa ir and equ itab le  d is tr ib u tio n  o f scarce 
commodities illustrates the establishm ent's fear o f the financia l 
and political repercussions of direct control of the economy from 
the centre. As far as the Liberals were concerned. Go was an 
entrepreneur rather than a criminal, a businessman whose political 
views fortunate ly coincided with their own. They provided him with 
the kind of economic environment in which he could prosper, and he 
was generous with the money he made. The respect accorded Suzuki
T 94 Kuhara had an impressive track record in business and politics. He founded Nissan 
at the beginning of the Taishô period, became Minister of Communications in 1928 and 
financially supported the young officers in the February 26th Incident, 1936.
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by American forces in Osaka ensured tha t he remained at his post 
th roughout 1947, although his opponents continued to  plot his 
dow nfa ll.
In May, 1948, more than one year after the initial a ttem pt to  secure 
his removal, Suzuki Eiji was accused of "adm inister(ing) his office 
in a d ic ta toria l, illegal manner and o f m isappropriating police 
welfare f u n d s " . The anonymous le tte r containing the charges was 
addressed to  General MacArthur, and claimed tha t the police chief 
was "w inn ing ....the  favour o f higher o ffic ia ls o f local m ilitary 
government, m ilitary police and Civil Intelligence Section through 
women and liquor".196 Apparently funds earmarked for w e lfa re  
expenses were being used to  en terta in  high offic ia ls o f the 
Occupation (around 80,000-1 50,000 yen /m on th ). 197 The le tte r 's  
authors referred to  Suzuki’s "political inclinations", stating tha t he 
claimed to  be a Socialist Party member, tha t he used his position to  
oppress the Democratic Liberal Party and tha t he played a major 
part in the impeachment of the former prefectural governor, Tanaka 
Kôtarô, and was now in conflict with his successor, Akama B u n z ô .  ^9 8  
Such comments betrayed the identity o f Suzuki’s accusers. Pulliam, 
with some justification, believed the le tte r to  be "the handiwork of 
Tanaka M anitsu ’’ 99, Tanaka Kôtarô, Kuhara Fusanosuke and Go 
Hyakufuku - all malcontents, principally o f the Liberal Party, who 
had failed in the April 1947 election".zoo He maintained tha t the 
le tte r was "part o f the Liberal Party’s political propaganda line, in 
consonance w ith other political party manoeuvres,....to stage a 
comeback in the Osaka area", zoi Investigations revealed tha t th e  
accusations against Suzuki were not only groundless but a lso
T 95 Comments on Anonymous Letter re. Osaka Police System, 2 7 /5 /4 8 ;  To: Lt. Col. 
Battey; From: Pulliam (NDL, G-2 00246 ).
T 96 Military Intelligence Section, ATIS: Full Translation of Letter Alleging Corruption of 
Osaka Police System led by Suzuki Eiji (NDL, G-2 00246).
 ^97 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 A Liberal Party member, and former Minister of State in the Yoshida cabinet, he 
was involved in the 4 /1 9 4 7  plot to unseat Suzuki.
ZOO Comments on Anonymous Letter re. Osaka Police System, 2 7 /5 /4 8 ;  To: Lt. Col. 
Battey; From: Pulliam (NDL, G-2 00246).
ZOl Ibid.
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malicious, m otiva ted  purely by p o litica l exped iency. 2 0 2  j h e  
conspirators once again failed to  discredit Osaka's police chief, the 
principal reason being his positive a ttitu d e  towards Occupation 
personnel. All spoke "very highly of Suzuki's in tegrity  and efficiency 
as a law enforcem ent executive and....s tressed his com ple te  
cooperation w ith ...forces in the Osaka area". 203  jh is , more th a n  
anything else, protected him from the barrage of accusations.
The tale o f Suzuki Eiji is a f it t in g  postscrip t to  th is  chapter. 
Throughout the main contention has been tha t the Japanese police 
served the old guard - those associated w ith  the financ ia l/ 
po litica l/econom ic organisations o f prew ar/w artim e Japan. They 
colluded w ith hoarders o f m ilitary supplies, black marketeers and 
criminal o va b u n . m otivated by a sense o f the ir traditional role in 
Japanese society and, more im portantly, by the ir own economic 
privations; the la tte r reinforced the former. Although the evidence 
for all th is is largely circumstantial, it is clear tha t the loyalties 
of the police did not lie with the Japanese people as the Occupation 
authorities intended. As has been suggested, the establishment was 
seen as the best guarantor of the police's future. Suzuki Eiji is the 
exception tha t proves the rule. The pressures tha t built up against 
him could only have been w ithstood by someone who combined the  
courage of his convictions with excellent connections in Occupation 
circles. Suzuki seems to  have been the only police chief who could 
boast such a ttributes . 204
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 Suzuki resigned as Osaka police chief in October, 1951, following the failure of 
a defamation suit. His parting comment - "I have been very stubborn" - was as 
memorable as his period of office.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ALLIES OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
This chapter draws on a lim ited number o f secondary sources, 
principally accounts by journa lis ts  and m ilita ry  go ve rn m e n t 
officials. Japan Diary by Mark Gayn, a correspondent for the Chicago 
Sun, figures prominently, together w ith Kakemono by Honor Tracy, 
employed by the Manchester Guardian, and Robert Textor's critique 
entitled  Failure in Japan. The la tte r focuses on the Occupation's 
lim ita tions, its failings, whereas the works o f Ralph Braibanti, 
another m ilitary government official, tend to  adopt a more balanced 
perspective. Gayn and Texto r had high expecta tions o f th e  
Occupation, Judging it according to  the realisation o f radical 
reforms described in the Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan. 
Both were aware of developments in the field, and were principally 
concerned w ith the implementation o f reform. Textor re c e n tly  
adm itted tha t he expected too much of the Occupation,i a charge 
tha t could equally be levelled at Gayn. Japan Diary has been 
described as the "Japanese le ft is t in te llec tua l's  bible on the 
O c c u p a t io n " ,2 and certa in ly some o f its  claims are e ithe r 
exaggerated or premature; Kazuo Kawai remarked tha t it is "perhaps 
the m ost in te res ting  but also the  m ost un re liab le ...o f the 
Jo u rna lis tic  w o rk s " .3 As for Honor Tracy, she regarded the 
Occupation as a misguided venture from the start, and was only too 
happy to  confirm her suspicions by travelling around the country. 
Nevertheiss, Tracy, Textor, Gayn and Braibanti all had a sense o f the 
Occupation in the round. For this reason, their works are valuable to  
the historian. Besides, sources tha t elucidate the Occupation's local 
dimension are scarce. Obviously m ilitary government officials could 
not bare their souls in reports to  higher authority.
As early as December, 1945, Mark Gayn voiced the anxieties o f those 
charged with monitoring the implementation o f SCAP directives. He
 ^ R. Textor, "Success in Japan - Despite Some Human Foibles and Cultural Problems", 
in W. Nimmo, ed.. The Occupation of Japan: The Grass Roots (MacArthur Memorial, 
Norfolk, Va., 1992) p.l 71.
2 T. Cohen, Remaking Japan, p.64.
3 K. Kawai, Japan's American Interlude (The University of Chicago Press, 1960 ) 
p.250.
186
used a nautical analogy to  illustrate the ir predicament vis à vis an 
indirect Occupation: Whilst GHQ charted the broad course tha t Japan 
was expected to  follow, the Japanese themselves continued to  
operate the ship, m ilitary government personnel acting merely as 
"observers".4 During a brief visit to Sendai, where he was a guest of 
General Soule, chief o f m ilitary governm ent for the area, Gayn 
complained tha t "the American observers can only report tha t the 
ship is being operated by what is largely the old gang, and (although) 
there appear to  be major deviations from the course....the observers 
can do nothing on the ir ow n".5 This chapter develops G ayn 's  
argum ent, drawing a tte n tio n  to  the  frus tra tions  o f "m ilita ry  
g o ve rn m e n t"^  and the unlikely alliances tha t they produced. The 
Japanese police and Allied officia ls in the localities a p p a re n tly  
needed each other, the one reinforcing the other's  position. The 
former - at least its upper echelons - will be trea ted throughout 
this chapter as a constituent part of a ruling elite ("the  old gang") as 
well as an agency o f law enforcement; tha t is to  say, the role and 
conduct of Allied administrators in the field will be examined in the 
light o f the ir relations with Japanese officials in general, and the 
police in particular. Such Journalists as Mark Gayn and Honor Tracy^ 
introduce us to  some very colourful m ilitary personnel, whose self- 
proclaimed commitment to  "democracy" was frequently undermined 
by their consumption o f large amounts o f black market produce. 
Ralph B ra ib a n ti^  and Robert Textor^, both of whom served as 
m ilitary government officers, provide more general critiques o f the 
O ccupation's local dimension. Many of the problems o f m ilitary 
government derived from both its structure  and context - these 
factors must be addressed at the ou tse t. Only then can the
 ^ M. Gayn, Japan Diary (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981) p.53 
 ^ Ibid.
6 Major Shaw, assistant chief of military government in the Osaka area, told Gayn that 
Military Government was "a misnomer....We couldn't govern even if we wanted to" 
(diary entry for 2 1 /2 /1 9 4 6 , p.l 17).
 ^ Tracy spent eight months in Japan (1 9 4 6 /4 7 ).
G R. J. D. Braibanti spent sixteen months as a military government officer in Yamanashi 
prefecture and three months as coordinator for military government teams in the Kantô 
region.
 ^ R. B. Textor - a civilian employee fluent in Japanese - was Assistant Civil Information 
and Education Officer for I Corps, based at Kyoto, for seventeen months. He then became 
Civil Information and Education Officer for Military Government in Wakayama 
Prefecture, a position he held for a further nine months.
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frustra tions and foibles of m ilitary government personnel be fu lly  
appreciated.
The Structure o f Military Government
W riting in 1949, Ralph Braibanti noted th a t "the  adm in istrative 
process of m ilitary government at the local level" had been largely 
disregarded in monographs or articles on the O c c u p a t i o n . i o The 
h istoriography o f the Occupation has continued to  re flect th is 
tendency, and Braibanti's explanation for th is could equally be 
applied today:
That the function of local military government units as the field service 
of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) has been 
overlooked is to be explained principally by the dramatic character and 
impressive scope of the functions of MacArthur's headquarters and the 
resulting eclipse of local activities necessarily o f a more prosaic nature 
(my italics).T ^
The fact tha t there were nearly two thousand m ilitary government 
personnel throughout Japan, all of whom were in daily contact with 
Japanese officials, suggests "the  inadequacy of a critique of the 
Occupation based solely on the functions o f S C A P " . 1 2 A fte r all, 
those working in the field were in a privileged position, although 
they themselves didn 't see it tha t way - unlike the ir superiors in 
Tokyo, engaged in formulating social and political reforms, m ilitary 
governm ent personnel were able to  m onitor the im p a c t  o f the 
legislation emanating from the centre. Honor Tracy found the 
ambience in Tokyo not only very d iffe ren t from  th a t in the 
localities, but also far less revealing:
It was not....in the mahogany foxholes of GHQ that I became aware 
of....undercurrents...of perplexity. That came later, when I went into the 
provinces and talked to some of the military government teams...In Tokyo 
the official note was one of a happy, almost a sublime c o n f i d e n c e . . .
T 0 R. J. Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government in Japan at the Prefectural 
Level", American Political Science Review Vol. 43, No.2 (April 1949), p.258.
 ^  ^ Ibid.
 ^2 Ibid.
T 3 H. Tracy, Kakemono - A Sketch Book of Postwar Japan (Methuen, London, 1950) 
p.l 7.
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Given tha t those charged w ith supervising the im plem entation o f 
reforms were so thinly spread throughout Japan, the confidence o f 
those in the ir "mahogany foxholes" was perhaps surprising. In 
August, 1947, G-2 enumerated actual and potential agents of law 
en fo rcem ent (the  Japanese police and Am erican personnel 
respective ly) in each prefecture, w ith a view to  discouraging a 
comprehensive police purge. According to  this survey there were 
only 1,885 military government personnel, 692 members o f Counter 
Intelligence Corps, 3,492 American Military P o lic e ^ a n d  7 2 ,0 5 6  
tactica l t r o o p s . ^  5 The la tter had almost no official contact w ith the 
Japanese and represented a weapon of last resort. Considered the 
"strong arm of the military government",^ 6 they were to  be used only 
if the Supreme Commander assumed direct control - this "reserve 
power....exist(ed), together w ith the combat troops, as a potential 
sanction in the event o f non-compliance by the Japanese".i  ^ In 
December, 1945, there were 43 0 ,2 87  American soldiers and 
civilians in Japan, a figure considerably higher than tha t o f 1947.18 
Due to  "the  hearty Japanese cooperation with the Sixth and Eighth 
Arm ies" and the tense politica l s itua tion  in Korea,^ ^ m il i ta ry  
government units had been either sent home or assigned to  southern 
Korea, "where there was a very real m ilitary government job to  
d o ".20 The Eighth Army assumed all Occupation duties in January 
1946, following the withdrawal o f the Sixth Army.2i
Their headwear - "inverted white pots" (Tracy) - caused many to refer to them as 
"snowdrops".
 ^  ^ Analysis of population, military and police strength by prefecture (NDL, G-2 
0 2 7 7 5 /6 )
^0 R. J. Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government...", p.273 (fn. 3a). Involved 
in occasional patrol duty when called upon by Military Government.
Ibid.. p.262.
10 Takemae Eiji, GHQ (Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1 983) p.44.
19 A. D. Bouterse, P. H. Taylor, and A. A. Maass, "American Military Government 
Experience in Japan", in C. J. Friedrich, ed., American Experiences in M ilitarv  
Government in World War Two (Rinehart, New York, 1948) p .321.
20 Ibid.. p.336 (Summary of a speech by Lieutenant General R. K. Sutherland, Chief of 
Staff).
21 Ibid., p.341.
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The Eighth Army was "supposed to  ensure tha t MacArthur's orders 
(were) actually followed by the J a p a n e s e " . 22 Until the outbreak of 
the Korean War in June, 1 9 5 0 ,  Eighth Army HQ coordinated corps, 
divisions, regiments and battalions throughout Japan, their principal 
responsibility being the maintenance of order. Military government 
teams, one of which was located in the capital o f each of Japan's 
fo rty-s ix  prefectures, were also under the Eighth Army until 1st 
January, 1 9 5 0 . 2 3  They communicated w ith m ilitary personnel at 
regional level - there were eight "regions", each responsible for 
several prefectures. Tactical (order-maintaining) generals at corps 
level issued orders to  and received correspondence from regional 
HQ.24 The commander of the Eighth Army stood at the apex of this 
cumbersome m ilitary structure.
As has already been in tim ated, it  was some tim e before the 
adm in istrative s tructures o f m ilitary governm ent se ttle d  down. 
Until July, 1946, they "inadequately met the needs o f the actual 
s itua tion ".25 |n February, 1946, Major Shaw complained to  Mark Gayn 
tha t a team of "twelve officers, twenty-six enlisted men, and four 
typew riters....(w as) supposed to  have d irect au tho rity  over tw o 
prefectures, and supervision over nine others".26 The reorganisation 
th a t took  place in Ju ly /A u g u s t 1946 was based on "an 
accommodation o f adm inistrative forms to  the disparate needs o f 
the (various p re fec tu res)".2/ Taking into account such factors as 
size, loca tion , po pu la tion , level o f in d u s tr ia lis a tio n  and 
concen tra tion  o f com bat troops, the  O ccupation c lass ified  
prefectures according to  three categories: "minor", "interm ediate" or 
" m a jo r " .28 Osaka was placed in a special category, and the 
metropolitan area of Tokyo and Yokohama was designated the Tokyo-
22 R .  Textor, Failure in Japan: With Keystones for a Positive Policy (Greenwood Press, 
Westport, Conn., 1972) Appendix 1, p.233.
23 Ibid. On 1 January, 1950, a Civil Affairs Section was set up in GHQ, along with eight 
regional Civil Affairs offices to monitor local developments (these replaced the 
prefectural military government teams).
24 Ibid.
25 Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.259.
26 Gayn, Japan Diarv. p.l 17.
2^ Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.259.
28 Ibid.. p.260.
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Kanagawa M ilitary Government D i s t r i c t . The number o f o fficers 
and enlisted men assigned to  each pre fecture depended on its 
c la s s ific a tio n .30 Eight regional headquarters were also set up in 
A u gu s t 1946 - these  "had no ju r is d ic t io n  o ve r th e
Japanese,...function(ing merely) as adm inistrative control echelons 
over groups of teams".3i
In December, 1946, the overall structure  was slightly modified - 
three pre fectures were reclassified, and the balance between 
officers and enlisted men was altered for all five catgories. A t th e  
same time the standard regional unit was abandoned, and "a greater 
variety o f structura l possiblities in troduced".32 A t the end o f 1946, 
422 officers and 1,466 enlisted s ta ff (to ta l o f 1,888) were assigned 
to  m ilitary government. Whereas a minor team, say in T o tto ri, 
consisted of five officers and 26 enlisted men, the Tokyo-Kanagawa 
m ilitary government d is tric t boasted a s ta ff o f 65 officers and 150 
subord ina tes.33 Thus, some efforts were made to  match the team 
with the prefecture concerned, although, as Braibanti maintains, 
there was perhaps still too much standardisation. He argues tha t the 
problem derived from the teams' m ilitary origins - "...in the m ilitary 
organisation structure and adherence to  structure assume virtue and 
sanctity o f unreasonable proportions".34
Robert Textor argued tha t the American m ilitary was not equal to  
the task of democratising Japan, and referred disparagingly to  "the 
dead hand o f Army b u r e a u c r a c y " . 35 One o f his "six suggested 
keystones for a positive Japan policy" was "civilianization":
29 M 6 ;  pp.260-1.
30 A "minor" military government team was composed of 6 officers and 25 enlisted 
men; an "intermediate" one included 40 people (8  + 32); and a "major" team was made 
up of 10 officers and 37 subordinates. Officers were assigned to one of the following 
areas: natural resources, commerce and industry; education; procurement; public 
health; adjutant. Specialisation within these categories could occur only where there 
were sufficient officers (eg. Osaka-fu military government team assigned one of its 
sixteen officers specifically to money and banking) .
31 Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.261. They were permitted a 
staff of 11 officers and 30 enlisted men.
32 Ibid.
33 IW ., pp. 261-2.
34 Ibid. p.262.
35 Textor, Failure in Japan, p.l 93.
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We must establish civilian supremacy In the Occupation at the earliest 
opportunity. The Army must be removed from all nonmilitary functions, 
and given the job of simply protecting and servicing a civilian
Occupation.36
Civilians worked both in the field as m ilitary governm ent officia ls 
and in the special s ta ff sections th a t made up GHQ, SCAP. Most 
positions in the various types o f field organisation were open to  
civilians, and, according to  Braibanti, by the end of 1 9 4 7  many were 
filled by men and women unconnected with the m i l i t a r y . 37 By 1 9 4 9 ,  
however, only GHQ, SCAP could boast "functional specialists w ith a 
high degree of expertise....Although originally the local teams were 
staffed w ith trained specialists, these have long since departed and 
have been replaced by combat o f f i c e r s " . 38 Right from the beginning 
of the Occupation civilian experts had to  contend with both the overt 
and covert agencies of the military. Textor reserved special disdain 
for the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), which were spread ve ry  
thin ly throughout Japan ( if  we accept the G-2 survey referred to  
earlier, the average number of CIC personnel per pre fecture was 
around 15). It was their close links w ith unsavoury individuals tha t 
particularly disturbed Textor, although he acknowledged "contact 
w ith the underworld (was) an integra l part o f the inte lligence 
f u n c t i o n ' \ 3 9  Despite a very d iffe re n t jo b  descrip tion , m ilita ry  
governm ent offic ia ls were also drawn to  prom inent Jap an ese  
racketeers. Such unholy alliances were perhaps unsurprising, given 
the fru s tra tio n s  associa ted w ith  the  process o f m i l i t a r y  
government.
38 Ibid.. pp. 228-9
37 Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.261. At the beginning of 
July, 1947, the Eighth Army specifically allotted civil service personnel to the 
military government teams. The total number of personnel engaged in military 
government officially increased from 1,888 to 2 ,439  - 398 officers, 1,436 enlisted 
men and 605 civilians, the latter occupying positions from welfare officer to clerk- 
typist.
38 Ibid.. p.264.
38 Textor, Failure in Japan, p.l 23.
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The Process of Militarv Government
"Ill-conceived channels of command"40 and a very limited role were 
the principal causes o f frustra tion. The la tte r derived from "the 
genius o f (m ilita ry  governm en t's ) organ isa tion", namely the 
"principle o f using the Japanese government to  take corrective 
action in (any) instance o f n o n -c o m p lia n c e " .B y  adopting th is  
principle o f action the US was able to  distance itse lf from the 
adm inistrative process - the Japanese Government was to  be held 
responsible fo r any problems th a t m ight arise, whereas the 
Occupation was to  take the credit for any successes. Whilst this 
policy o f aloofness might have benefited those formulating policy, it  
constantly undermined the e ffo rts  o f those working in the field. 
They were to  act as supervisors or observers, the ir role s tric tly  
lim ited  to  "surveillance and re p o rtin g  o f no n -co m p lian t 
behaviour".42 Military government responsibilities were specified in 
the  Eighth Arm y Annex No. 8 (M ilita ry  G ove rnm en t) to  
Adm inistrative Order No. 19 - the Occupation forces were " to  act 
solely as an agency for observ ing , in v e s t ig a t in g ,  and re p o r t in g  
compliance with the instructions of the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers to  the Imperial Japanese Government".43
Mark Gayn dined w ith a group o f m ilitary government officials in 
Sendai, and came away w ith the impression tha t they had the ir 
hands tied:
The Japanese, they said, were sabotaging every directive whenever they 
had the opportunity, and the local American commanders, operating under 
rigid orders from above, could do nothing but file reports that produced 
no action.44
40 Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.267.
41 Ibid., p.265.
42 Ibid.
43 A. D. Bouterse, P. H. Taylor, and A. A. Maass, "American Military Government 
Experience in Japan", in C. J. Friedrich, ed., American Experiences in M ilitarv  
Government in World War Two (Rinehart, New York, 1948) pp. 343-4.
44 Gayn, Japan Diarv. p.51
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It was not surprising tha t soldiers, used to  an active rather than a 
passive role, increasingly resented "the mandarins o f GHQ".45 Their 
a c tiv it it ie s  were so constrained, according to  Gayn, th a t "a 
commander....(could) not...,on his own authority, close up a brothel 
tha t (was) infecting his men. All he (could) do (was) either put the 
establishment o ff limits to  his men or request the Japanese police 
to  close i t " . 46 Military government's dependence on the Japanese 
police will be examined in a later section - for the moment it is 
enough to  reg is te r the cond itions th a t caused A m erican  
adm in istrators to  turn to  Japanese officia ls for help. Insecurity 
reflected weakness, both in terms of numerical strength and their 
s tr ic tly  supervisory role. In December, 1945, Mark Gayn, during a 
visit to  Akita, noted the anger fe lt by the local m ilitary government 
detachment at their not having the "right to  give orders to  Japanese 
officials, except on the m atter o f Japanese demobilisation":
"How can you get these people to do what you want them to do without 
authority?" asked one of the men. "I've observed no improvement here.
The old gang continues to run things. And the Military Government, 
instead of being what its name implies it is, and enforcing General 
MacArthur's directives, can only chew its nails"."^^
In fact, teams did not sit back and chew their nails - they opted for 
an active role, and made every e ffo rt to  circumvent Eighth Army 
regulations. Braibanti claimed tha t one of m ilitary g o v e rn m e n t's  
major functions was "the  rendering o f informal, non-mandatory 
advice and assistance to  Japanese prefectural governments''.^^ This 
was done, however, in contravention o f officia l policy directives. 
Paragraph 3 o f Eighth Army Operational Directive 2 9 /2 , dated 1 7th 
August 1946, expressly prohibited "local" d irectives, except in 
emergencies:
The necessity for subordinate occupation force commanders....issuing 
administrative instructions to implement further the operational 
directives of this headquarters or SCAP directives will be infrequent and 
confined to emergencies."^^
46 H. Tracy, Kakemono - A Sketch Book of Postwar Japan (Methuen, London, 1950)
p.82.
46 Gayn, Japan Diarv. p.52.
4^ Ibid., p.79.
46 Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.268.
49 Ibid.
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Even in an emergency, such orders were undermined by the provision 
tha t "no adm inistrative instructions....issued by occupation force 
commanders...will provide any penalty for violation thereof".so GHQ 
went to  extraordinary lengths to  ensure tha t the above regulations 
were observed. The Japanese administration was invited to  inform 
SCAP whenever m ilitary government exceeded its authority. W hat 
was technica lly an enemy government was encouraged by the 
Occupation HQ to  disobey American officials in the localities:
In some instances, especially in matters of procurement of Japanese 
supplies and services, SCAP...directed the Japanese prefectural 
governments to disobey local orders issued by prefectural military 
government officials, since such orders were illegal.
As a result o f such "curious reversal(s) of reasonable b e h a v i o u r " 5  2 
Japanese offic ia ls in the localities were able to  play o ff one 
Occupation agency against another, to  exploit the gulf between GHQ 
and its field units. The breadth of th is gu lf corresponded to  the 
height o f the command structure . Its numerous layers impeded 
effective communication between the centre and periphery.
The five layers of adm inistration - GHQ, Eighth Army, C o r p s , ^  3 
military government region, and prefectural teams - "reveal(ed) a 
standard army pattern of line command which is characterised by 
ve rtica l o r g a n i s a t i o n " . 3 4  The top and bottom  stra ta liaised w ith 
Japanese bureaucrats in the national m inistries and prefectural 
adm inistrations. As far as the three in te rm ed ia te  levels were 
concerned, they were detached from the governmental process. They 
were merely staging posts through which a " S C A P I N " 3 5  passed on its 
way to  the m ilitary government team. On receipt of a S C A P I N ,  the 
Eighth Army drew up an "operational directive", which defined the
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 1^.
33 I Corps in Kyoto was responsible for 20 prefectures in southern Japan (Kinki, 
Tôkai-Hokuriku and Kyûshû regions), IX Corps for the 15 prefectures which constitute 
the Tôhoku, Hokkaido and Kantô regions. The Eighth Army was directly responsible for 
the remainder (Shikoku and Chûgoku regions and the Tokyo/ Yokohama area).
34 Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.264.
33 SCAP instruction.
195
role o f local m ilitary government units - it m ight, for example, 
order teams to  undertake inspections and submit their findings.56 As 
it passed through Corps and regional HQ the directive underwent 
minimal change, suggesting tha t these stra ta  were superfluous. 
Indeed, Braibanti argued th a t these tw o  adm in is tra tive  layers 
served no useful purpose "except to  delay and confuse".5^ Directives 
from above and reports from below took several months to  pass 
through the various levels, the delay o ften  discounting th e ir 
contents.
Poor channels o f com m unica tion  in fu r ia te d  A k ita  m ilita ry  
governm ent team - they regarded w is tfu lly  the unobstructed  
conduits through which Japanese instructions passed:
The Japanese get the texts of the American directives through their 
official channels much quicker than we do. Sometimes, requests to 
American officers to check up on compliance with directives arrive 
before the directives themselves reach the outposts.^®
Military government officials, isolated and insecure, were no match 
for local Japanese administrations. Lieutenant Hartley, who "looked 
after" Mark Gayn in Komoro (Akita prefecture), was "perplexed by the 
problems o f political d irectives (and) a coldly hostile Japanese 
tow n. . . " . 5 9  On New Year's Day, 1946, Hartley was informed tha t "the 
Japanese town hall....had run up the 'meatball' (Japanese flag) in 
violation o f all known orders" - the local Japanese police chief 
insisted tha t the action had been sanctioned by General MacArthur. 
Hartley didn't know what to  think - he "had had trouble before w ith  
directives which reached the Japanese long before they got to  him, 
and he suspected tha t this had happened a g a i n " . 6 0  Major Shaw in 
Osaka experienced similar frustrations:
56 Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.264.
5^ Ibid.. p.265. R. Textor recently drew attention to military government’s "inefficient 
structure", arguing that three levels of administration "would not only have done the job 
faster, but saved manpower for other purposes" (W. Nimmo, ed.. The Occupation of 
Japan: The Grass Roots, pp.l 55-156.
56 Gayn, Japan Diarv. p.79. Mark Orr, an official of the Civil Information and Education 
Section in GHQ, recently confirmed that there was "a great deal of unease at the local 
level where the Japanese side seemed to know much more than the American side did". 
(W. Nimmo, ed., The Occupation of Japan: The Grass Roots, p.96).
59 Ibid., p . 8 0 .
60 Ibid.. p.83.
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Headquarters dreams up directives. These go to the Military Government 
in Yokohama. Weeks later, the directives filter down to us. Meanwhile, 
the Jap government rushes its orders down its own channels. What 
happens is this. The Japs...take some action...We say, 'You can't do this.'
They say blandly, 'Excuse please, but we can. There is a directive out to 
that effect.' We start checking frantically with Yokohama, and the next 
thing that happens is that we are embarrassed no end.®^
Unable to  rely on the Eighth Army for the transmission of d irectives, 
the m ilitary government teams turned to  the E ng lish -language 
Nippon Times ,which fortunately published most o f the S C A P IN s .62  
One officer told Gayn tha t his team subscribed to  the Nippon Times 
"to  learn what our policy for Japan is" .63
The fate o f military government reports was similar to  tha t of SCAP 
d irectives - they got lost or unnecessarily delayed in one o f the 
m ilitary strata. Sometimes they were simply ignored. Lieutenant 
Colonel Munske, chief o f m ilitary government in the Kansai area, 
submitted a report to  Eighth Army, Yokohama, cataloguing "Japanese 
evasions", particularly those relating to  the purge o f the T o kkô . 
Munske was an object-lesson in low expectations:
Under the cute setup we have here, all I can do is report. The report is 
buried in the files in Yokohama, together with other reports on the same 
thing happening all over Japan. Indirectly, we are told there are "higher 
considerations" which make it necessary "for the time being" to ignore 
this violation of directives by the government.
Meanwhile, Japanese offic ia ls explo ited the weaknesses o f the 
Occupation's adm inistrative s tructure . Prefectural governors fu lly  
appreciated the d ifficu lties of m ilitary government - they realised 
tha t "methods for reporting (were) such tha t failure to  comply on 
their part (would) seldom result in any reprimand, and when it (did), 
the tim e lapse (would) have been so great tha t the p a rt ic u la r  
condition complained of (m ight) well have c h a n g e d " .65
61 Ibid., p.l 17.
62 Bouterse, Taylor and Maass, "American Military Government Experience in Japan", 
p.344.
63 Gayn, Japan Diarv. p.79.
64 Ibid.. p.l 23.
65 Bouterse, Taylor and Maass, "American Military Government Experience in Japan", 
p.349.
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In short, the process o f m ilita ry  supervision was "rendered 
impractical by a sluggishness, a certain unresponsiveness, in th e  
co rrec tive  process p r e s c r i b e d " . 6 6  Braibanti cautioned th a t th is  
sluggishness provoked independent action on the part o f m ilitary 
government officials - determined to  impress the Japanese w ith 
"the promptness of American action,...(they were) impelled to  act in 
a personal c a p a c i t y " . 6 7  This "unauthorised assum ption o f  
d is c re tio n a ry  p o w e r " 6 8  undermined the  O ccupation's b a s ic  
philosophy, namely indirect rule, and widened the gulf between GHQ 
and its field units. Disillusioned w ith GHQ, m ilitary g o v e rn m e n t 
officials increasingly relied on anyone who commanded respect in 
the locale and so could assist them in the resolution of problem s. 
Perhaps more importantly, such individuals were able to  relieve the 
boredom endured by many Americans (a subject examined in the final 
section of this chapter).
Mutual Dependence
Chapter Two (The Consequences o f Defeat) touched on relations 
between the Occupation authorities and the Japanese police, paying 
particu lar a tten tion  to  the la tte r 's  need fo r re inforcem ent. In 
numerous cities and towns Japanese officials and politicians sought 
the support o f American agencies, fu lly aware th a t the people 
"im puted an almost unlim ited range o f au thority  to  the m ilitary 
government un its".69 However, the relationship between Americans 
and Japanese was not always a one-sided one. There is plenty of 
evidence to  suggest th a t m ilitary governm ent teams and CIC 
detachments worked hard to  foster good relations with local elites, 
which usually included a police chief. When Lieutenant Hartley, our 
friend in Komoro, threw a party on New Year's Eve, he invited those 
who carried weight in the community - fo r example, "the present 
chief of police, and his predecessor, who was dismissed for being a
66 Braibanti,"Administration of Military Government", p.267.
67 IW .,  pp.265-6.
68 Ibid.. p.265.
69 Ibid.. p.270.
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Thought Control man, and who apparently still runs th is to w n " /o  
According to  Mark Gayn, Hartley accepted help regardless of who 
offered it - "...in Komoro he (could) find it only among the Japanese 
villains, and his uneasiness m ount(ed) because he (was) aware of 
the ir villainy".^ i
Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) detachments seem to  have valued 
both the expertise of T okkô  officials and the connections of 
prominent racketeers. As has already been stated, Robert Textor was 
particularly concerned about alliances between intelligence agents 
and those who had supposedly been removed from positions o f  
influence. He argued tha t CIC detachments frustrated the efforts o f 
"dem ocratically inclined proreform p e o p l e " , ^2 and corroborated his 
charge with two examples:
First. The chief of CIC in 1946 in a prefecture adjoining my place of 
work, told me that his most valuable "man", whom he entrusted with his 
most important assignments, was a former high official in the Japanese 
Secret Police...A member of this CIC detachment remarked with surprised 
admiration how this former secret police official knew about everything 
that was going on in the prefecture as soon as it h a p p e n e d . ^ ^
Textor's second example demonstrated the CIC's dominant position 
in the localities:
Second. In another prefecture, where I spent some time, a local Japanese 
was believed by Military Government...to be the biggest racketeer in the 
prefecture....One way he sought to protect his position was to ingratiate 
himself with the local CIC detachment. Not only did CIC headquarter and 
billet themselves in a mansion owned by and procured from this man, but 
they actively used his services as a key informant..
In short, Textor believed tha t CIC units depended on Japanese who 
were in tent on obstructing the implementation o f reforms.
On the whole military government teams and CIC detachments were 
less concerned with reform than with the maintenance o f a stable
Gavn. Japan Diarv. pp.80-81.
Ibid., p.80.
72 Textor, Failure in Japan (Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1972) p.121
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.. p.122.
199
political environment. Major J. C. Milligan, responsible fo r public 
safety and rationing in the Osaka area, adm itted tha t he was "no 
reformer"- his Job was "to  maintain public safety", and, as far as he 
was concerned, a policeman's politics or background m attered far 
less than his ability to  do "a com petent jo b " .^5 in marked contrast, 
Robert Textor, committed to  démocratisation, condemned "trucu lent 
police measures on behalf of the Old G u a r d . W h e t h e r  supportive 
or suspicious o f the Japanese police, m ost American o ffic ia ls  
recognised the need for close liaison. In September, 1946, Major M. 
W. W hitlock, a PSD inspector, reported th a t the Nara m ilita ry  
governm ent team and Kumano Takaji, the  p re fec tu ra l Police 
D irector, worked very cooperative ly - daily liaison proved an 
effective means of resolving police problems.
CIC detachm ents, however, had to  exercise more care in the ir 
dealings with the Japanese police. Towards the end of 1948 Colonel 
Duff (G-2) fe lt obliged to  assure Pulliam, the head o f the Public 
Safety Division, tha t "contact established and maintained by CIC 
w ith  Japanese police at various levels (was) na tu ra lly  and 
necessarily lim ited to  securing information by appropriate m ethods 
and to  the lending of moral support".^8 Duff carefully defined the 
role o f CIC, making it clear tha t there would be no intrusion into 
PSD te rrito ry :
CIC must remain in the capacity of observers and reporters in the near 
background and must not involve itself in police operational support, 
training...Those are functions which are the assigned responsibility of 
other SCAP elements. As has been done in the past, CIC can report...(on) 
the pulse of overall law enforcement...in certain localities.^^
Following a disturbance involving repa tria tes at Maizuru^o in 
November, 1948, General Willoughby, the head of G-2, called for
Gayn, Japan Diarv (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1981), p. 117.
^6 Textor, Failure in Japan, p.22.
Memo dated 2 0 /9 /4 6 ;  To: Chief, PSD; Subject: Inspection of Japanese Police 
Installations in Osaka, Kyoto, Nara and Mie prefectures (NDL, G-2 00228).
To: Colonel Pulliam; Thru: CIS; undated (NDL, G-2 00252 ).
^9 Ibid.
90 A port on the Japan Sea.
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"in tim ate  liaison w ith Japanese police c h i e f s " . C o l o n e l  Bratton 
confidently informed him tha t "all CIC areas (had) regular con tact 
w ith (the Japanese) police, (and) CIC personnel...were personally 
acquainted with the....police chief in the ir respective areas".82 He 
went on to  insist tha t CIC was "making every e ffo rt to  cement 
relations w ith the Japanese police throughout the nation", and was 
"receiving ever-increasing cooperation", particularly w ith regard to  
re p a tr ia te s .83 According to  Bratton, Pulliam recommended th a t a 
cooperative relationship between CIC and the Japanese police should 
be founded on "friend ly liaison" ra ther than the more form al 
association tha t Willoughby desired. The head o f G-2 responded 
brusquely to  Bratton's comments:
When you speak of efforts to "cement relations", I want some positive 
action - place the Chief of Police on our payroll and initiate a more 
generous gift policy plus entertainment....Initiate informal steps with 
Yoshida government to develop orders for cooperation with local CIC
u n i t s .84
The reference to  entertainment was ironic, given tha t the provision 
o f food and leisure activ ities was the principal means by which 
local ruling elites endeared themselves to  the m ilitary government 
teams (this subject is examined in the next section).
Willoughby appears to  have been successful in formalizing relations 
between the Japanese police and CIC detachments. In February, 
1949, the head o f CIC in Mie prefecture proposed a "police liaison 
party", during which qualified personnel could deal w ith a number of 
questions tha t the local police had subm itted .85 He remarked tha t 
"close liaison...(had) already produced tangible results, (and) tha t 
clarification o f the attached questions (would) tend towards b e tte r  
understanding between the Japanese police and the Occupation
81 Memo dated 2 5 /1 1 /4 8 ; To: Colonel Bratton; Subject: Repatriates Incident at Maizuru 
(Communist indoctrination of repatriates from Soviet areas) NDL,
G-2 00251 .
82 Memo dated 3 0 /1 1 /4 8  (G-2 00251).
83 ibid.
84 Memo to: Colonel Bratton; dated 1 /1 2 /4 8  (NDL, G-2 00251).
85 Memo dated 1 7 /2 /1 9 4 9 ; Subject: Questions addressed to Mie CIC area by National 
Rural Police and Municipal Police of Mie prefecture; Thru: Commanding Officer, 3rd CIC 
District; To: Commanding Officer, 441st CIC detachment (NDL, G-2 00257).
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forces as a w h o l e " . ^6 His superior, Lieutenant Colonel Calvin Dickey, 
maintained that the questions "should be handled by a representative 
of PSD (as they fell) outside the CIC m ission".87 Dickey fe lt tha t the 
queries indicated a "confused state o f mind within Mie police" - ie. 
they implied tha t Mie CIC condoned a return to  p re -w a r/w a rtim e  
police practices. The topics tha t the police wished to  discuss were 
as follows:
....In case of riots what repressive measures do American police take?
Mie Military Government issued a directive dated 7 / 8 / 1 9 4 8 . ..th a t  
exempts reporting a gathering of less than 500 people. Now on account of 
extreme leftists would it not be better to include gatherings of less than 
500 people?
....Could not a SCAP directive give power to police to stand guard at any 
kind of meeting, public or private? At present plain clothes policemen 
attend labour union sponsored meetings.
....Heretofore CIC and Military Government have been instructing us by 
phone in matters of making investigations. Hereafter...we would like to 
have such instructions in writing so that we could show them to the 
persons who are to be investigated.®®
These questions indicated a good rapport between Mie police and the 
local CIC detachm ent, which, given the top ics invo lved, was 
po ten tia lly  embarrassing. The last paragraph suggests th a t the 
police could not function adequately w ithout the assistance of CIC 
personnel - a disturbing revelation in the context o f an "ind irect" 
Occupation.
There were, however, occasions when the reverse was true - when 
American officials could not perform the ir duties w ithou t the help 
of the Japanese police. Ralph Braibanti maintained tha t "the policy 
of utilizing existing agencies of Japanese government, the need for 
suitable housing for American troops, and the requ irem ent o f 
maintaining law and order made reliance on the police essential in 
the firs t few months of the O c c u p a tio n ".89 The Japanese police 
e ffic ien tly  dra fted "labourers in great numbers to  enlarge and 
improve cantonment areas". They "prepared rosters o f workers".
88 Ibid.
87 1st Indorsement, HQ, 3rd CIC District (G-2 00257).
88 Ibid.
89 R. J. Braibanti, "Japan's New Police Law", Far Eastern Survev. Vol.18, No.2 
( 2 4 /1 /4 9 )  p .l9 .
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visiting the ir homes early in the morning to  ensure compliance.90 
Such labour duties were unpopular, undermining social hierarchies 
and disrupting agricultural activities. Cooperation between the two 
parties was mutually beneficial, the Occupation seeing f it  t o  
constan tly  bo lster the police's "declining p res tige ....to  se cu re  
sufficient labour for their needs".91
According to  A rthur Bouterse, Philip Taylor and A rthur Maass, 
m ilitary governm ent's reliance on the Japanese police " fo r the 
maintenance of order and the execution of...d irectives" con s tan tly  
undermined the drive for d é m o c r a t i s a t i o n . 92 They maintained tha t 
the average Japanese lived "in jus t as great a fear o f the police as 
he did before the Occupation. He (knew) tha t the police (were) 
supported by the Occupation t r o o p s " . 93 in return for such support, 
the Japanese police made every e ffo rt to  assist American personnel 
in the performance o f their duties. For example, there was the case 
of the m ilitary government port o fficer for Kanagawa prefecture, 
who had to  clear a beach of small cra ft to  fac ilita te  the discharge 
of cargo:
Inspection of the area revealed that many of the fishing boats were not in 
use and that most of the markings did not yield the necessary information 
to the American Nisei in terpreter. The m ilitary governm ent 
officer...ordered the first policeman he saw...to have all the boats and 
barges out by noon the next day....At the designated time the Japanese 
boats were out and the Port Command commenced operations.^^
American officials - from the lowly m ilitary government officer to  
the army commander - depended on the Japanese police fo r th e  
resolution o f problems. Friendly relations between the tw o parties 
sometimes reflected this working partnership, but perhaps more 
im portant were the banquets and parties at which local dignitaries, 
such as the police chief, wined and dined their conquerors.
90 Ibid.. p. 18.
91 Ibid.
92 A. D. Bouterse, P. H. Taylor, and A. A. Maass, "American Military Government 
Experience in Japan", in C. J. Friedrich, ed., American Experiences in M ilitarv  
Government in World War Two (Rinehart, New York, 1948) p.351.
93 Ibid.. p.352.
94 1 ^ . ,  pp .352-353.
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A Weakness for Entertainment
The "leisure industry" was a growth area during the Occupation. The 
various constituent parts o f what has been called the Japanese 
establishment each had a stake in the industry's various offshoots. 
When General Soule put a "dance hall" in Sendai "o ff lim its" to  
prevent further cases of VD in his unit, he was visited by "a whole 
procession of Japanese - the owner, the mayor o f Sendai, the police 
chief", all o f whom "plead(ed) the owner's c a s e " . 9 5  Attending to  
Americans' needs was not only financially lucrative - it also served 
to  cement relations between local rulers and their overseers. A t a 
time when the US was supplying Japan w ith foodstuffs to  make up 
serious sho rtfa lls , local d ign ita ries f re q u e n t ly  e n te r ta in e d  
Americans, always managing to  satisfy the appetites of the ir burly 
guests.
Ralph Braibanti noted tha t Japanese "political parties were quick to  
discern the American weakness fo r en terta inm ent, parties and 
c e l e b r a t i o n s . . . " . 9 6  Lieutenant Hartley, Komoro's crusader against 
corruption, usually lost the scent when faced w ith a bowl of 
sukiyaki. Banquets at Otsuki (Yamanashi prefecture) and Mitsumine 
(Nagano pre fecture) made up for "school raids" tha t had been 
fru s tra te d  by Japanese ingenuity - Komoro's police chief had 
managed to  alert his counterpart in Otsuki, who in turn took steps to 
ensure tha t Mitsumine was "prepared" to  receive the A m e r i c a n s . 9 7  
Hartley, resigned to  his fate, decided to  get drunk:
He traded cups with the town officials, in a gesture of courtesy, and 
offered toasts himself. There was an atmosphere of deeprooted good will 
and understanding....He expressed pleasure over his visit and the 
indications of a good job of democratizing being done by the m a y o r .
Hartley was not alone in his frustrations, nor in the way he chose to  
deal w ith them. Honor Tracy introduces us to  an equally colourful 
character - Captain Mooney, the Food Officer in Kyoto prefecture, 
who found it disconcerting tha t record catches of mackerel were not
95 Gayn, Japan Diarv. p.52.
96 Braibanti, "Administration of Military Government", p.270.
97 Gayn, Japan Diarv. pp.85-91.
98 Ibid.. p.90.
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reaching the shops. Determined to  solve the m ystery o f th e  
disappearing fish, Mooney set o ff for Maizuru, accompanied by Tracy, 
an official from the Ministry o f Food, and a senior man from the 
Kyoto fish market. The la tte r's  get-up - suit, silk shirt and "s tou t 
moccasins" - suggested that Mooney's statem ent that he was "on the 
level" was perhaps mistaken.99 Representatives from the collection 
and forwarding points, the railway, the allocation point, and the fish 
market in Kyoto were summoned and verbally assaulted by the 
Captain, who alleged tha t the missing fish, rather than going "into 
legal channels", was being diverted into the black market, where a 
lot of people were "getting a r a k e - o f f " . l O O
One of the Japanese assured Mooney tha t "he did not hear anything 
o f black market,...that people were very honest and (the) police very 
b u s y " . 101 Following "a series o f th re a ts " Mooney adopted a 
conciliatory approach, distributing cigarettes and suggesting "a trip  
by launch to  the f i s h i n g - g r o u n d s " . ^  ^ 2  This turned out to  be "a 
delightful experience". They "witnessed a massive catch by three 
Japanese traw le rs", and jo ined the fishermen fo r a feast o f 
mackerel, washed down by bo ttle  a fter bo ttle  o f beer supplied by 
the man from the fish market, who Tracy unkindly nicknamed "the 
Shark". The size o f the catch reminded the Captain o f his mission, 
but only momentarily, and he quickly returned to  the business in 
hand - eating and the dinner arrangements for the evening. "On 
reaching land," the group retired "to  recover from one banquet and to  
prepare (them selves) for the next". The Shark, at the Captain's 
prompting, had invited them all to  dinner. They were treated to  a 
"deluge of fish..., crab and prawn tenpura ....(and) a vast sukiyaki...". 
The Food Officer was a victim o f his own endeavours:
The Captain had been left with a seemingly insatiable appetite by his 
efforts to track down the missing fish, of which he now swallowed a 
handsome portion as fast as if it were forty-eight hours since he had 
tasted foodjo^
99 Tracy, Kakemono - A Sketch Book of Postwar Japan (Methuen, London, 1950) p.96. 
T O O IM ., pp.98-9.
101 Ibid., P-99.
102 1 ^ .,  p. 100.
103 1 ^ .,  p. 104.
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Hartley and Mooney, and presumably o ther m ilitary government 
officials, seemed reluctant to  a ttr ib u te  the ir hosts' hospita lity to  
black market connections. Perhaps they were simply pragmatists, 
aware of their d ifficu lt position and determined to  salvage as much 
as they could from it. It was not surprising tha t they were drawn to  
Japanese who could supply them w ith  what they needed. For 
example, Asano Ryôzô, the "cement king" o f Japan and a "spectacular 
party-giver for Allied personnel" was clearly a man to  c u l t i v a t e . 10 4  
Ando Akira, who we met in Chapter Four, never tired o f entertaining 
Americans at the Wakatombo Club - he had between two and three 
hundred friends in Headquarters alone, all of whom worked hard and 
"need(ed) r e l a x a t i o n " . los |viark Gayn claimed that Ando's antics were 
part o f a "Japanese campaign to  corrupt the Army o f the US. The 
weapons (were) wine, women and hospita lity, and the objective 
(was) to  subvert the starch and purpose of the O c c u p a t i o n " . ! 0 6
Perhaps, Robert Textor should have the last word. His "case study in 
khaki" typ ified the Army's weakness for entertainm ent. Despite the 
shortage o f both arable land and building materials, and the initial 
objections of a Wakayama military government commander, a racing 
track was built "as a source of tax r e v e n u e " .  Textor regretted the 
m isappropriation o f labour and materials, and despaired o f th e  
a ttitude of some military government personnel:
In building the track, enough labour and materials were used to construct 
easily three schoolhouses....On the grand opening day of the track, in a 
special place in the stands RESERVED FOR THE OCCUPATION FORCES, were 
to be seen several Military Government personnel, eagerly placing their
betsJ°®
Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted the Occupation's local d im en s ion , 
focusing on the experiences, frustra tions and failings o f th o s e  
working in the field. Both the structu re  and process o f m ilitary
Gayn, Japan Diarv. p.243
105 1 ^ . ,  pp.249-50.
106 p.125.
107 Textor, Failure in Japan, p.189.
108 Textor, Failure in Japan, p. 190.
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government have been examined in detail in order to  elucidate th e  
alliances form ed between m ilita ry  governm ent team s or CIC 
detachments and the various groups tha t made up local elites. The 
Japanese police was one o f those groups, and their close ties with 
American units have been described and explained. So too have links 
between CIC detachments and unsavoury Japanese with backgrounds 
in thought control or black market activities. The intention has been 
to  concentrate on the activities of American observers, and it is no 
coincidence tha t they have figured more prominently than any o ther 
group. Their memoranda and reports are constantly referred to  
th ro u g h o u t the  thesis, and thus it  is essentia l th a t the ir 
preoccupations and predilections are fully appreciated.
The secondary aim of this chapter has been to  demonstrate tha t the 
Japanese police were "allies o f m ilita ry  governm en t". T h e  
Occupation's representatives in the localities required an e ffective  
police force - they didn 't want to  call on the services o f tac tica l 
troops - whilst the Japanese police depended on the moral and 
physical support o f the ir American overseers. Whereas com m on 
interests facilita ted jo in t endeavours, food and drink brought cosy 
re la tionsh ips. S uscep tib ility  to  Japanese h o sp ita lity  was an 
im portant influence on local developments. The degree to  which 
m ilita ry  governm ent o ffic ia ls  com prom ised them se lves b y 
consum ing large quan tities  o f "yam i" produce clearly had 
im plica tions fo r the e ffe c tive  perform ance o f th e ir d u t ie s .  
Ultimately, they were in a no-win situation - e ither they to le ra ted 
the deceit o f local police chiefs and prom inent racketeers and 
enjoyed the hospita lity tha t accompanied it, or they adopted an 
independent stance, and risked isolation, even extinction.
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CHAPTER SIX 
"IMMEDIATE AND FINAL DECENTRALISATION"
The decision to  decentralise the Japanese police system, taken in 
1947 and carried out in March 1948, was described by Alfred Oppler, 
head o f the Courts and Law Division, as "ideologically sound, 
but...som ewhat unrea lis tic".i Ideological struggles within both GHQ 
and the Japanese cabinet formed the backdrop to  the reorganisation 
of the police, the differences between Government Section (GS) and 
the Public Safety Division (PSD) o f G-2/CIS proving particularly 
d ifficu lt to  reconcile. The clash of interests tha t delayed and finally 
produced a flawed programme of reform will be examined in this 
chapter, whilst the second part o f Oppler's s ta tem ent will be 
assessed in Chapter 7. The white heat of the debate concerning the 
new police structure demonstrates the pivotal role o f the Japanese 
police throughout the Occupation - pivotal in both a positive and 
negative sense. Those concerned w ith national security  cherished 
the police, whilst those in tent on liberating the Japanese people 
saw them as obstacles in the ir path. PSD, preoccupied w ith the 
threat o f lawlessness, was committed to  a national police system, 
but GS would se ttle  for nothing less than complete, unqualified 
decentra lisa tion . M acArthur's de term ination to  push th ro u g h  
legislation concerning police reorganisation by the end o f 1947 
forced both sides to  retreat from the ir entrenched positions. The 
concessions made can best be evaluated by examining the original 
plans sponsored by the tw o parties, and the principles t h a t  
underpinned them. Only then can a judgm ent be made as to  whose 
interests were best served by the final settlem ent, which sought to  
reconcile national security  w ith local autonom y, e ffic ie n t law 
enforcement with public accountability.
P re lim inaries
During the firs t six months o f the Occupation "feeble attem pts were 
made to  modify the police s y s t e m " . 2 In November, 1945, the
 ^ A. Oppler, Legal Reform in Occupied Japan: A Participant Looks Back (Princeton 
University Press, N.J., 1976) p.171.
2 R. J. D. Braibanti, "Japan’s New Police Law", Far Eastern Survev. Vol.18, No.2 
( 2 4 /1 /4 9 )  p. 19.
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Japanese Government^ called, amongst other things, for the police 
uniform to  be redesigned "on less m ilitaristic lines".^ Writing in the 
spring of 1946, A rthur Bouterse, Philip Taylor and A rthur Maass 
returned to  the issue o f uniform, highlighting its inclusion in a 
"Home Ministry.,.plan for democratising its police force".^ The plan 
was "wholly inadequate" and te s tifie d  to  the cosm etic changes 
favoured by Japanese bureaucrats:
As described in the Japanese newspapers, one of the major provisions of 
the plan called for revising the uniform of the police to provide sleeve 
stripes rather than the existing shoulder boards.®
In January, 1946, MacArthur, clearly unimpressed by Japanese 
proposals, "requested by name eminent police experts....to come to  
Japan to....make recommendations concerning reorganisation o f the 
Japanese police system ".^ PSD instructed Lewis Valentine, form er 
commissioner o f the New York c ity  police, and Oscar d a nd e r, 
commissioner o f the Michigan s ta te  police, to  examine policing 
needs in m etropolitan and rural areas respectively. Their term s o f 
reference were clearly stated at the outset.
On the 12th of March, 1946, PSD informed Valentine tha t he was to  
submit "plans for the organisation (to  include numbers of personnel 
and equipment) and other recommendations for police forces in the 
m etropolitan areas of Japan", defined as cities and towns w ith a 
population greate r than 50,000.8 Olander was asked to  m a ke  
"recommendations on a national rural police force in.... rural areas", 
defined as "tow ns and villages (w ith  a population) o f less th a n
3 Led by Shidehara Kijûrô (9 /1 0 /4 5 -2 2 /5 /4 6 ) .
^ Summation of Non-Militarv Activitv in Japan. No.2 (Nov. 45), p. 36.
8 "American Military Government Experience in Japan", in C. J. Friedrich, ed ., 
American Experiences in Militarv Government in World War Two (Rinehart, New York, 
1948 ) p.353.
6 IMd.
^ Check sheet, dated 5 /9 /4 7 ; From: G-2; To: GS; Subject: Reply to Gen Whitney's Note, 
4 /9 /4 7 ,  Re. PSD's Activities Concerning Japanese Police Force [NDL, GS(B) 022 7 2 ]
8 The Intelligence Series. Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), 
FEC and SCAP" (GFIQ/FEC, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Tokyo, 1949) 
Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Special Report: Metropolitan Police Planning Group 
(1 7 /5 /4 6 ) ,  Introduction, p.1.
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5 0 ,0 0 0 ..."9  Although Pulliam assured Olander, as he had Valentine, 
tha t his team was free to  make general recommendations  ^o (je. to  
comment on the nationwide disposition of Japanese police forces), 
in practice the two groups were reluctant to  challenge PSD's urban- 
rural d ichotom y. This was hardly surpris ing given th a t the  
composition of the two groups reflected this dichotomy, and besides 
the neat division o f responsib ilities made th e ir tasks more 
manageable.
It is im portant to  establish tha t the framework w ith in which the 
police experts worked was conceived by PSD. This was in accordance 
w ith  the division o f responsib ilities w ith in GHQ - "under the  
provisions o f General Order No.13, SCAP, 1945, CIS/G-2 (was) 
spec ifica lly  charged w ith  the respons ib ility  fo r s u b m it t in g  
recommendations to  the Supreme Commander on the police forces of 
J a p a n . . . " !  i The Public S a fe ty  D iv is ion 's  plan fo r po lice 
reorganisation, as will be made clear, incorporated many o f the 
changes recommended by Valentine and Olander. This was to  be 
expected, given tha t Pulliam had framed the issues. Nevertheless, 
PSD argued throughout 1946 tha t its plan reflected the opinions of 
Am erican experts  in law en forcem ent. G overnm ent Section 
contended tha t the dialogue between PSD and the "specialists" had 
been too cosy - the la tter had not been given carte blanche as far as 
reform was concerned, presumably because PSD was determined to  
control the process. According to  Cecil T ilton, chief o f the Local 
Government Division (GS) , Valentine and Olander "operated under 
specific confining directives; neither were required to  in ve s tig a te  
such problems as what is the best overall police system for Japan..." 
Their recommendations were ta in ted  by the original term s o f  
reference:
9 Ibid.. Documentary Appendices 3, Directive to: Mr. Oscar Olander; re. National Rural 
Police Force; dated 9 /3 /4 6 .
! 0 Ibid.
! ! Check sheet, dated 5 /9 /4 7 ; From: G-2; To: GS; Subject: Reply to Gen Whitney's Note, 
4 /9 /4 7 ,  Re. PSD's Activities Concerning Japanese Police Force [NDL, GS(B) 02272].
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The two reports have been prepared in accordance with directives which 
laid down in advance a preconceived method of decentralising; quite 
naturally then their authors did not advance obiter dicta
Tilton declared tha t the Valentine Report did "not even attem pt to  
determine whether 50,000 (was) an appropriate minimum figure for 
the establishment of an independent f o r c e " J  3  its recommendations 
were "based on the apparent need in Japan for a reorganised police 
department in metropolitan cities of over 50,000 population having 
autonomous municipal g o v e r n m e n t s " . i ^ The Special M etropolitan 
Police Group, as Valentine's team came to  be known, was committed 
to  devolution of police power within the parameters set by PSD:
The needs and requirements of police protection in the various 
metropolitan cities are distinctly local, they vary with both the size and 
location of the municipality, and should accordingly be under the 
jurisdiction of local autonomous municipal governments
These m etropo litan  governm ents were " to  establish p o lic e  
commissions to  administer their police d e p a r t m e n t s " . 16 The elected 
head of a municipal administration would be authorised "to  appoint 
or dismiss the police commissioner or executive head of the police 
depa rtm en t".!^  The commissioner in turn was empowered to  appoint 
and dismiss deputies, who were to  assist him in the performance of 
ad m in is tra tive  and execu tive  du ties. In sho rt, the  re p o rt 
recommended "decentralisation through commissioner and deputies 
(w ith  a view to ) more e ffec tive  executive and adm in istra tive 
control w ithout loss of accountability to  the people through the ir 
elected o f f i c i a l s " . ! s
!2  Memo for the Chief, Government Section, dated 2 5 /4 /4 7 ;  From: Cecil Tilton; 
Subject: A Plan for the Japanese Police Structure [NDL, GS(B) 0 23 0 6 ]. By obiter 
dictum/a {obiter by the way + dictum  a thing said) Tilton means that the specialists 
did not feel their way towards a new police structure but rather headed for a destination 
set by PSD.
! 3 Ibid.
!^ The Intelligence Series. Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), 
FEC and SCAP", Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Summation of the Valentine Report,
p.6.
! 3 Ibid.. p.1.
! 6 Ibid.. p.5.
!  ^ Ibid.. p.6.
! 3 Ibid.
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Valentine and his s ta ff concerned themselves w ith many aspects of 
the m etropolitan police system, and did not, as I have implied, 
confine their attention to  the issues o f local autonomy and popular 
control. Indeed, four o f the six recommendations contained in the 
Summation o f the Valentine Report addressed o ther concerns, 
namely the removal o f "extraneous d u t i e s " , 1 9 the importance o f 
active supervision by police administrators in PSD, the need for a 
gradualist approach to  reform, and the usefulness of the New York 
City police department as a model for Japanese c i t i e s .20 With regard 
to  the latter, the "adaptation of an American police system to  Japan" 
had a dual purpose - to  "raise the morale and efficiency of the new 
police force (and to ) secure the respect o f the general public . . . " .21  
Bouterse, Taylor and Maass contended th a t "Mr. V a len tine 's  
recom m endations were primarily concerned w ith  m ethods fo r 
improving the e f f ic ie n c y  o f the Japanese police - cars, radios, 
roving policemen, and so on" . 22 They took issue with the report, and 
challenged the assumptions tha t lay behind it:
....it is not primarily in efficiency that the Japanese police are lacking; it 
is rather in any understanding of civil liberties....If the Japanese police 
system is in need of an expert to improve it, that expert should be a civil 
liberties lawyer, not a police a d m i n i s t r a t o r . ^ ^
Tilton argued tha t the Special Metropolitan Police Group was wrong 
to  assume tha t American practices and procedures were applicable 
to  Japanese conditions.24 He found very little  o f merit in either of 
the reports requested by PSD, but on balance seems to  have 
preferred Olander's offering. The National Rural Police Planning 
Group assumed tha t "national legislation (would) create a rural 
police force authorised to  be operated at e ither national or 
prefectural level.. . " . 2 5  The la tter proposal - prefectural police forces
These are examined in Chapter 3.
20 Summation of the Valentine Report, pp.6-7.
21 Ibid., p.l
22 "American Military Government Experience in Japan", in C. J. Friedrich, ed., 
American Experiences in Militarv Government in World War Two, p.353.
23 Ibid.
24 Memo for the Chief, Government Section, dated 2 5 /4 /4 7 ;  From: Cecil Tilton; 
Subject: A Plan for the Japanese Police Structure [NDL, GS(B) 02306].
25 The Intelligence Series. Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), 
FEC and SCAP", Text 2, Documentary Appendices 3, The Olander Report (2 4 /6 /4 6 )  p.4 
(Summation).
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- was welcomed by GS officials, who were determ ined to  prevent 
the establishment o f a national police system. Olander and his staff, 
however, favoured the national option:
Since the expressed desire of the Supreme Commander is decentralisation 
of government as far as is compatible with efficiency, this group 
considers that a national system of rural police, complemented by 
separate municipal police organisations, would be an ideal solution.
Acknowledging the serious condition of the Japanese economy and 
the paucity o f police equipment in good repair, the team advised 
against rapid change:
....there is the problem of how much change can immediately be made in 
the policing system of Japan that can be accepted by the people and not 
interfere with public safety - the function of good, efficient law 
enforcement.^^
The advocacy of "gradual" reform was not the only recommendation 
tha t the two reports had in common. The dominant role o f PSD 
officials - before, during and a fte r decentralisation - was endorsed 
by both groups, as was the need to  define what were proper police 
duties. As far as priorities were concerned, both reports emphasized 
the need for e ffic ient policing - the commissioner o f the Michigan 
state police fully appreciated the various problems tha t contributed 
to  poor performance:
The individual policeman had "lost face"....and his morale had dropped, his 
uniform was in general disrepair, his equipment...was lacking...., and he 
felt insecure because of contemplated or anticipated changes in the 
system. All of these factors....resulted in a marked loss of efficiency....28
Perhaps it was not surpris ing th a t Am erican police o ffic ia ls  
empathized w ith their Japanese counterparts, perceiving low morale 
as a more pressing problem than disregard fo r civil liberties. 
Olander and his s ta ff viewed administrative reform as the key to  
improving law enforcement on the ground. Once the necessary 
mechanisms were in place, providing incentives, training and clear
Ibid.. p.2 (Memo to Chief, PSD; Subject: Recommendations for a Japanese Rural 
Police System).
1 ^ . ,  p.3 (Introduction).
Ibid.. p.4 (Summation).
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chains of command, the Japanese police force could begin to  meet 
the expecta tions o f the Occupation au thorities. The te a m  
recommended th a t "organisational con tro l o f the rural police 
force...be echeloned laterally and vertically for decentralisation and 
efficiency o f operation". A national director, subject to  removal only 
by Supreme Court action, was to  be appointed by the Prime Minister 
to  supervise a centralised national headquarters. "The chain o f  
command and functional operation (would descend) from the national 
HQ th ro ug h  six estab lished d is tr ic ts  (reg ions) to  t r o o p  
headquarters". Lateral operational contro l was to  be exercised 
through three divisions, concerned w ith budgets, recru itm ent and 
tra in ing , and crim inal investiga tion . The group insisted t h a t  
"uniform crime reporting" was essential, and demanded "a wage 
scale sufficiently high to  a ttrac t the type of personnel best suited 
to  proper police functioning".29
Olander and his s ta ff were adamant tha t there were certain agencies 
th a t could be managed e ffec tive ly  only from the centre. They 
insisted tha t there would always be a need for a central police HQ, 
even if a prefectural rural police system was established:
Should the operation of a national police force....be abolished it is 
considered essential that the national goverment establish and operate 
(1 ) a national police academy (2) a scientific crime detection laboratory 
(3 ) a national bureau of identification (4 ) a national police 
communication system.
Assuming tha t a national system was preferred, the rural police 
were to  have powers "e ffe c tive  anywhere in Japan w i th o u t  
restraint, and upon request should receive the cooperation and aid o f 
all other law enforcement b o d ie s " .T h e  implication was tha t the 
m etropo litan  police forces should defer to  th e ir "n a tio na l" 
counterparts. This was in tune w ith preconceptions harboured by 
officials in the Public Safety Division. The "cosy dialogue" between 
PSD and the "specialists" was mutually gratifying. Those charged 
with reforming the police received the recommendations tha t they 
had invited, whilst their benefactors le ft Japan confident tha t the ir
29 The source for this paragraph is The Olander Report, pp.4-7 (Summation). 
2Q Ibid.. p.6.
2^  Ibid.. p.4.
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advice would be acted on. Ultimately, Valentine and Olander had 
simply fleshed out the skeleton of reform contained in their original 
term s o f reference. Thus, it was not surprising tha t PSD publicly 
approved the two reports, which so conveniently endorsed its own 
unstated views.
The PSD/Yoshida Government Plan
While "the  tw o  special commissions (headed by Valentine and 
Olander) were at work, the s ta ff o f PSD was busy w ith its own 
surveys and investigations...".32 Mr. Henry Eaton, former deputy chief 
of the Los Angeles police force and PSD's chief police administrator, 
compiled a report on the Japanese metropolitan police system. It 
was seen by his colleagues as "an adaptation of Mr. Valentine's ideas 
to  Japanese capabilities, concepts and po ten tia lities  based on 
further research and study".33 Eaton reiterated the need for gradual 
decentralisation, stipulating the conditions tha t would have to  be 
met if the process was to  proceed beyond the six largest cities:
The proposed reorganisation plan provides that transfer of the 
administration of policing functions....to the local level will not take place 
until municipal governments and the necessary agencies thereof, together 
with the means of obtaining municipal revenue for the support of a police 
department, have been established and are functioning.
Given the parlous financial state of the national government, it was 
safe to  assume tha t municipalities w ith populations o f little  more 
than 50 ,00 0  would not be able to  a fford the ir own police 
departments for some years to  come. Eaton,therefore, seemed to  be 
counselling indefinite delay, a course o f action (or rather inaction) 
that GS was to  find intolerable.
32 PSD, Police branch, report entitled "Japanese Police System", p.l 9 (NARA, Suitland, 
Box 334, File 25).
33 Public Safety Division Plan for Japanese Police Reorganisation, undated [NDL, GS(B) 
0 2 3 0 6 ]
34 The Intelligence Series. Volume 9: "Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), 
FEC and SCAP", Text 2^  Documentary Appendices 2, Summation of Metropolitan Police 
Report, p.3.
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PSD's National Police Planning Group Reportas further ruffled th e  
feathers o f Government Section officials. Its a u t h o r s ^ G  painted a 
bleak p ic tu re  o f p riva tion  and lawlessness, cond itions th a t 
necessitated the establishment of an effic ient national police force:
Japan is a war-torn nation suffering from scarcity, crime is increasing, 
industrial strikes abound, radical elements seek to exploit human 
misery...The nation has no army, navy or militia for defence  
against..-domestic disorder or anarchy...A national police system  
furnishes a maximum of police service at a minimum cost and is not as 
susceptible to political pressures and the ravages of local politicians as 
are numerous independent local departments.^^
Such expressions of support for a national police system at the 
expense o f local autonomy foreshadowed the r ift tha t would develop 
between GS and PSD follow ing the publication o f the Yoshida 
Goverment's police reorganisation p l a n . 38  As will become clear, the 
essential bone of contention was the "p itch" o f decentralisation - 
the number of towns and cities affected and the time-scale adopted.
In July, 1946, the chief o f the Police Affairs Bureau o f the Home 
M inistry announced " te n ta tiv e  reform  measures for the police 
s y s t e m " . 3 9  in line with plans taking shape under the direction o r 
guidance o f PSD, the police chief stressed the need fo r more 
e ffic ien t operation, proposing higher wages and modernisation o f 
equipment to  this end.^o The Japanese Government believed tha t "the 
most im portant point in the reorganisation o f the police system 
(was) its démocratisation", but only because it saw this as the key 
to  "s treng then ing  its  e f f i c i e n c y " . It was clear to  those who 
cherished the Japanese police that there could be no "modernisation" 
until the force had undergone a programme of "démocratisation". The
33 The team received its instructions on 1 /1 0 /4 6
38 Engle, Kimberling and Fritz, all of whom worked under Eaton.
37 The Intelligence Series. Volume 9, Text 2, Documentary Appendices 4, Summation of 
the National Police Planning Group Report, p .l.
38 Yoshida Shigeru was PM from 2 2 /5 /4 6  to 2 4 /5 /4 7 ,  when he was replaced by
Katayama Tetsu. Following the fall of Ashida Hitoshi in October 1948, Yoshida returned
to power and remained the PM of Japan until 1954.
39 Summations. No.lO (July 46), p.40.
"^ 8 Ibid.
Principles for the Reorganisation and Increase in the Strength of the Japanese Police 
Force and Temporary Measures Thereof (Yoshida Government Plan); dated 2 8 /2 /4 7  
(NDL, G-2 0 27 4 7 ).
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meaning o f that slogan as applied to the police, rather than the need 
for reform, was what divided the parties concerned.
At the end of November, 1 9 4 6 ,  a CIS periodical summary reported 
the  estab lishm ent o f a Police System Reform Investiga tion  
Committee, set up by the Home Ministry "to  explore possibilities for 
reform  and revision o f existing police organisational policies to  
conform  w ith  those provisions o f the new cons titu tion  w h ich  
concern the p o l i c e " . 4 2  Promulgated on 3rd November, 1 9 4 6 , 4 3  the 
new basic law had immediate implications for the reform o f the 
police system. For example. A rtic le  9 4  sta ted tha t "local public 
entities shall have the right to  manage the ir property, affairs and 
administration and to  enact their own regulations within l a w " . 4 4  The 
Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) apparently appreciated the 
impact o f this provision on policing in Japan. On the 6th November 
ESS requested information concerning "the plans o f the Japanese 
Government in regard to  the degree o f control and authority the 
national governm ent will have over the local police and/or the 
ass ignm ent o f 'na tiona l' func tions to  cen tra l en fo rcem ent 
o f f i c i a l s " . 4 5  The lax enforcement of economic contro l regulations 
was producing anxiety on the part of ESS officials:
Under local autonomy articles of the new constitution, authority over 
police forces will presumably pass from the Home Ministry to popularly 
elected local officials. Such a result will adversely affect enforcement of 
national economic control legislation, since police forces divorced from 
national control will be more concerned with furtherance of local rather 
than national interests. The present trend towards the disregard of 
national allocation plans will be intensified."^^
PSD's response was non-committal - the Japanese police system 
would be decentralised "but not to  the extent o f being inimical to  
the Occupation mission".47
42 Periodical Summary No.7, dated 3 0 /1 1 /4 6 , p.63, para.3.
43 Effective from 3rd May, 1947.
44 Chapter 8, Local Self-Government.
45 Check Sheet, addressed to G-2, attn. PSD; Subject: Japanese Police System (G-2 
0 0 2 3 2 )
46 Ibid.
4 /  Ibid.
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The Public Safety Division's confidence and steady nerves, in marked 
contrast to  the nervousness o f ESS, derived from its close liaison 
with the government o f Yoshida Shigeru. General Willoughby, head of 
G-2 and Pulliam's superior, characterised Yoshida's cabinet as 
" f r ie n d ly " .48 The close resemblance tha t the government's plan for 
police reorganisation bore to  the various complementary reports 
w ritten  or guided by PSD during 1946 certa inly suggests a cosy 
working relationship between the tw o parties. According to  Harry 
Emerson Wildes "General Willoughby and Colonel Pulliam forwarded 
the (various) plan(s) to  the Japanese Government and induced the 
Cabinet, February 22, 1947, to  (incorporate them in)...a Japanese 
proposal fo r police r e fo rm " .49 G-2/CIS was making every e ffo rt to  
d irect the course o f police reorganisation, influencing firs t the 
proposals o f Valentine and Olander and then practically dictating a 
plan to  Yoshida's government.
Striking similarities between a "memorandum for record" w ritten  by 
Pulliam on 21 February, 1947, and the Yoshida governm ent plan 
vindicate Wildes' contention th a t the Public Safety Division was 
prom pting the Prime Minister. The sub ject o f the memo was 
"Reorganisation Plan and Increase in Strength o f the Japanese Civil 
Police Force",50 whilst the government's plan was headed "Principles 
for the Reorganisation and Increase in the Strength of the Japanese 
Police Force and Temporary Measures Thereof".5 i Both documents 
cautioned against the enfeeblement o f the Japanese G overnm ent's 
only instrum ent o f control. Pulliam warned tha t "the  only arm o f 
authority available...for law enforcement and supporting the national 
will is the Japanese civil police" - the Cabinet clung to  "the  only 
stabilizing influence available to  the Japanese Government for the 
enforcem ent of law and order". Accordingly, Yoshida and his 
colleagues insisted tha t "the control o f the police force should 
remain as at present". They were com m itted "in principle" to  the 
devolution o f contro l, but th is  was to  be preceded by the
48 G-2, Inter-Office Memorandum, dated 2 4 /8 /4 7 ;  Subject: Police Reform Papers (G- 
2 0 2767 ).
49 H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law. Criminology 
and Police Science. Vol.43, No.5 (Jan.-Feb. 1 953), pp.660-61.
50 Memorandum for record, dated 2 1 /2 /4 7  [GS(B) 02306].
51 Yoshida Government Plan, dated 2 8 /2 /4 7  (NDL, G-2 02747).
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estab lishm ent o f "a national police fo rce ...fo r the purpose o f 
executing and taking charge o f m atters th a t may concern the 
national interest..., and o f maintaining contact w ith and regulation 
o f the police activities of the local public bodies...". Thus, units of 
the national force were to  be empowered to  "re g u la te " th e ir 
supposedly autonomous, metropolitan counterparts.
Pulliam advocated a force o f "30 ,000  uniformed police (under) a 
Department of Public Safety in the Japanese government", the final 
residue o f a process of gradual shrinkage o f the national police. The 
slack would be taken up by local police forces "in cities and towns 
with populations capable of supporting the (m )". Pulliam stated tha t 
it was "necessary to  increase the overall strength of the Japanese 
police (from  around 94 ,000) to  125,000", suggesting tha t local, 
m etropolitan police forces would eventually absorb 95 ,000  police 
o f f i c i a l s . 5 2  The Japanese Government requested tha t "the  overall 
police strength be increased to  125,000 to ta l", reiterating tha t "the 
national police shall have a strength o f 30 ,000  uniformed police 
officials under a central headquarters". This was to  supported by 
e igh t regional headquarters - Pulliam called fo r "six or more 
regional sub-divisions fo r reasons o f e ff ic ie n t adm in is tra tion , 
operation and con tro l". Perhaps the  m ost in te res tin g  parallel 
between the two documents concerned the "transition...from  national 
to  local government c o n t r o l " . 53  The government warned tha t "the 
enforcement from May 3rd (1947 ) of the New Constitution" would 
result in "drastic changes in the local adm inistrative system " and 
the consequent loss of much of the central government's authority. 
Such circumstances, the Cabinet argued, demanded prudence and 
re s tra in t:
The Japanese Government as well as the whole nation desires that the 
transition period be carried out peacefully with tranquillity and 
stability. Until the foundation of the local administrative bodies Is 
established and their employees....have passed through the most critical 
period, it is required that the most stabilized condition of the nation 
should prevail.
52 30 ,000  national police (+ 95 ,000  municipal police) = total numerical strength of 
1 2 5 ,0 0 0
53 Pulliam's memorandum for record, dated 2 1 /2 /4 7  [GS(B) 02306].
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That the Japanese police were the essential guarantors o f s ta b ility  
was a view already endorsed by Pulliam - they would ensure tha t 
changes would take place in an atmosphere o f "tra n q u illity  and 
s ta b ility ". The chief o f PSD was convinced tha t a national police 
system was indispensable "during th is critica l period", when "a 
democratic form of local self-government" was establishing itself:
Since it is not...desirable to use Occupation troops...there is no other 
reasonable or logical alternative except to provide the Japanese 
government with a law enforcement agency on a national level capable of 
maintaining law and order until such time as the officials of local self- 
governing bodies have demonstrated proficiency.
Disturbed by "prevailing economic and social cond itions...and ...the  
continual upward trend in crime ra te", Pulliam surely endorsed 
Yoshida's view tha t "hasty reorganisation o f the...(po lice) system 
(m ig h t) no t only bring about confusion and ine ffic iency  of 
adm inistration, but (also) would a ffec t the functioning o f o ther 
administrative agencies, creating public unrest and confusion in law
and order".54
Thus, the message of both documents as far as police reform was 
concerned was "wait and see". The questions tha t needed answering 
related to  the quality o f local government officials and the ability 
o f municipalities to  finance the ir own police departments. Pulliam 
insisted th a t the issues he raised re fle c ted  "th e  considered 
judgem ent and recommendations of outstanding s p e c i a l i s t s " 5 5  (ie. 
V a len tine  and O lander). PSD's p roposed  plan com b ined  
decentra lisation at some tim e in the fu tu re  w ith  im m e d ia te  
preparation (recru itm ent and tra in ing) o f a national rural police. 
Likewise, the Japanese Government saw the la tte r as a priority:
Commence the establishment of the national police force immediately in 
order to be prepared for the national needs when com plete  
decentralisation of the present system occurs.
5"^  Ail the quotations contained in this paragraph, and the one immediately preceding it, 
come from the two documents under examination.
55 Memorandum for Record, dated 2 1 /2 /4 7  [GS(B) 02306].
56 Principles for...(Yoshida Government Plan), 2 8 /2 /4 7  (NDL, G-2 02747).
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Yoshida and his colleagues, as has been intimated, approved of the 
Public Safety Division's programme of reform. However, there was 
divergence on "administrative m atters":^^
(The Japanese Government) recommended retention of the existing 
administrative organisation with prefectural governors exercising 
executive authority under the supervision and control of the Minstry of 
Home Affairs, which would retain powers to appoint and dismiss 
officials.^®
This was not a tac tfu l suggestion - the Home M instry had been 
identified as the chief support o f Japan's wartime regime, and many 
in GHQ, particularly in GS, were looking forward to  its abolition. 
Nevertheless, the Cabinet was unabashed, expressing its intention to  
introduce the plan "in the present session o f the Diet which (was) 
expected to  be closed within a short period of time because of the 
impending general election".59
The Japanese Government's proposals, however, "ran counter to  
Government Section's cherished ideal of a completely decentralised 
a d m in is tra tio n ".60 On 24th March, 1947, the Public Safety Division 
convened a meeting to  discuss "the  reorganisation and increase in 
s tre n g th  o f the Japanese p o l ic e " .C o lo n e l  Pulliam gave an 
in troductory ta lk outlining the purpose o f the meeting, which was 
presumably to  sell the PSD's plan to  GS, represented by Cecil Tilton. 
The la tte r expressed reservations w ith regard to  "a dual police 
capacity"62 and the institution of "reg ions",63 seeing both as threats 
to  the independence of elected prefectural governors. Tilton assured 
the others tha t "the tax program" would provide municipalities "w ith  
far more funds than they had ever had before"64 - postponing
5^ Historv of the Non-Militarv Activities of the Occupation of Japan. M.55, p .21.
58 IW .
59 Memo, dated 2 8 /2 /4 7  (accompanied the Yoshida Government Plan); To: GHQ SCAP; 
From: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo (the intermediary organisation between GHQ and the 
Japanese Government); Subject: Reorganisation and Increase in Strength of Japanese 
police force.
66 H. E. Wildes,"The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law. Criminoloav 
and Police Science. p.661.
61 Conference stenographic notes, dated 2 4 /3 /4 7  (NDL, G-2 00247),
62 Ibid.. p.2.
63 Ibid.. p.7.
64 Ibid.. p.4.
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decentra lisation on the basis o f inadequate local budgets was 
therefore unnecessary. Pulliam warned again hasty decentralisation, 
a course of action tha t would "turn the nation over to  the pinks and 
reds". The PSD chief had serious reservations w ith regard to  GS's 
elevation o f the prefectural governor:
....if legal democracy unlimited is provided, the governor could take over 
completely. We could have secession. The governor could use his police 
power without restraint and prevent an ounce of rice, foodstuffs or other 
commodities from entering or leaving his prefecture.
Mr. Unkeless of ESS insisted tha t "no im m ediate decentra lisa tion 
should be considered" until the economy was stable. Tilton's was the 
only dissenting voice - the other officials present endorsed PSD's 
plan, some arguing tha t it unnecessarily w eakened  the police! 
Colonel Purdy (Eighth Army) found it d ifficu lt to  understand GS's 
opposition "to  any national force which can be moved from one place 
to  a n o t h e r " . 66 Purdy insisted tha t a national police force with mobile 
units was the key to  con tro lling  "s itua tions which may arise 
unexpectedly".67
T ilto n 's  com m ents during the  m ee ting  were s u rp ris in g ly  
r e s t r a i n e d , 68 suggesting that GS d i d  not yet know enough about PSD's 
plan to  mount a full-scale offensive against it. By the 12th April, 
however, the section was rehearsing arguments to  be used against 
the Yoshida Government/PSD plan, and anticipating the opposition's 
line of defence:
It is likely that very few, if any, members of the Government Section 
could qualify as police experts and it is likely that such an allegation will 
be made against any criticisms which are made by this section....®®
66 ibid.. p.3.
66 Ibid.. p.4
67 1^ .  PSD proposed a national force that was anchored in the rural areas. Purdy seems
to have preferred a central police force - located in Tokyo - that could immediately be
sent to any trouble spot.
68 Surprising given Tilton's commitment to local autonomy and in the light of the fierce 
disagreements that raged during the summer of 1947.
69 Memo for the Deputy Chief, Government Section, dated 1 2 /4 /4 7 ; From Guy Swope; 
Subject: Reorganisation of the Japanese Police System [NDL, GS(B) 02306].
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Directing his comments to  Charles Kades, Guy Swope, head o f the 
National Government Division, drew a tten tion  to  "the  record o f 
dictatorships, more especially those o f recent years, (and the ir) use 
o f centralised police forces in the ruthless liquidation of opposing 
elements". Thus, it followed tha t "the very firs t requisite in th e  
re o rga n isa tio n  o f the Japanese police system  (should) be 
decentralisation". Unfortunately, this was not appreciated by PSD:
The subject plan pays lip service to decentralisation at some vague future 
date but accepts with very little change in substance the over-centralised 
police system as it has been developed during the years of growing 
dictatorship.
Swope argued th a t Pulliam 's Jus tifica tio n  fo r delay - the  
adm in istrative im m aturity  o f prefectura l and local officials - was 
se lf-genera ting :
This plan, which would practically throw a national espionage system 
over the prefectural and municipal governments, could...prevent those 
governments from ever reaching the point where they would be 
considered qualified to take over the police system in their communities.
Reversion to  "the  use of powerful regional o ffic ia ls" was also a 
cause for concern. Swope contended tha t regional directors would 
bypass prefectural governors, preferring to  discuss police m atters 
w ith prefectura l superintendents - he alleged tha t e ffo rts  were 
being made "to  isolate the governor w ith respect to  police m atters". 
A t the end o f the memo Kades expressed his approval of Swope's 
arguments by writing "I agree" and then signing his initials.
Cecil Tilton, who had been in a minority o f one at the conference in 
March, developed some o f Swope's points in a comprehensive 
critique of the proposed new police structure, conveyed to  General 
Whitney on 25th  April, 1947.^1 His th irteen page report clearly 
reveals tha t GS was now in receipt of PSD's detailed proposals, and 
was determined to  obstruct their passage into law. According to  
T ilton, the Public Safety Division had circu lated its  plan to  all
The source for all the above quotations is Swope's memo for the Deputy Chief, dated 
1 2 /4 /4 7 .
Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, dated 2 5 /4 /4 7 ; Subject: A Plan for 
the Japanese Police Structure [NDL, GS(B) 02306].
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in terested s ta ff sections, hoping to  a ttra c t the ir support prior to  
formal submission. Pulliam and his colleagues asserted th a t the ir 
"prim ary ob jective was the maintenance o f internal s ta b ility  in 
Japan conducive to  a tranquil Occupation and the development of 
s tron g  and dem ocra tica lly  hea lthy a u to n o m o u s  m u n ic ip a l 
g o v e r n m e n t s " . ^ 2  They proposed a reform process comprising tw o 
stages - a preparatory phase followed by "gradual decentralisation 
of the present national system". Although recruitment, education and 
training were areas targeted for reform during Phase One, the police 
structure, subject to  only minor modification, was to  remain much 
as before - "a national police system headed by a Director General, 
w ith six or more regional d istric ts, 46 prefectural divisions and 
approxim ately 1,164 d is tr ic t s ta tions". S tructura l reform  would 
take place during Phase Two, and would culminate in a dual police 
system - "....over 100 police departments controlled and operated by 
the local municipalities w ith populations (o f over 50 ,000) capable 
of supporting the(m, and) a national rural police, or Department of 
Public Safety, ...serv(ing) all areas of the country falling outside the 
boundaries o f m un ic ipa litie s  op e ra ting  in d e p e n d e n t po lice
departments".^3
The Public Safety Division listed the various fac tors  th a t had 
"determined the general character of the overall recommendations". 
Most o f these have already been m entioned, pa rticu la rly  such 
concerns as "the  s tab ility  o f the existing economic and soc ia l 
s itua tion" and "the  need for an agency capable o f maintaining 
internal s ta b ility  during the trans ition  period from  cen tra lised  
governm ent to  local autonom y". In te resting ly , th ree o f these 
"determ ining factors" amount to  im plicit criticisms o f US policy. 
The increase in crime is attributed, amongst other things, to  "a more 
liberal in terpretation of individual rights"; it is suggested th a t the 
US learn from  its  m istakes in th e  P h ilipp ines, w here 
decentralisation of law enforcement gave way to  "a strong national 
m ilitary police force"; finally, the authors lament "the  w o rld w id e  
m isconception o f what the Japanese police actua lly represent
^2 Public Safety Division Plan for Japanese Police Decentralisation - undated [NDL, 
GS(B) 0 23 0 6 ].
^3 The above quotations can be found in Public Safety Division Plan for Japanese Police 
Decentralisation.
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{b rought about by our own thoughtless indictments  and the 
consequent critical a ttitude  of the world in whatever reforms are 
introduced in Japan"/^
Guy Swope considered this to  be a startling  admission - one tha t 
implied tha t the US had "wrongfully attacked the iniquities of th e  
Japanese police s y s te m "/^  If tha t was the case - he certainly didn't 
think so - then perhaps the Occupation authorities "should be honest 
enough to  apo log ise "/^  The head of the Local Government Division, 
Tilton, preferred argument to  sarcasm, declaring tha t there was "no 
misconception whatsoever as to  the domineering and at times brutal 
conduct o f the Japanese civil police as it ha(d) functioned as....part 
o f an extraord inary police s t a t e " . ^ 8  Scrutinising the various 
"de te rm in ing  fa c to rs " posited by PSD, T ilton  dismissed th e  
"incongruous comparison w ith the Philippine Commonwealth", and 
sought to  turn the argument around - in fact, " it  (was) their (the 
Filipinos') unlikeness which point(ed) towards the non-necessity o f 
a national system in Japan". Moreover, he did not share PSD's 
misgivings with regard to  the vulnerability o f local police forces - 
"adequate provision (could) easily be made for lawful assistance to  
be rendered by one or more prefectures to  a disturbed neighbour" in 
the event o f a crisis. The "inferred financial one" was the only 
argum ent th a t T ilton  was w illing to  acknow ledge, if  on ly 
tem porarily  - " th e  recons truc te d  financia l system  and tax 
program ...w ill allow local budgets to  m eet th e ir m anagement 
requirements adequately".
It was not surprising th a t the ch ie f o f the Local Government 
Division was active in the in itia l skirm ishes between the tw o 
sections. Adamant tha t "the growth o f democracy" was impossible
My italics.
The "principal determining factors" are listed in Public Safety Division Plan for 
Japanese Police Decentralisation [GS(B) 02306].
Memo for the Deputy Chief, Government Section, dated 1 2 /4 /4 7 ; From Guy Swope; 
Subject: Reorganisation of the Japanese Police System [NDL, GS(B) 02306].
Ibid.
Memo for the Chief, Government Section, dated 2 5 /4 /4 7 ;  Subject: A Plan for the 
Japanese Police Structure [NDL, GS(B) 02306]. This is the source for the remainder of 
this section.
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under a highly centralised police system, his language was both 
alarmist and uncompromising:
....this quasi national system preserves an evil nexus with the past 
autocratic central domination....(its) adoption....would bring upon SCAP 
the unwarranted criticism of the entire world.
Acknowledging the need for construc tive  critic ism , Government 
Section was determined to  develop a realistic alternative to  PSD's 
plan. T ilton recommended "the passage o f a well-defined national 
law which provide(d) for a decentralised civil police s tructu re  for 
Japan at prefectural and municipal levels...". Only during "tim es of 
national crisis..." could the government exercise control over these 
police forces. Thus, GS proposed to  break with tradition, to  rid Japan 
of a centralised police system, and to  en trust the jo b  o f law 
enforcement to  the prefectures and cities. The Department o f Public 
Safety would represent the only surviving trace of a national police 
system - considering tha t it would merely supervise such agencies 
as the police academy, the scientific crime detection la b o ra to ry , 
and the bureau o f identification, th is cannot have been o f much 
consolation to  the Japanese Government. In short, GS envisaged a 
police s truc tu re  composed o f four elements - p re fectura l and 
municipal police forces on the one hand, and a Department o f Public 
Safety and "special government police" (ie. railway guards, customs 
officials etc.) on the other.
T ilton 's memorandum o f 25 th  April foreshadowed the  co n flic t 
between GS and G-2 tha t would erupt during the summer. Both 
parties were determined to  figh t it out, seeing the fa te  o f the 
Japanese police system as intrinsically bound up w ith tha t o f the 
Occupation itse lf. The fierce debate th a t followed Government 
Section's refusal to  approve PSD's plan pointed up differences tha t 
went beyond the reform of the police - they could not agree on the 
aims of the Occupation, its achievements up to  tha t point and the 
role o f the  US fo llow ing w ithdrawal from  Japan. C onflic ting  
analyses o f the relationship between power and human r ig h ts  
revealed ideological, philosophical differences. Both sides sought to  
demonstrate the strength of their arguments by employing historical 
precedent to  good effect. Even "the Patrician thinkers of society in
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the c ity  states of ancient Greece"^9 were considered useful allies in 
the battle that ensued.
A Clash o f Principles
Considering th a t the responsibility fo r police reform  had been 
vested in the Civil Intelligence Section early on in the O c c u p a t i o n , 8 0  
it was perhaps surprising tha t Government Section tried to  promote 
a plan of its own. There were several reasons for doing so - the 
principal jus tifica tion  was spelled out in February, 1947, when GS 
requested a copy of PSD's plan for police reorganisation , insisting 
tha t it was "d ifficu lt to  introduce bills - basic codes of law - into 
the Diet until the problem of organisation of the police force ha(d) 
been s o l v e d " . Pulliam's response was less than accommodating:
I do not accept that essentially Jurisprudential legislation of basic bills 
on codes of law, court structure, civil codes and codes of civil and 
criminal procedure are wholly dependent on national police structure.^z
He refused to  accept tha t Government Section's responsibility for 
constitu tiona l/legal reform necessitated consultation w ith G-2 on a 
re lated m atter, namely the s truc tu re  and organisation o f the 
Japanese police. Thus, the m atter remained unresolved when the new 
constitution and Local Autonomy Law took effect on 3rd May, 1947. 
These affirm ed GS's determ ination to  close the gap between 
government and the people and to  redress the balance between the 
two. As far as Whitney's section was concerned the Occupation 
should err on the side o f the Japanese people. Willoughby, Pulliam 
and others in G-2, however, preferred to  err on the side of the State.
CIS comments on Government Section's non-concurrence to Police Reorganisation 
Plan, undated, paragraph 3.b. (NDL, G-2 02748)
80 Military Intelligence Section, General Staff - Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, 
undated: "General Order No.13, SCAP, 1945 ...d irec t(ed ) that CIS/G-2 make 
recommendations relative to measures which will provide a civil police system in Japan 
adequate for the accomplishment of the objectives of the Occupation forces".
(NDL, G-2 0 2 7 7 0 )
81 Check Sheet, dated 1 0 /2 /4 7 ; From: GS; To: PSD, attn. Colonel Pulliam; Subject: 
Reorganisation of Japanese Police System (G-2 00240 ).
82 Check Sheet, dated 4 /3 /4 7 ;  From: G-2; To: GS. It began frostily with the officious 
statement that GS's "communication should have been addressed to G-2 under the explicit 
terms of paragraph 1, Government Order 22, SCAP, 3 /5 /4 6 ...."
(G-2 0 0 2 4 0 )
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A reflection o f the ir differing remits, th is was the basic point o f 
divergence, and a useful starting point for an examination of the 
gu lf th a t separated them concerning the decentralisation o f the 
Japanese police system.
On the 17th July, 1947, Government Section informed G-2 tha t it did 
"not concur in...the Police Reorganisation Plan...".83 The plight of the 
Japanese people dictated tha t PSD's gradualist, piecemeal approach 
to  the devolution of police power be summarily rejected:
Decentralisation, immediate and final, is required in order...to free the 
Japanese people from continued and minute regimentation by the central 
government, in particular from fear of an agency whose entire history 
has been characterised by cruelty and coercion, intimidation and 
retaliation against those who failed to conform to the orders of that
government. 84
CIS/G-2 sprang to  the defence o f the Japanese police, contending 
th a t the force o f 1947 was very d iffe re n t from  its  wartim e 
counterpart. Above all, Pulliam and his colleagues urged th a t a 
distinction be drawn between the police as an institu tion on the one 
hand, and the police as the key support o f a defunct wartime regime 
on the other:
Internal police power implements are indispensable aids to sound 
government. This line of reasoning®  ^would advocate the destruction of the 
Roman Catholic Church because of the Spanish Inquisition.86
The Civil Intelligence Section maintained tha t the Japanese police 
were the scapegoats for the m ilitary's excesses during the 1930s 
and early 1940s. Certa in ly, Governm ent Section seemed to  
concentrate the blame for Japan's aggression on the police:
...perhaps more than any other single agency the state police contributed 
to the development of that docility and passiveness of the Japanese people
83 Check Sheet, dated 1 7 /7 /4 7 ; Subject; Police Reorganisation Plan [NDL, GS(B) 
0 2 3 0 6 ]
84 Ibid.. paragraph 2.d.
83 Refers to GS Check Sheet, paragraph 2.d. (the previous quotation).
88 CIS comments on GS's non-concurrence to Police Reorganisation Plan, para. 2.d. 
(NDL, G-2 0 27 4 8 ).
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which made possible the promotion of aggressive warfare at the behest of 
a handful of leaders in the Central Government.®^
Those responsible for public safety countered tha t "the police did 
not make possible an aggressive w a r " . 8 8  The Japanese Government 
saw the police as an instrument o f national mobilisation. CIS argued 
tha t it  was no different from other governments in this respect - 
the police could "assist to ta l war in any country under any 
s y s te m ".89 It was im portant to  d iffe ren tia te  between the political 
system  taking shape and the wartime regime tha t preceded it. 
Rather than "rem ind (ing ) people o f e ither m ilitarism  or o f 
re ta lia to ry  measures of any kind w hatsoever....the existence o f 
police under a democratic governm ent" served to  deter those 
contemplating crime or insurrection.so
GS disagreed, warning tha t "fear o f the national police" would 
inhibit "the  flowering of local government and...that quickening o f 
the mind and independence o f spirit which alone (could) guarantee 
the continued development o f democracy in Japan".si R. W. Reid, 
special assistant to  Kades, claimed tha t a central police force was 
incom patib le w ith  viable local se lf-governm ent - "local ch ie f 
executives (would) soon find themselves bereft o f the very powers 
necessary to  assert and maintain the ir new position in the  
governmental structure o f J a p a n " . S2 Reid warned tha t anything short 
of immediate and final decentralisation of the police system would 
place "unnecessary stresses and strains upon the new structure o f 
g o ve rn m e n t, which was conce ived  on the  princ ip le  o f 
decentralisation and (would) thus be to rn  between con flic ting  
Occupation ideologies".83 The pragmatists in CIS countered tha t men 
like Reid did not live in the real world:
87 GS Memorandum for Record, dated 1 7 /7 /4 7 ; From: R. W. E. Reid, Special Assistant 
to the Deputy Chief; Subject: Reorganisation of the Japanese Police Force; Paragraph 
7.b. Memo accompanied GS Check Sheet stating non-concurrence [NDL, GS(B) 02306].
88 CIS comments on GS's non-concurrence, para. 3.i (NDL, G-2 02748).
89 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Reid's memo, dated 1 7 /7 /4 7 , para. 7.b [NDL, GS(B) 02306].
82 Ibid.. para. 7.d.
83 Ibid.
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In a country where controlled economy will be necessary for years to 
come, it is ridiculous to even consider that local officials can be entrusted 
with the problems involved, nor could they be expected to work them out 
on a scale calculated to benefit the nation..
The Economic and S cien tific  Section had expressed s im ila r  
m isgivings regarding decentralisation at the end o f 1946.95 a  
balance had to  be struck between liberating the Japanese people 
from government controls on the one hand, and ensuring equal/ fair 
d is tribu tion of scarce commodities on the other. The la tte r task 
demanded central direction, a policy option tha t GS was loath to  
support.
There seems to  have been a psychological fault line running through 
GHQ, a fissure th a t caused Occupation o ffic ia ls  to  consider 
them selves e ithe r p ra g m a tis ts /so ld ie rs  or id e a lis ts /c iv ilia n s . 
These are crude categories th a t tend to  sim plify and d is to rt 
complex, m ultifaceted struggles. Still, the fac t th a t the con flic t 
over police reform was seen by contemporaries in such s im p lis tic  
term s is interesting in itself, suggesting tha t participants liked to  
iden tify  w ith one or the other grouping. Commenting on GS's 
op po s itio n  to  its  police plan, the  Civil In te lligence Section 
described the impressive phalanx defending its position:
Perhaps the desire for the destruction of central government agencies 
should be re-examined with infinite care when practical common sense 
civilian experts, and military men whose shrewd calculations won the 
greatest struggle in history, recommend the proposed police 
reorganisation plan....^^
According to  CIS, Reid called for "m ilita ry  considerations...to be 
u tte rly  disregarded".9^ GS was staffed by "inexperienced p l a n n e r s " 9 8  
with to ta lly  unrealistic expectations, "idea lis ts" who wished " to  
throw  the burden of national government in adddition to  local 
governm ent on local autonomous bodies before they  (w ere) 
thoroughly o r g a n i s e d " . 9 9  CIS scathingly dismissed Reid's statem ent
94 CIS comments on GS's non-concurrence, para. 3.k (NDL, G-2 02748).
95 See footnote 46.
95 CIS coments on GS's non-concurrence, para. 3.e (NDL, G-2 02748). 
9^ Ibid.. para. 3.d.
99 Ibid.. para. 3.a.
99 IW ., para. 3 .a (7).
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of the aims and accomplishments o f the Occupation, and ridiculed 
GS's e fforts to  achieve the impossible. The removal of "all obstacles 
to ....d e m o c ra tic  tendencies"^oo was not as stra ightforw ard as 
implied - US experience in the Philippines suggested th a t a ttem pts 
at fundamental social change, particularly w ith regard to  the family 
sys tem , were fu tU e .io i As fo r "inculcation o f resp ec t fo r 
fu n d a m e n ta l human r i g h t s " ,  ^ 02 th is  task was not to  be 
underestimated:
It means that the entire Oriental cultural stream is to be bent back upon 
itself. 400  years of occupation of Gaul by the Romans and 946 years of 
Norman influence have not sufficed in either instance to change the deep 
immutable stream of culture to any degree which can be said to be more 
than superficial.^
Moreover, the process o f "m odif(y ing)...the feudal and authoritarian 
tendencies of the central g o v e r n m e n t "  i 0 4  was a protracted one tha t 
could "no t be hurried by senseless de s truc tion  o f ex is t(ing ) 
a g e n c i e s " . 1 0 5  gs was accused of destroying "old patterns of conduct 
and power...w ith no particular design for new patterns which are, 
however, e n c o u r a g e d " .  106 Above all, CIS charged th a t "idealists 
(were) s triv ing to  pin the responsib ility fo r the failure of the ir 
ineffectua l a ttem p ts  at reform in law and governm ent on an 
i r r e l e v a n t . . . i s s u e " . ! 0 7  Such damning critic ism s te s tif ie d  to  the 
resentment unleashed by GS's rejection o f PSD's police plan. The 
negative tone of CIS's comments would not have pleased MacArthur, 
a leader w ith a weakness for se lf-congratu la tion. The Supreme 
Commander would have approved o f Reid's sense o f mission and his 
penchant for melodrama:
...the long term objectives of the Occupation...must be lifted above the 
residue of ruined hopes and cities, stripped of ties which would chain 
them to considerations of a purely ephemeral or military nature, and
100 Reid's memo, dated 1 7 /7 /4 7 , para. 1 [NDL, GS(B) 02306].
101 CIS comments on GS's non-concurrence, para. 3.a (3).
102 Reid's memo, dated 1 7 /7 /4 7 , para. 1.
103 CIS comments on GS's non-concurrence, para. 3.a (2).
104 Reid's memo, dated 1 7 /7 /4 7 , para. 1.
105 CIS comments on GS's non-concurrence, para. 3.a (6).
106 Ibid.. para. 3.c.
107 1^ . ,  para. 3 .a.(8 )
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visualised as components of a final structure which must and will stand
the test of historyJ os
Kades' special assistant contended that the test of history was to  be 
negotiated by Japan alone - the end of the Occupation would signal 
the birth o f a democratic, sovereign nation. "Immediate and drastic 
reform " o f the police system was necessary in order " to  satisfy 
world public opinion",^ 09 concerned w ith the past and the future. It 
was not ju s t a question o f preventing "outrageous violations o f  
personal libe rties, individual d ign ity  and fundam enta l human 
r i g h t s " . !  1 0  Equally important was a commitment on the part o f the 
United States not to  meddle in Japan's internal affairs following 
w ithdrawal. Reid linked immediate decentralisation w ith a post- 
Occupation policy tha t the world could respect: "If the police force 
of Japan (remained) centra lised....critics would imply ( th a t)  the 
central police force was to lerated as the principal instrum ent of 
post-O ccupation contro l o f J a p a n ".!!! Willoughby, Pulliam and 
others in CIS/G-2 reminded colleagues in GS o f "the  prodigious 
e ffo rts  the United States (was) making to  stop the world march of 
com m un ism ".! !2 it was essential tha t the withdrawal of Am erican 
forces was followed by an alliance o f some sort - "the United States 
(could not), less than any other nation on earth, wash its hands of 
what happen(ed) in Japan after the Occupation".! !3 As for the charge 
tha t "a central police force (was) encouraged as a major instrument 
o f American post-Occupation control of Japan", CIS was reluctant 
to  even address such a "stock communistic critic ism ".! !4
The exchange o f insults tha t accompanied the debate over police 
reform revealed fundamental differences between GS and G-2. The 
tw o sections defended philosophical/ideological positions tha t were 
diam etrically opposed. Whilst Kades' special assistant regarded 
"power" and "the rights of man" as irreconcilable, contending tha t
!98 Reid's memo, dated 1 7 /7 /4 7 , para. 4.
!09  GS Check Sheet, dated 1 7 /7 /4 7  (non-concurrence), para. 2.c [GS(B) 02306]. 
! ! Q Ibid.
! ! ! Reid's memo, dated 1 7 /7 /4 7 , para. 2.e.
! ! 2 CIS comments, para. 3.1.
! ! 3 Ibid.
! !4  Ibid.. para. 2.g.
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"coordination (was) preferable to  c e n tra lis a tio n " ,1 C IS  adopted an 
altogether more pragmatic approach to  politics and government:
Men do not cooperate readily, they bring matters to an issue at which 
point superior authority steps in to remove the impasse. This superior 
authority or power is indestructible, it must be wielded and always is.iiG
Given tha t the tw o parties could not even agree on a common 
theo re tica l position, it was not surprising th a t the process of 
mutual accommodation was so fraught w ith difficulties.
A t the end of his memorandum of the 1 7th July, Reid stated tha t
"decentralisation of the police force must come w ithout delay it
must be full and final....and tha t continued failure to  act on th is 
m a tte r (was) a reproach to  claims o f the dém ocratisation o f 
J a p a n . . . . " .^  CIS countered tha t GS did not appreciate "the practical 
problems facing both the Occupation authorities and the Japanese 
G overnm ent".118 The section responsible for reforming the Japanese 
police refused to  gamble "w ith the hopes, money and reputation of 
the United States Government which (had) invested....heavily in the 
future of Japan as a democracy".11  ^ A t the beginning o f August, 
1947, Pulliam penned a spirited defence o f the PSD plan - he 
declared tha t "as Hammurabi, Genghis Khan, Cesar Borgia and Charles 
V had each relied upon a centralised police, Japan should do 
l i k e w i s e " . 1 2 0  The chief of the Public Safety Division recommended 
"tha t the democratic state government o f Japan be provided with an 
adequate internal security power im plement".121 Drawing a parallel 
between the Covenant of the League o f Nations and Government 
Section's proposals, Pulliam encapsulated the collision over police 
reform - "mawkish sentim entality over the individual rights of man"
115 Reid's memo, para. 2.
110 CIS comments, para. 3.b.
11^ Reid's memo, para. 8.
118 CIS comments, para. 3.p.
118 Ibid.. para. 3.q.
120 H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law. Criminology 
and Police Science. p.661.
121 Memo dated 5 /8 /4 7 ; Subject: Democratic Stable Government and Internal Security 
Power Implements [GS(B) 02298]
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could not coexist w ith "practica l considerations in a world o f
eternal c o n f l i c t " . 22
Advising the Katavama Government
In July, 1947, Government Section re jected not only the police 
reorganisation plan presented by PSD, but also "the  proposed 
directive to  the Japanese Government" tha t accompanied itJ ^ s y h e  
la tte r implied that the new government of Katayama Tetsu, who had 
succeeded Yoshida as Prime Minister in May 1947, was incapable or 
unwilling to  formulate its own police plan. GS insisted tha t this was 
not the case - Katayama's government had "evidenced every desire to  
approach such problem s w ith  courage and fu ll honesty o f 
p u r p o s e . . . " . ^ 2 4  I n  fact, Whitney's section was so sure tha t they could 
tru s t the new administration with police reorganisation th a t they 
had told it to  start afresh:
This section has informed the present Government in unmistakable terms 
that in connection with such plans of internal organisation it is not bound 
by any plans formed by its predecessor and is entirely free to approach 
these problems, as yet unsolved, from the new, broader and more 
enlightened concept to which the present government shows every
evidence of a d h e r i n g J 25
Just as PSD had helped Yoshida's government draw up a police plan, 
so GS expected to  influence Katayama's draft. Thus, the real meaning 
o f "more enlightened" was more amenable to  the wishes o f Whitney, 
Kades et al. "The....leader of the Social Democrats, a pious Christian, 
a shrewd labour lawyer and a devout f e m i n i s t " ,  ^2 6  Katayama was the 
ideal Prime Minister as far as Government Section was concerned. 
Immediately a fter the elections he had assured his supporters tha t 
together they would "struggle against the conservative reactionary 
camp and carry out a revolution through the D i e t " . ' 2 7  Such 
declarations encouraged ambitious reformers to  seize the in itiative.
 ^22 Ibid.
 ^23 GS Check Sheet, dated 1 7 /7 /4 7  (non-concurrence), para.1 [GS(B) 02306].
 ^24 Ibid.. para.3.
T 25 Ibid., para.4.
 ^26 Gayn, Japan Diarv (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1 981 ) p.488.
 ^27 Quoted in A. Cole, G. Totten, and C. Uyehara, Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan (Yale 
University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1966)p .15.
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Kades decided to  hijack the issue o f police reorganisation, to  
secretly liaise w ith cooperative Cabinet members and to  surprise 
PSD w ith a Japanese government plan more in tune w ith  GS's 
proposals. Naturally, the pretence o f non-intervention was to  be 
upheld - an open dialogue was out of the question, given tha t PSD's 
d irective had been rejected on the grounds tha t the Japanese 
Government should be allowed to  draft its own plan.
The Judicial Adm inistration and Police System Reform Committee, 
established in the Japanese Cabinet on the 15th July, 1947, was set 
up by Government Section d i r e c t i v e . 1 2 8  it  was the firs t o f several 
manoeuvres on the part of Kades, determined to  overturn the plan for 
police reorganisation under consideration. The com m ittee consisted 
of five Cabinet members appointed by Katayama: Suzuki Yoshio, the 
Justice Minister, who acted as chairman; Nishio Suehiro, C h ie f 
Secretary o f the Cabinet; H itotsumatsu Sadakichi, Welfare Minister; 
Saito Takao, M inister o f S tate; and Kimura Kozaemon, Home 
M i n i s t e r . 1 2 9  /\s was later made clear by PSD, Government Section 
authorized this com m ittee to  assume sole responsibility for police 
reform :
GS memorandum, marked "confidential", for the Director General of the 
Cabinet Secretariat, in effect took from the Home Minister all matters 
pertaining to police reorganisation and placed that authority in a Cabinet 
Committee appointed by the Prime M i n i s t e r . ^
Clearly, Kades had not set up a committee to  then leave it to  its own 
devices - it was seen as the vehicle for Government Section's more 
enlightened proposals and Suzuki, the chairman, was to  be the 
chauffeur. On the 19th July Whitney's deputy "practically dictated a 
fairly detailed police plan to  Suzuki",131 which was not discussed by 
the cabinet com m ittee . Its members la ter assured Pulliam th a t 
"there were no committee meetings on police reorganisation...from
128 Miura Yôichi, "Senryôka Keisatsu Kaikaku no Ichi Danmen: 1 947-nen 9-gatsu 16- 
nichi Makkâsâ Shokan no Seiritsu Katei", Rekishiqaku Kenkvû. 498  (Nov. 1981) p.37.
129 Ibid.
130 Memo for record, dated 4 /9 /4 7 ;  Subject: Development of Suzuki Plan for Police 
Reorganisation; From: Pulliam (NDL, G-2 0 2767 ).
131 Memo to Commander-in-Chief, dated 6 /9 /4 7 ;  Subject: Unilateral Government 
Section Action re. Police Plan (NDL, G-2 02767).
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10 July 1947 to  8 August 1 9 4 7 " J 32 Thus, when PSD received the 
Suzuki plan from Government Section on the 8th August, 1947, it 
was clear tha t Its supposed author had been "playing a lone h a n d " J  3 3
Nevertheless, the Justice Minister had subm itted a "com m ittee plan" 
to  Government Section on 29th JulyJ 34 whether or not he consulted 
w ith  his co lleagues is less im p o rta n t than h i s / t h e i r  
recommendations, which corresponded closely with those o f GS - 
immediate devolution of police power to  the six largest cities and 
prefectures, combined with drastic reduction o f the national police 
force. These proposals undermined the Public Safety Division's call 
fo r gradual decentralisation and the maintenance of a national 
police force. According to  its chief , "PSD had no knowledge o f the 
existence o f any police plan (other than its own) prior to  receipt of 
(the Suzuki) p a p e r " , 1 3 5  suggesting tha t Kades had been successful in 
his e ffo rts  to  surprise the authors o f the original police plan. 
However, Pulliam's account o f what happened indicates th a t his 
division was not caught completely unawares:
About 26 July 1947, PSD was informed that a paper of instructions from
Mr. Kades, concerning police reorganisation was somewhere in the
Japanese Government....By devious methods a Japanese translation of the
paper was obtained.^
It appears tha t the Public Safety Division was very busy during the 
last week o f July. While "specific persons in PSD and the Bureau of 
Police w e re ...( try in g )to  locate and obtain a copy (o f Kades' 
i n s t r u c t i o n s ) " , !  3 7  other o ffic ia ls were inv iting  the  Cabinet 
committee, o f which Suzuki was a member, to  dinner at the Imperial 
Hotel on the night o f the 26 th  July. U n fo rtunate ly , only th ree  
attended, "together with appropriate Bureau of Police o f f i c i a l s " . ! 3 8  
It was clear tha t PSD was trying to  regain the initiative w ith regard
! 32 Ibid.
!33 1^.
! 34 Miura Yôichi,"Senryôka Keisatsu Kaikaku no Ichi Danmen", p.37.
! 35 Memo for record, dated 4 /9 /4 7 ;  Subject: Development of Suzuki Plan for Police 
Reorganisation; From: Pulliam (NDL, G-2 02767).
! 38 Ibid.
! 37 Ibid.
! 38 Ibid.
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to  police reform, even though it was only faintly aware at this time 
tha t it was losing it:
After dinner, with appropriate charts, the group was appraised of PSD 
police reorganisation plans and the course of action that should be taken 
by the committee in the preparation of a Japanese Government plan. The 
committee was informed at this time who was responsible for police 
reorganisation. Daily contact was maintained with committee members as 
to progress. At this time Mr. Suzuki was strongly suspected of being a 
pro-GS man.
When the GS/Suzuki plan popped up, apparently supported b y  
M a c A r t h u r , 1 4 0  it seemed that Kades had achieved his objective - the 
defeat o f the PSD police reorganisation plan. However, Pulliam 
moved quickly to  isolate Suzuki and so to  d iscred it h is / GS's 
proposals. The other four members of the committee were "emphatic 
in their denial o f any knowledge of the plan and appeared surprised 
tha t such had happened without the(ir) being informed by S u z u k i " . i 4 i  
This was not surprising, given tha t Kades had to ld  the Justice 
Minister "to  let no one see the paper (o f i n s t r u c t i o n s ) " . ! 4 2
According to  Ashida Hitoshi, the Foreign Minister, "Suzuki's action  
was censured in Cabinet meeting on 9 th  August, 1 9 4 7 ".143 it is 
interesting tha t Ashida, rather than the Prime Minister, telephoned 
Pulliam to  inform him of the Cabinet's action. Perhaps PSD was 
cultivating the more conservative members o f Katayama's coalition 
government - Ashida was president o f the Democratic Party, and 
more likely to  cooperate w ith G-2 than his socialist colleagues. 
Three o f the five cabinet com m ittee  members represented the 
Democratic Party - Suzuki and Nishio belonged to  Katayam a's 
p a r t y . 144 On 16th August "the entire committee was called to  PSD 
for conference and orientation on PSD police plan and again informed
1 29 Ibid.
140 Memo to Commander-in-Chief, dated 6 /9 /4 7 ;  Subject: Unilateral Government 
Section Action re. Police Plan (NDL, G-2 02767). Paragraph 2 noted "prompt approval 
(of Suzuki plan) by direction of C.-in-C. PSD not notified".
141 Pulliam’s memo for record, dated 4 /9 /4 7 ;  Subject: Development of Suzuki Plan 
(NDL, G-2 0 27 6 7 ).
142 1^ .
143 Ibid.
144 Miura Yôichi, "Senryôka Keisatsu Kaikaku no Ichi Danmen", p.37.
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as to  who in SCAP had priority in police m a t t e r s " . Pulliam and his 
colleagues were now working hard to  repair the damage done to  
the ir reputation by the Kades/Suzuki in itia tive : "The com m ittee 
was....informed tha t all PSD facilities were available to  them...(and) 
e ffo rt was made to  discreetly and effective ly sell the PSD plan to  
the c o m m i t t e e " . 1 4 6  it was clear from the proceedings tha t at least 
one com m ittee member preferred to  deal w ith the Public Safety 
Division rather than Government Section:
Hitotsumatsu....posed the question - "The Japanese Government is in a 
very difficult position with respect to SCAP. There is a SCAP section that 
says they are concerned with reorganisation of the police forces. We have 
heard here today that no other section in SCAP has the right to do so. We 
would like to deal with your section, PSD, alone on police matters. Is it 
possible for you to have an understanding in SCAP...?"^"^^
The question was welcomed, perhaps even invited, by the American 
officials present. Their response was fo rth righ t and supported by 
documentary evidence: "That question has already been answered. 
Here are the w ritten instructions. S ta ff Memo No. 21, 16 A u g u s t 
1947. These instructions have not been changed or a l t e r e d . "148
On the 1 8th of August Whitney telephoned Pulliam, and informed him 
tha t "General MacArthur...(was) very anxious to  le t the Japanese 
Government develop their own police p l a n " . 149 Clearly the head of GS 
was try ing to  consolidate gains made by Kades - he wanted the 
Cabinet to  endorse the Suzuki plan, and knew tha t this was unlikely 
to  happen if PSD vigorously promoted its own proposals. Pulliam 's 
response was polite but firm:
If that is what General MacArthur wants OK, but until I receive 
instructions from the proper source to the contrary, I consider
145 Pulliam's memo for record, dated 4 /9 /4 7 ; Subject: Development of Suzuki Plan.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid. "The committee was subsequently furnished a copy of Staff Memo No.63, 19 
Aug. 47". These memoranda made it clear that the Japanese Government should liaise 
with CIS/G-2 re. policy matters affecting the Japanese police.
149 Memo for record, dated 1 8 /8 /4 7 ; To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; From: H. E. 
Pulliam; Subject: Report of Telephone Call from General Whitney, GS (NDL, G-2 
0 2 7 5 1 )
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reorganisation of the Japanese police the primary interest of CIS/G-2  
and will continue to act accordingly....Thank you for c a l l i n g .
Willoughby expressed outrage at Government Section's manoeuvres 
and what he regarded as the sluggish reaction o f PSD officials. He 
claimed tha t "GS had moved into... a hiatus,...a g a p " i t h a t  should 
never have been allowed to  develop. The Public Safety Division 
should have moved quicker - "...the (police) plan...could have been 
w ritten six months ago, and...its adoption by the former (friendly) 
Government was more assured than w ith this new inexperienced 
Government, completely under the thumb of...Government S e c t i o n " .  1 5 2  
Willoughby ordered tha t "an a ttem pt be made discreetly to  sell (the 
PSD) plan...for adoption by the Japanese committee...none o f them 
(had) the grasp o f detail o f the PSD...".153 The head of G-2 accused 
his colleagues of "dawdl(ing) along the way until GS stepped in, and 
through a clever blend of 'judicial and police requirement' forced a
hand".i54
PSD's loss o f momentum regarding police reform may have derived 
from increasing awareness of serious flaws in their plan. It had not 
been approved by the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) in July, 
T 947,155 despite the fact tha t both parties harboured s im ila r 
reservations w ith regard to  rapid decentralisation. ESS made three 
recommendations, the firs t o f which concerned the absence o f a 
timetable for devolution of police power - CIS acted on this advice: 
"In itia tio n  o f decentra lisa tion prior to  1st July, 1948, and 
immediate decentralisation in Chiba prefecture on an experimental 
basis (were) added to  the initial p l a n . . . " . 1 5 6  ESS also recommended 
tha t the "national police organisation (be placed) under more direct
1 5 0 Ibid.
151 Inter-Office Memorandum, dated 2 4 /8 /4 7 ;  From: General Willoughby; To: Col. 
Bratton - Action, Col. Duff - Follow up, and Col. Myers - Info.; Subject: Police Reform 
Papers (NDL, G-2 0 27 6 7 )
152 Ibid.
153 1 ^ .
154 Ibid.
155 CIS comments on ESS's non-concurrence with Police Reorganisation Plan (NDL, G-
2 02749). ESS and GS were the only two sections that did not concur with the PSD plan.
156 Ibid.
239
and responsive c o n t r o l " . Willoughby directed his subordinates in 
G-2/CIS to  take their cue from the Economic and Scientific Section:
ESS comments....point...to a basic defect, namely that you still have a 
national central police with a director practically autonomous except 
through the Prime Minister.^58
Another serious blunder was to  place the Director General under the 
Home Ministry - " ...it should have been known...that the Home 
Ministry was practically a b o l i s h e d " . 1 5 9  Finally, Willoughby reminded 
his colleagues tha t the police "plan must come from the Japanese 
Government if you wish to  win. It will be defeated if it comes from 
y o u " .  1 6 0  In other words, victory could best be secured by forcing the 
Cabinet to  submit the PSD plan as its own.
On the 3rd of September, 1947, "the basic reform plan of the 
Japanese G overnm ent"i6 i, prefaced by a short le tte r from Katayama, 
was presented to  the Supreme Commander. A t the outset o f the 
document it was made clear tha t "the Government...(had) strived for 
the formulation o f a reform plan o f its own from an independent 
s ta n d p o in t..."162 . a d ifficu lt task indeed considering the behaviour 
of both Government Section and PSD. The Cabinet proposed "to  pursue 
a policy allowing the co-existence o f both the national and local 
public en tity  police". 163 This was presented as a moderate course of 
action, an attem pt to  steer clear of "tw o fundamentally conflic ting 
proposals" which had surfaced in committee meetings:
....the Government proposed to take the middle course between...two 
extreme plans. One of the two alms primarily at the perfection of local 
self-government and the fundamental remedy of the misuse of the police 
by the state power in the past. It is a progressive plan....The other 
purports to conserve the national police to a large extent and to place the
157 Ibid.
158 Inter-Office Memorandum, dated 2 5 /8 /4 7 ;  Subject: Police Reorganisation Plan; 
From: C.A.W; To: Col. Bratton - Action, Col. Duff - Follow-up, Col. Myers - Info.
(NDL, G-2 0 2 7 5 0 )
159 1^.
160 Ibid.
161 Japanese Government Plan (NDL, G-2 02746).
1 62 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
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metropolitan police under the national police...This may be called a 
conservative plan.^^4
PSD later described the "progressive plan" as "the GS proposal w ith  
little  i f  any m o d i f i c a t i o n " J 6 5  it  recommended tha t "all uniformed 
police...be transfe rred  to  the six large m unicipalities^ 66 a n d 
pre fectures, leaving to  the centra l governm ent only certa in  
syn the tic  and technical f u n c t i o n s " . ^  6 7  Pulliam argued th a t these 
proposals denied police to  all "local autonomous bodies except the 
six special c ities", and, more dram atically, "em ascu la te (d ) the 
central police power and pave(d) the way for revolution".! 68 The 
conservative plan, preferred by PSD's chief, was a ttr ib u te d  to  
Hitotsumatsu. "It provide(d) the status quo less decentralisation to  
13 cities (w ith populations) of more than 200,000", and would have 
been, according to  Pulliam, the Cabinet's firs t choice " if  they (had 
been) completely free to  d e c i d e " . !  69
As it was, the Katayama Government had to  choose between GS's 
policy o f immediate and final decentralisation on the one hand and 
PSD's hybrid police system on the other. Not surprisingly the la tte r 
option was preferred - no self-respecting central government would 
vo lun ta rily  donate its police forces to  p re fectura l governors, 
accepting only emergency powers in return. Thus, the C a b in e t 
endorsed PSD's recommendations - the urban-rural dichotomy, the 
need fo r a gradualist approach and the ins titu tion  o f regions. In 
short, the Japanese Government took their cue from Pulliam rather 
than Kades, adopting a prudent, cautious strategy:
The national police shall gradually be decreased to the total of
3 0 ,0 0 0 ...while the local (city) police shall gradually be expanded to 
include cities of more than 5 0 ,0 0 0  population...W e hope that
! 64 Ibid.
! 65 Memorandum for the Record, dated 7 /9 /4 7 ;  From: Pulliam; Subject: Analysis of 
the...Japanese Government's Police Reorganisation Proposal to the Supreme Commander 
(NDL, G-2 0 2750 ).
! 66 Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kyoto, Nagoya, Kobe 
'67 Japanese Government Plan (NDL, G-2 02746).
! 66 Memorandum for the Record, dated 7 /9 /4 7 ;  From: Pulliam; Subject: Analysis of 
the...Japanese Government's Police Reorganisation Proposal to the Supreme Commander.
! 69 Ibid.
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consideration be given to increase the total number of police to
1 2 5,000.170
The Cabinet's principal concerns reflected those of PSD, and to  a 
lesser exten t ESS. "The present financial sta tus o f local public 
e n t it ie s " ,1 the absence of armed forces and the unpropitious 
socio-economic climate all necessitated a step by step approach.
It seemed tha t Pulliam's efforts following the sudden appearance of 
the Suzuki plan had paid off. The Japanese Government had subm itted 
a plan to  MacArthur tha t closely corresponded with PSD's proposals. 
Whitney was furious - his determined attem pts to  consolidate gains 
made by Kades had failed. On 4th  September, 1947, he wrote to  
Willoughby, complaining o f Pulliam's conduct:
I was amazed to learn yesterday that subsequent to the decision of the 
Supreme Commander that the Japanese Government was to be left free to 
formulate its own plan for the reorganisation of the police force....Colonel 
Pulliam called in various State Ministers and continued to exert great 
pressure to enforce his views on the G o v e rn m e n t. 1^2
The head o f G-2 defended Pulliam - he was "merely performing his 
duties within the scope of the mission assigned by SCAP. It (was) 
clearly w ithin his field of activ ity  to  confer, assist and advise the 
Japanese Government agencies and/or com m ittees responsible fo r 
m atters affecting the Japanese p o l i c e " . ' ' ^3  jp a hand-written n o t e , i  
Willoughby tried to  reassure Whitney, w ith a view perhaps to  ending 
the damaging feud between GS and G-2 over police reorganisation:
My Dear Courtney,
...I really believe that you are unduly alarmed. The interests of the Govt. 
Section are not prejudiced. You have not been in the police business 
before. We have for two (2) years....
T Japanese Government Plan (NDL, G-2 02746).
T Ibid.
Letter dated 4 /9 /4 7  [NDL, GS(B) 02272].
T Check Sheet, dated 5 /9 /4 7 ; From: G-2; To: GS; Subject: Reply to General Whitney's 
Note, 4 /9 /4 7 ,  re. PSD's activities concerning Japanese Police Force [NDL, GS(B) 
0 2 2 7 2 ]
Accompanied above Check Sheet.
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A t the end of the note Willoughby stated tha t "the legislation is 
w ritten : You will assist....", suggesting th a t he expected PSD's 
proposals to  be carried out. Such expectations, however, were 
premature - PSD had won this particular battle, but the war was not 
ye t over. Katayama had "subm it(ted) the Government reform plan 
informally and directly to  the Supreme Commander w ith a view to  
seeking firs t of all his high o p i n i o n s . . . " . ' * it  was well known tha t 
MacArthur shared many of Government Section's concerns, and was 
com m itted  to  "the  basic concept o f a s tr ic t ly  civilian p o lic e  
o r g a n i s a t i o n " . ! ^ 6  He insisted tha t GS and PSD work togethe r to  
prepare the "com m ents and ins truc tions" th a t Katayama had 
requested in his le tter.
Just before the final act o f the police drama began, Sone, Deputy 
D irector General o f the Cabinet Secretariat, called on Kades to  
discuss the Japanese Government's plan. He stated tha t "feelings in 
the Cabinet on this issue cut so deeply tha t it was impossible to  
put the question....on the agenda".! Whilst elderly members of the 
Cabinet (70-75 years old) wanted to  rely for advice on the police 
bureaucracy in the Home Ministry", their younger colleagues (5 5 -6 9 ), 
wary o f bureaucratic domination, "wanted to  form ulate the ir own 
proposals....". Sone also informed Kades that "the Cabinet committee, 
headed by...Suzuki, had been under 'te rrific  pressure' by the Public 
Safety Division to  submit its plan as the Japanese Government plan". 
Police reorganisation was proving to  be a very divisive issue. It was 
important, Sone argued, tha t officials did not lose sight o f the real 
enemy - a centralised police system: " It would be the figh t o f 
Katayama's life to  break centralised police control....anything tha t 
could be done to  demonstrate to  the government tha t (he) had the 
full backing o f the Supreme Commander would help immeasurably". 
Apparently, only MacArthur could untie the knot of police reform.
! Japanese Government Plan (NDL, G-2 02746).
! ^6 GS, Memo for Record, dated 1 2 /9 /4 7 ; Notes on GS-PSD Conference Beginning at
10.00, 1 2 /9 /4 7  [GS(B) 0 2303 ]
! Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section, dated 9 /9 /4 7 ;  Subject: 
Conversation Concerning Police Reorganisation Plan [GS(B) 0 23 0 5 ] - the source for 
the remainder of the paragraph.
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Reconcilia tion
On 12th September, 1947, a round of conferences began tha t aimed 
to  thrash out the problem of police reorganisation. A t 10 am high- 
ranking officials from GS - Whitney, Kades, T ilton and Rizzo - and 
Pulliam and Smith of PSD sat down together to  try  and resolve their 
differences. The conference opened with a statem ent by the head of 
Government Section to  the effect tha t MacArthur was aware o f both 
parties' views concerning police reform, and was im patient for a 
settlem ent o f this divisive issue. The Supreme Commander had asked 
Whitney to  "coordinate with Colonel Pulliam and reconcile existing 
differences or report to  him those differences tha t could not be 
r e c o n c i l e d " , ! ^ 8  suggesting tha t he was willing to  act as arbitrator. 
Increasingly MacArthur's views determined the course o f events. 
Whitney reported tha t "the General" disagreed with the proposal for 
a national police":
It resembles a gendarmerie (and) would be challenged as a nucleus for a 
standing army. Neither the PSD proposal nor the Government Section's 
offer^^9 showed a disposition of this force which would accord with the 
basic concept of a civilian police organisation.
MacArthur had rejected PSD's gradualist approach, warning tha t 
"d ece n tra lisa tio n , if  not ac tu a lly  accom plished under the  
Occupation, would not be accomplished at all; therefore, it should 
proceed at once". He dismissed Pulliam's claim tha t such a course of 
action would expose the government to  lawless elements - in the 
event o f an emergency, the Prime Minister would be empowered "to  
take over command of the police force or part the reo f under 
safeguards and conditions specified by the D iet". Moreover, the 
Supreme Commander had c ritic ise d  GS's sugges tion  th a t 
"decentralisation of police forces to  local bodies be made subject to  
a choice by such bodies" - it was "considered objectionable because 
it would delay decentralisation indefin ite ly". A strong com m itm ent 
to  civilian contro l o f local police forces lay at the heart o f 
MacArthur's protests.
GS, Memo for Record, dated 1 2 /9 /4 7 ; Notes on GS-PSD Conference Beginning at
10.00, 1 2 /9 /4 7  [GS(B) 02303] - the source for the remainder of this paragraph.
! GS proposed "a national force of no more than 10,000 to carry out such duties as 
guarding important national installations, property and persons, and furnish assistance 
to prefectural and local forces when required" [GS(B) 02303]. This force was to be 
concentrated in the capital, whereas PSD's national police was to be dispersed.
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Pulliam expressed surprise at W h itne y 's  d isc losures. The 
Commander-in-Chief had only recently approved the principle of a 
national police force. Whitney explained tha t "the realisation tha t 
proper disposition for the use of such a force was not provided" had 
led the Supreme Commander to  reconsider his p o s i t i o n . 1 8 0  Pulliam 
and Smith must have been disturbed by this revelation - sensing 
the ir uneasiness, GS suddenly suggested a compromise, "a basis for
reconciliation.
....if the police were decentralised immediately in all cities and towns the 
Government Section would agree to the maintenance of a nationally 
controlled police force of approximately 30 ,000  to enforce law and order 
in the rural areas including villages.^^2
PSD expressed doubts as to  the viability o f such a plan, particularly 
w ith regard to  "the financial ability o f the smaller cities and towns 
to  support independent police forces...". Still, Pulliam was prepared 
to  consider such drastic decentralisation, providing tha t local police 
departm ents coexisted w ith a national force. The la tte r, it was 
agreed, should be administered by a commission,^ 83 composed of 
five civilians, appointed by the Prime Minister w ith the consent of 
the Diet. "The actual direction of the rural police would be entrusted 
to  a chief o f police who would be under the au tho rity  of the 
commission". It was proposed that "there be no channels o f command 
between the national rural police and the various c ity  and town 
police forces...(just) a relationship o f mutual assistance, liaison and 
coordination".
Pulliam requested 48 hours to  consider Government Section's offer. 
Another conference was held on the 1 5th September, attended by all 
those present on the 12th, except for W hitney and Tilton. The
180 Notes on GS-PSD Conference, 1 2 /9 /4 7  [GS(B) 0 2 3 0 3 ] - the principal source for 
the remainder of this paragraph.
T 81 GS, Memo for Record, dated 1 3 /9 /4 7 ; Subject: Reorganisation of the Japanese 
Police System; From: Rizzo [NDL, GS(B) 02303].
T 82 This would mean that "9 0 -9 5 ,0 0 0  city and town police would operate in 
approximately 209 cities (with populations greater than 30 ,000 ) and 1,800 towns of
5 .000  population or more, while about 30,000  rural police would cover approximately
11.000  villages" and the remaining rural areas.
T 83 The commission would also oversee a national police academy, a crime detection 
bureau, a central bureau of identification etc.
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representatives o f PSD stated tha t they had conferred with the ir 
experts, and decided to  reject the "ten ta tive  plan evolved at the 
in ter-section c o n f e r e n c e . . . " . 184 The principal reason given was that 
communities of around 5,000 inhabitants did not have the necessary 
resources to  support autonomous police forces. Pulliam then tried to  
back-pedal - he announced tha t "the Public Safety Division was 
ready to  support the principle of decentralisation as applied to  the 
121 cities o f over 50,000 population and (was) w illing...to apply the 
princip le to  smaller localities g ra d u a l ly . . . ” . Kades and Rizzo, 
however, reminded the chief of PSD of the quid pro quo of a national 
police force:
...the Government Section's willingness to support the existence of a 
national rural police force to maintain law and order in the country and 
villages was predicated on the immediate application of decentralisation to 
all cities and towns, since this would consolidate the principle of local 
autonomy in enough localities to ensure freedom of local government from 
domination by Tokyo.
They warned Pulliam tha t "in the absence o f agreement on th is  
point...Government Section might well return to  its original position, 
sponsoring im m edia te de cen tra lisa tio n  to  th e  p re fe c tu ra l 
governments and m etropolitan areas, w ith authority vested in the 
prefectura l governments to  decentralise fu rthe r". Their message 
was clear - PSD could only lose by rejecting the compromise put 
forward on 12th September. Pulliam suspected that MacArthur, given 
his reservations regarding a national police force, was more likely 
to  support GS's position than the original police reorganisation plan. 
The conference ended w ith an a ttem pt by Pulliam and Smith to  
regain the in itia tive - concerned about "the  chances o f political 
influence over the police", they proposed tha t "the chief o f police in 
each locality having an independent police force be put under a 
civilian commission w ith a fixed tenure o f o ffice  rather than 
directly under the chief executive". The head of PSD now realised 
tha t immediate decentralisation was going to  take place whether he 
liked or not, and moved to  prevent abuses of the system. Kades and 
Rizzo accepted PSD's proposal, "subject to  the approval of the chief".
184 (3s, Memo for Record, dated 1 6 /9 /4 7 ;  Subject; Reorganisation Plan for the 
Japanese Police System [GS(B) 02303] - the source for the rest of this paragraph.
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The conference held on 15th September proved th a t Government 
Section was making the running with regard to  police reform. "On 
the evening o f 1 6th September MacArthur was shown the proposed 
reply to  the Prime Minister's le tte r" - proposed by  Government  
Section - and informed that the head of G-2 had not ye t seen Ü.185 
The Supreme Commander "s ta ted  th a t unless W illoughby had 
fundam ental ob jections to  any part o f the le tte r it would be 
approved". MacArthur's endorsement o f Government Section's dra ft 
spelled the end o f the long battle over police reorganisation. Both 
sides were exhausted, and the terms o f the truce did not represent a 
decisive v ictory for either party. On balance, however, GS emerged 
the less battered of the two combatants. This much is clear from 
the last scene of the final act, when, on the morning of the 17th 
September, Rizzo delivered a copy of the proposed le tte r to  Pulliam 
and Smith - the la tte r expressed surprise, or more a c c u ra te ly  
dismay, at the sudden appearance of "civilian police commissions...at 
p re fectura l l e v e l " , 1 8 6  designed to  prevent central control o f the 
national police system. Still, Willoughby had no choice but to  agree 
to  the establishment of prefectural public safety commissions - in 
return "separate c ity  police would be included under the Prime 
M in ister's emergency powers as desired by PSD". F o llo w in g  
W illoughby's approval o f the proposed le tte r, it was delivered to  
Katayama at 11.05 am on the 17th September.
Signed by MacArthur, the le tte r stated tha t "the po ten tia lity  o f a 
police s ta te  inherent in centralized control must scrupulously be 
a v o i d e d " . ! 8 7  This could best be achieved by the establishment o f 
local police departments and civilian commissions. Both had been 
part o f the equation of police reorganisation from the very beginning 
- Valentine had recommended that "municipal police departments be 
established in cities over 50,000 population, responsible through 
a....commission to  the elected head of the m u n i c i p a l i t y " . ! 88  However,
! 85 GS, Memo for Record, dated 1 8 /9 /4 7 ; Subject: Reorganisation of Japanese Police 
System; From: Frank Rizzo [GS(B) 0 2303 ] - the source for the remainder of this 
paragraph.
! 86 They were to be appointed by the governors subject to the consent of the prefectural 
assemblies.
!87  Letter dated 1 6 /9 /4 7  (NDL, G-2 02750)
! 88 The Intelligence Series. Volume 9, Text 2, Documentary Appendices 1, Brief of the 
Valentine Report.
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a protracted dispute over the speed or pitch of decentralisation had 
obscured the issue of popular control of policing. It had reappeared 
when Pulliam and Smith, smarting from MacArthur's advocacy o f 
immediate decentralisation to  all cities and towns, had proposed 
civilian commissions for each locality possessing its own police 
departm ent. MacArthur's le tte r to  Katayama explained the local 
dimension of the new police system:
Each city and town should be responsible for the preservation of law and 
order within its boundaries through its own local police system  
independent of the central government and headed by a police chief to be 
appointed and removable by a commission composed of three civilian 
members appointed by the mayor of the city or town with the consent of 
the local assembly...
As for the national dimension, the Supreme Commander was "in full 
accord w ith  the proposition tha t the realities o f the situation 
require the maintenance of a national rural police unit to  maintain 
law and order in the rural areas and available to  the National 
Government to  meet emergency c o n d i t i o n s . . . . 8 9  Moreover, the 
"suggested increase in the overall authorized police s treng th  to  
125,000 men, to  provide for such a national rural police (m et) with 
(his) full a p p r o v a l " . ! 9 0  psD had consistently argued tha t prevailing 
socio-econom ic conditions necessitated a national police force. 
Preoccupied with the threat of lawlessness, Pulliam had given little  
thought to  the issue of civilian control, so much so tha t ESS had fe lt 
the need to  recommend "more direct and responsive control" o f the 
national police o r g a n i s a t i o n . ! 9i The late appearance o f prefectural 
public sa fe ty  commissions, on the  in it ia tive  o f W hitney or 
MacArthur, reflected the ir common determ ination " to  prevent the 
resurgence in disguised form of a centra lly contro lled national
police network...":! 92
At the prefectural level there should...be a...commission...which will 
exercise operational control over the national rural police operating 
within the boundaries of that prefecture, reserving to the national
! 89 MacArthur's letter to Katayama, 1 6 /9 /4 7  (G-2 02750 ).
!90 Ibid.
! 91 CIS comments on ESS's non-concurrence with Police Reorganisation Plan (NDL, G- 
2 02749).
!92 MacArthur's letter to Katayama, 1 6 /9 /4 7 .
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government administrative authority ^^ 3 over such national rural police 
wherever stationedJ^'^
The national, prefectural and municipal public safety com m issions 
"were to  be non-partisan and po litica lly  neutral bodies, q u ite  
separate from the heads of the executive branch of the central and 
local governments"J95 Just as public safety commissions were to  be 
insulated from political pressure, so too  "the prefectural governor 
(was) to  be protected against arbitrary police interference by the 
national government":
...in the event of a national emergency..., upon the recommendation of the 
National Public Safety Commission, the Prime Minister might assume 
operational control over prefectural units of the national rural police 
force, subject to ratification by the Diet within twenty days. 196
Thus, the national police force, which both PSD and the Cabinet 
cherished, was to  be available to  the governm ent only in 
emergencies. For the rest o f the time, the national public safety 
commission was to  administer prefectural rural police forces. As 
for relations between municipal and rural forces, "no channel of 
command (was to ) exist between the national rural police unit and 
the local police forces...". Again, s tric t separation of the tw o police 
systems was deemed necessary to  prevent the re-emergence of a 
police state.
Bralbantl distinguished between the two types of control as follows: "Operational 
control is defined as the enforcement of law including the direction of police forces in 
preservation of law and order, planning and execution of law enforcement procedures 
before and during situations prejudicial to law and order, and the use of police power in 
areas of responsibility as provided for by law. The Police Law defines administrative 
control as management of all police affairs not included in operational control, including 
such matters as pay, promotion, supply, training, personnel management and like 
activities".
T 94 MacArthur's letter to Katayama, 1 6 /9 /4 7  (G-2 02750 ). Braibanti drew attention 
to the fact that the prefectural commission "could not appoint its own public safety 
director. Prefectural directors (were) appointed by the regional directors (of which 
there were six), who in turn (were) appointed by the Director General in Tokyo. Hence 
it would be difficult for a prefectural commission to exercise effective control over a 
police chief whom it (was) powerless to remove".
S. Sugai, "The Japanese Police System", in R. E. Ward, ed.. Five Studies in Japanese 
Politics (University of Michigan Press, 1957) p.6.
^96 MacArthur's letter to Katayama, 1 6 /9 /4 7  (G-2 02750 ).
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Ultimately, the new police structure, outlined in MacArthur's le tte r, 
represented an a ttem pt to  reconcile conflicting interests and ideas 
w ithin GHQ and to  comply w ith the demands o f the S u p re m e  
Commander. The la tte r shared with GS a determination to  eradicate 
every trace of a centralized police system tha t had "degrade(d) the 
dignity of the i n d i v i d u a l " . ! 9 7  ju s t as PSD's obsession with the threat 
of lawlessness caused it to  disregard the issue of popular control o f 
police forces, so GS's preoccupation w ith  decentralisation meant 
tha t it ignored the socio-economic context o f police reorganisation. 
The final product o f months o f bickering was a dual police system 
tha t aimed to  satisfy all the parties concerned - it tried to  combine 
conflicting models o f police organisation, to  reconcile conflic ting 
ideologies. Towns and cities were invited to  exercise control over 
the ir own police forces, whether they wanted to  or not, and the 
Japanese Government was presented with rural police forces which 
it was perm itted to  use only in emergencies. Alfred Oppler, usually 
so enthusiastic about the Occupation's achievements, damned the 
new police s truc tu re  w ith  fa in t praise - "ideo log ica lly sound, 
but....somewhat unrealistic" - the next chapter will dem onstrate 
jus t how "unrealistic" it proved to  be.
! 97 Ibid.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
TOWARDS RECENTRALISATION
Those who advocated decentralisation o f the Japanese police in 
1 947 would have done well to  consult a document w ritten  at the 
very beginning of the Occupation. OSS Research and Analysis Report 
Number 2758, entitled "The Japanese Police System Under Allied 
Occupation", warned of the dangers of a fragmented police structure. 
Decentralisation might "create jurisd ictional barriers or conflic ts", 
and by removing national control bring about "a decline in personnel 
and other standards".i The report also predicted "hardship for poorer 
areas unable to  afford a police (force) adequate to  their needs", and 
expressed concern about "the subjection o f the police system to  the 
influence of local po litics".2 The d ifficu lties experienced by the 
various police units brought into existence by the Police Law, and 
the abuses associated with the new system, bore out many of the 
authors' predictions, particularly w ith regard to  the financial burden 
o f local police systems.
As was made clear in the previous chapter, Pulliam and his 
colleagues in G-2 had been wary o f drastic decentralisation for the  
very reasons specified in the OSS report. Their failure to  resist 
demands made by Government Section meant tha t Japan had to  cope 
with sudden atomization of the police system rather than gradual 
decentralisaton. In short, the Police Law tha t was implemented in 
March, 1948, did not take account o f pertinent points made in 
Research and Analysis Report Number 2758 - the consequences were 
such tha t w ithin eighteen months members o f the Public Safety 
Division were working "qu ie tly " w ith offic ia ls o f the Ja p an ese  
Government w ith a view to  revising the Police L a w .3 Structura l 
problem s - incoherence and poor a rticu la tion  - necessita ted 
revision, as did inadequate facilities, the inability o f communities 
to  pay fo r the ir own police forces, and the la tte r 's  apparent 
vulnerability to  lawless elements. Corrupt practices and partial 
law enforcement seem to  have been even more widespread a fte r
 ^ R. & A. Report, p. 65.
2 Ibid.
3 Memo dated 1 5 /8 /4 9 ; From: PSD; To: G-2 (NDL, G-2 00262).
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decentralisation than before. Certainly, the police were brought 
closer to  the people, but not in the sense that Government Section 
had intended - they accepted eagerly offers of assistance from  
in fluen tia l, w ealthy c itizens, whose involvem ent in the black 
m arket was conven iently  ignored. Identify ing  more w ith  the 
in te rests  o f the ir respective communities than w ith  abstrac t 
notions o f justice, many policemen deferred to  the Judgement of 
local leaders, o ften  working at cross purposes w ith  forces in 
adjacent areas.
Organisation and Facilities
"The development of a spirit o f cooperation between Japanese police 
agencies..." was one o f many challenges confronting the Public 
Safety Division when the "new law concerning civil police becam e 
effective on the 7th March, 1948"."^ About two weeks later Colonel 
Pulliam, daunted by the tasks ahead, s ta ted  th a t p o l i c e  
reorganisation invited problems "far more numerous and complex 
than any facing the division before the 7th March".^ PSD would have 
to  monitor police units constituting both the municipal police (MP) 
and the national rural police (NRP):
Control of this system no longer stems from the top but from 1,652  
different sources (1 ,605  local forces, 46 prefectural organisations and 
the national government). Surveillance of compliance with SCAP 
directives can be accomplished in the future only through frequent trips 
into the field.^
Pulliam insisted tha t PSD required more personnel to  cope w ith the 
tasks ahead. A model municipal code was being developed, along 
with plans for the education and guidance of more than 5,000 public 
safety commissioners and the training of administrators for MP and 
NRP forces. Six regional training schools were to  be established, 
general fac ilitie s  improved, and guidelines laid down fo r the 
recruitment and training of around 30,000 new policemen. It was not 
surprising th a t Pulliam was alarmed by the workload so recently
Memo dated 2 4 /3 /4 8 ; Subject; Status of Japanese Police Reorganisation; From: Col. 
Pulliam; To: Willoughby (NDL, G-2 00241).
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid. The source for the following paragraph.
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fo isted on his division - his subordinates were actively involved in 
activ ities ranging from the preparation of standard report forms to  
the estab lishm ent o f crim inal labora to ries  and id e n tifica tio n  
bureaux.
Unfortunately, the rapid execution o f many of the above tasks was 
obstructed by serious socio-economic problems. Pulliam in tim ated 
th a t d iff ic u lt working conditions and inadequate resources - 
buildings, transport, firearms etc. - necessitated a cooperative 
attitude towards one another on the part o f the various police units:
With the Japanese economy in its present state and with the supply and 
resupply of equipment and facilities almost non-existent, various police 
agencies, no longer centralised, must be educated to cooperate in the use 
of all existing facilities../
However, the Police Law had set ou t to  create lo ca l  forces, 
in dependen t o f each other, p ro te c tive  of th e ir respective  
jurisdictions and by extension possessive of their limited resources. 
Given th a t the main ob jective o f the new legislation was the 
establishm ent o f police forces th a t served the ir communities, it 
was not surprising tha t they were unwilling to share facilities. In 
his le tte r to  the Japanese Prime Minister, dated 16th September, 
1947, MacArthur had informed Katayama tha t "no channel o f 
command should exist between the national rural police unit and the 
local police forces, but technical channels o f communication should, 
o f course, be pe rm itte d ...to  fac ilita te  a relationship o f mutual 
assistance, liaison and coord ina tion".8 Conditions on the ground, 
however, made such protestations seem ridiculous.
In June, 1948, G-2 recommended tha t ESS approve "allocation o f 
(necessary am ounts) o f cement and glass to  be used in the 
construction of about 1,500 municipal police sta tions".^ The new 
buildings would fac ilita te  the "p hys ica l  decentralisation o f th e  
Japanese police system, as prescribed in the police leg is la tion...".!o
 ^ Ibid.
8 NDL, G-2 02750
8 Memo dated ? /6 /4 8 ; Subject: Cement and Glass Allocations for Police Stations; From: 
G-2; To: ESS (G-2 00245).
! 8 Ibid.
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Thus, although decentralisation had taken place on paper, the view 
from the ground was hardly encouraging - CIS reported tha t "a great 
m ajority...o f the 1,130 police stations in Japan...are as a temporary 
measure occupied Jointly by the NRP as d is tric t HQ and MP as 
municipal HQ".i i This could not be allowed to  continue:
...joint occupancy results in overcrowding, a lack of clear-cut command 
functions, confusion of duties and responsibilities, and a deterrent to the 
establishment of autonomy on the part of municipal departments.
The break with the past was not as final as MacArthur had wished - 
clearly, "the evils of the past centralised system (could) not be 
d issipated when MP officia ls, designated by the Police Law to  
function autonomously, maintain(ed) the ir offices and perform (ed) 
the ir duties in the same room (as) administrators of the NRP under 
(whom they had) so recently operated".^3 One observer, recalling the 
chaos tha t ensued as a result of the establishment o f a dual police 
system, described how a line painted down the middle of the police 
station doorway indicated le ft for the NRP, right for the MP (or vice 
v e r s a ) . 14 Not only did the tw o police forces often use the same 
buildings, they also looked very similar - distinguishable, at least 
to  begin with, only by their armbands.i  ^ The public was baffled - 
lines painted down the middle of doorways and armbands proved an 
inadequate introduction to  the complexities of the new s y s t e m . 1 6
Policemen fortunate enough not to  be sharing office space were ofen 
tripping over each other - "about eight hundred small municipalities 
u tilis e (d ) police boxes as s u b s titu te s  fo r m unicipal HQ..., 
consequently operating in such close confines as to  make it 
impossible to  e ffic ien tly  police the ir com m un ities".!^  CIS s ta ted
11 Inter-office memo, dated 8 /6 /4 8 ; Subject: Cement and Glass Allocations for Police 
Stations; From: CIS; To: G-2 (G-2 00245).
1 3 Ibid.
1 3 Ibid.
14 Disclosed by Professor I. H. Nish during an informal chat with the author.
13 Nippon Times. 7th March 1948 [GS(B) 0 2 2 8 3 ] - "Armbands will distinguish the 
local and the rural police for the time being..."
1  ^ As late as July 1949, an opinion survey in Tokyo, organised by the Yomiuri Shinbun. 
revealed that more than 50% of those questioned (51.4% ) still did not understand the 
dual police system [ATIS trans., 2 5 /7 /4 9  - GS(B) 02280].
1  ^ Inter-office memo, dated 8 /6 /4 8 ;  From: CIS; To: G-2; Subject: Cement and Glass 
(G-2 0 0 2 4 5 ).
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th a t the Police Law stipulated tha t "state-owned property surplus 
to  the needs of the N R P  be transferred to  the MP concerned" J 8 
Unfortunately, however, G-2 insisted tha t "the m ajority o f Japan's 
present 1,130 police stations (were) required as HQ facilities for 
the N R P " . 19  So, where were the MP units to  conduct their business?
Although "the  Japanese Government allocated ¥1,500 million in the 
1948 national budget for construction of approxim ate ly 1 ,500 
municipal police s ta tions " , 20 the actual sums handed over did not 
m eet the needs o f the s itua tion . Many local police forces 
com prom ised them selves by accepting funds from  w e a l t h y  
individuals, whose prosperity derived from black market dealings. 
For example, in May, 1 949, Nishi Kantarô, a well-known authority on 
the Japanese police system, reported in Shakai th a t the Tokyo 
metropolitan government had insufficient funds for the construction 
of new buildings in 1948 - "the budgetary appropriation was only 
20% of the required s um ".21 Those engaged in criminal activities - 
"some black market profiteers and the postwar nouveaux riches with 
shady backgrounds" - provided large sums o f money fo r the 
construction of "dormitories and stations". Indebted to  such people, 
the police were reluctant to  prosecute them for their o f f e n c e s .22
Inadequate or insuffic ient accommodation was ju s t one o f many 
problems compounded by decentralisation and devolution o f police 
power. A un itary police system  p e rm itte d  the  opera tion  o f 
econom ies o f scale in term s o f buildings and adm in istra tive  
personnel. A dm itted ly , equipment such as m otor vehicles and 
firearm s was very th in ly  spread, bu t c e n tra l c o o rd in a tio n  
facilita ted its full utilisation. As was stated by representatives o f 
PSD in September, 1947, "...decentralisation of police forces to  all 
cities and towns....require(d) physical facilities (fo r communication, 
transportation etc.) which simply did not exist in J a p a n " . 23  Another
1G Ibid.
19 Memo dated ? /6 /4 8 ; Subject; Cement and Glass (G-2 0 0 2 4 5 ).
20 Inter-office memo, dated 8 /6 /4 8  (G-2 00245).
21 Article entitled "Démocratisation of the Metropolitan Police" by Nishi Kantarô.
22 Ibid.
23 GS Memo for Record, dated 1 6 /9 /4 7 ; Subject: Reorganisation Plan for the Japanese 
Police System [NDL, GS(B) 02303].
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point made was tha t "coordination among the many units would 
become im practica l and the police system  would be b a d l y  
a r t ic u la te d " .24 Thus, resistance to  decen tra lisa tion  re fle c te d  
misgivings w ith regard to  facilities and coordination, both areas 
tha t proved to  be problematic.
In July, 1949, the Yomiuri Shinbun published the results o f an 
opinion survey in Tokyo, reporting amongst other things tha t 66.9% 
of the sample favoured increasing police arms and equipm ent.2 5 
Questions from the United Press (UP), addressed to  GHQ's Public 
Information Office (PIG) on 16th December 1948, suggested tha t 
influential figures in the US were in agreement. UP wanted to  know 
why SCAP did not permit the NRP to  utilise all the "normal arms 
possessed by the police of any democratic country..." .26  W illoughby 
and Pulliam surely knew what had prompted the UP's in terest. On 
1 5th December Eichelberger, former commander o f the Eighth Army 
in Japan, had publicly "urged the  'im pera tive  im portance ' o f 
establishing a well-armed....defence corps for policing purposes".27 
As it was, "the police force o f 125,000 had only about 18 ,000
p is to ls ".28
Eichelberger was drawing attention to  a problem tha t most of Japan 
already acknowledged. On the 7th and 8th September, 1948, th e  
Nippon Times had assessed the performance o f the NRP and MP 
respectively during the firs t six months o f their existence. Although 
both were deemed to  have been satisfactory, it was made clear that 
they were "seriously handicapped by the shortage o f arm s".29 In 
June, 1948, the head o f Gifu m ilita ry  governm ent team  had 
recommended tha t Gifu NRP "be issued more pistols as a c rim e  
preven tion  measure", warning th a t supplies were "c r it ic a lly
24 Ibid.
25 a TIS trans. (Yomiuri Shinbun. 2 0 /7 /4 9 ) ,  dated 2 5 /7 /4 9  [GS(B) 02280].
26 Check sheet , dated 7 /1 2 /4 8 ; Subject: Questions from UP; From: G-2; To: PIG (G-2 
0 0 2 5 2 ) .
27 Nippon Times. 1 6 /1 2 /4 8  [GS(B) 02283].
28 Ibid.
29 8 /9 /4 8  [GS(B) 02283].
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s h o r t" .30 GHQ was unable to  remedy the situation, declaring tha t 
there was "no source of supply" and tha t military government teams 
m ight "assist in th is m atte r by making all confiscated pistols 
available for police use".3 i By August, 1949, however, such half 
measures had given way to  determined efforts on the part o f PSD to 
arm the police. On the 1 9th August G-4 stated tha t "the initial issue 
of 14,000 cal .38 S&W revolvers provided for in the originally 
approved schedule of distribution had been accomplished".32 The aim 
was to  supply all policemen with firearms by the end o f the year.3 3
Efficient policing depended on m obility and a reliable system of 
communications as well as p isto ls.34 On the 10th July, 1949, the 
Nippon Times contended that the police desperately needed "more 
transportation facilities and a be tte r system of being kept informed 
of impending troub le .. ." .3 5  The previous March, a Nagoya paper had 
claimed tha t "police were handicapped in the performance of their 
du ties ....(by ) a dearth o f communication and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
facilities, such as autom obiles".36 Likewise, a journal in Fukuoka 
"deemed it urgent to  reinforce police equipment...".3 / Whilst nobody 
denied th a t there was a shortage o f cars, radios etc., many 
Journalists focused on the issue o f manpower, calling for a larger 
police force or more e ffic ien t utilisation o f its urban and rural 
components. The la tte r could best be achieved by a closer working 
relationship between the various police departments.
Unfortunately, the Police Law discouraged partnerships not only 
among local police units but also between municipal police and their 
rural counte rparts . The various police units were to  confine
30 Letter from Frank C. Seitz, head of Gifu MGT, dated 1 9 /6 /4 8 ; Subject: Strength of 
Gifu Prefecture NRP; Thru: Commanding Officer, Tôkai-Hokuriku MG Region; To: 
Commanding General, 8th Army (G-2 00243).
31 4th Indorsement, dated 2 3 /7 /4 8 ; From: GFIQ, SCAP; To: Commanding General, 8th 
Army (G-2 0 02 4 3 ).
32 Memo dated 1 9 /8 /4 9 ; Subject: Distribution of Revolvers to Japanese Police (NDL, 
G-2 0 4 2 2 1 )
33 Ibid.
34 Chapter 2 examines transport, communications and firearms in greater detail.
35 Article entitled "For Better Teamwork" [GS(B) 02280].
36 ATIS trans., dated 2 9 /3 /4 9 ;  Prefectural Press Analysis: Police System [GS(B) 
0 2 2 8 2 ].
3^ Ibid.
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themselves to  the ir own jurisdictions, contacting other forces only 
when criminals sought refuge across the "border" and requesting 
assistance only in the event o f an emergency. Sometimes as few as 
five or six officials policed a small c o m m u n i t y , 3 8  an ideal situation 
from the point of view of reformers, whose chief preoccupation was 
devolution o f police power. However, many o f those working in the 
field were horrified by the patchwork o f conflic ting Jurisdictions, 
knowing full well tha t it would hamper law enforcement. On March 
8th, 1949, an article in the Nippon Times gently pointed out th e  
"c ircu m s ta n ce s  m ilita t in g  a g a in s t...( th e  po lice  s y s te m 's )  
sa tis facto ry operation":
One of them is attributable to the geographic conditions peculiar to our 
country....urban and rural areas are contiguous to each other with hardly 
any discernible boundary between them. As a result it often happens that 
a small area falls under the Jurisdiction of different police units.
Here is an example. Between Tokyo Metropolis and Musashino City in the 
Musashi plain one notices no distinct demarcation, whether one travels in 
a tram-car or in an automobile. Rows of houses interspersed with groves 
stretch out from the outskirts of the metropolis into the sylvan city as if 
the two were an extension of each other. This small area between the 
metropolis and the rural city falls under the Jurisdiction of th re e  
different police units - the Metropolitan Police Board, the Musashino MP 
and the NRP for the Musashino sector....
With three police Jurisdictional zones dovetailed like a Jigsaw puzzle in a 
small area, as in this case, satisfactory police work is impossible without 
the utmost coordination among the constabulary units concerned.39
The precondition for sa tis facto ry police work was not fu lf il le d . 
Numerous reports complained of a reluctance to  cooperate on the 
part o f MP forces. The Nippon Times stated tha t "the new police 
system ...p ractica lly  preclude(d) aid in the way of reinforcem ent 
among the  municipal police o f d iffe re n t localities even in an 
e m e r g e n c y " . 4 0  it substantiated its claim by drawing attention to  a 
strike in April 1948, when around 1,000 operatives of the Japan 
T y p e w rite r  Company surrounded its  fac to ry  in Chôfu (on the 
outskirts o f Tokyo). "The Chôfu...MR with its strength o f less than 50
38 ATIS trans. (Asahi. 1 1 /2 /4 9 ) , dated 1 1 /3 /4 9  [GS(B) 02282].
30 "Police System Weathers First Year of Operation - Actual Enforcement Reveals 
Unforeseen Conditions Hampering Proper Functioning" [GS(B) 0 22 8 2 ]. The second 
problem identified by the article - a financial one - will be examined in the next 
section.
40 Ibid. The source for the remainder of this paragraph.
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was unequal to  the occasion". Although the Metropolitan Police Board 
could easily have assisted its helpless neighbour, "re inforcem ents 
were unobtainable due to  the ju risd ic tiona l dem arcation". The 
situation was only brought under control when the NRP arrived with 
about 1,000 armed policemen, a force tha t had taken several days to  
"muster".
According to  an ATIS press summary, dated 29 th  March, 1949, 
numerous Journals in various parts o f the country claimed tha t there 
was a "lack of cooperation between municipal police units", although 
it was generally accepted tha t "local units cooperated w ith the 
NRP" .4 i  A sub-editorial in the 16th March issue of Ma i n i ch i  
disagreed, s ta ting  th a t even "liaison between the S tate and 
autonomous police forces seem(ed) to  be u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . ..".42 i n  
February the Asahi had reported tha t "many criminals and local 
bosses" were taking advantage of "insuffic ient cooperation between 
the national and local police units". Disturbed by "many deplorable 
cases....(re flecting) defects in the police system", the paper drew 
atten tion  to  poor "communications and liaison facilities (and) the 
inconvenience encountered in criminal cases...., arising from the 
division o f Jurisdiction between the national and local po l i ce
units....".43
The dual police system com plicated the suppression o f illegal 
activ ities, particularly the transport o f black market produce. In 
April, 1949, an article in the Yomiuri Shinbun explained why the NRP 
had "decided to  place roving plain-clothes men on trains...":
This decision resulted from difficulties encountered in the investigation 
of crimes committed aboard trains due to the different "spheres of 
influence" involved...- the changes in police Jurisdiction along the runs, 
and the control of almost all the principal stations by the autonomous 
police. Henceforth, the sphere of control will be put on the basis of 
regional HQ and the autonomous police will cooperate with the rural 
police."^
41 Prefectural Press Analysis: Police System [NDL, GS(B) 02280].
42 ATIS trans., dated 1 6 /3 /4 9  [GS(B) 02282].
43 ATIS trans. (Asahi. 1 1 /3 /4 9 ), dated 1 1 /3 /4 9  [GS(B) 02282].
44 ATIS trans. (YS, 2 3 /4 /4 9 ) ,  dated 2 9 /4 /4 9  [GS(B) 02281].
259
On this occasion the NRP was merely seeking the cooperation of MP 
forces. However, the situation in some com m unities necessita ted 
much closer relations. In May, 1948, Lieutenant Colonel E. D. Lucas, 
head of Shiga military government team, informed his superiors tha t 
the town of Maibara (Sakata d is tric t) was policed by national rural 
policemen as well as its own municipal force.^s A community w ith a 
resident population of around 7,500, Maibara was also a "railway 
centre" - it had "yards for the Tôkaidô line, was the starting po in t
of the Hokuriku line, and the terminal point o f the Omi electric line".
Between January and March, 1948, an average o f around 5 ,5 0 0  
passengers had passed through the railway yards every day. "This 
amount o f tra ffic ....pu t a burden on the police force entirely out of 
proportion to  the population o f the town". To make m atters worse 
police strength  had fallen from 51 to  39 w ith the passage and 
implementation of the Police Law. The situation, Lucas explained, 
had produced an unequal partnership between Maibara MP and Shiga 
NRP:
At the present time Sakata district NRP are assisting the MP in their
duties at the railyards. This is not in accord with the Police Law, but
must be done if stations are to be properly policed. Shiga NRP have 
recommended that Maibara MP be discontinued and the NRP take 
responsibility for this town. Do not concur in this recommendation since 
many towns of this size would prefer not to have their own police force 
and abolition of one MP would set a dangerous precedent.'^®
Around the same tim e, Frank Seitz, the head o f Gifu m ilita ry 
government team (MGT), was reporting an imbalance of a d ifferent 
sort: visits to  police stations throughout the prefecture in April and 
May, 1948, had revealed tha t NRP units were understaffed, "while 
nearly every autonomous (police) chief fe lt tha t he had suffic ient 
strength to  perform his m is s io n " .^7 The relative strength o f the 
system 's urban/local and rural/national components was perhaps 
less significant than the d ifficu lties associated w ith  red istribution 
of personnel, transfers of police officers from the NRP to  the MP or
Letter dated 2 9 /5 /4 8 ; Thru: Commanding General, I Corps; To: SCAP, Attn. PSD (G- 
2 00243). This is the source for the remainder of the paragraph.
Ibid.
Letter dated 1 9 /6 /4 8 ; Thru: Commanding Officer, Tôkai-Hokuriku MG Region; To: 
Commanding General, 8th Army; Subject: Strength of Gifu Prefecture NRP (G-2 
0 0 2 4 3 ) .
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vice versa. Given th a t the Occupation au tho rities  would not 
countenance structural change, the inflexibility of the new system - 
the absence o f mechanisms for slight adjustment - seems to  have 
been its chief defect.
Although Frank Seitz "recommended tha t the NRP strength in Gifu 
prefecture be increased", warning o f "a tendency for criminals to  
transfer operations to  rural a r e a s " , ^ 8  his superiors in GHQ refused 
" to  entertain any suggestions for revision of the...(Police Law) in so 
far as the NRP (we)re concerned".^9 Military government teams were 
to  "assist in alleviating....police personnel shortages by encouraging 
local police adm inistrators to...use the personnel ava ilab le ...m ore 
e f f i c i e n t l y . . . " . 5 0  Seitz surely viewed such instructions as half 
measures, unlikely to  stem the rise of crime. Likewise, the s itua tion  
in Maibara, Shiga prefecture, did not admit o f any easy solution. 
Although Colonel Lucas disapproved of any moves to  abolish Maibara 
MP, his immediate superiors favoured "amending the Police Law to  
permit municipalities with 5,000 to  10,000 population the option of 
vo ting whether to  maintain their own police force or to  Join the 
NRP".51 This recommendation was not even considered by Lieutenant 
Colonel Schafer at Eighth Army HQ - he endorsed Lucas' rejection of 
NRP control "inasmuch as assumption o f police functions in the town 
by NRP, w ith ou t request from the municipal authorities, would 
constitu te  a violation of the Police L a w " . 5 2
Schafer maintained tha t "one of the chief causes of the difficulties 
enumerated in the....le tter and the 1st Indorsement appear(ed) to  be 
the prevalent practice of requiring a municipality requesting police 
support to  pay the salaries of the police forces l o a n e d " . 53  Lucas had
"...because of the thinner police coverage there."
4th Ind., dated 2 3 /7 /4 8 ; From: PSD; To: Commanding General, 8th Army (NDL, G-2 
0 0 2 4 3 ) .
50 Ibid.
51 1st Ind., dated 9 /6 /4 8 ;  From: W. V. Flickey, Asst. Adj. General, HQ, I Corps; To: 
Commanding General, 8th Army (G-2 00243)
52 2nd Ind., dated 2 2 /7 /4 8 ;  To: SCAP; From: Asst. Adj. General, HQ 8th Army (G-2 
0 0 2 4 3 ) .
53 Ibid. 1st Ind., dated 9 /6 /4 8 ,  stated that Maibara was not the only town with  
"insufficient police forces...Another example...(was) a resort town with slightly more 
than 5,000 population trying...to maintain its own police department. On holidays and at 
weekends the population (might) double or treble, and police protection (was) spread
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explained tha t Maibara was a poor town - "no industries other than 
railways and (only) a small amount of farming" - and thus unable to  
pay fo r extra policemen. He had recommended tha t "provisions be 
made to  furnish additional police (for) Maibara MP and (th a t) support 
for these police...(should) come from central governm ent".^4 Lucas 
and Schafer d iverted a tten tion  away from the new s truc tu re 's  
shortcomings, directing it instead at the Japanese Government. GS 
followed suit, a spokesman declaring tha t "the practice o f requiring 
municipalities to  meet the expense of supporting local police before 
adequate provisions for local financing ha(d) been made....(was) in 
co n tra ve n tio n  o f the  express d ire c tiv e  o f th e  Supreme 
C o m m a n d e r" .55 Thus, the inadequacy o f local police forces was 
blamed on the centra l governm ent, which many alleged was 
deliberately sabotaging the new police structure by starving it o f 
funds. The inability o f communities to  finance the ir own po lice  
departm ents undermined the new system from the moment o f its 
creation, and lay at the heart of the debate concerning revision. The 
nature of the problem and its ramifications increasingly preoccupied 
those concerned with law enforcement, convincing most o f them by 
the summer o f 1949 that the Police Law would have to  be amended.
Shouldering the Financial Burden
According to  the official history of the Occupation, "the inability of 
m unicipalities, especially smaller ones, to  finance separate police 
forces....constituted the single greatest deterrent to  the success of 
r e f o r m " . 56 To begin with, as has been made clear, the  centra l 
government was expected to  subsidize the local police forces ("un til 
such time as local financing (was) possible"). Those concerned w ith 
police reorganisation knew tha t support from the national treasury 
could only be a short-te rm  expedient. Clearly, police forces 
dependant on the financial backing of the government could never be
very thin...If a call to adjacent units for support (was) made, the receiving unit (had to) 
pay the salaries of forces loaned."
54 Letter dated 2 9 /5 /4 8  (G-2 00243).
5 5 Memo dated 2 4 /7 /4 8 ;  From: Major J. P. Napier; To: G-2; Thru: ESS; Subject: 
Municipal Police Financing (G-2 0 0 2 4 3 ). MacArthur's letter to PM Katayama 
(1 6 /9 /4 7 )  was quoted to substantiate GS's claim: "...The national government should 
allocate the necessary funds until such time as local financing is possible."
56 Historv of the Non-Militarv Activities of the Occupation of Japan. M.55, p.101.
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tru ly independent. Besides, Yoshida and his cabinet 57 couid hardly be 
expected to  provide finances for a police system over which they 
had virtually no control. Thus, GHQ painted itse lf into a corner - it 
knew th a t small communities could not afford the ir own po lice  
forces, but at the same time it could not expect or allow the central 
government to  finance the "autonomous" police forces indefinitely.
Therefore, when the Japanese Government declared local pub lic  
entities to  be "se lf-supporting" on the 1st July, 1 9 4 8 , 5 8  few in 
Occupation circles can have been confident of the outcome. Indeed, 
those who examined the local finance legislation were appalled by 
its provisions. Eaton, the head of the Police branch (PSD), informed a 
colleague tha t his "thoughts concerning the subject o f 'autonomous 
entity  financial autonomy' were unprintable". He contended tha t the 
"Japanese Government, apparently w ith the approval o f ESS, had set 
up a method o f obtaining finances for autonomous en tities  tha t
would have been something to  pity the ignorance of, if  it had been
done through ignorance". Police operations were to  be financed with 
revenue from  theatre admission and liquor taxes, "when a great 
number o f towns (d id) not have thea tres  or liquor sales". 
Understandably, Eaton was "convinced tha t it was done w ith ulterior 
motives on the part o f the Japanese governm en t".59 Osaka's police 
chief, Suzuki Eiji, to ld  him th a t the  financia l a rrangem ents 
represented an attem pt "to  destroy the autonomous police":
Governors were Jealous of the power they lost through autonomy in 
policing, and pressured the national government to "starve" the 
autonomous police out of existence. Through the type of tax rebate
subsequently set up, this "starving" is definitely taking place.
Pulliam agreed, re iterating in January, 1949, th a t a lthough "the  
Japanese Government (had) provided in part for local fin a n c in g  
through allocation o f percentages o f theatre admission tax and of
57 Yoshida Shigeru formed his second government in October 1948. His predecessor was 
Ashida Hitoshi who was PM from 1 0 /3 /1 9 4 8 .
58 Check Sheet, dated 1 7 /1 /4 9 ; From: G-2; To: GS; Thru: ESS; Subject: Funds for MP 
(G-2 0 0 2 5 7 ).
59 Letter from H.S.E. to Lt. Col. Battey, 12(? )/1  948 (G-2 00257). Eaton charged the 
Japanese government with "using very poor judgement" - a typical small town had no 
theatre, and its inhabitants made their own "home-brew" (G-2 00252).
Ibid.
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liquor tax....many towns (had) no theatre or liquor sales". Echoing 
Eaton and Suzuki, he blamed factions w ithin the government for 
what had happened .P u lliam  explained tha t G-2/PSD was anxious to  
ensure "the  allocation o f proper funds for support o f local public 
safe ty agencies", but was not really authorised to  intervene - 
" ...( th e ) problem extend(ed) in to the entire s truc tu re  o f local 
government taxation, and as such (was) o f primary interest to  ESS, 
Finance D i v i s i o n " . ^ 2  Realising tha t financial hardship would invite 
corruption scandals, PSD's chief was determined to  distance himself 
from MP budgets.
Perhaps Pulliam had taken his cue from Eaton, who warned tha t 
"small towns had their backs to  the wall, tha t they had insufficient 
tax income to  pay their police, and tha t the programme had greatly 
encouraged the promotion o f "co llections'".63 There was plenty of 
evidence to  suggest tha t autonomous police forces would bankrupt 
the communities they served unless municipal authorities could find 
lucrative a lte rna tive  sources o f income. When liquor sales and 
theatre admissions were low or non-existent, com m unities could 
either rely on the designated sources of income and go bankrupt or 
raise money through private subsidies that often derived from illic it 
activities. Not surprisingly, most chose the la tte r course o f action, 
preferring survival to  insolvency.
In December 1948 the head o f Nagano MGT, Major S tra tton , drew 
a tten tion  to  the financial problems o f "all 36 public en tities in 
Nagano ken...(w ith) municipal police", and anticipated the ir recourse 
to  "extra-legal means o f obtaining financial s u p p o r t " . 64 Following 
representations by its ruling elite, S tratton singled out the village 
of Agata in the d istrict of Chiisagata:
The village chief and several members of the village assembly...visited
this HQ in connection with the financial condition of their village
resulting from the necessity of financing the municipal police system.
They reported that the village will have a ¥500 ,000  deficit by the end of
61 Memo for Record, 1 /4 9  (G-2 00257).
62 IW.
63 Letter from Eaton to Battey (G-2 00257).
64 Letter dated 1 4 /1 2 /4 8 ; To: Commanding Officer, Kantô MG Region; Subject: Funds 
for Municipal Police (G-2 0 02 5 7 )
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the current financial year (31 March, 1 9 4 9 ) unless funds are 
forthcoming from either the prefectural government or the national 
government as subsidies for the police department. Because of their 
limited power of taxation, there is no hope of alleviating the situation. It 
was also reported that the village will need ¥ 1 ,2 0 0 ,0 0 0  for the next 
fiscal year to support their police.®^
Nagano MGT HQ believed tha t unless immediate action was taken by 
the national government to  subsidize MP forces throughout th e  
prefecture "until such time as local autonomy in financial m atters 
(had) been established,^6 many cities, towns and villages (would) 
become bankrupt and (would) lose all fa ith  in the desirability o f  
local police".67 Stratton's major concern was tha t such communities 
would solicit contributions from persons who had "received services 
from the police".68
Comments made by his superiors demonstrate tha t the problem was 
not confined to  Nagano prefecture. Following receipt o f S tra tton 's  
"basic com m unication". L ieutenant Colonel Loren L. Gmeier, 
commanding officer o f Kantô m ilitary government region, informed 
HQ, IX Corps, tha t "the situation as reported (was) typical o f tha t 
existing throughout this MG region".69 Major R. M. Breeze o f HQ, IX 
Corps, then passed the report on to  the commanding general, 8 th  
Army, concurring w ith S tra tton 's  opinion and provid ing fu rth e r 
evidence to  support it:
A recent conference of prefectural public safety commission members of 
Tôhoku region resulted in an agreement of participating members to urge 
local public bodies to request additional aid from central government to 
maintain police in small communities..
HQ Eighth Arm y noted "the  generally unsa tis facto ry  condition 
regarding financing o f local police systems" and recommended to  
GHQ that "th is m atter be referred to  the appropriate agency of the 
Japanese Government w ith a view to  study and suitable remedial
66 Ibid.
66 Article 8, Supplementary Provisions, Police Law.
67 Letter dated 1 4 /1 2 /4 8  (G-2 00257).
68 Ibid. "Contributions" are examined in Chapter 4.
69 1st Ind., dated 2 9 /1 2 /4 8  (G-2 00257).
70 2nd Ind., dated 6 /1 /4 9  (G-2 00257).
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a c t io n " / '' The officer concerned, Major N. Hiney, didn’t  even hint at 
the kind o f measures tha t would remedy the situation, probably 
because he had no ideas on that score. As has been noted, G-2 passed 
the buck to  E S S ,^2 the section responsible for approving inadequate 
financial arrangements in the firs t place.73
Just two months a fte r the in troduction of "se lf-supporting" local 
administrations, the Nippon Times had reported that "the MP (were) 
anxious for State financial aid in view o f the present state of local 
f i n a n c e s " . 74 The following month a representative o f the Tôkai- 
Hokuriku assembly stated tha t cities, towns and villages required to  
fund their own police departments found "the burden of expenses 
i m p o s s i b l e . . . " . 7 5  Chairmen of the seven prefecural assemblies tha t 
constitu ted  the Tôkai-Hokuriku forum - Aichi, Shizuoka, Mie, Gifu, 
Fukui, Ishikawa and Toyama - called for MP forces to  be lim ited to  
cities w ith populations of more than 3 0 , 0 0 0 . 7 6  G-2's response was 
hardly sympathetic, but held out the hope tha t revision o f the Police 
Law might be considered in the not too distant future:
...T im e and experience in local government does not indicate the 
advisability of entertaining suggestions for revision of the Police Law at 
this t/me....During the latter part of November PSD police specialists 
will explain in detail to those concerned the inherent value of existing 
laws and the reasons why suggested changes should not be made at this 
time (my italics).
At least one o f the chairmen was not convinced by the arguments 
and explanations provided by PSD's experts. In December, 1948, Omi 
Tameji, chairman o f Aichi p re fe c tu re ’s assembly, complained o f 
"inadequate sources of revenue", insisting tha t "small communities 
could not afford the autonomy they had been g i v e n " . 78 Displeased
71 3rd. Ind., dated 1 2 /1 /4 9 ; To: SCAP.
72 See fn. 63.
73 According to Eaton's letter to Battey (G-2 00257).
74 8 /9 /4 8  issue, entitled "Police Knit More Closely To People By New System" [NDL, 
GS(B) 0 2283 ].
75 Letter dated 6 /1 0 /4 8 ;  From: Representative of Tôkai-Hokuriku Assembly 
Conference; Thru: Toyama Liaison Office; Subject: Recommendations on renovation of 
police setup (NDL, G-2 00252).
78 Ibid.
77 G-2 Inter-Office Memo, undated (G-2 0 02 5 2 )
78 Correspondence between Omi and PSD investigator (G-2 00252 )
266
with PSD's a ttitude, he added tha t "the  conference o f the seven 
chairmen of their respective prefectural assemblies was held at the 
insistence of a majority o f mayors and headmen o f cities and towns 
of less than 30,000 population". All concerned were wrestling with 
the problem of finance:
The object of the said meeting was to find ways and means to secure 
sufficient revenue for the affected small municipalities. Supported by 
statements of many mayors and head-men, this group of seven 
assemblymen concluded that even with the assistance of contributions and 
revenue obtained through tax channels, the majority if not all would soon 
be bankrupt.^^
Omi was told tha t PSD had "no control over budgetary matters, and 
thus could take no action pertaining to  finances". He was advised to  
report his findings and conclusions to  GS and ESS - the agencies th a t 
G-2 held responsible for drastic decentralisation and inadequate 
financial provision respectively. Moreover, the chairmen, mayors and 
headmen "should explain their needs to  Diet representatives and 
press them for an early corrective m e a s u re " .P S D  had warned of 
the problems tha t would accompany the kind of reorganisation 
favoured by GS, and was presumably con ten t to  look on as its 
predictions came true. Sooner or later, the Occupation would have to  
sponsor a police system more in tune with G-2's way of thinking.
Meanwhile the financial health o f many small c o m m u n it ie s  
continued to  deteriorate. In March, 1949, the Mainichi reported th a t 
"Kanagawa towns (were) unable to  meet police e x p e n s e s " . Members 
of the prefectura l assembly were re luctan t to  impose "g re a te r  
burdens on local taxpayers....to meet the expenses of operating local 
autonomous police forces", and so were "increasingly inclined to  
turn over police functions to  the national rural police". With the 
exception o f two cities, municipalities throughout the p re fe c tu re  
were unable to  shoulder the burden of their own police departments. 
The paper substantiated its claim by disclosing budget deficits in a 
number of towns:
Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 ATIS trans. (M, 2 9 /3 /4 9 ) ,  dated 4 /4 /4 9  [NDL, GS(B) 0 22 8 1 ] - the source for the 
remainder of this paragraph.
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Hatano-machi police expenses are expected to amount to ¥4.5 m. This 
means that there will be a deficit of more than ¥1 m. even if town taxes 
are collected in full. Moreover, admission taxes collected from country 
theatres, which are expected to cover police expenses, do not even cover 
half of these expenses as a rule. Machida-machi is also in similar 
difficulty. In the case of Minamiashiaara-machi and Yamakita-machi 
which do not have theatres their distress is keener still. Autonomous 
police bodies in mountainous districts appear doomed to disappear.®^
Even in a c ity  o f the size o f Fujisawa, thea tre  admission taxes 
provided only about a quarter (¥ 6 ,7 6 0 ,0 0 0 ) o f the  necessary 
expenditure (¥23 ,250 ,000). The article concluded by declaring th a t 
the maintenance o f MP forces would de s ta b ilise  p re fe c tu ra l
government.83
The following month the Asahi Shinbun focused attention once more 
on Kanagawa communities, claiming tha t they were "overburdened" 
by police e x p e n s e s " . 8 4  in some cases budgets were "so big tha t they 
(could) not (even) be covered....by the aggregate of residence taxes...". 
Determined to  express the ir d issatisfaction w ith  the new police 
system, a number of headmen and public safey commissioners had 
decided to  m eet at Hatano-m ach i " to  vo te  on the abolition 
of....autonomous police forces".
Although a new police structure was out o f the question so soon 
a fte r the in troduction o f MP and NRP forces, it was becoming 
increasingly clear tha t the "serious financial d ifficu lties  o f the 
se lf-gove rn ing  com m un ities" threatened to  destroy the  local 
autonomous police s y s t e m . 8 5  Survival depended on either higher or 
additional taxes or cuts in expenditure. The la tte r course o f action 
was contem plated by those responsible for governing the c ity  of 
Okayama. In May 1949 it was reported by a local paper th a t a 
reduction in police personnel was under consideration:
As police expenses cannot be covered by the admission tax alone, the 
municipal authorities are considering a reduction in personnel, although
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 ATIS trans. (AS, 1 9 /4 /4 9 ) ,  dated 2 3 /4 /4 9  [GS(B) 0 2 2 8 1 ] - the source for the 
remainder of this paragraph.
85 ATIS trans. (Sanvô Shinbun. 1 /5 /4 9 ) ,  dated 1 4 /5 /4 9  [GS(B) 02281].
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they are not at all certain that a smaller force can give the city adequate
protection. 86
Given tha t Okayama - with a floating population o f 200,000 - was 
"known as the nation's number one criminal hotbed", it was not 
surprising tha t they were carefully considering the ir options. The 
police reinforced the ir apprehensions by arguing tha t they needed 
more manpower, not less.87
Even when communities managed to  raise enough money to  support 
adequate police forces, "financial s tringency prevent(ed) costly 
criminal i n v e s t i g a t i o n s " . 88 a  small force, numbering seven to  ten 
policemen, could hardly afford to  allow one or tw o o f its members 
to  undertake long-distance trave l fo r in ve s tig a tive  purposes. 
Moreover, a shortage o f funds made it more d ifficu lt for the police 
to  combat black market activities, particularly when the in terests 
of the local populace were involved:
The police of a fishing town in Shizuoka prefecture once rounded 
up...black market traffickers smuggling fish out of that town. The 
smugglers being guests of local inns, a strong protest came from the inn­
keepers' association, (some) of whose leaders were on the local Public 
Safety (Police) Commission. The police relented under the pressure.89
It is perhaps surprising tha t this situation arose at all, given the 
prevalence of alliances between local police forces and successful 
entrepreneurs (ie. black m arketeers). Theirs was a sym b io tic  
relationship - in return for financial support, the police perm itted 
the ir benefactors to  engage in illegal, albeit prosperous, ac tiv ities . 
In March, 1949, the Jiii Shinpô reported tha t financial d ifficu lties 
had "given rise to  conspiracy between local bosses and police 
officials since the police must depend on local citizens for f u n d s " . 8 0  
Three months later, a journalist writing in Seikai Jeep claimed tha t 
"the  current critica l s ta te  o f local finance....(m ade) the police 
extremely susceptible to  the influence of local bosses", particularly
88 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Nippon Times. 8 /3 /4 9 ,  article entitled "Police System Weathers First Year o f 
Operation" [NDL, GS(B) 02282] - the source for the rest of this paragraph.
89 Ibid.
90 ATIS trans. (JS, 6 /3 /4 9 ) ,  dated 1 1 /3 /4 9  [GS(B) 02282].
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in cities and towns with less than 20,000 residents.91 Money was 
channelled through "such groups as the  Police S upporte rs ' 
Association or the Crime Prevention Society, and as a result the 
influence of wealthy bosses (was brought to  bear on) the police 
f o r c e s " . 9 2  The Occupation authorities knew about such organisations 
- indeed, they had already considered blocking these conduits for 
private subsidies or "contributions".
As we have seen, it had been decided to  defer action against such 
informal financial provision until circumstances p e r m i t t e d . 93 T hey 
never did - circumstances following decentralisation o f the police 
system  were even more unfavourable than before. Traditional 
sources o f financial support - inform al and u n re g u la te d  
increasingly made up the shortfall arising from inadequate revenue- 
raising measures. In January 1949, a magazine artic le, en titled  
"Facts Concerning the Metropolitan Police Board (MPB)", intim ated 
tha t there was a history of close relations between policemen and 
bosses:
The bosses and gangsters have always presented large sums of money to 
the police as a means of preventing any unpleasant collisions, and there 
has always been respect for the law of inviolability between them.^^
The creation of local police forces altered the relationship between 
the police and criminal elements, elevating its economic dimension 
at the expense o f political/spiritual affinities. Realising tha t a huge 
organisation like the MPB could not function satis facto rily  on its 
small budget, rich bosses moved to  capitalise on the situation, 
enterta in ing the ir friends in the force and providing funds fo r  
salaries and new b u i l d i n g s . 95 "Many police station chiefs (were) said 
to  be openly connected with local bosses", and involved in "countless 
shady deals". Some of them had even built "palatial houses w ith 
'con tribu tions ' from contractors, and (were) living in l u x u r y " . 9 6 
Nevertheless, Nishi Kantarô, the previously mentioned authority on
91 ATIS trans. (monthly magazine, 6 /4 9 ), dated 9 /6 /4 9  [GS(B) 02281].
92 Ibid.
93 See the relevant section in Chapter 4.
94 ATIS trans. (Van, 1 /4 9 ), dated 1 5 /1 /4 9  [NDL, GS(B) 02283].
95 Ibid.
96 ATIS trans. (Shin Tokvo. 7 /3 /4 9 ) ,  dated 1 8 /3 /4 9  [GS(B) 02282].
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the Japanese police system, was more inclined to  emphasize the 
MPB's positive advances since the implementation of the Police Law. 
Confidently claiming tha t "gangsters and local bosses (had) mostly 
disappeared", he then thought it necessary to  qualify this statement:
....but behind the Police Supporters' Association there are still some 
bosses in action, taking advantage of the lack of funds in the Police 
Board.
The Board's financial problems seem to  have come to  a head in 
March, 1949, when the Yomiuri Shinbun reported tha t "many police 
stations under the jurisd iction o f the (MPB had) failed to  p a y  
telephone, light and water b i l l s " . 98 in some instances, failure to  
settle  up had led to  suspension of services:
Extreme cases are Totsuka and Waseda police stations, whose public 
telephone service was temporarily cut off....Still more embarrassing is 
the fact that payment is a very difficult task for the poverty-stricken 
Metropolitan Police Board - the nation's biggest autonomous police
force.
According to  the artic le , "the  people 's fa ilure to  pay t h e  
m etropolitan residence tax" accounted for at least some o f the 
arrears. Public unwillingness to  contribu te  to  adm inistrative costs 
presumably brought the police and the ir private sponsors c lose r 
together.
There was unanimity amongst Japanese newspapers, regardless o f 
the d is tric ts  they were covering, th a t "so long as the police 
depend(ed) on contributions for their salaries they would inevitably 
be linked w ith local bosses".i oo in April, 1948, William Fritz - one 
of PSD's police administrators - examined the case of Shibata Joji, 
mayor o f Onuki (Ibaraki pre fecture). A lthough local police chiefs 
described him as "the biggest gangster in the Kantô area", they 
hastily added th a t "the subject (was) very 'ge n tle ' now", his
9^ Article entitled "Démocratisation of the Metropolitan Police", Shakai. 5 /49 .
98 ATIS trans. (Y& 2 5 /3 /4 9 ) ,  dated 3 1 /3 /4 9  [GS(B) 02282].
99 Ibid.
T 90 ATIS trans., dated 2 9 /3 /4 9 ;  Prefectural Press Analysis: Police System [GS(B) 
0 2 2 8 2 ].
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generosity much appreciated by "policemen and the people".i oi 
Physical evidence indicated th a t the police though t highly o f 
Shibata, despite his criminal record - Fritz wanted to  know why "th e  
form er pre fectura l chief o f police..., the local police chief and 
prominent officials o f towns and villages (had) so eagerly sponsored 
the erection of a monument to  the subject". According to  the MPB, 
Shibata could be "pu t away (only) if  investigated by an outside 
agency" - local police forces (NRP and MP) were "believed to  be 
under (his) influence....". Given tha t he led "an extravagant life " , 
spending a great deal on e n t e r t a i n m e n t , 102 it was probably correct 
to  assume tha t local officials would be unwilling to  te s tify  against 
him.
Unscrupulous, wealthy individuals - Shibata is a good example - 
dom inated com m unities by accom m odating the in te res ts  o f 
potentia lly obstructive  agencies, particularly the police force and 
the public sa fe ty  commission (PSC). According to  an ATIS 
prefectural press summary, dated 29 March 1949, "the 'a ttitud e ' of 
(PSC) members and police towards money and influence was....one of 
the (chief grounds for public concern)....over the present po lice  
s y s t e m " . ! 0 3  An editorial in a Nagoya newspaper had "demanded 
that....Public Safety Committee members as well as policemen be 
i n c o r r u p t i b l e " . ! 0 4  Assessing the new police system 's track record 
after one year, the Nippon Times drew atten tion to  the problems 
attending the PSCs:
It is bruited on all sides that they are doing little or naught..With men of 
questionable character on the commissions, there is the danger of the 
local police being made a tool of local bosses....Utmost circumspection and 
sound Judgment are called for in the selection of (candidates)....^°^
Just a few days later, on 11th March, the Yomiuri stated tha t MP 
forces were at the mercy of public safety commissions, "which have
!0 ! Letter dated 2 9 /4 /4 8 ;  Subject: Shibata Joji, Mayor, Onuki-machi. Ibaraki ken: To: 
Chief, PSD (NDL, G-2 02860) - the source for the rest of the paragraph.
!02 "His monthly cost of living (including social expenses) amounts to ¥1m".
!03 NDL, GS(B) 02282.
! 04 Ibid.
!05 8 /3 /4 9  [NDL, GS(B) 02282].
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absolute influence in local d i s t r i c t s " J  0 6  it was, therefore, a m atter 
o f some concern th a t "the  quality o f....com m itteem en (w a s ) 
generallly in fe rio r" - indeed, "in some extrem e cases, s u c h  
unsuitable persons as gangsters (had) been a p p o i n t e d . . . " . 1 0 7  On the 
basis o f such a c c o u n ts ,1 h .  E. Wildes later declared tha t " it  was 
common knowledge th a t many local (PSCs) were packed w ith 
g a n g s te rs " .  T 09 This was in marked con trast to  H. S. Eaton's 
premature endorsement of the new commissions on 13 May, 1948:
The fear that under the new system gangsters and "bosses" would be 
placed on PSC.s, and thereby obtain control of the police for their own 
selfish purposes, has not materialised. Today's public safety  
commissioners are....s trong-m inded, public-spirited, intensely  
interested people.^
The following February the Mainichi conducted a nationwide public 
opinion poll on the dual police sys te m .m  Japanese residents were 
asked, amongst other things, if they had confidence in the ir local 
public safety committees. Nearly 50% of those living in MP districts 
didn't know (49.6%), whilst 1 5.6% answered in the negative - Eaton's 
views were shared by less than 1/3 of those questioned.^
In teresting ly , po llsters asked a question th a t concerned the  
relationship between "bosses" and policemen - "Have you heard or 
seen bosses in your d is tric t exerting influence upon the police by 
taking advantage o f police aid societies (or) crime prevention 
associations...?" Nearly 1 /4  of those residing in MP districts (22.9% ) 
answered in the affirmative, suggesting tha t little  e ffo rt was made 
to  conceal such practices as bribery and corruption. Just a month
106 ATIS trans., dated 1 1 /3 /4 9  [NDL, GS(B) 02282].
1 0 / Ibid. "...of the 136 PSC men who have so far resigned, 12 were connected with 
economic offences and 12 with violent crimes".
108 Others include Asahi Shinbun. 9 /9 /4 8 , Tokvo Shinbun. 7 /3 /4 9 .
109 "The Postwar Japanese Police", Journal of Criminal Law. Criminoloov and Police 
Science. Vol.43, No.5 (Jan.-Feb. 1953) p.664.
110 Press conference (G-2 00259).
111 Using the "regional random sampling method", the Mainichi Shinbun Public Opinion 
Survey Department selected districts/samples of residents in 100 cities and 191 towns 
and villages. 3 ,165 residents filled in questionnaires. Answers received to the seven 
questions asked in the survey were classified according to whether the pollee lived in an 
MP district or in a NRP district.
112 ATIS trans. (M, 7 /3 /4 9 ) ,  dated 1 1 /3 /4 9  [GS(B) 02282].
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earlier, in January 1949, a magazine article had drawn attention to  
"the inseparable bonds between the policeman and the boss":
The police are easy to bribe - tha t is, the results of a bribe are 
instantaneous. This is why there is always a close relationship between 
the black marketeer and the policeman. The results of this connection can 
be seen in the poor results of....black market raids, since police secrets 
are confided in the course of giving and receiving "presents".^
The fo llow ing April, representa tives o f local organisations in 
Hachiôji, a Tokyo suburb, complained th a t "since the local police 
was reorganised into an autonomous police force, no major violators 
of economic laws (had) been arrested...". They also pointed out tha t 
"black market goods (were) being sold o p e n ly " . T h e  valid ity o f 
these criticisms was recognised by the head of Hachiôji MP and the 
chairman o f the local PSC, both of whom "promised to  strive to  make 
the police a respected and trusted group". The decline o f police 
discipline was noted by a representative o f the c ity 's  Ex-Convicts 
Relief Committee.^ i ^
Naturally, policemen were re luctant to  b ite  the hand th a t was 
literally feeding them. Collectively and individually, they depended 
on black marketeers to  fund the ir policing activ ities and to  he lp 
them keep body and soul together at home. Some commentators were 
sym pathe tic , declaring th a t "crim es by the  police (w ere) a 
phenomenon born of d ifficu lt living conditions".^  ^6 Nishi Kantaro, 
writing in Shakai in May 1949, argued th a t it was unreasonable to  
"expect policemen to  be above the general level of society - being 
human, they (were) also exposed to  tem ptations".  ^ Up to  a point, 
the re fo re , close relations between the  police and w ea lthy, 
unsavoury characters were explained away - mutual accommodation 
was inevitable given the financial problems faced by local police 
forces. However, the combination o f a weak police force and a 
crim inal organ isa tion  acting  w ith  im pun ity  was p o te n tia lly  
explosive. In some communities the MP force was so com prom ised
113 a t IS trans. (Van. 1/49), dated 15/1 /49 [GS(B) 02283].
114 ATIS trans. (Asahi Shinbun. 20 /4 /49), dated 27 /4 /49  [GS(B) 02281]. 
11 3 ibid.
116 ATIS trans. (Van. 1/49), dated 15/1/49.
11 ^ Article entitled "Démocratisation of the Metropolitan Police".
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and so weakened by its relationship with a particular gangster tha t 
the la tte r actually took control o f the community, usually w ith  
disastrous results.
Vulnerability to  Lawless Elements
The weakness o f the municipal police in the face o f crim inal 
elements and, more im portantly, organised com m unist p ro te s t  
convinced the Occupation authorities tha t revision o f the Police Law 
was not only necessary but urgent. They came to  this conclusion 
following a number o f incidents - notably in Honjô (Saitama), Chôshi 
(Chiba) and Taira (Fukushima) - scandals tha t were exposed, or at 
least thoroughly investigated, by the Japanese press. Indeed, 
exposes in the Nippon Times frequently caused General Willoughby to  
berate his subordinates - the head of G-2 (Intelligence) did "not like 
to  get (his) news from ... newspapers".118 Leading tit le s  were 
provoked in to  unmasking prom inent crim inals by a ttacks  on 
journalists. "A press campaign against the activ ities o f gangster 
bosses" was in itia ted in August 1948, when the Asahi Shinbun 
reported on developments in Honjô, and continued into 1 949 with the 
Yomiuri's "crusade against bosses and gangs in Chôshi c ity"."'^9
The Honjô story broke during the summer of 1948, when "a cub 
reporter for the Asahi" was "publicly and physically assaulted" by a 
pillar o f the community whose public persona did not f it  well w ith 
his criminal background. Oishi Kasuichirô was a member o f the 
municipal assembly, the Ex-convict Relief Com m ittee and the  
Prefectural Judicial Protection Committee as well as the founder 
and chief d irector o f the Police and Citizens' Society - all th is  
despite a string o f convictions. His unfortunate v ictim  had been 
investigating reports o f black market activ ities , which m ilita ry  
government authorities had called to  the a tten tion  o f the local 
police. Although the police investigation had yielded nothing in the 
way o f results, the reporter had managed to  uncover "part of a story 
which involved prominent citizens, including the moving spirit o f
 ^ Memo dated 7 /9 /48 ; To: Col. Bratton - Info (G-2 00253).
T ^ HQ, Civil Censorship Detachment - Press, Pictorial, Broadcast Division; Summary 
of Information, dated 5 /3 /49 ; Subject: Yomiuri Shinbun Fights Boss Rule in Chôshi City 
(NDL, CIS 02702).
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the 'voluntary' collection campaign". The publication o f expressions 
of disapproval in local editions of the Asahi provoked the assault, 
which in turn justified  coverage in the paper's national edition. The 
la tte r carried reports daily on developm ents in th is  "tow n o f 
gangsters", focusing on "measures taken by procuratorial authorities 
as well as the general public to  rid (the ) town o f its  f i r m ly  
entrenched bosses".‘'^o
Willoughby was not aware of what was going on in Honjô until he 
"picked up....a public newspaper article...on 30 August, five days 
after the (Nippon Times) reported on (the) incident".121 in a caustic 
memo to  Colonel Bratton, he ordered an investigation in to  the 
"effic iency of the local GIG u n i t " .  ^22 He was assured tha t "local 
GIG....was not aware of the situation until an anonymous le tte r was 
received by Saitama MGT during the second week of August 1948". 
As for the head o f PSD, he had been examining the allegations 
contained in the le tte r when the story broke:
Colonel Pulliam (CIS/PSD) was cognisant and has been investigating 
conditions with a view (to) prosecuting all persons guilty of illegal or 
unlawful acts, whether they be the mayor, members of the Public Safety 
Commission, police officials or....ovabunJ^^
Honjô had its own inadequate police force - it was a "tow n o f 
gangsters" resting on foundations o f collusion and corruption. These 
tw o tru th s  fused in to  a public perception th a t  asso c ia te d  
vu lne rab ility  w ith  local police forces and e ffec tiveness w ith  
greater centralisation. Although there was a willingness on the part 
of the Occupation to  learn from what had happened at Honjô, the 
sections concerned could hardly be expected to  blame the very police 
system  they  had devised. National agencies were s im ila rly  
am bivalent - a Diet com m ittee, w h ilst c ritica l o f MP forces.
T 20 The information is this paragraph comes from three sources: Historv of the Non- 
Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan. M.55, pp. 103-4. Memo dated 4 /9 /4 8 ; 
From: Col. Bratton; To Gen. Willoughby (NDL, G-2 00253). HQ, Civil Censorship 
Detachment - Press, Pictorial, Broadcast Division; Summary of Information, dated 
5 /3 /4 9 .
121 Memo dated 7 /9 /4 8  (G-2 00253).
122 Memo dated 30/8 /48; Subject: Honjô Scandal (G-2 00253).
123 Memo dated 4 /9 /48 ; From: Col. Bratton; To: Gen. Willoughby (G-2 00253).
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produced inconclusive findings with regard to  " c o n t r i b u t i o n s " .  ^24  
Still, the publicity surrounding the affair led to  the resignations of 
the mayor o f Honjô and members o f the local public sa fe ty  
commission, together w ith the transfer o f the NRP d is tr ic t police 
chief. In teresting ly, the Police and C itizens' Society was not 
d i s b a n d e d , ' '25 suggesting tha t its importance as a conduit fo r 
funding was fully appreciated by the Occupation authorities. Any 
a ttem pt to  block tha t channel might have had serious implications 
for autonomous police forces - the alternative was to  perm it the 
flow of money, and to  engage in an exercise o f damage lim itation. 
Providing gangsters did not run rio t, the system 's fu n d a m e n ta l 
anomaly - its reliance on bribes - could be concealed.
However, the press was determ ined to  expose m a lp ra c tic e s , 
particularly when Journalists were the victims, and so continued to  
produce illum inating coverage o f local policing. For example, in 
September 1948 several metropolitan newspapers reported tha t a 
Yom iuri reporter had been attacked in the HQ o f the MPB by a 
"gangster who was known to  have frequented the bui ld ing" .^  26 Major 
Imboden (Civil Information and Education Section) considered the 
incident serious enough to  warrant a declaration tha t "assaults upon 
newspaper reporters were infringements upon the basic freedom of 
the p r e s s " . !  27 According to  Shinso, a m onthly magazine, unsavoury 
characters were drawn to  the premises o f the MPB - black 
marketeers were "rampant" in its offices, supplying policemen w ith 
food and clothing. "Real love for the police", it contended, was 
"expressed by the bosses, as typ ified  by the Honjô c a s e " . !  2 8 
Reference was made to  crime prevention societies, and "dinner 
parties...presumably paid for by....black m a r k e t e e r s " . ! 2 9
! 24 History of the Non-Military Activities. M.55, p.104.
!25  1 ^ . ,  pp. 104-105.
! 26 hQ, Civil Censorship Detachment - Press, Pictorial, Broadcast Division; Summary 
of Information, dated 5 /3 /49 ; Subject: Yomiuri Shinbun Fights Boss Rule in Chôshi City 
(NDL, CIS 02702).
! 27 Ibid.
! 28 ATIS trans. (Shinso. 2/49), dated 5 /2 /49 ; Article entitled "Metropolitan Police 
Exposed" [NDL, GS(B) 02283].
! 29 Ibid.
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"Even where the police were honest the tiny forces were...,often.... at 
the mercy of...gangs"J 30 This view - expressed by H. E. Wildes - was 
substantiated by events in Kônosu and Omiya (Saitama). On 2 3 
February, 1949, the Tokyo Shinbun reported the comments o f a 
police chief - Iwasaki o f the NRP - together with the context o f his 
remarks:
To illustrate the helplessness of the police, take as an example Kônosu 
machi with a population of 14,000. Only five or six national rural and 
autonomous policemen during the day and one or two at night can be 
mobilised in case of emergency. Chief Iwasaki of the (NRP) in this 
district stated that if more than 10 armed gangsters attack the town, the 
police force would be powerless. As a result the police are hesitant about
arresting g a n g s .
During "the prosecution o f the Omiya and Kônosu cases involving 
assault and battery o f minor gangsters by their bosses", it became 
clear tha t the local police were im potent in the face o f gang 
violence. Gambling was identified as the root o f the problem, its 
luxuriant grow th in the provinces re fle c tin g  e ffe c tiv e  police 
measures in the m e t r o p o l i s . ^  32
In January, 1949, the Yomiuri drew attention to  the problems o f 
Chôshi, a fishing town of 72,000 situated on the Pacific coast east 
of T o k y o . ^33 It  was reported tha t "nine tough gangs....(had) control 
over the labour unions and the press in the c ity", tha t "gambling and 
stabbing (were) everyday affairs", and tha t "the police (was) not 
much concerned w ith  these happenings".  ^3 4 /\ll the necessary 
ingredients were present for a good story - blatant disregard for the 
rights of journalists, a feeble police force incapable o f maintaining 
even a semblance of law and order, and an archetypal villain at the 
centre of the fray. Takahashi Toramatsu - nicknamed Takatora - was 
described as the "AI Capone of Chôshi" by Mr. Beech of the Chicago
T30 H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", p.663.
131 ATIS trans., dated 1 /3 /49  [GS(B) 02282].
132 Ibid.
133 hq , Civil Censorship Detachment, Summary of Information, dated 5 /3 /4 9  (NDL, 
CIS 02702).
134 Civil Censorship Detachment - Press, Pictorial and Broadcast Division, Press 
Section; Memo for record, dated 17/2/49; Subject: Yomiuri's Crusade Against Gangs and 
Bosses in Chôshi (CIS 02702).
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Daily News, who met and interviewed the "notorious gambler-boss" 
in March, 1949. His conclusions were as follows:
(Takatora) is the most powerful boss in the city of Chôshi, (controlling 
the people) by use of terror...He is always protected by a tricky lawyer 
named Shiina Takashi whenever he gets in trouble with the law....A most 
courageous man is needed to ostracize....(him). There is a man named 
Koshikawa Yoshimaro, the editor of a local newspaper, who....once fought 
against him. There is still a large scar on his face...inflicted by one of
(Takatora's) g a n g . . . . ^ 3 5
Takatora had skilfully expanded his power base. He had capitalised 
on divisions in the fishermen's union, organised by communists in 
May 1946, by encouraging a breakaway of disillusioned members. He 
then "formed a new union around the bolting members, appointed 
himself adviser and selected members o f his gang as leaders". In 
December, 1948, his union took over the job o f "maintaining order" 
in the c ity 's  fish markets, a task usually reserved for the police. 
Those assigned to  this duty "looted the catches o f fishing vessels 
from other prefectures", demonstrating scant regard for the rule o f 
law. Likewise, threats and intim idation were the principal supports 
of Takatora's gambling empire:
'Customers' were threatened if they tried to stop gambling, and eight of 
the ten richest fishermen have gone bankrupt from gambling losses. Cases 
of intimidation of the townspeople as well as acts of violence....are
numerous. 3^6
At the beginning of its "crusade", the Yomiuri Shinbun stated tha t 
"the relationship between the bosses and the police (in Chôshi was) 
i n s e p a r a b l e " .  ^37 as a result, external agencies - the A t to rn e y  
General's O ffice and the Chiba Procuratorial O ffice - began to  
investiga te  "boss a c tiv itie s  in Chôshi". Public pressure fo r 
something to  be done escalated when a woman was "punished" for 
telling a reporter about threats she had received - her forehead was 
pierced w ith a pair o f fire-tongs. "Mina-san's wounds" became the 
focus of "growing anti-terrorist public o p i n i o n " .  ^38 On 20 March, the
T 35 Memo for Record, dated 8 /3 /49 ; Subject: Follow-up on Yomiuri's Crusade Against 
Gangs and Bosses in Chôshi (CIS 02702).
 ^36 hq, Civil Censorship Detachment, Summary of Information, dated 5 /3 /49  (NDL, 
CIS 02702).
137 YS, 3 1 /1 /4 9  (NDL, G-2 00261).
138 Summary of Information, dated 5 /3 /49  (CIS 02702).
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Yomiuri reported that the "Chôshi PSC and autonomous police gave no 
positive aid to  the arrest of Takatora", because "all the expenses of 
the autonomous police were paid by Takatora and other influential 
persons of the c i t y " . 1 39 Eight days later, "Takatora...., who had been 
under investigation o f Chiba D is tric t P rocurator's Office, (was) 
prosecuted on the charge of attem pted murder, injury, violence and 
e x t o r t i o n . . . . " . 1 4 0  Pujii Shôjô, a PSD police investigator, later reported 
tha t Chiba's procurator favoured a sentence o f at least five years 
imprisonment for Chôshi's notorious boss, and was optim istic about 
the c ity 's  fu ture prospects now tha t it was "m ostly  cleared o f 
gangsters and bosses". In teresting ly, Fujii in tim ated th a t the 
Yomiuri's "account o f Chôshi's condition was exaggerated....,that the 
(municipal) police...(were) not 'friendly' w ith bosses and gamblers as
alleged".! 41
Although the Occupation authorities might have fe lt able to  question 
the significance of such cases, the same could not be said for acts 
o f sedition instigated by the Communist Party. When "an unruly 
communist-led mob occupied Taira police sta tion" for about eight 
hours on June 30, 1949,142 the press, the Occupation authorities and 
the Japanese governm ent reacted w ith  alarm. The incident 
demonstrated not only tha t municipal police forces were extremely 
vulnerable in the face o f organised p ro tes t, but also - m o re  
im portantly - tha t communist elements were capable o f humiliating 
NRP and MP units. Taira's force o f th irty  policemen had been quickly 
overwhelmed by a force o f several hundred, most o f whom were 
miners. The mob had then released two communists, stolen the one 
and only firearm and draped the police station in red flags. When the 
Fukushima MGT heard what had happened it immediately ordered 
Fukushima, Sendai and other cities to  send armed NRP units to  Taira. 
However, the National Railway W orkers' Union (NRWU) was 
determined to  obstruct the dispatch o f reinforcements, particularly
139 YS, 20/3 /49; article entitled "Outrageous Chôshi PSC Retarded Arrest of Takatora" 
(G-2 00261).
140 YS, 29 /3 /4 9  (G-2 00261).
141 Memo dated 31/8/49; Subject: Newspaper Campaign Against Gangsterism in Chôshi, 
Chiba Prefecture; To: Administrator, Group V (G-2 00260).
142 1^, 3 /7 /4 9  (G-2 04221).
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from  Sendai where the police must have been screaming w ith  
fru s tra tio n :
About two hundred armed cadets of the (NRP) Academy (tried)...to board a 
special train for Taira. However, the NRWU first stoned the train, then 
pulled the engineer down from his locomotive and locked the car doors 
from the inside to prevent rescuers from gaining access. When the police 
were fully transferred to  trucks,...workers used the railroad's 
communications system to order the gates closed all along the way to 
Taira, (thus) blocking road traffic.
The c ity  of Kôriyama sent two thirds of its police force to  Taira, 
only to  find its e lf  su ffe ring  a s im ila r  fa te .  C om m un is t 
dem onstra to rs  s torm ed the police s ta tio n  and occupied it 
"apparently under a prearranged s c h e d u l e " .1^4
Most commentators believed tha t the chain of events corresponded 
to  "a well-coordinated and prearranged plot,.... (aimed at) tes t(ing ) 
the strength  o f the police in (the ) area". This suspicion was 
"heightened by the fact tha t the direct cause o f the...rio ting was 
insignificant e n o u g h " . 1^5 The riot in Taira was apparently sparked 
o ff by a police order to  remove a bulletin board used by the local 
communist party com m ittee. The circumstances surrounding th is 
order are less important than the real reason for the conflict tha t 
erupted during the afternoon of June 30:
The true cause was the dismissal...of 143 out of 500 members of the Yagô 
Coal Mine Workers' Union in Taira, including its chairman and vice- 
chairman, both of whom belonged to the communist party. These fired 
men were looking for a vent for their anger in a city already sullen and 
frustrated by economic conditions...
According to  Chalmers Johnson, the Taira incident was "the c losest 
thing to  actual insurrection tha t occurred in Japan in 1 9 4 9 ".147 \ i 
demonstrated tha t the dual police system was incapable of coping 
with organised subversive elements, so much so tha t "citizens in the
Chalmers Johnson, Consoiracv at Matsukawa (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1972) p.103 - the source for the preceding paragraph.
144 3 / 7 / 4 9  (G-2 0 4 2 2 1 ) .
145 Ibid.
146 Johnson, Conspiracy, p.101.
147 Ibid.
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Taira area organised a body of 1 , 3 0 0  v i g i l a n t e s " . ^8 The N ippon 
Times reported that the public was running out o f patience:
The question which the public is naturally asking is whether or not the 
present police forces, national and local, are able to maintain law and 
order and to provide the people with the necessary protection against mob 
action. This problem...is even more pressing and pertinent than before 
because the highly publicised "summer labour offensive" is expected to 
begin in earnest with the execution of the Goverment's personnel slash
programme. 4^9
The programme o f economic stabilisation, subm itted by the Dodge 
mission in April 19 4 9 ,150 provoked social unrest, sabotage and 
subversion. Drastic cuts in personnel, or the threat o f them, were 
active ly resisted by communists and the ir supporters, w h o s e  
"amateur revolution-making" strengthened the government's case for 
revision o f the Police Law. One of many squalls during the "Dodge 
storm ", the Taira incident demonstrated tha t economic retrenchm ent 
and the attendant social problems necessitated an effective police 
force.
Trusting in the National Rural Police
On 15 July, 1949, the Tokyo Shinbun declared tha t "the Japanese 
police....should not be le ft divided....(but rather) reorganised as the 
national rural police system a l o n e " . i Around the same tim e a
public opinion survey in Tokyo, conducted by the Yomiuri Shinbun.
showed tha t there was substantial support for the adoption of a 
single police system (53.9% ). This was not surprising given tha t
three months earlier - before the Taira incident - the M ain ich i's
"nationwide public opinion poll on the new police" had revealed tha t 
41.9% of those questioned favoured "unification", whilst 37.2% d idn 't 
know what kind of system they w a n t e d .  ^^2 Although these statistics
s. Sugai, "The Japanese Police System", in R. E. Ward, ed.. Five Studies in Japanese 
Politics (University of Michigan Press, 1957) p.7.
149 1^, 3 /7 /4 9  (G-2 04221).
1 Joseph Dodge, the president of a Detroit bank, headed the mission. Regarding Japan's 
problems, he did not mince his words: "Japan's economy is walking on stilts, one leg of 
which is built on external aid from the US and the other on internal subsidies" ( NT. 
8 /3 /4 9 ) .
151 ATIS trans. ( IS , 1 5 /7 /4 9 ) , dated 2 1 /7 /4 9  [NDL, GS(B) 02280].
152 ATIS trans., dated 1 1 /3 /4 9  [GS(B) 02282].
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may be of questionable value, they do at least indicate th a t there 
was litt le  public support for a fragm ented police structure . The 
Occupation authorities held the press at least partia lly responsible 
for th is rebuff. Its "ignorance o f the underlying principles o f 
decentralisation in a democratic society played into the hands o f 
those interested political circles which supported centralisation o f 
police authority on grounds of efficiency and effectiveness w ithout, 
however, mentioning the inherent evils o f the s y s t e m " . 153 More 
significant, however, was a gut feeling on the part of the general 
public th a t drastic decentralisation was misguided. Local police 
forces were seen as a burden, a liab ility rather than a benefit. 
Generally, they were cursed as much by ordinary Japanese citizens 
as they were by the national g o v e r n m e n t . 154
In June 1949 the Prime Minister hosted a two-day meeting, the 
purpose of which was "to  study the reform of the police system,.... 
and the maintenance o f peace and order against the labour 
o f f e n s i v e " . ! 55 Attended by the nation's police chiefs, it was "the 
second conference o f its  kind", a tte s tin g  to  the increasing 
momentum of reform. Formal discussions concerning revision of the 
Police Law seem to  have begun as early as March 1949, follow ing 
reports th a t "the  United States au thorities  had d irected re ­
examination o f local decentralisation o f Japan's police sy s te m ".!5 6 
The basis for these reports was a "statem ent made by US Secretary 
of the Army Royall tha t Japan should be allowed to  have suffic ient 
police force for peace preservation and the suggestion forwarded by 
Lieutenant General Robert Eichelberger th a t a police force o f 
1 50,000 should be created in Japan for purposes o f internal peace 
and o r d e r " . ! 57  The Japanese government was determined to  forge 
ahead with its plans in the light of these statements.
! 53 Report entitled "Evolution of a Democratic Police System", compiled in 1951 by GS 
[NDL, GS(B) 0 18 3 2 ].
! 54 An ATIS trans. (summary), dated 2 3 /7 /4 9 , declared that "there is undoubtedly no 
one in Japan who approves the present Japanese police system" [GS(B) 02280].
!55 ATIS trans. ( Hôchi Shinbun. 1 6 /6 /4 9 ), dated 1 6 /6 /4 9  [GS(B) 02280].
!56  ATIS trans. (Mainichi. 7 /3 /4 9 ) ,  dated 1 1 /3 /4 9  [GS(B) 0 22 8 2 ].
!57  6 /3 /4 9 ,  Editorial Survey [GS(B) 02282],
283
The very same day tha t the nation's police chiefs met to  discuss 
these plans at the Premier's official residence - 16 June 1949 - it 
was reported in the Tokvo Shinbun that "the  (NRP's) Adm inistrative 
Management Board (had)....subm itted to  State Minister Higaii 58 g 
report on the revision of the police system which was based on the  
actual conditions of the local p o l ice" .^  ^9 Expressing an expectation 
tha t a revision bill would be submitted "in the coming Diet session", 
the article outlined its likely provisions: An increase in police 
manpower; the "lim ita tion of ...autonomous bodies to  cities only, 
leaving the establishm ent o f such police forces for towns and 
villages to  their own discretion"; and the consequent "expansion o f 
the ac tiv itie s  and functions o f the NRP vis à vis the local 
autonomous p o l i c e " . ‘' ^ o
It seems tha t the Japanese government was increasingly taking its 
cue from  prom inent figures in W ashington ra ther than the ir 
counterparts in Tokyo. Fully appreciating the importance o f tensions 
between the US and the USSR, Yoshida and his cabinet acted on signs 
- the Dodge mission was the most visible - o f a more prominent role 
for the US adm in is tra tion  at the expense o f GHQ. General 
Willoughby's reaction to  an editorial in the Nippon Times in August 
1949 dem onstrates tha t he was com plete ly out o f touch w ith 
developments on the police front, th a t certain members o f the 
Japanese government were quite willing to  discuss the prospect of 
reform with little  regard for the wishes o f G-2. He asked Pulliam if 
he had "been advised that plans (for the reform of the police system 
had) been drafted by the Democratic L i b e r a l s " . ^ T h e  head of PSD 
stated tha t the "editorial appear(ed) to  be part o f a planned press 
campaign prom pted by Higai,....spokesman fo r the  in te res ts  
apparently desirous o f a return of the form er police s t a t e " .  1 6 2  
Pulliam described Higai as a "general nuisance", who was "closely 
associated w ith....recent press-aired differences between the Prime
168 Cabinet member in charge of police affairs.
169 ATIS trans. dated 1 6 /6 /4 9  [NDL, GS(B) 02280].
160 Ibid.
161 Inter-office memo, dated 1 2 /8 /4 9 ;  From: Willoughby; To: Pulliam; Subject: 
Reform of the Police System (NDL, G-2 00262 ). In January 1949 the Democratic 
Liberal Party, led by Yoshida, had won an absolute majority in the lower house.
162 Memo dated 1 5 /8 /4 9 ; From: PSD; To: G-2 (G-2 00262).
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M inister (on the one hand and) the National Public Safe ty 
Commission (on the o t h e r ) . . . . " J  63 He assured Willoughby tha t PSD 
was manoeuvring behind the scenes to  ensure tha t the outcome of 
the revision process, which was accepted as necessary, was in line 
w ith Occupation policy:
upon application and reasonable test of the Police Law, PSD....recognised 
the mandatory need of a revision...This has been quietly worked on by 
PSD...with officials of the Japanese government. The revision, 
representing months of education and labour, has been handled quietly on 
a....schedule for submission to the next session of the Diet....'officials in 
the know' have quietly injected many of the desired revisions into 
discussions with their friends of the press. That (these)...have proved 
beneficial and have countered Higai's proposals is evidenced by the 
objections raised in the Nippon Times editorial to the more radical and 
nationalistic version desired by Higai.
No sooner had Willoughby received Pulliam's memo than he was 
inviting everyone's attention to  another article in the Nippon Times. 
this time concerning a conference of prefectural g o v e r n o r s .  165 The 
la tte r had adopted a resolution tha t called for "autonomous local 
police....(to) be limited to  municipal zones (w ith) populations of over 
30 ,000 and all the police in centres below th is figure ( to )  be 
incorpora ted in to  the National Rural Police".^ 66 Pulliam w a s  
impatient o f the arguments expressed at the conference:
Governors, mayors and autonomous assemblies have failed, in most 
instances, to adequately tax them selves to  support lo c a l 
government....They revel in talking about their problems, and in order to 
point the finger of responsibility away from themselves they close such 
discussions by blaming the national government. They still prefer the 
politically controlled system of contribution to taxation.
MacArthur was equally impatient o f Yoshida's complaints. In a le tte r 
dated August 6, 1949, the Japanese Prime Minister informed the 
Suprem e C om m ander th a t  " th e  in e p titu d e  o f ( th e )  
police,....dem onstrated during these past eventfu l months, is a 
source o f grave concern to  my government, w ith which, a fte r all.
T 63 In July 1949 Yoshida told the National Public Safety Commission (NPSC) to replace 
NRP chief Saitô Noboru on the grounds that he was not up to the Job. Realising that the 
PM wanted more control over policing, the NPSC rejected his demand.
164 Memo dated 1 5 /8 /4 9  (G-2 00262).
165 Inter-office memo, dated 1 5 /8 /4 9 ; To: Pulliam (G-2 00262).
166 1 4 /8 /4 9  (G-2 00262).
16/ Memo dated 1 9 /8 /4 9 ; To: Willoughby (G-2 00262).
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rests the ultim ate responsibility for public s e c u r i t y " J  Yoshida's 
principal complaints were as follows:
....the country's police power has been split up into numerous units, large
and small, each of which is independent, isolated and often helpless.
Moreover the entire system is detached from the govemment.
He requested MacArthur's assistance in "bring(ing) the police into 
closer liaison with government,...coordinat(ing) the various branches 
and un its , and...p lac(ing) them  under un ified co n tro l and 
d irection....for sw ift vigorous and e ffec tive  action". The Supreme 
Commander's r e p l y , 169 based on a report prepared by PSD, claimed 
tha t "the potential effectiveness of the Japanese police ha(d) been 
increased" by such measures as the loan of firearms and the 
provision o f m otor vehicles. MacArthur dismissed Yoshida's cla im  
tha t "the  failure o f coordination between the national and local 
police un its....(was) due to  the manner o f the ir organisation or 
definition of their powers as provided by the law...". The problem 
could best be resolved, he argued, by "the proper education o f the 
personalities involved", a process tha t was already underway. In 
other words, MacArthur stressed the importance o f working within 
the existing system rather than overturning it. Presumably, he was 
suspicious o f Yoshida's motives, and so was determined to  resist the 
pressure for recentralisation of the police.
By early 1950, however, MacArthur was considering "an expansion of 
police forces available to  p ro te c t Japan ....(from ) subversive 
a c tiv itie s  on a major scale p rio r to  te rm in a tio n  o f the  
O c c u p a t i o n " . !  1^0 The outbreak of the Korean War in June convinced the 
Supreme Commander tha t Japan's national security must be the 
priority. The hasty establishment o f the National Police Reserve, a 
m ilita ry  force under the operational con tro l o f the  national 
government, seemed to  foreshadow revision of the Police Law at the 
same time that it made it less necessary. MacArthur's replacement 
by Ridgway in April 1951, and the la tte r's  sta tem ent on 3 May 
authorizing the Japanese government to  review existing legislation.
168 NDL, GS(B) 02270.
169 Letter dated 8 /8 /4 9  [GS(B) 02270].
1^9 Report entitled "Evolution of a Democratic Police System" [NDL, GS(B) 01832].
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spe lt the end o f MP forces. On 24 May 1951 the House o f 
Representatives passed the government's police revision bill, which 
went into e ffect on 12 J u n e . i T h e  revised law perm itted  "tow ns 
and villages, but not cities, to  relinquish (the ir local police forces) 
and (place) them under the jurisdiction of the N R P " . ' ' ^ 2  By October 
1951 "a to ta l of 1,028 towns out of 1,314 had held plebiscites, all 
but four asking the N R P  to  assume c o n t r o l " . ' ' ^3 Local police forces, 
so cherished by the reformers within GHQ, were close to  extinction. 
In an editorial on 4 October, the A sahi captured the essential 
dilemma facing the Occupation - it warned against "the  evils 
accompanying concentration o f (police) power", but recognised the 
need to  "increase efficiency (to ) maintain public o r d e r " . i
1^1 Ibid.
T^2 Ibid.
^^3 H. E. Wildes, "The Postwar Japanese Police", p.667.
T Report entitled "Evolution of a Democratic Police System", p.34 [NDL, GS(B) 
0 1 8 3 2 ].
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CONCLUSION
For reasons touched on in the introduction, Japanese and Western 
historians of the Occupation have been reluctant to  examine the 
reform of the Japanese police during the American Occupation of 
Japan (1945-52). There is never more than passing reference to  the 
police, despite their being one of the principal targets o f the radical 
re form  agenda a rticu la ted  in the United S tates In itia l Post- 
Surrender Policy. Given the Occupation's com m itm ent to  free the 
Japanese people from  "res tric tions  on freedom o f thought, o f 
religion, o f assembly and of speech",^ it is extraordinary tha t nobody 
has assessed the degree to  which the wartime regime's principal 
instrument o f oppression was reformed during the Occupation. Every 
other area of Occupation reform has been examined in monographs by 
either Japanese or Western scholars, usually both. Even the Japanese 
film industry during the Occupation has a ttracted  more atten tion 
than the police . 2 This thesis begins to  close this gap in Occupation 
historiography. It has examined the professed aims o f police reform, 
and demonstrated tha t the Occupation's achievements fell far short 
of these markers. The reasons for this, it argues, relate to  the 
mechanics o f the Occupation itse lf and, more significantly, the 
resilience o f Japan's social forms and conventions. These are 
subjects th a t have been trea ted  briefly, if at all, in previous 
accounts. In short, this study breaks new ground, shedding light on 
vital areas of the Occupation tha t have until now hardly figured in 
histories o f this period.
It quickly became clear tha t this project necessitated a new kind of 
approach to  the Occupation, the essential reason being tha t the 
police occupied a unique position, unlike tha t o f any other Japanese 
institution. Obviously, it was not the only governmental agency that 
was allowed to  continue, largely unaffected - in the short term at 
least - by the American presence. The bureaucracy, fo r example, 
"survived the Occupation - minus a Home Ministry here, and a few
 ^ SCAPIN 93 (Civil Liberties Directive), dated 4 /1 0 /4 5 .
2 Whereas there is at least one monograph on this subject - eg. K. Hirano, Mr. Smith 
Goes to Tokvo: The Japanese Cinema Under the American Occupation. 1 945-52  - there 
are no more than a few articles on the Japanese police during this period.
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prewar personnel there - relatively u n s c a t h e d . . . ." .3  However, the 
police's omnipresence, its indispensability to  the Occupation, made 
it unique. It faced several ways at once, looking to  its traditional 
masters, both within the government and outside, for support and 
direction, at the same time as it received instructions, sometimes 
assistance, from American officials. The la tte r expected Japanese 
policemen to keep order, but also to  respect the people's newly-won 
civil liberties. There was tension between these two positions, the 
Occupation u ltim ately according social s tab ility  a higher p rio rity  
than emancipation.
The sh ift from reform enthusiasm to pragmatism - usually referred 
to  as the "reverse course" - clearly affected the police, although the 
tim e frame was rather d iffe ren t from th a t o f other institu tions. 
Indeed, structura l reorganisation was implemented at a time when 
earlier liberalizing measures - concerning labour, fo r example - 
were being reversed. The delay reflected the special position o f the 
police. It was too  im portant an agency to  be immediately and 
drastically overhauled. However, at the same time, its wartim e 
record dictated tha t it be "democratised" as soon as practicable. The 
moment came in late 1947, when members of Government Section, 
convinced that the police held the key to  lasting démocratisation in 
Japan, pushed through a policy o f drastic decentralisation tha t was 
hopelessly ill-adapted to  prevailing conditions. U ltim ately, the 
problems and reversals tha t attended police reform reflected the 
contradictions inherent in an indirect Occupation, together w ith the 
persistence o f traditional modi operand!. Clearly, these conclusions 
are intertwined. Each must be explored and related to  the notion o f a 
"reverse course", before a proper assessment can be made o f the 
implications of these findings for broader studies of the Occupation 
and postwar Japan.
3 C. Gluck, "Entangling Illusions - Japanese and American Views of the Occupation" in W. 
I. Cohen, ed.. New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations (Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1983 ) pp.188-9.
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A Two-Faced Occupation
One of the great paradoxes of the Occupation was the a ttem pt to  
bring about social and political transform ation through the agency 
o f the Japanese g o v e rn m e n t .^ The decision to  adopt a policy of 
remote control was a highly significant one, the origins o f which 
remain obscure. According to  Justin W illiams, a member o f 
Government Section, Foreign M inister Shigemitsu Mamoru m et 
MacArthur on 3 September, 1945, at Yokohama, and persuaded him to  
abandon plans fo r the establishment o f m ilita ry  governm ent.^ 
However, Theodore Cohen maintains tha t MacArthur was observing 
"the  formula worked out hurriedly a fte r the Potsdam Declaration 
tha t the Occupation was simply to  use the Japanese Government.
This is the more credible of the two accounts, and is backed up by a 
statem ent in the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy, which 
justifies indirect Occupation as a way o f saving scarce resources.^ 
MacArthur would have received this statem ent o f policy by the end 
o f August - it  was sent by radio on the 29th - and so would have 
been predisposed to  give up plans fo r d irect m ilitary government 
before he met Shigemitsu. Perhaps the official history should have 
the last word. It suggests tha t the decision to  work through the 
Japanese government was only tentative ly made in Washington, and 
tha t policy-makers were careful to  give the Supreme Commander 
some room for manoeuvre:^
Peaceful occupation of Japanese territory and satisfactory compliance 
with instructions issued to enforce the terms of surrender confirmed the 
feasibility o f exercising control through the existing machine o f the 
Japanese government (my italics). This policy for the exercise of control 
and the Supreme Commander's decision to issue all orders to the
Theodore Cohen maintains that "the great project was replete with paradox". He 
highlights the paradox of democratization "by means of that least democratic of 
institutions, the Army...." (Remaking Japan, p.6).
 ^ J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur (University of Georgia 
Press, Athens, 1979), p.5.
G Remaking Japan, p.44.
 ^ See Chapter 2, p.2.
8 This much is clear from the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy, which 
recommended that "the Supreme Commander....exercise his authority through Japanese 
governmental machinery and agencies... to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers 
United States objectives" (my italics).
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government at the SCAP level made conventional staff organisation plans 
for military government unsuitable.^
"Impressed by General Marshall with the urgent manpower shortage 
in the US A r m y " J 0  and unwilling to  divide Japan up into Occupation 
zones on the German model, MacArthur certainly saw the benefits of 
indirect rule. Thus, this vital resolution - " to  use the existing form 
o f government in Japan, not to  support i t ' ' i i  - was influenced above 
all by the desire to  lim it deployment o f American m ilitary personnel 
and to  save resources. Its implications fo r the radical reform  
programme outlined in the Initial Post-Surrender Policy were a 
secondary consideration.
In short, the principle o f a unitary Occupation was emphasized at 
the expense o f a direct one. Determined to  prevent its leading role 
being usurped by other Allied nations, particularly the Soviet Union, 
the United States trusted  in the Japanese government, naively 
believing tha t traditional agencies could be used as tools o f reform. 
The subtle distinction drawn between using and supporting these 
governmental agencies did not work in practice. This much is clear 
from the case o f the police, whose indispensability protected them 
from meaningful or lasting reform. With the abolition o f Japan's 
armed forces, the police became the sole guarantor o f domestic 
s tab ility , a role particularly d ifficu lt to  perform  in the face o f 
serious socio-econom ic d is location. For these reasons, the 
Occupation's a ttem pts at reform of the police - whether it was 
purging police personnel or circumscribing the ir activities - usually 
ended in failure or at best only partial success. Clearly, it  is 
d ifficu lt to  reform a police force when it is working at full stretch.
The charge tha t the Occupation was two-faced rests on a number of 
findings. Firstly, there was the discrepancy between radical policies 
and lim ited follow-through - the difference between dynamic policy 
form ation and sluggish, even passive, implementation. Related to
 ^ Historv of the Non-Mllitarv Activities of the Occupation of Japan. Monograph 2 
(Administration of the Occupation) pp.28-9.
T. Cohen, Remaking Japan. p.60.
 ^1 US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, Political Reorientation of Japan. Sept. 
1945 - Sept. 194 8 . p.347.
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th is  was the dual s truc tu re  o f the Occupation, the essential 
dualities being GHQ-Japanese government and, equally im portant, 
GHQ-military government. Secondly, there was the coexistence in 
the same organisation of liberals, in tent on promoting a New Deal 
for Japan, and conservatives, who winced at any reference to  radical 
change. These dualities direct our a tten tion  to  the Occupation's 
loose connections, its anomalies and contradictions. The Occupation 
was two-faced in the sense of promising so much, and delivering so 
l i t t l e .  12 A t the risk o f being cynical, it could even be portrayed as a 
giant confidence trick - on an institu tional rather than a personal 
level. Whilst the Occupation espoused noble causes, its mechanics or 
modus operand! often frustrated meaningful reform. The case of the 
Japanese police demonstrates the valid ity o f this claim with more 
force than that o f any other governmental agency.
The professed aim o f US policy was the establishm ent o f a 
"dem ocra tic " police system - th a t is to  say, one th a t was 
accountable and responsive to  the Japanese public, serving the 
nation in the widest possible sense. Traditionally, the activities o f 
the police had reflected the narrow, sectional in terests o f ruling 
politic ians and bureaucrats, a s itua tion anathema to  American 
reform ers. MacArthur encapsulated the la tte r 's  views when he 
declared tha t "police power in the preservation of law and order in a 
democratic society does not attain its maximum strength through 
oppressive controls imposed...from above, but rather does it find 
in fin ite ly greater strength in the relationship o f a servant of, and 
answerable d irec tly  to , the peop le ".13 D ecentra lisa tion  was 
considered the key to  démocratisation, but long before structura l 
re o rga n isa tio n  was a tte m p te d  re fo rm e rs  were try in g  to  
circumscribe the role of the police - to  rid the people o f those 
"oppressive controls". However, chaotic conditions dictated rigorous 
control and regulation, activities that could only be undertaken by 
the Japanese police. The Occupation faced a dilemma o f its own 
making - how to  stem the growth of the black market and eliminate 
such "superfluous" police functions as economic regulation. W ithout
12 In a variant of this, William Macmahon Ball, the British Commonwealth's outspoken 
representative in the Alllied Council for Japan, declared that "it's not that they do so 
little, but that they claim so much".
12 MacArthur's letter to Katayama, dated 1 6 /9 /4 7  (NDL, G-2 02750).
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the will or the manpower to  tackle the black economy, the 
Occupation had no choice but to  support the police in this regard. 
Such was the logic o f indirect Occupation.
Committed reformers in Government Section insisted on drastic 
decentralisation of the police system in 1948, because they were 
only too aware of the dangers of indirect Occupation. Fully cognisant 
o f support for the police in conservative circles, they feared tha t 
the trad itional police system would emerge from the Occupation 
unscathed unless radical, s truc tu ra l reform  was im plemented 
quickly and decisively. Government Section won the battle  but lost 
the war. It was easy for the Japanese government to  sabotage the 
new police system by failing to  provide resources in the firs t 
instance and then to  insist that feeble, uncoordinated police forces 
unnecessarily exposed Japan to  the  th re a t o f com m unist 
insurrection. Largely unaware of the subterfuge and susceptible to  
anti-communist propaganda, the relevant sections in GHQ perm itted 
or rather encouraged some backpedalling.
U ltim ate ly , G-2 won the tug o f war between liberals and 
conservatives over the police. Its victory, secured with the help o f 
the Japanese government, was inevitable in the con text o f an 
indirect Occupation. Volatile social conditions tha t delayed police 
reform in the firs t place eventually scuppered decentralisation. 
Latterly, o f course, it was the vivid spectre o f communism rather 
than a more general threat o f lawlessness that exercised American 
policy-makers. Commenting on the new police system , George 
Kennan, the arch itect o f "containm ent", contended th a t " it  was 
d ifficu lt to  imagine a setup more favourable and inviting from the 
standpoint of the prospects for a communist t a k e o v e r " . Thus began 
the shift in policy from grudging support to  confident endorsement 
o f the Japanese police. In the field, o f course, pragmatism rather 
than reform ing zeal had always prevailed. M ilitary governm ent 
officials depended on the police for the resolution of problems, and 
were not inclined to  counsel radical reform. The likes of Lieutenant 
Hartley and Captain Mooney were more concerned w ith  the
G. Kennan, Memoirs 1 9 2 5 -1 9 5 0  (Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston, Mass., 1967 ) 
p.390. Kennan briefly visited Japan in February/March 1948.
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appearance o f s tab ility  than anything else. Isolated and confined, 
they became enmeshed in a social system tha t was impervious to  
"ind irect" Occupation.
A Durable Social System
The enthusiasm and dedication of reformers in GHQ was not enough 
to  ensure social transformation in Japan. More than anything else, 
they had to  contend with the weight o f tradition, a burden hardly 
lightened by indirect rule. The resilience and durability o f social 
forms and patterns o f interaction have been illuminated by this 
study o f the conduct, behaviour and loyalties of the Japanese police 
during the Occupation. From the beginning o f the Meiji period the 
police had acted on behalf of the government rather than serving the 
interests o f the people. The la tte r were expected to  respect the 
police, whose brusque manner and arrogant demeanour suggested 
contem pt for their charges. Despite American e ffo rts  to  close the 
gap between the police and the people, the traditions o f the Meiji 
police prevailed over American prescriptions. Intent on forging an 
e ffec tive  instrum ent o f social contro l, the Meiji oligarchy had 
chosen to  establish a centra lly-contro lled, adm inistrative police, 
such as existed in Continental France. Ironically, th is model was 
more applicable to  an ind irect Occupation amidst chaotic economic 
cond itions than the Anglo-Am erican model favoured by the 
reformers: hence, the delay in structural reorganisation.
The harsh economic climate caused the police and others besides to  
fall back on traditional support networks. These served to  reinforce 
the very ties between the police and the establishment tha t the 
Occupation sought to  dissolve. Throughout the Occupation the police 
were contro lled  by an alliance o f politic ians, bureaucrats and 
criminal elements. The la tter constituted a "shadow government", a 
network o f extra-legal or illegal organisations tha t became known 
in American circles as the ovabun-kobun system. In fact, the term 
described a pseudo-familial relationship tha t pervaded Japanese 
socie ty and was as likely to  exist in leg itim ate  as criminal 
organisations. Justin Williams, a member o f Government Section, 
sketches in the background to the controversy:
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Kades....charged that there were mobs, gangs, and racketeers seeking to 
pressure and intimidate public officials. The root of the evil was thought 
to be the ovabun-kobun system. Deeply rooted in Japan's past, the 
system, in occupation parlance, suggested a boss-henchman relationship.
Makoto Matsukata, Government Section research analyst...., informed 
Kades...that an attempt to outlaw personal relationships between ovabun 
and kobun would be almost impossible.^ ^
Of course Matsukata was right and Kades' crusade soon ran out of 
s team . It was impossible, and perhaps misguided, to  a ttem pt to  
undermine "habits ingrained for hundreds o f years".i G
The natural inclination for the police to  look to  the ir traditional 
masters was reinforced by the la tte r's  ties to  prom inent black 
marketeers. This thesis has demonstrated the importance o f the 
black market as a lever for political control, as a support for the old 
regime. Those who appropriated the m ilitary 's huge stockpiles of 
food, clothing and other necessities controlled the police on both an 
individual and a corporate level. In a country where the boundary
between g ift-g iv in g  and bribery remains blurred, it  was not
surprising th a t public officia ls should succumb to  tem pta tion  in 
hard times. The Public Safety Division was more concerned about 
private subsidies or "contributions" to  police forces, which surely 
derived from the principle of collective security. H. E. Wildes noted 
th a t "co n trib u tio n s " had a long h istory, and were po ten tia lly
disruptive o f impartial law enforcement:
For many years various unofficial groups had voluntarily contributed for 
police expenses. Sometimes these "police supporters" or "crime 
prevention clubs" were innocent; more often their support covered 
bribery or protection of illicit interests.
The problem was compounded by the fragmentation o f the police 
system in 1948. Many small communities w ith litt le  more than 
5,000 inhabitants were forced to  fund their own police forces w ith 
revenue from theatre admissions and liquor sales. The funds raised 
from such sources were in most cases inadequate, forcing policemen 
to  depend more than ever on large donations from individuals and
J. Williams, Japan's Political Revolution, p.46.
 ^  ^ W. Macmahon Ball, Japan....Enemv or Allv? (Cassell, Melbourne, 1948) p.97. 
17 H. E. Wildes, Typhoon in Tokvo (Macmillan, New York, 1954) p.l 87.
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organisations with often questionable reputations. When PSD had 
begun to  investigate the system of contributions, they had expressed 
concern not only about generous donors being above the law, but also 
about the manner in which money was exacted from  ordinary 
Japanese.
The la tte r were supposed to  be the beneficiaries o f police reform. 
However, due to  the weight of trad ition and the economic lifeline 
thrown the old regime in the form of the m ilitary's stockpiles, the 
police did not trans fe r the ir loyalties to  the people as the 
Occupation intended. Despite MacArthur's concern with "the dignity 
o f the i n d i v i d u a l " , 18 the conduct o f the police showed little  regard 
for civil liberties. They continued to  serve the interests of a narrow 
establishment, harassing the consumers rather than the hoarders of 
"yami" goods. The debate in 1 949 over the legality o f spot checks of 
individuals' personal effects by the police, together with evidence 
o f con tinued neighbourhood surve illance, dem onstra te  th a t 
trad itiona l policing methods could not be eradicated by SCAP 
directives. The la tte r were no match for traditions stretching back 
more than 75 years.
Resisting Reform
This thesis contends tha t the Japanese police resisted reform, 
taking strength from deeply-rooted traditions and benefitting from 
the Occupation's decision to  use , and support, them. Longstanding 
social a ttitudes induced the police to  disregard the Occupation's 
exhortations concerning respect for civil liberties and restriction of 
the ir activ ities . They got away w ith it, principally because US 
policy was ambivalent, even contrad ictory, in the context o f an 
indirect Occupation. Police reform was always a "sensitive issue",19 
and was delayed as long as possible. If G-2 had had its way, the 
gradualist approach to  reform would have protected the police from 
disruptive change until the end of the Occupation. Of course, GS won
T G Letter to Katayama, dated 1 6 /9 /4 9  (NDL, G-2 02750).
19 R. B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur. Yoshida and Postwar Japan (University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1992) p.39.
296
the day, pushing through a radical programme tha t represented the 
New Dealers' last gasp before the "reverse course" set in.
The backpedalling on police reorganisation th a t occurred in the 
years tha t followed demonstrated the im practica lity o f the new 
police system, and, more importantly, the lack o f political will for 
it to  succeed. The Japanese government resisted GS's plan for 
decentralisation o f its police force, and, when it was imposed, 
sabotaged it. The strong ties between the government and the police 
were reinforced by an indirect Occupation th a t had eradicated 
Japan's m ilitary forces. Understandably, each worked hard to  serve 
the interests o f the other. Of course the "reverse course" o f police 
reform was not long in coming. George Kennan's anxieties were 
articulated in "the  central cold war statem ent o f NSC 13 / 2 " . 2 0  it 
"suggested tha t SCAP strengthen the Japanese police establishment 
by reinforcing and re-equipping the present forces and expanding the 
national police organisation" . 21
Ultimately, this thesis points up the lim itations o f the Occupation, 
the durability o f traditional forms and institu tions and the basic 
continuity between the prewar and postwar periods. It suggests that 
the aims o f US policy "could not be achieved through the 
instrum entality o f Japan's old g u a r d " . 22 The emphasis on continuity 
rather than change, on parallels between prewar and postwar Japan 
rather than disjuncture, is a pronounced historiographical trend, 
evident in the works o f Chalmers Johnson and John Dower. Whilst 
the form er has focused on the economic b u r e a u c r a c y , 23 the la tte r 
has drawn attention to  rearmament and "conservative h e g e m o n y " . 24
If such a key insitution as the Japanese police was not remade, 
despite the efforts of dedicated reformers, then surely we should be
20 C. Gluck, "Entangling Illusions....", p.204.
21 J. Williams, Japan’s Political Revolution. p.210.
22 T. A. Bisson, Prospects for Democracy in Japan (Macmillan, New York, 1949 ) 
p.l 30.
23 c. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy. 1925- 
75 (Tuttle, Tokyo, 1986).
24 J .  w. Dower, "Reform and Reconsolidation" in H. Wray and H. Conroy, eds., Japan 
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wary o f accounts th a t suggest tha t the Occupation ushered in 
democratic revolution. The Japanese police must be set within the 
c o n te x t o f " th e  survival o f individuals and organ isa tions, 
institu tiona l structures and patterns of authority, which had not 
been associated w ith genuinely democratic practices in the prewar 
p e r i o d " . 25 This thesis dem onstrates th a t the Occupation was 
incapable o f eradicating the trad itional police system - it  had 
neither the will nor resources to  attem pt such an ambitious reform. 
The end result is described by Walter Ames, "commended for the 
'nuanced' nature of his w o r k . . . " : 2 6
...the present police establishment in Japan is an imperfectly blended 
amalgam of the authoritarian, powerful and highly centralised prewar 
police system and the 'democratic' and decentralised postwar system. The 
prewar system was based on a....model of a national police force on a level 
above the people, and the postwar system was patterned after an American 
or British model of small-scale police forces on the same level with the 
people. The former is closer to the honne (reality) of the police system, 
and the latter is ultimately a mere tatemae (facade).
25 Ibid.
26 Frank Leishmann, "Under Western Eyes: Perspectives on Policing and Society in 
Japan", Policing and Societv. Vol.4 (1 9 94 ) p.36.
22 w. L. Ames, Police and Communitv in Japan (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1 981 ) p.21 5.
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